Cyprus, 1960-1974: internal developments

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Aims

This chapter aims to present the early history of the Republic of Cyprus. Created through a *sui generis* process (independence had not been among the objectives of the armed struggle and the rules governing its existence had been produced outside Cyprus), the new state was born and operated in a strange environment. The international stage (the Cold War was in full swing) was also an important factor in internal developments. All this together in the context of the events described in previous chapters created an unstable political scene. A number of challenges to the new state from home and abroad (and often simultaneously from both) came almost immediately to the fore. Structural weaknesses compounded the local problems. The efforts of the international community added another factor, sometimes stabilising, sometimes not.

After studying this chapter, students will be able to:

•   Have a general overview of the political history (including party formation and election history) of the Republic of Cyprus between its creation in 1960 and the Turkish invasion in 1974 (the latter is dealt with in a separate chapter);

•   Have examined the more important problems and challenges the new Republic faced and the way(s) by which it tried to overcome them;

•   Will be able to see the effects of these events for later developments;

•   Will be able to understand the efforts the international community made to solve the Cyprus problem.

Keywords

•   1960 Costitution of the Republic of Cyp.

•   Intercommunal clashes

•   UNFICYP

•   Acheson Plan

•   "National Front"

•   («Ευκταίο και εφικτό»)

•   Intercommunal talks

•   "13 points"

•   Turkish Cypriot enclaves

•   Πενταμερής Διάσκεψη

•   Kofinou incident

•   "Desired" and "Achievable" outcome

•   EOKA B

Introduction

When the Republic of Cyprus was formally created in August 1960, the future was certainly not cloudless. The last Governor himself had voice these concerns in his valedictory speech. As is obvious from even a casual reading of the Constitution, the new Republic of Cyprus had a difficult and somewhat irregular creation. The irregularities were mainly in three areas: (a) the way its constitution was devised (b) the philosophy behind the constitution (c) the incompatibility of the outcome of the anti-British struggle (independence) with the long-term aspirations of the Greek majority of the inhabitants of Cyprus (union with Greece) amounting to a limited legitimisation of the Constitution in the eyes of the majority community and an ambivalent attitude towards it for the Turkish Cypriots.

First meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers

In normal circumstances a democratic state's constitution is the result of the internal balance of political power and should reflect the values and choices prevalent in a given point in time. A constitution is normally agreed by the political parties represented in parliament and draws its inspiration from earlier forms of related constitutional texts (either produced locally or in other political entities). Rather than being the product of the interaction of the political and social forces in both the majority and the minority populations, the constitution was drafted by experts and agreed by the guarantor powers, each with different briefs. The overall framework within the experts had to work was indeed described by the Zurich and London Agreements.

Every Constitution includes checks and balances, to ensure fairness. The 1960 Constitution provided strong safeguards for the Turkish Cypriots who were elevated from the status of a minority to this of a constituent community and armed with the means to make sure that their rights (as defined in the Constitution) would be respected, even to the detriment of the functioning of the Republic itself: separate electoral rolls, separate state offices reserved for each community, separate vetoes for the leaders etc are some of the examples. Many in the Turkish Cypriot community saw the 1960 constitution and its provisions as the minimum they were entitled to. On the other hand, the checks and balances included (mainly to protect the minority community) were seen by many in the Greek Cypriot community as fetters, in a constitutional agreement that was imposed on the will of the majority. The constitutional 'fetters' imposed on the Greek Cypriot majority were not easy to bear. Multiple layers of checks and balances could be used to delay, hinder or stop decisions deemed to be harmful to the interests of each of the two largest communities. Hindrance and delaying tactics were a fertile breeding ground for frustration.

Fetters aside, the Greek Cypriot community also had to face a sense of failure, since independence had never been part of the demands of the anti-British struggle. Thus in the eyes of the Greek Cypriot community both the solution (independence) and the means to safeguard it (the Constitution) lacked the necessary legitimisation to make it immediately acceptable. Indeed, part of the Greek Cypriot

community believed that independence was only a stage on the road to Union with Greece. Given the beliefs and the dynamics of the recent past, this view was shared by at least part of the political elite of the community, both old and new.

Independent Cyprus was really a compromise solution between the opposing Greek Cypriot demand of *Enosis* (Union with Greece) and the Turkish Cypriot counter-demand of *Taksim* (division of the island between Greece and Turkey); despite the constitutional prohibition of both Union and Partition as options, independence was seen by many in both communities as a compromise, essentially a half way house. With the coming of independence, neither community abandoned its original aims. Both communities saw (and described) themselves as Greek or Turkish, and thus the policies of the respective motherlands (as well as local tensions) were also a factor in events in Cyprus.

Fracturing in the political field was also an issue. President Makarios was the undisputed political leader of the Greek community (and from independence onwards the easily recognisable public face of Cyprus. General Grivas, the undisputed EOKA leader had left Cyprus at the end of the anti-British struggle (but had naturally maintained an active interest in the developments on the island); the General's views often diverged from those of President Makarios.

At the lower level (in government, parliament and society at large), a very sizeable part of the new people in politics were former EOKA activists, a fact that gave them a ready-made support network and a measure of independence from state structures. The (often but not always) divergent views between President Makarios and General Grivas, allowed for a measure of fracturing among the former EOKA men (evident as early as the first presidential and parliamentary elections).

Fracturing was much less an issue in the Turkish Cypriot community. It was much smaller (under a fifth of the total population of Cyprus) and its political leadership had much closer relations with Turkey (which also exercised a closer control over it). Any dissenting voices were soon silenced and a greater degree of discipline imposed, leaving it was much less politically divided, at least openly.

Thus, attitudes on both sides of the divide were far from conducive to the compromises and trade-offs required to make any new state function effectively. It could therefore be argued that both sides used the early years of the Republic as a testing ground for some cooperation and for testing the new environment. On the other hand it is true to say that the Constitution included many features that encouraged division. All these were combined with the fears (real or perceived) created within the Turkish Cypriot minority by the exit of the British from the administration of the island; the aims and objectives of the respective motherlands (Greece and Turkey); and (for at least part of the Greek side) the quest for a solution that would radically alter the agreements on which the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus was laid. If one adds the (real or perceived) geostrategic value of Cyprus and the tensions and fault-lines caused by the Cold War, what emerges is a very complex picture. It is within this complex picture that the Republic of Cyprus was founded and invited to face the realities of the day during the period 1960 -1974.

The Constitution, the common state and the communities, 1960-1963

The early years (between the proclamation of independence in August 1960 and the breakdown of December 1963) is sometimes seen through rose-tinted glasses, as a golden period of bi-communal cooperation. However, one could argue (and research seems to indicate so) that there are alternative interpretations to this that appear better grounded on the historical facts of the case.

Among the problems of the new state was finding suitable **personnel**. The 1960 Constitution provided quotas (70% Greek Cypriots, 30% Turkish Cypriots; the quota was 60:40 for the Cyprus Army) for government positions. From the beginning, the filling of these positions was made a major issue, particularly since it was part of the spoils of power, with the generous salaries and the job security it offered. In some cases the educational requirements were low; filling the posts of soldier or even non-commissioned officer in the Cyprus Army should not have been difficult. However, some of the posts had to be filled by persons with educational or professional qualifications and these were not always available in the small Turkish Cypriot community. In addition, choice of personnel on the basis of ethnicity or religion was seen as creating inequalities. Delays to fill the posts (mainly for lack of suitable Turkish Cypriot candidates; 18% of the population had to provide personnel for 30% of government positions) caused staffing problems and considerable suspicion, the latter to the Turkish Cypriot community and leadership. What is more, the Turkish Cypriot side claimed that the quota had to be applied to all positions, including Committees and Councils, as well as to professional associations. Official Turkish Cypriot protests were voiced in the House of Representatives in December 1961 and this issue was mentioned, among others, to justify the negative Turkish Cypriot vote in the discussion for the 1961 Budget Law. The quota in public service staffing was not reached by the end of 1963 and the issue left pending, given the different views of the two sides.

There were also other dividing issues at hand. The London and Zurich Agreements had provided for **separate municipalities** for the Greek and Turkish Cypriot quarters of the major cities in Cyprus. Initially a British idea put forward during 1958, while the EOKA struggle was ongoing, the separate municipalities had been included in the agreements. However, the mixed-membership committee that had been created to set the municipal boundaries had failed to reach agreement. The Turkish Cypriots claimed for the Turkish municipalities areas that were of significant economic or strategic value despite the fact that the inhabitants were Greek Cypriots. *Ex post* interpretations attribute to the Turkish Cypriot side the strategic aim of creating, where possible, self-sustaining enclaves, with access to the sea or in control of main roads. Since the general philosophy of the constitution was against mixed institutions, Greek Cypriots refused to come under Turkish Cypriot municipal administration.

Compromise proposals submitted by President Makarios on 10 February 1961 were received favourably by Vice-President Kutchuk. However, a month later (on 10 March 1961) the Turkish Cypriot Members of the House of Representatives voted against the Law Regarding Taxation, essentially imposing a veto, since taxation legislation required separate majorities in the House for its adoption. The justification they put forward for their negative vote was not that they disagreed with

the contents of the taxation law, but mainly because the 70:30 staffing quota for Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots in public service had not yet been achieved. This move led President Makarios to refuse the legality of the existence of separate municipalities; in turn the Turkish Communal Assembly passed legislation founding separate municipal institutions. The Council of Ministers (where the Greek Cypriot members had the majority) annulled this legislation and the Turkish Communal Assembly took the issue to the High Court. In the end, both legal acts (the Turkish Assembly legislation and the act of the Council of Ministers) were declared void, leaving the issue unsolved.

The question of taxation has already been mentioned previously. In this (and in the separate majorities required for the passage of such legislation in Parliament) lies part of the blame for the decisions that led to the breakdown of the common state. Tax Laws and the Budget had to be agreed (otherwise the state would collapse) but the Turkish side used its constitutional position to block their passage, using it as a negotiating tool for concessions in other issues. On 1st April 1961, faced with a dead end, President Makarios transferred competence for taxation issues to the Greek Communal Chamber, calling income tax a 'personal contribution'. The High Court confirmed the legality of this move (the Chambers could levy contributions from the members of their Communities), and the Turkish Chamber followed suit. The issue was certainly very serious and President Makarios put it to Ismet Inonu, the President of the Republic of Turkey, in his visit at Ankara in November 1962. The answer he was given was that the question of the separate municipalities had to be solved first. It should be noted here that according to the available evidence, because of the disparity in population size and the difference in wealth between the two communities, settling of the issue of taxation would have significant advantages for the Turkish Cypriots: compromise proposals put forward in the course of the discussions offered 25% of the tax revenue to the Turkish community. In the overall climate of evolving crisis, the proposals were rejected.

The Cyprus Army was another bone of contention among the two communities. The 2000-strong army, with 60% (1200) Greek Cypriots and 40% (800) Turkish Cypriot, would be trained by Greek and Turkish officers seconded from the respective countries and staffed by Greek and Turkish Cypriot officers. It was lightly armed and of a mainly ceremonial nature (though defence and the maintenance of internal order in cases of trouble was in theory part of its remit). The Turkish Cypriot side was very much in favour of its creation and development, since it would solve the problem of unemployment among the Turkish Cypriots who had been recruited as auxiliaries in the anti-EOKA fighting. For President Makarios such an army was an expensive, unnecessary and unwanted luxury. Differences arose in relation to the character of the units to be formed. The Turkish side wanted it ethnically segregated from company level and down. The Greek side wanted an army of mixed units. A decision of the Council of Ministers in favour of the latter (in March 1961) was overturned by the Vice President but reaffirmed by the House in October 1961, at which point Dr. Kutchuk formally vetoed it. The issue of the Cyprus Army was brought up again in the discussion of the Budget at the end of 1961 and again in 1962; no solution was reached.

Makarios' 13 points

By 1963, the dysfunctional nature of the 1960 Constitution was evident and President Makarios was actively seeking a solution through constitutional changes that would alleviate the problems and allow the Republic to function effectively. Thus, the Guarantor Powers were sounded on this question (directly in the case of Britain and Greece, indirectly, through the British Embassy in Ankara in the case of Turkey). Ankara had always made clear that it objected to any constitutional change that would alter the balance struck in 1960. Greece also made its objections clear, with a letter that was sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Evaggelos Averof (who was also one of the architects of the London and Zurich agreements in the government of Constantinos Karamanlis). However, the Karamanlis government fell in June 1963, a period of instability followed and the elections of 7 November led to a Centre Union government under Georgios Papandreou. Papandreou had in the past openly declared his opposition to the London and Zurich agreements and the 1960 settlement. This and the support of Sir Arthur Clark, the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, led President Makarios to his 13 Points proposals. Often the responsibility of the British side for this initiative is stressed: Sir Arthur Clark was in favour of constitutional changes and cooperated with the Archbishop in the preparation of the drafts. However, the British side was divided, with the Foreign Office at best sceptical towards the chances of success of the initiative.

The first President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III

On 30 November 1963, the text under the title "Proposals for measures that aim towards facilitating the smooth functioning of the State and the removal of some of the causes of inter-communal friction" was submitted to the Turkish side. As the text's main thrust were the 13 proposed changes to the Constitution, it became known as 'Makarios' 13 Points'. It is correct to say that effort had been made to offer some compensation to the Turkish Cypriot community, but the main content of the text was proposing the abolition of some of the gains the latter had according to the Constitution. Among others, the proposals abolished the right of veto for both President and Vice President (point 1), separate majorities for some legislation in the House (point 5), separate municipalities, the right of Greeks and Turks to be judged by members of their respective communities (point 7), the limitation of quotas for members of the public service, police and army of the Republic to the proportion of the population (point 10) etc. It should again be stressed that the 13 Points were proposals (the President could initiate a discussion but could not constitutionally impose his or his community's wishes on the minority) bred from the paralysis caused by the dysfunctional elements embedded in the constitution. This dysfunctionality could perhaps be overcome by the close cooperation of both communities and the respective fatherlands. As we saw, bi-communal cooperation began to fail soon after independence. In Cyprus, frustration became the major influence on both communities. The 13 Points were seen as an attack on the constitutional privileges of the Turkish Cypriot community.

The Turkish side often presents this incident as justification for the events that followed. It should,

however, be borne in mind that the Constitution's character was ambivalent. It included both elements of a unitary state and others stressing its bi-communal nature. Given the choice, each community chose one of the elements. In the Cyprus tug of war, the Turks chose the state's bi-communal nature, possibly as a first step for future moves. An indication is the insistence of the Turkish side on a segregated army and separate municipalities and on their 30% share of the state structures. These would later be supplemented by claims of a third of the area of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots on the other hand chose to support the unitary character of the state, the democratic principle and the right of self determination. Each side rallied around different characteristics. The point of no return was probably the transformation of the political differences to an armed confrontation.

From the outbreak of inter-communal fighting (December 1963) to the end of 1967

On 21 December 1964, a Greek Cypriot police detachment tried to check the contents of a car with Turkish Cypriot passengers; an exchange of fire resulted where two Turkish Cypriots died. This was the pretext for the formal breakdown of the common state: most Turkish Cypriot state employees (the Vice President and Ministers included) abandoned their positions and the Turkish Cypriot community erected roadblocks and closed off the parts of the larger cities that it inhabited; similar developments were also to happen in the countryside, particularly where there were Turkish Cypriot groups of villages that could form a contiguous 'canton' (the word would be used later in connection with attempts to solve the Cyprus problem). Part of Nicosia with a number of Turkish Cypriot villages to its North, the walled city of Famagusta, the area around Tziaos (north east of Nicosia), part of the city of Pafos (the quarter of Moutalos), several groups of villages in the Pafos district, Lefka (close to Morphou), Kofinou (of 1967 fame), the strategically located medieval fortress of St. Hilarion (in the district of Kyrenia) and parts of Larnaca and Limassol, came under the control of the Turkish Cypriots and were closed off. A total of 39 areas in Cyprus (totalling approximately 6% of the area of Cyprus) thus remained outside the control of the Republic of Cyprus and generally inaccessible to the Greek Cypriots from the 1963 clashes until 1974. These areas were defended by Turkish Cypriot fighters and led by Turkish Army officers clandestinely sent from Turkey.

Turkish Cypriot enclaves

It should be noted that there were apparently prepared fixed fortifications along the 'borders' of the Turkish quarters; and preparations (military training, arms stashes and cooperation with Turkish officers in TURDYK – the Turkish Force in Cyprus and others seconded to the Cypriot Army, at the time still under formation) had apparently been prepared well in advance of the crisis. Thus the word pretext seems to be the most appropriate for the incident of 21 December 1963 that led to the separation of the two communities.

On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot community had also made its preparations, though both the scale and the plan (if indeed there was one) are still contested. Greek Cypriot groups had formed

in anticipation of an internal crisis or even an armed intervention from Turkey. Given the right of separate intervention of all three Guarantor Powers, the numerical inferiority of the Turkish Cypriots and the geographical proximity of Turkey to Cyprus, the latter was far from impossible to envisage. Small defence groups had been forming, sometimes in a quasi-spontaneous way, for some time; often part of the initiative is attributed to mid-ranking political figures, with close ties to higher ranking political personalities, such as Polycarpos Georgadjis, Vassos Lyssaridis and Nicos Sampson. By far the largest such organisation was EOK (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion- Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων) led by Polycarpos Georgadjis, the Minister of the Interior. This organisation aspired to bring under its control all individual groups (with some success); its strength is difficult to calculate, but a figure of approximately 5.000 appears close to the truth. Despite its numerical strength, the Greek Cypriot community had serious (according to the sources) deficiencies in arms and the training levels and discipline of the irregular bands were uneven.

Polycarpos Georgadjis and others are often attributed with the ownership of the so-called Akritas Plan; it is correct that a document signed by 'Akritas' (an alias for the unnamed leader; the original use of the term describes a type of frontier guard, defending the borders of the Byzantine Empire) does exist; however, this was much more a political document describing a way out of the developing political crisis in 1963 Cyprus, than a plan for the slaughter of the Turkish Cypriots (as sometimes claimed). A last question is what was the attitude of the Greek Cypriot community to this development. The answer is still unclear. The contents of the 'Akritas plan' seem to indicate a readiness to accept the separation: in the context of 1963, this is relatively easy to explain, given the circumstances of 1963. Independence was a compromise, unwanted by many. At the same time, considerable frustration and mutual distrust was bred by what was seen as the negative Turkish Cypriot attitude towards the functioning of the common state, the privileges accorded to the Turkish Cypriots by the Constitution, and the demands -seen by many Greek Cypriots as excessive- the latter community was making on the majority. In the context of an era where the democratic principle was accorded a hallowed place and self-determination was the byword of the day in all the colonial possessions, given the significant numerical preponderance of the Greek Cypriot community, what existed in Cyprus looked like an unreasonable fetter on the exercise of the right of self-determination of the majority population (and therefore Enosis). The rest was left to the extremist elements in both communities, who provided the pretexts, the responses and the necessary ingredient, violence, political and other.

The response of the international community was relatively swift, in part due to the existence on the island of a well organised armed force. Initially the British Army assumed the role of peacemaker and armistice-keeper. However, the early attempts to stabilise the situation, either by means of contacts between President Makarios and Vice-President Kutchuk, failed. An armistice on 25 December (in which both the British and the US ambassadors were involved) also failed. On 26 December, while Turkey was threatening intervention to protect its compatriots in Cyprus, an agreement was signed that provided for the "Green Line", the division of Nicosia into Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot sectors. The division has persisted to this day. British Army forces (the British Truce Force) interposed themselves among the opposing forces beginning on 27 December 1963, until the end of March 1964, when it was replaced by the multi-national United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). This force (still in existence) was also to become one of the most long-lived UN operations.

The result of the above was a curious and uneasy situation of neither war nor peace. The enclaves controlled by the (self-proclaimed, officially at end of 1968) 'Turkish Cypriot Administration' were further strengthened, both in fortifications and population. The latter was achieved by the transfer of Turkish Cypriots from mixed villages or from areas where the Turkish population was small and the villages difficult to defend. The enclaves ran a siege economy, funded mainly by Turkey. Movement in and out of them was controlled on both sides, but the Turkish Cypriots could leave them to work their fields and continue their activities. The Republic of Cyprus forces (initially irregular, semi-irregular until June 1964 and regular army from this point onwards) kept guard on the Turkish enclaves and imposed and enforced an embargo on trade with them (mainly materials that could be used for fortifications but also petrol, chemicals etc). However, the Republic continued for example to provide electricity (though no payments for its cost were made) and to pay pensions to the Turkish Cypriots; on a local level cooperation between producers did continue. At times, throughout the period to 1974, an outwardly peaceful facade did appear to exist. However, the regular threats of invasion from Turkey (in the summer of 1964 an invasion was averted only through a strongly worded letter from the US President Lyndon Johnson) and the lack of complete control of the armed forces on both sides meant there was always a possibility of a local flare-up.

Such flare ups did happen: between January and August 1964, battles took place, among others, in Agios Sozomenos (close to Nicosia), Limassol, Pafos, Mallia (in the Limassol District) and the Pentadaktylos Ragne. In August 1964, attempts by the Turkish Cypriots to enlarge an area under their control in the north west of Cyprus (in the area of Mansura-Kokkina, in Tylliria) resulted in full scale battles and a napalm bombardment of the area by the Turkish Air Force. This was far from unexpected: in March 1964, the Parliament of Turkey had empowered the government to invade Cyprus, even at the risk of causing a generalised Greek-Turkish war. As a result of these events (but probably also for other, politically motivated goals) the Greek government secretly decided to send to Cyprus additional military forces. In 1964, the Georgios Papandreou Government decided to send 2000 military personnel (additional to the Treaty-sanctioned 950-strong ELDYK force). Probably at the initiative of then Minister of Defence, Petros Garoufalias, the force quickly grew to division strength (approx. 10000 officers and men). This move was primarily an effort to bolster the defence of Cyprus against a projected (and often threatened) Turkish invasion. The presence of the Greek Division (ELDYK-M) had a deterrent value, was a strong morale-booster for the Greek Cypriots and significantly altered the balance of forces in Cyprus, attempting to minimise the strategic and tactical advantages of Turkey. It is, however, also possible that there was an element of assuming effective control of part of the events in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot National Guard (under formation since June 1964, eventually coming under the leadership of General Georgios Grivas, the military leader of the 1955-59 struggle against the British) had the enormous task of bringing under control all armed groups and organising the defence of the island. To this effect a Higher Military Command for the Defence of Cyprus was created, under whose command all the Greek division could, in the meantime, make sure no faux pas or deliberate provocation (political or military) threatened the internal peace in Cyprus and by extension, the peace in the wider eastern Mediterranean. The overall balance sheet of military forces in Cyprus in the mid-1960s was therefore not unimpressive: a Greek-Cypriot National Guard (strength: between 8000 and 11000) faced the Turkish Cypriot Fighters (conscripted

for 4 years and reaching a reported strength of approx. 11000); the treaty forces of ELDYK (Greek, strength 950) and TURDYK (Turkish, strength 650); the Greek Division (strength almost 10000); and between the two sides, 6000 UN forces spread all over the island. Cyprus was really a place d' armes, as initially envisaged by the British planners before its acquisition, in 1878. Unfortunately, these numbers would be exceeded once more in 1974.

The quasi-peace lasted until November 1967, when an incident again brought Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to the brink of war. Kofinou, a Turkish Cypriot enclave, was sited on a strategically important section controlling the main road between Nicosia and Limassol. Local provocations led to a prolonged crisis in the summer of 1967; an escalation, which in turn led to an operation by the National Guard to clear the enclave. The military part of the operation was a success; however the heavy loss of life on the Turkish Cypriot side (22 dead, against one on the Greek side) allowed Turkey to send an ultimatum demanding, among others, the removal of both General Grivas and the Greek Division from Cyprus and the disbandment of the National Guard. The international community (led by Britain and the US) put pressure on the Greek side to comply; General Grivas left on 19 November and the Greek Division followed in December 1967; the National Guard was not disbanded, as President Makarios insisted this could only be done as part of a general demilitarisation of Cyprus. By this time, the altered situation in Greece (where a military junta had taken control following a coup on 21 April 1967) and the developments in Cyprus also signpost an official change of policy as regards the 'ultimate goal' of the Greek Cypriot controlled government of Cyprus.

The Greek junta had from the start of its time in office shown unusual activism as regards the Cyprus Question. The colonels' belief was that they could have a quick success in direct negotiations with Turkey. They proved highly deluded, with limited understanding of both international and regional affairs. An attempt in December 1967 (a meeting on the Greek-Turkish border) ended in a fiasco. Nonetheless, the Junta did advance the theory of the 'Ethniko Kentro' (Athens, as the 'National Centre' of Hellenism should be given the main say regarding issues in Cyprus, as they could involve Greece into major international issues and even lead to war).

In Cyprus, the new developments led to President Makarios proclaiming a radical change in policy. In a public speech in January 1968 he declared that union with Greece would not cease to be the desired outcome for the Greek Cypriots (το ευκταίον); however, this goal was no longer achievable, and therefore the community should now concentrate on the achievable goal (το εφικτόν), i.e. retaining and strengthening the independent state. This new set of ideas, though it was realistic, would deepen the divisions within the Greek Cypriot community to the borders of an all out civil war.

A solution for the Cyprus Problem? International efforts, local application

The intervention of the international community to stop the violence was not limited to the creation and operation of UNIFICYP.

The London Conference was convened between 15 January and 10 February 1964; in its course the

British side proposed: an international peacekeeping force for Cyprus; the transfer of approx. 4.700 Greek Cypriots and 14.000 Turkish Cypriots, so as to limit the number of mixed villages; the creation of wider administrative areas for Greek- and Turkish Cypriot villages; and the replacement of the Presidential with a Parliamentary system of government. The rejection of the proposals by President Makarios led to a US initiative, the so-called Ball Plan. Named after the US Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, George Ball, the plan provided for a 10.000-strong NATO peacekeeping force (1.200 of them would be Americans) that would come to Cyprus for three months. During this time, the Guarantor Powers would undertake not to exercise their intervention rights (during this period Turkey was threatening invasion); the Commander of the NATO force would be getting his orders from a London-based committee of representatives from the countries that would contribute contingents to the force. A European mediator would in the meantime prepare proposals for a political solution.

President Makarios rejected the Ball Plan, opting instead for the establishment of a UN Peacekeeping force. The UN, following the Republic of Cyprus' appeal, UN Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964, which affirmed the sovereignty to the Republic of Cyprus and led to the formation of UNFICYP.

The next major initiative was the so-called Acheson Plans, submitted in the course of the summer of 1964. Once more a US initiative, the Acheson Plans came after the failure of the US to persuade Greece to negotiate directly with Turkey and were the result of the need to avert a threatened Greek-Turkish war over Cyprus. Such a war would cause major problems, and could lead to the collapse of the SE wing of the NATO Alliance. Operating from Geneva, Acheson worked closely with representatives of the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, focussing on a solution that both sides could interpret as needed: for the Greek side (including the Greek Cypriots) the solution had to be seen as bringing Enosis; for the Turkish side (including the Turkish Cypriots) it had to be seen as Partition – Double Enosis (i.e. union of parts of Cyprus with the respective motherlands). The general shape of the proposed solution would be for most of Cyprus going to Greece with a base (with sufficient area) given to Turkey. The trick was balancing the demands of the two sides as regards the size and the status of the Turkish base. The first plan provided for the cession of the Karpasia peninsula to Turkey as a sovereign base area and special semi-autonomy status for the Turkish Cypriots (in areas where they were the majority) and a Turkish administrative authority with responsibility for local matters in Greek majority areas. A special UN Commissioner would act as a further safeguard. This plan was rejected by the Greek government, which refused to accept the transfer of sovereignty to Turkey. A revised Acheson Plan where the Turkish base was given on a 50 year lease was rejected by both Greece and Turkey.

With the crisis continuing (August 1964 was the time of the Tylliria clashes and the Turkish Air Force bombardments), in September 1964 the UN Secretary-General U Thant, appointed the Galo Plaza, a former (1948-52) President of Ecuador as UN mediator in Cyprus. The Galo Plaza report in March 1965, reflected the position of the two sides in Cyprus, proposed negotiations between the sides to reach a solution and noted that the demands of the Turkish side for a federal solution -that would entail geographical separation of the communities- could not be applied in Cyprus, because of "the island-wide intermingling in normal times of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot populations" [Galo Plaza Report, para. 150].

The suggestion of the Galo Plaza Report for direct negotiations between the opposing sides in Cyprus was followed up in 168, resulting in the long drawn out (they lasted from 1968 until 1974) inter-communal negotiations. Initially involving representatives of the Greek- and Turkish Cypriots, they were later (from June 1972) enlarged to include constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey. The negotiations made some progress (particularly after they were enlarged), but the main stumbling block (the issue of municipal autonomy) proved hard to surmount. They were interrupted by the coup against President Makarios and the Turkish invasion that followed on 20 July 1974.

Persons, parties and elections, 1960-1974

As a new, post-colonial state, the new political scene in the Republic of Cyprus had its individual characteristics. Some were shared by other new states, others were particular to Cyprus. Parties in Cyprus throughout the period from 1960 up to 1974 were more in the form of groupings around individual figures. The only exception was the communist AKEL, the longest-living and best-organised political party in the pre-independence political scene. As it has failed to support the EOKA-led struggle, AKEL was initially a loser in the division of political power: it found itself in a quasi-wilderness in the transitional period leading to the proclamation of the Republic. Its consolation was the fact that the gentlemen's agreement between Karamanlis and Menderes concerning anti-communist action was never implemented in Cyprus, allowing it to function freely and participate fully in parliamentary and local politics; at the same time, its sister parties in both Greece and Turkey fare far worse.

The first **presidential** elections took place on 13 December 1959, just over 8 months before the formal establishment of the Republic. The candidates were Archbishop Makarios, Primate of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, Ethnarch and paramount political figure in the Greek Cypriot community. He was supported by a wide coalition of supporters under the name of EDMA (Ενιαίο Δημοκρατικό Μέτωπο Αναδημιουργίας- Unitary Democratic Regeneration Front), that had been formed in May 1959. He was opposed by the lawyer Ioannis Clerides (father to Glafkos Clerides, later President of the Republic). Clerides was supported by a coalition made up of AKEL and right-leaning groupings of anti-Makarios (and anti-independence) activists. Roughly two thirds of the vote (66,85%) went to Archbishop Makarios, with Clerides getting 33,15%; interestingly, Glafkos Clerides supported Makarios' candidacy against his father. Though AKEL quickly abandoned its ephemeral allies as early as the first parliamentary elections that followed, it was still viewed with some suspicion by the new political establishment, dominated as it was by former EOKA members and supporters. What the results showed was an early rift in the Greek Cypriot electorate, a rift that existed from the start of the Republic of Cyprus.

Since the electorate was divided according to ethnicity (Greek Cypriots elected the President, Turkish Cypriots the Vice-President) there was no question of joint tickets or electoral cooperation between the communities. In the Turkish Cypriot Community, only one candidate came forward, Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, who was proclaimed Vice President unopposed, without an election.

The first **parliamentary** elections took place two weeks before independence, on 30 July 1960. Three political parties contested the elections: the Patriotic Front (Πατριωτικό Μέτωπο), a pro-

Makarios grouping of personalities (Glafkos Clerides, Lellos Demetriades and Vassos Lyssarides were all members of the Front), the communist AKEL and three candidates running under the umbrella of the Pan-Cyprian Association of [EOKA] fighters; there were also 5 independent candidates. As the electoral system chosen was first-pass-the post, the Patriotic Front and AKEL formed an electoral pact whereby 30 (of 35) seats in Parliament were allocated to the former and the remaining 5 to the latter. This in effect meant that no other political group elected a candidate in the first Parliament. The Turkish Cypriot community (again voting from a separate electoral roll) elected 15 candidates, all from the Turkish National Party.

The next elections, both Presidential and Parliamentary, did not take place due to the irregular circumstances in Cyprus following the collapse of the common institutions in December 1963. Repeated postponements led to extensions in the President's as well as to the Parliament's term. Presidential elections took place in February 1968 with two candidates, President Makarios and the psychiatrist Takis Evdokas. The anti-Makarios forces were crushed, with Makarios getting 221.000 votes, or 95,45% of the total vote. There were allegations of wrongdoing by Makarios supporters (some of them most probably true) but the clear overall victory of the incumbent cannot be put into doubt. The next elections (the last before 1974) took place in February 1973; by this time Greek Cypriot politics were highly polarised; General Grivas (already at the head of EOKA B') called for abstention; no candidate other than Makarios came forward and he was elected unopposed.

Parliamentary elections delayed even longer: after 1960, elections took place on 5 July 1970 (almost a decade after the election of the first Parliament!). In the meantime, the political scene had altered radically. With the Patriotic Front long dissolved, in the period from May 1968 to February 1969, five new parties were formed. In May 1968, Takis Evdokas founded the Democratic National Party (Δημοκρατικό Εθνικό Κόμμα); it was the only party that officially opposed President Makarios. In February 1969, four parties came into existence withing a few days. On 5 February, Glafkos Clerides, Polycarpos Georkadjis and Tassos Papadopoulos founded the Unitary Party (Ενιαίο Κόμμα), aspiring to succeed the defunct Patriotic Front. The same day, Vassos Lyssaridis founded the United Democratic Centre Union (Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Ένωσις Κέντρου – EDEK). On 7 February Nicos Sampson founded the Progressive Party; and the next day Odysseas Ioannidis and Andreas Azinas announced the Proodeftiki Parataxi (Προοδευτική Παράταξη - Progressive Front). All except EDEK were rightist in character; the multitude of parties vying for the same shade of the electorate together with the electoral system (again first-past-the-post) meant that electoral pacts were encouraged: AKEL and EDEK formed one. The election results gave 15 seats to the Unitary Party, 9 seats to AKEL, 7 to the Proodeftiki Parataxi (an alliance of the party of the same name and Sampson's Progressive Party), 2 seats to EDEK and 2 to independents. It is, however, notable (and indicative of the atmosphere of the time) that the abstention rate was 24%: almost one in five voters chose not to vote.

Violence and counter-violence in the Republic

Violence breeds violence; and in the Greek Cypriot community, incidents of violence were present almost from the beginning. They were in part a result of the (inevitable) power vacuum left by the

handover of power from the British to the Cypriots. The new state had to be staffed (and the prime candidates were in the first instance the persons who had fought against the British in the 1955-59 struggle). However, in all levels (and, it should be noted, in both communities) changes, at times painful, had to be made. What is more, the political personnel in both communities had to learn from scratch the art of governance, now without the mediating influence of an external power. This unrestrained exercise of power was a heady wine.

Conditions in the Turkish Cypriot community cleared relatively early. Unity was effected by the extremists, using violence and even murder. On 26 April 1963, two journalists, both from the moderate Turkish Cypriot daily *Cumhurriyet*, were murdered. Ahmet Gurkan and Ayhan Hikmet were voices in favour of moderation, who had announced revelations in their paper of extremist actions. Their murder silenced them. Later on (in February 1973), the extremists' control was made even more evident by the ease by which Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, the long term leader of the Turkish Cypriot community was replaced in power by Raouf Denktash, (a prominent figure in the extremist camp).

In the Greek community the basic division had to do with the person of the President of the Republic and the issue of Enosis. Though the latter was a goal explicitly shared by all political forces (at least until early 1968), there were from the very start voices denouncing the Zurich agreements (and independence) and asking, with lesser or greater strength, for the quick realisation of Enosis. Therefore, moves that were seen (or could be interpreted) as 'delaying action' diverting from the quickest road to Enosis, bred suspicion of ulterior motives and in some cases violence. As President Makarios was the clear and (largely) uncontested master of both the political scene and the state apparatus, all attention (and suspicion, where there was) focussed on him and his supporters. On the other side, the anti-Makarios forces were essentially excluded from mainline politics (by means of the electoral system but also as a result of the close control of the state resources by the Government), leading to a polarisation of society and ultimately to violence. It should be noted that the above statements do not automatically accept the interpretations of actions either side advanced or the allegations levelled. It is a simple fact that societies in crisis do not always act (or think) rationally. And the Republic of Cyprus found itself in a long drawn out crisis almost from the beginning of its existence.

Signs of rifts within the Greek Community became evident in the first elections, even before independence. Attacks against journalists in April 1960 were certainly politically motivated, as were the murders, in 1961 of three prominent members of a pro-Grivas group, who were agitating for immediate actions to bring about Enosis. The inter-communal clashes had a unifying effect (the hatchet was buried for the duration) but the advent of the junta in Greece and the period of relative calm in Cyprus brought the divisions to the fore again.

The first attempt to destabilise President Makarios with the use of violence was in the spring of 1969, when an organisation calling itself Ethniko Metopo (Εθνικό Μέτωπο – National Front) was formed. Based mainly in Limassol, the National Front first issued proclamations targeting close associates of the President (among them Glafkos Clerides) and later by bombs placed at the houses or offices of the persons it had targeted. The National Front was made illegal on 28 August 1969 but on 23 May 1970 it staged an impressive raid, occupying unopposed the Central Police Station in Limassol (it almost

certainly had 'insider' assistance), disarming the police officers and driving away with a large amount of arms and ammunition. However, it fell prey to its own success: the perpetrators were quickly found and arrested, most arms were recovered and in the trial that followed 21 of its members were given prison sentences; all were set free shortly after, with a presidential pardon in January 1971.

Undoubtedly, the most significant actions of this period were an attempted murder and a murder. On 8 March 1970, President Makarios was due to go to the Monastery of Machairas, for the memorial service for Grigoris Afxentiou, a hero of the 1955-59 struggle. As there were reports that an ambush would be staged against his car on the way to Machairas, he chose to go by helicopter. The presidential helicopter lifted off from the courtyard of the Archbishopric in Nicosia, but an armed group had set an ambush on the roof of the Pancyprian Gymnasium, just opposite. They opened fire against the helicopter and hit it, but the pilot, Zacharias Papadogiannis, managed to lad it in a nearby vacant plot despite the fact he was seriously wounded. Makarios walked out of the helicopter unharmed. The perpetrators (some of whom were associates of Polycarpos Georkadjis) were arrested, tried and given prison sentences. Again they were set free with a presidential pardon.

The murder of Polycarpos Georkadjis that followed is probably the most notorious unsolved political murder in the history of post-independence Cyprus. Georkadjis had been Minister of the Interior (and probably the most influential person in Cyprus after Makarios himself) from 1960 until 2 November 1968. What led to his downfall was his involvement with Alexandros Panagoulis, an anti-junta Greek who had sought refuge in Cyprus, from where he had returned to Greece with a Cypriot passport that Georgkadjis had provided. On 13 August 1968, Panagoulis had attempted to assassinate Georgios Papadopoulos, then strongman of the Greek junta. The attempt failed, Panagoulis was arrested and his links with Cyprus (and Georkadjis) were revealed. A few months later, Makarios at the request of the junta asked Polycarpos Georkadjis to resign. This led to a deterioration of their relations, to such an extent that after the assassination attempt of March 1968, Makarios ordered a search of Georkadjis' house. A week after the attempt against Makarios, and after he had unsuccessfully tried to leave Cyprus, Polycarpos Georkadjis was murdered by persons unknown, in a quiet spot close to Nicosia, where he had gone for a meeting. The murder was never solved. While contemporary sources sometimes tried to lay the blame at the feet of persons close to Makarios, more recent accounts seem to point towards Dimitrios Papapostolou, a mainland Greek Special Forces officer and associate of Dimitrios Ioannidis, then Head of the notorious Greek Military Police and later strongman of the junta; according to some sources, Papapostolou may also have been involved in the attack against Makarios.

By far the greater challenge to President Makarios was the formation, on 26 October 1971, of EOKA B'. Formed by General Grivas and using in part personnel from the first EOKA, the organisation made itself known by means of proclamations. The name of the leader was its most important asset: Grivas had very considerable political capital both for his anti-British actions and later, during his tenure as military chief in Cyprus (1964-1967). He had arrived in Cyprus secretly, on 31 August 1971, and spent the first few months for the formation of EOKA B', securing arms and recruiting cadres. What followed were demonstrations in favour of Enosis and the direct action. Direct action included arms thefts (in particular a large arms stash was formed after a theft from a National Guard camp

in Trikomo), bombing campaigns (including one against the Limassol Central Police Station, when part of the station building was demolished) etc. In an impressive operation (timed to coincide with the end of the period for submitting candidacies for the Presidential election), on the night of 7-8 February 1973, EOKA B' members simultaneously occupied 21 police stations, disarmed the police and left with the arms and blew up three police stations. During the same period, EOKA B' abducted Christos Vakis, the Minister of the Interior (on 27 July 1973; he was released on 27 August) staged an unsuccessful attempt against President Makarios (on 7 October 1973, in the village of Agios Sergios, in the district of Famagusta). A plan for a coup that was drawn up was not put into effect.

An indication of the peculiar climate in Cyprus at the time is the fact that the activities of EOKA B' were publicly condemned by Georgios Papadopoulos, the junta leader on 27 August 1973, but the organisation itself was not declared illegal until April 1974, well after the death of Grivas (in January 1974).

Parallel to direct action there were some suggestions to politicise EOKA B'; though discussions took place among its members, they came to nothing; in any event, given the strength of pro-Makarios support in Cyprus (it is safe to say that Makarios never lost the support of the vast majority of Greek Cypriots), it is doubtful if politicisation would have had any success. An attempt to find a political solution to the crisis by means of a face to face meeting of Makarios and Grivas in Nicosia in March 1972 also came to nothing.

Efedriko men in operation

Given the strength of feeling on both sides of the rift and the fact that at least part of the police apparatus was apparently unreliable and taking into account the 'distancing' of the National Guard leadership from Makarios' government (the junta had already been assuming direct control of the Army), there was the problem of how to combat EOKA B'. The solution Makarios selected was the formation of the Police Tactical Reserve (Εφεδρική Τακτική Μονάς) better known as the "Efedriko" or "Epikouriko" (both terms indicate the 'reserve' element in the title of the unit). Staffed by hand picked Makarios loyalists and directly responsible to him, the Efedriko was several hundred men strong and took over the task of anti-EOKA B' operations. With a climate of latent civil war developing, atrocities of lesser or greater extent (ranging from car bombings to beatings of opponents to murders) were committed by both the loyalists (Makariakoi) and the pro-Grivas supporters (Grivikoi), the latter represented by the EOKA B activities, as described above. However, it is notable that both sides tried to limit the scope of their activities and avoid causing casualties. The total number of deaths attributed to EOKA B is probably under 15; the number of dead supporters of EOKA B' is probably even smaller than that. Cases taken to trial, ended with relatively light sentences. No death penalty was imposed even in cases of political murder trials. Those condemned for political crimes benefitted from presidential pardons three times between January 1971 and January 1973.

Probably the most traumatic action on the part of the Makarios government was the deep rifts caused

by the violence and counter-violence, as well as by the government purges of the public service, by which public employees suspected of anti-government activity (in some cases: anti-government feeling) were either denied promotion or in some cases fired, without given a fair trial or allowed to present their defence. Though at the time these actions were deemed necessary as part of the defence of the state against those seen to conspire against it, there is no doubt that the means employed put further stress on the society.

EOKA B strike against the Kokkinotrimithia police station (April 3rd 1973)

The same was true for another attempt to destabilise Makarios, the so-called ecclesiastical coup. On assumption of his duties as Head of State, Makarios had also retained his ecclesiastical office. On 2 March 1972, the three bishops holding the Metropolitan Sees of Pafos, Kitium and Kyrenia invited him to choose either one of the two offices (and thus either resign the Presidency or the Archbishop's position), quoting Canon Law. A war of opposing interpretations ensued, with no clear winner. The crisis spread causing a schism in the Orthodox Church of Cyprus: in places the local Christians were split between followers and opponents of Makarios, with either side attending a different church with different clergy, loyal to one or the other side. On 7 March 1973, the anti-Makarios metropolitans took the unprecedented step of deposing him from his post. In response to Makarios' request, on 14 July 1973, a Major Synod (composed of Heads of neighbouring Orthodox Churches) convened in Cyprus and in turn deposed the three metropolitans. Though swift action ended the crisis, the schism itself took much longer to heal.

On 27 January 1974, General Georgios Grivas died of an existing heart condition. The death of such a prominent figure could offer a way out of the crisis. The House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus that had earlier asked for the condemnation of the use of force, now passed a resolution declaring the deceased "worthy of his fatherland, Cyprus" («άξιον τέκνο της ιδιαιτέρας αυτού πατρίδος Κύπρου»). Two days later, the interim leader of EOKA B' announced the cessation of its activities.

Illogical as it may appear, Grivas' death resulted in a worsening of the situation. Grivas had been the undisputed leader of EOKA B'; with his authority gone, the organisation soon disintegrated in feuding groups. The interim leader was sidelined by Ioannidis (by then in full control of the Athens junta) and EOKA B' came under the complete control of Athens. In April 1974 it resumed its activity. Security Forces operations in the period up to the July coup, led to the capture of major figures in EOKA B and even of part of its archive. By July 1974, EOKA B was but a shadow of its former self and close to disbandment. It is indicative of this condition that the coup itself was planned and staged by National

Guard units, with minimal involvement of EOKA B (though its members did take part in activities after the coup had prevailed).

Denouement: the short road to Coup

The last crisis before the Coup took place in June 1974. The pretext for the crisis was the selection process for the reserve (warrant) officers of the National Guard. This was clearly a pretext: the main

Assassination attempt against President Makarios in Aghios Sergios (October 7th 1973)

issue was (and had long been) the question of control of the Army. Dimitrios Ioannidis, strongman of the Athens junta since 1973, wanted to keep the National Guard under his control and use it to exert pressure and even topple Makarios when the moment was ripe. To this effect he was using mainland Greek officers: as there were not enough Greek Cypriot officers, even for the lower ranks of the officer corps and as there were very few officers of suitable seniority for the higher ranks, mainland Greek officers staffed the majority of positions in the National Guard. Greek Cypriot warrant officers filled the slots of platoon leaders in the units. As these positions were sought after, both the political leadership in Cyprus and the National Guard Command (at this point: men selected by Ioannidis) wanted to keep the selection process for themselves. Generally only right-wing anti-Makarios conscripts would be selected for the warrant officer posts. The crisis developed into a direct clash between Ioannidis and Makarios, with the Government Spokesman in Cyprus levelling direct accusations that the Athens junta was directing EOKA B' activities. When President Makarios brought to the Council of Ministers a proposal to cut the national service period from 24 to 14 months, the clash became inevitable. It was clear that the proposal was aimed at cutting down the size of the National Guard, to a point where it would require far less officers; a smaller army would require far fewer officers from Greece and therefore the influence of the junta would diminish considerably. Of course, fewer men under arms also had security aspect: the strength of the National Guard would go down to approx. 5000 men, a number that according to some sources would be inadequate even for the task of manning the posts around the enclaves. However, at this point it seems this was the lesser danger.

The decision to limit the size of the National Guard was announced to Athens in a letter from Makarios to Gen. Phaidon Gizikis, at the time holding the post of 'President of the Republic of Greece'. The letter included a formal request for the recall to Greece of the mainland Greek officers of the National Guard. In an unprecedented move, the full text of the letter was also released to the press in Nicosia, on 6 July 1974. This move was designed to force the hand of the junta; it did so. The head-on clash that followed led to the coup that deposed President Makarios on 15 July 1974.

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