

Introduction to the History of Cyprus

Open University of Cyprus

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Preface

With the publication of the e-book at hand the Open University of Cyprus and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs celebrate the happy conclusion of the *Introduction to the History of Cyprus* project. The project began in 2009, when the University and the Ministry agreed it was expedient to create an academically demanding university module on the history of the island addressed to Cypriot expatriates. OUC's charge was to design the module according to international university standards, as well as to see to it that a group of leading experts on the field of ancient, medieval and modern history of Cyprus wrote specially-commissioned chapters, organised according to the principles and methodologies of Open and Distance Adult Learning, by means of which the module would be delivered. These chapters, as well as the electronic design and publication of this e-book, were generously funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The *Introduction to the History of Cyprus* module (IHC 05) was offered to a keen group of Greek Cypriot expatriates from around the world (mainly USA, Canada, UK, South Africa, Australia and Greece) during the academic year 2011-12. Its principal aim was to introduce the students to the history of Cyprus from ancient to modern times with special emphasis on the modern and contemporary period (1878 onwards). The module adopted a 'broad-brush' approach to the ancient, medieval and early modern times, leading to a more thorough and comprehensive examination of the period from the establishment of British rule in Cyprus to the 2004 Annan-plan, the subsequent plebiscite and the accession of Cyprus to the EU. The same balance is naturally kept in this e-book as well.

This volume, as its title indicates, is an introductory text to the History of Cyprus, with a declared intention to serve as the first step towards understanding the challenges and the complexities of the island's history. It does not aim to be the final word on the subject; neither does it assume the role of an all-encompassing work of reference. It does aim, however, to present an honest approach by a group of scholars (both established and younger ones), experts in their own field.

In the three years it took to reach this stage, this project incurred many debts, as people and institutions showered it with moral and material support. First and foremost, the University expresses gratitude to Mr. Stephanos Stephanou, Spokesman of the Cyprus Government, without whose constant encouragement and support this volume would not have materialised. The late Ambassador Stavros Epaminondas, Ambassador Antonis Toumazis and Mr. Stelios Georgiadis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also offered invaluable help and advice. Professors Antonis Tsakmakis and George Kazamias, Dr. Antonis K. Petrides and Mrs Elena Gregoriou formed the ad hoc Committee, who saw the project to fruition supported by Prof. Yiannis Ioannou. Mr. Stathis Mavrotheris and his IT staff (Christos Rodosthenous, Michalis Epiphaniou, Georgia Matheou and Petros Christoforou) did an excellent job in producing this e-book. Dr. Emmanouel Koumas taught the module for the first time with nerve and enthusiasm. He also assisted readily in the editing and the presentation of the book in its later stages.

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CHAPTER 01

Cyprus in Antiquity

P a n o s C h r i s t o d o u l o u

Introduction

The strategic location of Cyprus in the north-eastern corner of the Mediterranean Sea has always played a significant role in its history. At the crossroads between East and West, and facing the fertile valley of the Nile, the island in antiquity was in close proximity to the great civilizations of the Syro-Palestinian coast, while it was also linked to areas of the Aegean and Asia, through intense interactions and exchanges. As a consequence, Cyprus attracted the attention of several great Empires of the antiquity such as the Assyrians, the Persians, the Macedonians and the Romans. The control of the island – the third largest island in the Mediterranean basin after Sicily and Sardinia – was of a crucial importance for the political, economic and strategic interests of these major Empires.

Cyprus was exalted for its important geographical position, but mainly for its legendary wealth, already in antiquity. The Greek geographer Strabo (63BC – AD21) wrote in 23 BC:

« In fertility Cyprus is not inferior to any one of the islands, for it produces both good wine and good oil, and also a sufficient supply of grain for its own use. And at Tamassus there are abundant mines of copper, in which is found chalcantite and also the rust of copper, which latter is useful for its medicinal properties. Eratosthenes says that in ancient times the plains were thickly overgrown with forests, and therefore were covered with woods and not cultivated; that the mines helped a little against this, since the people would cut down the trees to burn the copper and the silver, and that the building of the fleets further helped, since the sea was now being navigated safely, that is, with naval forces, but that, because they could not thus prevail over the growth of the timber, they permitted anyone who wished, or was able, to cut out the timber and to keep the land thus cleared as his own property and exempt from taxes ».

Rich, fertile meadows, abundant fresh water, dense forests that covered the mountains of Troodos and the Kyrenia mountain range, olives, vines, fruit and nuts, figs, almonds and pistachios, carobs, pomegranates, palms and lotus, wild animals like moufflon, wild pig, fox, also domesticated animals like, pigs, goats, sheep, dogs and cats composed the Cypriot environment of the ancient times.

The ancient Cypriot environment was composed by rich, fertile meadows, abundant fresh water, and dense forests that covered the mountains of Troodos and the Kyrenia mountain range. The flora of the island was rich with products, such as olives, vines, fruit, figs, almonds and pistachios, carobs, pomegranates, palms and lotus. The fauna consisted of wild animals, such as the moufflon, wild pig, and the fox, while domesticated animals included pigs goats, sheep, and cats.

Ancient Cyprus was particularly famous for its copper resources. Due to the discovery and mining of copper ores the island became infamous for the production and trading of raw material and metal objects. The principal copper ores are on the north and northeast slopes of the Troodos mountains.

Periods	Date Range
Neolithic and Chalcolithic	8200-2500
Bronze Age	2500-1050
Early Cypriot	2400-2000
Middle Cypriot	2000-1700
Late Cypriot	1700-1050
Iron Age	
Cypro Geometric	1050-750
Cypro Archaic	750-480
Cypro Classical	480-310
Hellenistic	310-30
Roman	30-330

Prehistoric Cyprus

Aims

This section succinctly describes the characteristics of the period of Cypriot history known as the prehistoric period, all of which are based almost exclusively on archeological findings. The most widely accepted and valid theories concerning the islanders' way of life from 8000 to 750 BC are presented. There follows an examination of the changes which occurred in cultural, economic, political, and social areas, and especially the ones which led to the foundation of the Cypriot kingdoms, the main constitutional form encountered in Cyprus during the archaic and classical years.

After reading the first section the student should:

- Establish the chronological outlines of the following periods of prehistoric Cyprus:
- Neolithic age.
- Chalcolithic age.
- Bronze age.
- Describe the characteristics of each of the aforementioned periods.
- Recognise and comprehend the changes which led to the foundation of the Cypriot Kingdoms.

Neolithic Age

The first evidence of organised human life in Cyprus dates to 8000 B.C, which marks the beginning of the Neolithic period. The most renowned Neolithic settlement on the island, and one of the most important sites in the Mediterranean, is that of *Khirokitia*. Built on a hill near a river on the south end of the island, the settlement overlooks a wider area. Its location offered natural protection to its inhabitants while the fertile plain stretching south of the hill must have contributed to the further development of the settlement itself. Archaeological evidence points to the existence of a culturally and economically developed society. The origin of the Neolithic culture on the island is uncertain, although one hypothesis stresses the arrival of people from the opposite Syro-Palestinian coastland or from A. Minor, based on similarities in the archaeological assemblages. Another hypothesis underlines the importance of endogenous factors in the development of the Neolithic culture.



The Neolithic settlement of Chirokoitia

People lived in small circular buildings - the so-called *tholoi* - and buried their dead directly beneath their houses. Some of the burial customs, such as the position of the dead and the stone placed on the skull, bear similarities to customs encountered in other eastern areas. From the tools found at the site we can conclude that the inhabitants were familiar with agriculture and that they had tamed the sheep and the pig. Other evidence suggests that the inhabitants of *Khirokitia* were also

hunters and knew how to work stone and other materials. The Neolithic period is distinguished into two phases, the Aceramic and the Ceramic phase, both of which are attested in *Khirokitia*. As the name of the first phase suggests, it is characterised by the existence of stone vessels, while the Ceramic phase is distinguished by the use of clay and firing for the manufacture of ceramic vessels. The site of *Khirokitia*, therefore, represents an important technological development that occurred in the Neolithic period, associated with changes in food production and storage. Abundant vessels, tools, figurines and ornaments have been recovered from both phases, elucidating aspects of economy and ideology in the Neolithic culture. It seems possible that the settlement of *Khirokitia* had gone into decline by 5500 BC. Other important sites of the Neolithic period in Cyprus are *Kalavassos-Tenta* (Aceramic phase) and *Sotira*.

Chalcolithic Period

The Chalcolithic period is a period of important changes in the lives of the island's inhabitants. Ceramic findings indicate the existence of new cultural developments and the tendency to experiment, through the creation of new ceramic forms and the use of geometric motives and red tincture. The Red on White Ware is probably the most famous example of the pottery styles prevalent during this period. Artistic works of sculpture indicate the skills and sense of taste of the manufacturers. In particular, the abundance of cruciform figurines has led to the development of the idea concerning the worship of the goddess of fertility. An important settlement dating to this period is that of *Erimi*, on the south of Cyprus, which is comprised of large round habitations. Its inhabitants must have

enjoyed relatively high living standards, whereas at the same time there are indications of the first use of the metal which is to mark the economy – amongst other things – of the island for more than three thousand years. Copper is used to make the first copper tools, though more systematic use of the metal is not made until later, in the Late Bronze Age. The process of copper moulding was also still unknown during this period. Agriculture and cattle breeding are now sustained on a regular and intensive basis, while the great variety characterising the tools of this period manifests the imminent economic change. Major sites during the Chalcolithic period can be found at Lemba, Kissonerga and Souskiou. Many aspects of this period, however, are unknown, due to the limited archaeological record.



Cruciform figurine found in the village of Pomos (Cyprus Archaeological Museum)

Bronze Age (2500-1050)

The main characteristic of the Bronze Age is the remarkable cultural evolution of the island, which inevitably affected other aspects of life. It is first and foremost from this period that we start the historical dating of the exploitation of the rich copper deposits, which resulted in the emergence of urban centres with complex economic structures and the development of strong links and exchange networks between Cyprus and the greater area of the East Mediterranean, as well as the West.

The Bronze Age is distinguished into three periods, based on changes in material culture: the Early Bronze Age, also known as Early Cypriot (2400-2000), the Middle Bronze Age, also known as Middle Cypriot (2000-1700), and the Late Bronze Age or the Late Cypriot period (1700-1050) (see the chronological table, p.2). During the Late Bronze Age the situation changed dramatically with the appearance of at least one important urban state, that of Enkomi, which marks an important evolution in the prehistoric period of the island. The basic characteristics of each period are described below.

The Early Bronze Age (2400-2000) is not as rich in settlements and archaeological material as the Neolithic Period, with the exception of its last period. The mining of copper becomes more frequent, and is now systematically alloyed with tin, which was imported from abroad, resulting in the creation of bronze objects. The plethora of copper objects, such as weapons, tools and jewellery, indicates how well Cypriots could process the metal. On the other hand there are impressively rich findings in tombs, such as elaborately-shaped pots decorated with images, a result of the progress achieved in every aspect of life, evidenced throughout this period. Some of the finest examples of pottery were found in the great necropolis of Vounous near Bellapais, whereas one of the first copper mines was probably located near the village of Ambelikou. These rich findings are also a result of the indigenous population's ability to creatively assimilate elements imported from Asia Minor, the Syro-palestinian coastland and Minoan Crete. During this period the island emerged from its isolation and started establishing contacts and relations with populations of the afore-mentioned neighbouring areas.

During the **Middle Bronze Age (2000-1700)** the population was transferred from the centre of the island to the east and south coasts, a development brought about by the exploitation of copper ores and the increasing trade and exchanges with the East. The establishment of new urban centres, such

as Alambra, Episkopi and Kalopsidha is characteristic of this period. It is now confirmed

Occupation of the island was now complete, excepting the most mountainous regions. For the first time since the end of the Chalcolithic era we have a balanced view of Cypriote culture [...] The lighter side of life is suggested by a number of stones marked with shallow depressions arranged in spirals of parallel rows, and interpreted as Cypriote versions of Egyptian broad games. Although burial customs remained unchanged, the increase of weapons in the tombs towards the close of the period might indicate a degree of instability, further emphasized by the constructions of fortresses. All, with one exception, were less suited to repulse a foreign incursion than to promote internecine warfare. This state of affairs was probably caused by an increasing degree of rationalisation – suggested by differing pottery styles – coupled with an expanding population that put pressure on the dwindling supplies of arable land and water.

Cyprus BC – 7000 Years of History, Veronica Tatton – Brown, London, 1979, p. 29.

archaeologically that Cypriots extracted copper to cover their own needs, as well as to export it to areas such as Syria, Egypt and Palestine. Moreover, the identification of Cretan pottery in Cyprus during this period is indicative of commercial relations and exchanges with the West, which, as noted above, had slowly begun already in the Early Bronze Age. Besides, Cretans had established commercial relations with areas situated farther East, like the important centre of Ugarit. Cypriot ships carrying copper must have sailed throughout the Mediterranean, an assumption further corroborated by one of the greatest and most important findings of marine archaeology: the ancient wreck

discovered in 1982 between Cyprus and Rhodes of a ship carrying plates of copper, pottery, tools, weapons and silver and gold objects.

The **Late Bronze Age (1700-1050)** is one of the most important periods of ancient Cypriot history. Relations with the Aegean and Crete, as well as with the Mycenaeans are strengthened. Most importantly, the end of this period marks the progressive and long-term arrival of Greek populations from the Aegean and Peloponnesus.

The special relations between Cyprus and Crete in particular, resulted, by the end of 1600 B.C., in the development of the **Cypro-Minoan script**, which is probably connected to Linear A. Very little is known concerning this script, which like Linear A has not yet been deciphered. The Cypriot language of this era remains unknown, yet the writing has Aegean characteristics with eastern influences. Most inscriptions date back to the 14th and 13th centuries B.C. and mostly derive from the area of Enkomi. Judging by the locations in which the inscriptions were found, and their use in local societies, it becomes possible to assume that during the last period of the Late Bronze Age there was a linguistic unity in the island. This is also corroborated by the fact that most of the inscriptions come from the areas of Enkomi and Kalavassos-*Agios-Dimitrios*, two great urban and economic centres sustaining relations with all areas of the island as well as abroad. Major sites can be found also at Hala Sultan Tekke, Kition, Maroni, and Alassa.

It must, however, be noted that although the Cypro-Minoan script was connected to the central administration, just like Linear A and B were, it also involved people from different social spheres, unlike the two afore-mentioned scripts. This is made obvious by the frequent identification of symbols belonging to this script on objects of everyday use. Thus, one can safely assume that the Cypro-Minoan script reflects the needs of a homogenous population living on the island during the

Late Bronze Age and sharing more or less the same language. In fact, the appearance of the Cypro-Minoan script shortly before the end of the 12th century B.C., an important moment in Cypriot history marked by the arrival and settlement on the island of Greek-speaking populations, was probably not accidental.

From the inner harbour of Engomi copper was exported to the east and west (the copper ore having been brought from inland) an in one of her temples an 'Ingot god' (standing on a base in the form of a copper ingot) was worshipped. The town was fortified with 'cyclopean walls' towards 1200 BC and was adorned with spacious 'places' and temples built of ashlar blocks. A large part of the town has been uncovered revealing a unique town plan. The streets cross each other at right angles and connect the various gates of the city wall with one another.

Cyprus BC., - 7000 Years of History, Vasos Karageorghis in Veronica Tatton-Brown ed., London, 1979.

The trade of copper continued throughout the Late Bronze Age, and the great centres which had been developed at the end of the previous period (Enkomi, Kition, Hala Sultan Tekke, and Maroni) also became important economic centres. Copper definitely played a capital role in the development of these coastal urban centres. However, the existence on the island of an important dominant urban centre, which profited exclusively from copper deposits is not confirmed.

Enkomi however – which since 1600 must have systematically exported copper due to the existence of a commercial harbour – must have been a powerful urban state with a centralized administrative system dominating a wider area, at least until the end of the 14th century. However, during the last period of the **Late Bronze Age (1125/1100-1050)** other important urban states emerged. Archaeological evidence suggests that they also shared the same economic and political structure as Enkomi. Based on the above, it becomes clear that a central feature of the Late Bronze Age is the development of an early form of political organisation on the island, which led to the gradual emergence of a unified central administration

The dominance of the Mycenaean civilisation in the end of the 15th c. BC in the Mediterranean sea, following the emergence of Mycenae as a new cultural, economic, and political power in Greece, must be highlighted when studying the Late Cypriot Bronze Age. Cyprus' important geographical position played a crucial role in attracting the Mycenaeans, who traded with the entire Eastern Mediterranean region. However, the reason underlying the interest of the Mycenaeans in Cyprus must have been the island's abundance in copper and natural wealth. Indeed, their relations with Cypriot urban centres during the 14th and 13th centuries B.C. were particularly close. Based in Cyprus, the Mycenaeans could trade with areas of the East. Thus, the hypothesis that a small number of Mycenaean merchants and technicians were based on the island must not be ruled out. The considerable wealth of the finds from the tombs of Enkomi, and other cities, including Mycenaean pots, golden jewellery and other highly-valued objects indicates the prosperity enjoyed by Cyprus during this period. In reality, during the centuries under study the distance between Cyprus and the Aegean was eliminated due to the development of an extensive and well-organised commercial maritime network

As noted above, this period on the island was marked by the resettlement of Greek populations. Even though it is not possible to analyse in detail the conditions under which this phenomenon took place, it is vital to highlight certain important aspects which occurred during this period in the broader

region. The arrival of populations from Peloponnesus, and by far smaller numbers from the Aegean, is connected to the collapse of the palatial system of Mycenae, which occurred around 1200 B.C.

What we can be fairly certain of is that they chose to resettle in Cyprus and that they had the means to do so because they were intimately acquainted with the island, its culture and its economic potential; indeed, a principal motive for this colonial enterprise may have been commercial. They did not cross the seas unaware of the fact that they were coming upon a highly urban and affluent society. As we shall see, the specificity of the Cyprus colonization pattern, indeed its uniqueness, is that after cohabitation and integration with a highly civilized native population the newcomers did not succumb to acculturation. Instead they left on Cyprus an indelible proto-Greek identity of great antiquity.

Iacovou, M. 1999. 'The Greek Exodus to Cyprus: The Antiquity of Hellenism', in *Mediterranean Historical Review*, vol. 14, no. 2: 1-28.

This was followed by a period of unease in the whole of the Mediterranean, involving the transfer of populations and the abandonment of previously important urban centres. Even in Cyprus, settlements, such as Kalavassos-Ayios Dhimitrios, with powerful economic, social and political structures, were abandoned. Nevertheless, archaeological evidence does not corroborate the massive, dynamic and violent colonisation of Cyprus in the beginning of the 12th century, by Mycenaeans, nor does it link the changes which took place on the island, with the arrival of populations from the Aegean.

Furthermore, in areas such as Enkomi, Kition, and Palaipaphos, there is no evidence of activity proving the existence of Mycenaean colons, although these would have been the first places they must have settled in. Neither do we have the establishment of new urban centres, where new populations would settle, living apart from the indigenous population. It is, however, in the 12th century that the colonization of the island by Greek populations is placed, which was to continue well into the 11th century. It is a fact that the changes which occurred on the island only became apparent in the 11th century and the first half of the 10th; the nature of these changes lead us to believe that they were influenced by populations coming from Peloponnesus.

The settlement in Cyprus of new dynamic colons from the Greek area is now apparent in every aspect of human activity and mainly in the establishment of new urban centres. The changes which occurred during this period (1100 BC) are perhaps the result of the decision of the Greek population, supported by the arrival of the colons, to create new urban centres, such as Salamis and Kourion, or to obtain control of already existent ones, such as that of Palaepaphos, after a period of coexistence with the indigenous elements. The myths surrounding the foundation of these cities – as well as others, such as Soloi – are perhaps an echo of reality.

The predominance of this new element is also evident in the appearance of new burial customs, but also in the change that occurred in the very important domain of language and writing. The language spoken by the populations in question, the so-called **arcadocypriot** dialect, remained the primary language until the end of the classical period. More important is the fact that three centuries later, the greatest part of the island was Greek-speaking; this proves that the shifts which took place during the 11th century B.C., the destruction of the old political system and the founding of new centres of power, were so radical and so important as to define the fate of the island and its inhabitants for centuries to come.

The Geometric Period (1050-750)

From the 11th century, when the arcadocypriot dialect appears in writing, up to the 8th century when the new urban centres are formed and acquire the status of cities with complex institutions and monarchic regimes, the Greeks' cultural and linguistic domination of the island is indubitable. The appearance of a second ethnic group, that of the Phoenicians, is noteworthy. Having most probably come from the region of Tyr, their settlement on the island in the area of *Kition* is dated from the 9th century B.C. The Phoenicians subsequently penetrated to the interior of the island and settled in areas such as *Lapethos* and *Salamis*. Phoenicians and the largest group on the island, the Greeks, are to be the two dominant elements of population until the conquest of Cyprus by the Macedonians and the final prevailing of *common Greek*.

In the years preceding the archaic period, the Cypro-Geometric period (1050-750), settlements like Salamis, Kition, Curium, Palaipaphos, Lapithos, Idalion and Chytroi are to evolve into important cities, some of which will play a decisive role in the political, economical and cultural developments, that are to take place on the island during archaic and classical years.

Archaic and Classical Cyprus - The Age of Kingdoms (8th-4th c. B.C.)

Aims

The second section aim is the presentation of the primary characteristics of Archaic and Classical Cyprus. Reference is particularly made to written sources related to Cypriot kingship, whose main features are described. Moreover the political and economical relations between the island's cities and the great empires of the east, as well as the Aegean area and the city of Athens, are examined. Extensive reference is made to the life and action of the king of Salamis, Evagoras I, as well as to the process which ultimately led to the end of the Cypriot Kingdoms.

After studying the second section the student should:

- Be able to recognise the types of written sources related to ancient Cypriot history
- Have understood the particularities inherent in the island's political and cultural history as a result of the coexistence of two distinct ethnic groups, the Greeks and the Phoenicians.
- Be aware of the processes leading to the imposing and establishment of the Greek as official language, and those pertaining to the conservation of the Cypriot syllabary.
- Comprehend the nature of relations between Cypriots and the great empires of the East, the Assyrians and the Persians.
- Have adequately understood the reasons leading to the dissolving of the Cypriot Kingdoms.
- Know the main cultural achievements of the island's inhabitants during the Archaic and Classical Eras.

The period of **Archaic** (c. 750-475) and **Classical** years (c. 475-323) is one of the most important periods in Ancient Cypriot history, for two main reasons:

- a. The primary form of polity is shaped, that of kingship, which exists on the island from the 8th till the end of the 4th century B.C. (Archaic and Classical periods)
- b. We have the first written testimonies – mainly inscriptions – relating the names of Cypriot cities and their kings.

Sources and evidence of Cypriot Kingdoms

One of the greatest problems that the scholar of ancient Cypriot history faces is the lack of written sources. In particular, no text was written by a local Cypriot, a fact that prevents us from fully comprehending two very important elements: **a.** The political, economic and social situation of the island during the Archaic and Classical periods. **b.** How Cypriots, as a cultural entity, defined themselves in relation to the foreigners, the populations they were in contact with, and in relation to the empires that conquered the island throughout the centuries.

Almost all the texts containing references to the Archaic and Classical period of Cyprus come from the Greek area and, more specifically, Athens. They are dated to the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. but there are also written sources from later scholars of the Hellenistic and Roman period. They contain information on historical events regarding the Cypriot kingdoms, but also on the names of these kingdoms and their kings. Such works include the *Persian Wars* by Herodotus (480-425), the *Peloponnesian War* by Thucydides (460-400), the *Hellenics* by Xenophon (428-355), the *Cypriotes Orations* by Isocrates, the *Historical Library* by Diodorus Siculus (90-30), Plutarch (1st-2nd c. AD), Arrien (2nd c. AD), and extracts by less important writers.

The disadvantage of these sources is that their references to Cyprus are always directly related to political and military events taking place in the wider area of the Mediterranean, involving the Greeks. As a consequence, they do not enlighten us as to the structure of Cypriot kingdoms, their social organisation, their characteristic practices, their economic structures and cultural specificities. They moreover tell us very little about the most important aspect characterising the political system of Cyprus, which is the form of kingship. Nevertheless, despite this situation, one of the wisest men in Antiquity, Aristotle, wrote a work about this exact subject, entitled *On the Constitution of the Cypriotes*, which has unfortunately not been saved. Another lost work is that of Aristotle's pupil, Theophrastus, entitled *On the Cypriote Kingship*.

Thus, the sources giving us the most reliable information on the Cypriot kingdoms are the primary sources, which derive directly from archaeological sites: **inscriptions** (from Cyprus or elsewhere, concerning aspects of public and private life), **coins** (these are of capital importance for the comprehension of royal ideology and the economy), and all other **archaeological evidence** (e.g. temples, private and public buildings, burials, pottery, etc).

These are the constantly renewable sources on which we rely for the study of ancient Cypriot history,

as they are informative on cities and societies, the language and script, and the cultural character of each kingdom. Before examining the various kingdoms of the Archaic and Classical periods, and their kings respectively, let us first note some aspects of the Cypriot kingship.

Cypriot Kingship

Kingship, for the Greek world of the Classical years, was a regime evoking a very distant past. Greeks of the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. had knowledge of this regime, because of Homer, and therefore identified kingship with the heroic era of the Trojan War. In reality, however, they considered it obsolete. Let us not forget that most Greek cities during that time were either democratic or oligarchic. Kingship, as a system of government, had survived in the outskirts of the Greek world, mainly in Macedonia, Epirus and Cyprus. There is no doubt that from the early Archaic period until the end of the Cypriot cities (c. 306 BC), there was one and only term in use by Cypriots themselves to describe the highest power exercised by the leaders of cities: the Greek word **βασιλεύς (king)**, in cyprosyllabic reading *pa-si-le-wo-se*. This is confirmed by numerous inscriptions found in almost all known locations of ancient kingdoms and by other archaeological evidence, such as the bracelet bearing the name of king *Eteandros* (dated around the first half of the 7th century B.C.). It is noteworthy that even non-Greek kings, such as those of Amathous or Kition still used the term **βασιλεύς** to characterise their power. Phoenicians use the term *mlk*, whereas the **Esarchadon plate** (see below) bears an Assyrian term corresponding to that of king.

The truth is that little importance is given to the use of these terms or to their meaning in written sources and texts from the Greek world, largely due to the idea that monarchy was an obsolete political system. Thus, the terminology relating to this system in many cases was not clear. For example, Herodotus (5th BC) or Isocrates (4th BC) sometimes refer to Cypriot city leaders as *tyrants* and sometimes as *kings*; this does not however imply any sort of uncertainty concerning their official title. Furthermore, very little is known about the extent of the power bestowed upon the king. We can but make assumptions. It makes sense to assume that not all kingdoms had the same rules of government. Let us therefore succinctly point out the following general characteristics of Cypriot kingship:

All power was concentrated in the king's hands who in many cases also represented religious, political and magisterial power.

- As supreme state ruler, judge and legislator he defined justice and the law and his decisions must have been considered as laws themselves.
- He defined the city's external policy and in times of war led the army.
- He disposed of the sovereign right to grant to foreigners the privilege of settling on the kingdom's territory. As in the case of Evagoras I, these foreigners were mostly illustrious men from the Greek world who more often than not became part of the royal court. The Athenian general Konon settled at Salamis in 404 B.C., made a fortune, had a family and stayed until the end of his life.
- We know not the form of the tax system. Nevertheless Strabon reports that kings exempted from taxes certain private citizens who exploited the forest. The famous tablet of Idalion also informs us that the doctor Onasilos and his whole family were exempt from taxes because of valuable services they offered to the city in a difficult time.
- The king was most probably the richest person in the city. He owned the biggest share of land in the kingdom and in places possessing copper mines he must have been their sole operator.
- We know very little of the political hierarchy, and of the highest forms of statesmanship. It is possible that in some cities members of the royal family constituted a sort of council. From Aristotle's lost text *On the Constitution of the Cypriotes*, we have recovered the information according to which the males of the royal family were called *ἀνακτες* and the women *ἀνασσαις*. This probably indicates a certain particular position in the political hierarchy. We know that during his reign Evagoras kept his son Pnytagoras by his side, who must have bore the title of the prince (*αἰναξ*).
- The title was hereditary and corresponds to what Aristotle called *heroic Kingship* (Politics, 1285b4).

These general observations concerning the form of government of Cypriot kingdoms would greatly benefit from new archaeological material, mainly inscriptions, bearing new elements and information on the subject. It must also be stressed that Cypriot monarchy has nothing in common with eastern type despotism. This is confirmed by certain inscriptions informing us of the existence of some form of *demos*: Idalion is of course the most typical example. An inscription dated from the first half of the 5th century relates the following incident: after an attack upon the city by the Persians and the inhabitants of Kition, the doctor Onasilos tended to the wounded. The king and the *demos* then met to decide jointly how to honour the doctor's service. We thus learn of the existence of royal and private land, of the existence of a royal and public treasury and an overall form of "constitutional" monarchy.

This does not imply that all kingdoms were the same but the example of Idalion is so clear as to provoke speculation as to whether in other cities as well the king did not exercise his power in an arbitrary manner. Besides, a fragmentary early fifth century text from Curium has also been thought significant by virtue of its reference to *demos* and use of the word *themizein* as a hint that the king operated within the framework of law. In this case he is indenting to grant part of the royal land to the *damoteroi* of the city. The existence of a certain form of *demos* is also apparent on coins. One example amongst others is the king Nikodamos of Salamis who reigned in the second quarter of the 5th century and called himself *Ba(sileus) Selamini(on)*. This may be evidence that in outsiders' eyes it

was the city-attribution, not the royal name, which was important and needed to be comprehensible.


[...] The move to Cyprus was organised under recognized, regional leaders. Having been reinstated as local rulers after the Mycenaean wanax had been ousted, basileis from different parts of the Aegean world reached the island at the head of troops of highly specialized industrial craftsmen and contributed to the preservation of the island's major asset. This interpretation can at least explain a migration that did not cause chaos but rather boosted the island's industry (P. 328)

Iacovou, M. 2006, 'From the Mycenaean QA-SI-RE-U to the Cypriote PA-SI-LE-WO-SE: The basileus in the kingdoms of Cyprus', in *Ancient Greece from the Mycenaean palaces to the Age of Homer*, Deger-Jalkotzy, S. and I. Lemos (eds). Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh Leventis Studies 3: 315-335.

Examples such as these do not exist in eastern type kingships. It is pointless to deny the uniqueness and specificity of the Cypriot kingship, or to try and identify it with something completely different. It is perfectly clear that kingship was shaped and developed throughout the years and, despite the fact that the leaders of the Greek populations that founded kingship on the island came from Mycenae and the Aegean islands, we must not search for regimes identical to those they left behind; what they primarily tried to achieve was to adjust to the situation already existing on the

island, i.e. to the developed urban centres which systematically exploited copper and other rich natural resources. Based on the available evidence we can stress that the continuation and not the destruction of this already existent structure must have been their primary objective.

Population and language



Inscription in Cypro-syllabic script from Idalion (Cyprus Archaeological Museum)

Two major ethnic groups constituted the population of Cyprus during the Archaic and Classical periods: the Greeks and the Phoenicians. The timeline of their settlement on the island as well as their choice of domain have already been noted. The aim of this section is to briefly outline their principal characteristics, as evidenced in their language and script. The subject is certainly extremely complex and the absence of written sources makes the attempt to reach definite conclusions even more perilous.

Greek, and more specifically the arcadocypriot dialect, was the primary language spoken on the island during the Archaic and Classical periods. The great majority of the population used it even after the *common* Greek language became dominant in the Greek world (during the Hellenistic era), and was also used by the central authority of the island, the Ptolemies.

This was the dialect spoken by the settlers from Peloponnesus, who settled on the island during the 12th and 11th centuries after the collapse of the Mycenaean palatial system. Its script was syllabic, known as the **cypro-syllabic**, which remained in use, even if sparse, until the Hellenistic period. It is present on inscriptions and coins of kingdoms such as Paphos, Salamis, Kourion and Idalion. However, the inscription of Idalion remains the clearest and most impressive sample of the Cypro-syllabic script.

It is very intriguing to observe that the Greeks which colonized the island in the 12th century B.C. were not linguistically assimilated by the indigenous population, but managed to impose their own language. At the same time they adopted, developed and adapted to their own needs the script already existing on the island. The **Cypro-minoan script**, which was already in use in Cyprus before the arrival of the Greeks, was probably the basis for the creation of the new *cypro-syllabic* script, which was thus not imported from Peloponnesus but developed directly on the island. The presence of these new populations only makes itself apparent when they have succeeded in defining themselves through written and spoken word. This was a constantly evolving dynamic process. In fact, the gradual and in the end definitive and exclusive use of the arcado-cypriot dialect, as well as the use of the syllabary as a tool for writing the Greek language is proof of the power thrust behind the Greek settlement in Cyprus.

The earliest existing inscription justifying the derivation of the Arcado-cypriot dialect from the cypro-syllabic script belongs to the second half of the 11th century B.C. Even though, according to some scholars, this inscription found in Paphos is too ancient to be proof of the complete transfer from cypro-minoan to cypro-syllabic script, it bears in arcado-cypriot dialect the name *Οφέλτης*.

This allows us to draw two conclusions: **a.** That the Greeks who came to Cyprus did not have a script of their own and therefore adopted the one pre-existing on the island; **b.** That the Greeks in Cyprus had developed a script long before those of the wider Greek area, who only created the alphabet in the beginning of the 9th and into the 8th century.

Seen from the point of view of the Late Bronze age Aegean and the relevant material culture, the establishment of Greek-speaking people in Cyprus has to be dated after the collapse of the Mycenaean palace system, therefore after the thirteenth century. Seen from the point of view of the Late Bronze Age Cyprus, the Greek-speaking newcomers had to have merged with the literate stratum of the local population before the Cypro-Minoan system of writing had become obsolete, therefore no later than the twelfth century. Through these parameters the chronology of the Greek colonisation of Cyprus is largely confined to the twelfth century, though it is quite likely that it continued in the eleventh century. A third, though more nebulous, chronological indicator is suggested by the fact that as late as the end of the third century BC, the Arkado-Cypriot dialect is presented with a freedom of contamination which is remarkable. The absence of dialect contact with the other three main dialect-groups of historical Greece (West Greek, Aiolic and Attic Ionic), could be explained if the human carriers of the 'proto-cypriot' dialect had settled in Cyprus – where they were linguistically isolated from the other dialects – by, or before, the end of the Late Bronze Age.

Iacovou, M. 2006. 'Greeks', 'Phoenicians' and 'Eteocypriots' Ethnic identities in the Cypriote Kingdoms, in *Sweet Land...: Cyprus through the Ages*, Chrysostomides, J. and Ch. Dendrinos (eds). Porphyrogenitus: Camberley: 27-59.

It must however be noted that during the 7th and 6th centuries there is a more systematic, even if sporadic, use of the Greek alphabet. During the 5th century it is used in parallel to the cypro-syllabic script, to reproduce the same language, Greek. Very few inscriptions are *bilingual*. They are related to the first king who systematically used the Greek alphabet, Evagoras I (412-374 BC) as evidenced in the coins he issued (?). But even Evagoras I was not yet in a position to completely and definitely replace the Cypriot syllabary. Let us not forget that the script in question must have been directly linked to royal authority and it would have been extremely innovating and risky for a king to suppress it abruptly.

The Phoenicians, who settled in Kition at the end of the 10th and the beginning of the 9th century,

were the second linguistic group of the island. As they brought with them their own developed alphabetic system, they did not adopt the cypro-syllabic script then in use by the Greeks. This also explains why the Greeks of Cyprus did not use the Phoenician alphabet: they had already, during the previous years, become attached to the cypro-syllabic script.

A plethora of inscriptions found at Kition confirms the existence of the Phoenician language and writing in this kingdom, as opposed to the small number of inscriptions in the cypro-syllabic script. This indicates a linguistic differentiation between Phoenicians and Greeks, which is visible during the Archaic period and even more so during the Classical period – mostly after 500 B.C. – when Kition became more powerful. The royal authority in Kition is haste to stress its linguistic identity, for political reasons, against its two great rivals, Salamis and Paphos.

Phoenician inscriptions disappear from Cyprus after the island's conquest by Ptoleme I Soter (294). The last known inscription dates to the beginning of the 3rd century B.C. This also signals the gradual disappearance of the Phoenician language. The hellenisation of the Phoenicians of Cyprus and the Mediterranean started taking place in the middle of the 4th century and was completed during the Hellenistic period.

Apart from the afore-mentioned population groups, a third one existed on the island, the so-called "Eteocypriots", which concentrated around the area of Amathous. The Eteocypriots were an indigenous population, evidence for which derives from a number of syllabic inscriptions bearing an unknown language, yet to be deciphered. It could be a language retaining a great number of pre-Greek elements. However, during the 4th century, Androklis, the last king of Amathous, used bilingual texts. There are inscriptions bearing both the unknown syllabic script and the Greek alphabetic writing.

It is very interesting to observe that there exists no Phoenician or Greek inscription mentioning the third population group or defining it ethnically. On the Idalion inscription, for example, which relates the attack on the city to the Persians and Phoenicians from Kition, these are mentioned as « Medes and Kitians », without specifying the fact that the latter are Phoenicians. More than half a century later, the king of Kition Milkyaton, after he successfully fought back an attack by Evagoras I, built a monument on which he celebrated – in Phoenician writing of course – his victory over Evagoras and his allies the Paphians. The Phoenician king does not use the term "Greeks" to define his attackers, since, in his eyes, they are first and foremost political rivals. The gap between them was not due to ethnic differences – even though these affected their relations to an extent – but to a political and military rivalry over the control of economically important areas.

Herodotus makes the following observation when describing the population of the island:

Herodotus, Persians Wars, 7, 90, 5:

These are their tribes [of the Cypriotes]: some are from Salamis and Athens, some from Arcadia, some from Cythnus, some from Phoenice, and some from Ethiopia, as the Cyprians themselves say.

Trans. By A. D. Godley. Cambridge. Harvard University Press. 1920.

Even though the Greek historian recognises the ethnic origin of Cypriotes, he nonetheless makes

it clear that this information comes from Cypriots themselves. Both of the two latter inscriptions mentioned earlier confirm this point of view, related by Herodotus.

Having discussed the basic issues relating to the Cypriot kingship, language and composition of population during the Archaic period the next section will focus on the names of Cypriot kings and kingdoms, as revealed by the most important primary and secondary sources.

The Assyrian Royal Inscriptions

Assyrian inscriptions are of capital importance for the study and analysis of evidence of independent Cypriot cities during the archaic period. The famous Stele of Sargon II, dated from 709/7 B.C. we are informed that Cyprus came under Assyrian rule at the end of the 8th century B.C.

« Seven kings of the land of Ia', a district [of Iad]nana, which [is situated] at seven day's journey in the midst of the sea of the setting sun [...] they heard from the midst of the sea of the deeds that I performed in Chaldaeia and the Hatti-land, and their hearts beat fast; their tribute: gold, silver, vessels of ebony, boxwood, the treasure of their land, into Babylon to my presence, they brought and they kissed my feet.....» [This is a short extract from the source]

**The Stele of Sargon II, found in the Larnaca area,
Cyprus, Berlin, Vorderasiatisches, Museum.**

This information is extremely important as it helps us formulate three conclusions:

- a. The rise of the Neo-Assyrian Empire during the 7th century B.C. had political and economical repercussions on the island;
- b. The island was divided in seven cities, each ruled by a king;
- c. These cities were considered part of the Greek world, for the term *Iatnana* was used by Assyrians to name Greeks of the Aegean and Asia Minor. The term signifies “the island of the Danaans” and suggests that Assyrian kings considered Cyprus as part of the Greek world. This signifies that between the arrival of Greeks on the island and their submission to Sargon II – approximately four centuries – the island had acquired a Greek character. This is also confirmed by another equally impressive archaeological finding, a royal inscription, again from the Assyrian empire. It is the first written testimony of the existence, the number and the names of Cypriot kingdoms. It is the famous prism of **Esarhaddon** (673/2 BC), which bears the names of ten cities-kingdoms and their kings:

Kingdom	King
Idalion	Akestor
Chytroi	Phylagoras
Salamis	Kisu ή Qish
Paphos	Eteandros
Soloi	Aratos ?
Curium	Damasos
Tamassos	Admitos ?
Qartihadast	Damusi ή D'm's
Ledra	Onasagoras
Nuria	Bususu

The importance of the prism of Esarhaddon is amplified by the fact that it allows us to define its date as the terminus ante quem of the timeline of the foundation of the locations which are to become the centres of the archaic and classical kingdoms. We thus know that in the beginning of the 7th century B.C. ten kingdoms existed in Cyprus, seven of which seemed to have Greek kings. This must have been the greatest number of kingdoms that ever existed on the island.

On a pot dating from the same period or a little later, as the prism of Esarhaddon, we learn the name of a king of Paphos:

Ακέστορο (ς) τω Πάφω βασιληΦος
[Dedication] of Akestor, the king of Paphos

Therefore, from the 8th century B.C. inscriptions from abroad and archaeological evidence from Cyprus confirm the existence of Greek royal dynasties in the island's cities. In the middle of the 5th century B.C. Herodotus offers another piece of important information concerning Cypriot kingdoms, by naming four kingdoms and five kings:

Kingdom	King
Salamis	Euelthon Gorgos Onesilos
Soloi	Philokypros Aristokypros
Curium	Stasanor
Amathus	

There were undoubtedly other kingdoms on the island at the time, but Herodotus – whose narration concerning Cyprus is somewhat problematic – was either not aware of their existence or was not interested in mentioning them. It is almost certain that during that period other cities-kingdoms included Paphos, Idalion, Kition, Lapithos and Marion.

Other sources, such as coins, also give us the names of kings. Let us mention one characteristic example, that of **Euelthon** which also confirms Herodotus' narrative. Euelthon was in fact the first

king in Cyprus to strike silver coins. The number of Cypriot kingdoms will surely fluctuate until their final collapse at the end of the 4th century B.C. The number of Cypriot kingdoms must have fluctuated until their final collapse at the end of the 4th century B.C. What is certain, according to Diodorus Siculus, is that when Alexander, and subsequently his Successors, established themselves in the eastern Mediterranean (332-306), there existed seven kingdoms in Cyprus (the ancient writer also names five of the kings):

c. 540-520
 Inscr., E • u • ve • le • to • ne or E • u • ve • le • to • to • se (Ευφελθων, Ευφελθον-τος)

Kingdom	King
Salamis	Nicocreon
Paphos	Nicocles
Kition	Pumayyaton
Marion	Stasioikos
Lapithos	Praxippos
Soloi	(Stasicrates)
Amathus	(Androcles)

In conclusion, Assyrian inscriptions, Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, and the archaeological material constitute the main sources concerning Cypriot kingdoms. However it must be noted that inscriptions and coins are by far more trustworthy than texts, for they are constantly enriched and supported by new archaeological evidences.

Archaic Cyprus

• Cyprus and Assyria

Sargon II (721-705 BC) is the king who orchestrated the rebirth of the Assyrian empire and the creation of a great and powerful state stretching from the depths of Asia to the Syro-Palestinian coast.

The Neo-Assyrian Empire
(824-612)

Important Kings:

Sargon II 721-705 BC

Sennacherib 705-681 BC

Esarhaddon 681-669 BC

It appears that in 709/7 the Cypriot kings wilfully submitted to the rule of Sargon II. Were it not so there would have been some testimony of an Assyrian military operation on the island. Furthermore, the only archaeological evidence in Cyprus related to the Assyrian rule, the plate of Sargon II, has no mention of Cypriot kingdoms or their accession in the empire's administrative regions. We can thus assume that they remained *autonomous* as cities and paid a yearly tribute to Assyrian kings.

The relations between kingdoms and central command were probably economy-based. In reality the island's geographical position facilitated the commercial connection of the Assyrian empire and areas of the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean.

This must have been the Assyrian kings' chief claim, who were probably indifferent to the island's natural resources, copper and timber. It is sensible to assume that the period in question was crucial for the definitive configuration of the economical structures within Cypriot kingdoms, which must have profited from the fact that, for the Assyrians, they were a bridge connecting them to the wider area of the Mediterranean. The end of Assyrian rule in Cyprus is dated 612 B.C., when the Medes destroyed the Assyrian Empire.

The period of time between the fall of Assyrian domination and the dynamic appearance of the Persian Empire (545) was one of great development and prosperity for the kingdom of Salamis, especially during the reign of Euelthon (c. 560).

Herodotus, Persian Wars, 4.162.8

Now Salamis at this time was ruled by Euelthon, who dedicated that marvellous censer at Delphi which stands in the treasury of the Corinthians.

Trans. by A. D. Godley. Cambridge. Harvard University Press. 1920

Besides the fact that he was the first king to strike coins, an indication that he had reached a high level of organisation and economy, Euelthon had achieved a panhellenic presence in sanctuaries such as Delphi. Cypriot kings entertained relations not only with the East but with

the Greek world as well.

• The Cypriot Kingdoms under the Persian Empire

Cyrus II The Great, the man who created perhaps the largest state of ancient years, founded the Persian Empire. It stretched from the depths of Asia to the coast of Palestine, while in 545 took over the Greek cities of Asia Minor. That is probably the time when Cypriot kingdoms also passed under Persian rule. It is however a fact that two decades later, in 525, Cypriot kings participated with their fleet in **Cambyses'** successful campaign in Egypt. During the period in question there must have existed 9 kingdoms on the island.

Let us ponder upon the Cypriot kingdoms' status when they came under Persian rule. It is almost certain that Cypriot cities remained autonomous, that is they continued to function according to their proper laws and institutions, retaining or upgrading existing economic structures and instating cultural bonds with areas of their choice. Xenophon's statement that Cypriot kingdoms were part of a Persian administrative province, a satrapy, does not seem to reflect reality. There is in fact no mention of a Persian commander permanently residing on the island, and the intervention of a Satrap in the kingdoms' interior affairs is extremely rare, and only occurs when the Great King's interests are at stake.

As for the economic autonomy of the kingdoms, this is confirmed by the continuous issuing of their proper coin throughout the duration of Persian rule. This ideologically symbolised the kingdoms' freedom to define themselves. The coin was a powerful and successful way of promoting royal ideology, for the symbols it bore along with the king's name were a statement of his uniqueness. Of course the autonomy enjoyed by Cypriot kingdoms was paid for through the respect of certain important obligations. These included: **a.** The participation of their powerful fleet in the Persian campaigns, thus forming, with Phoenician boats, an important part of the Persian fleet; **b.** The payment of a yearly tax to the Great King.

• The Ionian Revolt

In 500 B.C. the Greek cities of Ionia were increasingly dissatisfied with Persian intervention in their affairs, interventions resulting in the support of tyrannical regimes that served the interests of the Great King. They thus decided to revolt. The revolt soon spread to the greater part of Asia Minor, and in 499 Sardes was set on fire, urging other cities and areas to join the uprising, amongst them some cities-kingdoms in Cyprus.

Herodotus is our main source for the facts in question. However his narrative is extremely problematic and does not, unfortunately, give a clear image of the events. According to Herodotus, Onesilos, brother of the king of Salamis Gorgos, was the main actor of the rebellion. Onesilos urged his brother to revolt, but Gorgos hesitated in fear that a failure would put his kingship in jeopardy. Onesilos then overthrew his brother and as king of Salamis declared the revolt. He must have been enjoined by other kingdoms such as Soloi and Curium (according to Herodotus), although the king of Amathus refused to revolt even when Onesilos besieged the city. Meanwhile, Darius did not remain inactive. He sent a great military force to Cyprus led by Artybius who attempted to restore order. In

the meantime the Persian fleet sailed off the coast of Karpasia. This was a negative state of affairs for Cypriot kingdoms, which could not face imperial troops with their local powers. So they turned to the *Koinon of the Ionians* for help.

The Ionians were willing to help, for a positive outcome of the struggle in Cyprus would signify the realisation of two important strategic objectives:

- a. The formation of an anti-Persian front spreading from the Hellespont to Cyprus, and
- b. The division of Persian forces into two fronts, if not more, one in Ionia and one in Cyprus.

The Cypriot kings and the Ionians decided that the Ionian fleet face the Phoenicians in the large of Salamis and at the same time Cypriots fight the Persian army in the plain of Salamis. This was the first of many great battles that took place during the 5th century B.C. between Greeks and Persians, on land and at sea.

The Ionians were victorious against the Phoenicians, mainly thanks to the fleet of Samos. However on land things did not go as well. Although in the beginning the Cypriots seemed to be winning, halfway through the battle the king of Curium Stasanor decided to fight with the Persians, taking with him part of Onesilos' army. This act of treason doomed the revolution to failure. Onesilos, the king of Salamis, fell in battle and the Persian victory also sealed the end of the Cypriot kings' revolt. As Herodotus characteristically phrased it, « so the Cyprians, having won freedom for a year, were enslaved once more ».

There followed some difficult times for the Cypriot kingdoms. Without delay the Persians restored Gorgos to the throne of Salamis. Herodotus relates that the city of Soloi was under siege for a long period of time before falling to the Persians while based on archaeological evidence, it is possible that the destruction of the temples of Aphrodite at Tamassos and Marion are related to the events following the revolt. Another result of the Persians' attempt to control the kingdoms and prevent a new revolt is the appearance of Phoenician kings at Marion and Lapithos during this period.

The clearest and most noteworthy consequence of this episode was the rapid and spectacular rise of the kingdom with the strongest Phoenician element, Kition. The aggressive expansiveness of this kingdom during the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. greatly changed the island's political map. Cities such as Idalion and Tamassos became part of the land controlled by the king of Kition, while his expansion to the east soon caused the reactions of the kings of Salamis and especially that of Evagoras I. After Darius A' restored order on the island, the Cypriots were forced to take part in the Persians' great campaigns against the Greeks in 490 and 480 B.C.

• **Persian Wars and the Cypriot Kingdoms**

Darius I (522-486) was one of the most brilliant kings of the Achaemenian Empire. This is evident in the excellent way he restructured its every aspect. The Empire's administrative cohesion – the division of the Empire in administrative regions, Satrapies, would remain unchanged for the next 200 years – great cultural achievements and of course the establishment of an extremely powerful

economy are some of the aspects of this great king's work.

However Greeks did not appreciate Darius for his virtues. To them he was the tyrant trying to stretch his empire to the West and enslave the Greek world. Following a failed campaign in 492 – the Persian fleet was destroyed during a storm at Mount Athos – in 490 B.C. Darius A' assembled a large army and passed into Europe. Even though there is no evidence of Cypriot ships in the Persian fleet, we can assume they did take part in this campaign. There was however no naval conflict between Greeks and Persians, only the great battle of Marathon. A decade later Xerxes, Darius' heir (486 B.C.) decides to complete what his father failed to do: the conquest of Greece. Cypriot kingdoms participated in this campaign with a large number of ships. Herodotus says there were 150 ships and also gives some of the Cypriot generals' names. We thus know that the king of Salamis Gorgos was in charge, with his brother Philaon, Pentilos from Paphos – who was captured by the Athenians along with Philaon – whereas the name of Timagoras the son of Timoanaktas is also mentioned, with no specifications as to which kingdom he represented.

During the great sea fight of Salamis in 480 B.C. the Cypriots fought alongside Phoenician ships, against the Athenians. Facing the powerful Greek attack the Cypriot and Phoenician lines were rapidly broken and in the general confusion that followed many of

“Do not, O king, make the Persians the laughing-stock of the Greeks, for if you have suffered harm, it is by no fault of the Persians. Nor can you say that we have anywhere done less than brave men should, and if Phoenicians and Egyptians and Cyprians and Cilicians have so done, it is not the Persians who have any part in this disaster”

Herodotus, Persian Wars, 8. 100. 4. Herodotus, with an English translation by A. D. Godley. Cambridge. Harvard University Press. 1920

their ships either sank or were captured by Greek forces. Herodotus mentions that Artemisia and Mardonius remarked upon the fact that Cypriots turned out to be very bad slaves.

The tragic epilogue of Xerxes' campaign in Greece was written in 479 B.C. at the battle of Platees. His greatest general, Mardonius, was killed and his elite military force the “Immortals”, was destroyed. Xerxes' defeat following the sea fight of Mycale resulted in the definitive withdrawal of Persian forces from the Aegean.

Thus ends a period of conflict between Greeks and Persians which started with the Ionian Revolt, and in which Cypriot kingdoms also played their part. A new era is now dawning, marked by the spectacular rise of Sparta and Athens and mainly the latter's effort to move and maintain the conflict with the Persian Empire in the area of the East Mediterranean. Cyprus found itself in the centre of this conflict.

• Archaic economy, culture and religion

Next he sailed to Cyprus, and was greatly beloved of Philocyprus, one of the kings of the island. This prince had a small city founded by Demophon, the son of Theseus and lying near the river Clarius, in a position which was strong, but otherwise incommodious and sorry. Solon therefore persuaded him to remove the city to the fair plain which lay below it, and make it more spacious and pleasant. He also remained and took charge of the new city's consolidation, and helped to arrange it in the best possible manner both for convenience of living and for safety. The result was that many colonists flocked to Philocyprus, and he was the envy of the other kings. He therefore paid Solon the honor of naming the new city after him, and called it Soli; its name had been Aipeia. Solon himself also makes mention of this consolidation. In his elegies, namely, he addresses Philocyprus and says:

“ Now mayest thou long time be lord and master for the Solii here, Dwelling in this city thyself, and thy family after thee; But may I and my swift ship, as we leave this storied isle, Be brought upon our way in safety by Cypris of the violet crown. Upon this settlement of thine may she bestow favour and glory; And upon me an auspicious return to my fatherland”

Plutarch, *Lives, Solon*, English Translation by Bernadotte Perrin, Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press. London. William Heinemann Ltd. 1914

The arrival of the Phoenicians in the 9th century B.C. was an important boost to the economy of Cyprus. These people, already familiar with commercial practices and the establishment of relations with neighbouring populations, probably played a leading part in the island's economic prosperity during archaic years.

The use of coins was capital for the economy of the island. Amongst the first kingdoms to strike coins were those of Paphos, Idalion, Marion, Kition, Amathus and Salamis. As already mentioned, the king of Salamis Evelthon struck silver coins bearing his name. This signifies that his kingdom was financially developed and

active and that it sustained autonomous economical and commercial structures whose functioning necessitated the use of a coin. During this era the great majority of Greek cities did not share the same prosperity or possibilities. Evelthon's economic and political power was such that royal families from abroad sought his financial and military help to face their own internal problems.

The economical changes which took place and the prosperity of Cypriot kingdoms during the archaic period are best reflected in an episode related by Herodotus and Plutarch: during the first half of the 6th century the king of Aipeia Philokypros hosted Solon, the great Athenian legislator, in his court. The latter advised the king to build a new, bigger city, which could better host the administrative centre necessary for the function and supervision of complex civic and economic structures.

Unfortunately we know very little of the deities worshipped by the Cypriots during archaic years. It is however certain that the principal deity was the **Great Mother Goddess** who was first of all identified with Aphrodite, who was already being described as 'the Cyprian' in the poems of Homer and the works of Hesiod. The worship of Aphrodite was connected to Palepaphos, which is why the goddess is often referred to as Paphia.

In the 8th century the Phoenicians built, on the foundations of an impressive pre-existing sanctuary, a temple dedicated to Astarte – goddess of fertility and sexuality, who during classical years was identified with Aphrodite. On another spot, near the ancient port of Kition they founded the temple of Heracles-Melqart the patron god of their motherland, Tyr.

It appears that Zeus was worshipped in Salamis, for he was connected to the royal family of the Teukrides, founders of the kingdom of Salamis. Archaeological evidence confirms the worship of a male deity in the city founded by Teukros, hero of the Trojan War.

Cypriot literature is also developed during the first years of the archaic period. Poets lived in royal courts during the 7th and 6th centuries B.C. Euklos, considered the composer of Cypriot epics, wrote works relating episodes taking place before and during the Trojan War. It is also possible that the Cypriot poet Eginos wrote one of the hymns to Aphrodite.



Terracotta figurines mainly from the Archaic Period (Cyprus Archaeological Museum)

Classical Period

- **Athens, Persia and Cypriot Kingdoms**

In 478 B.C. Greek allied forces decided to sail – for the first time – to the Eastern Mediterranean, far from the Aegean, to strike the Persian forces in Cyprus, where they had found refuge after their defeat at Plataia and Mycale. The Greek historian Thucydides and Diodorus Siculus constitute our two main sources concerning this event.

Two questions arise

a. Why would the Greek allied forces attack the Persians in Cyprus?

Meanwhile Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, was sent out from Lacedaemon as commander-in-chief of the Hellenes, with twenty ships from Peloponnese. With him sailed the Athenians with thirty ships, and a number of the other allies. [2] They made an expedition against Cyprus and subdued most of the island, and afterwards against Byzantium, which was in the hands of the Medes, and compelled it to surrender.

Thucydides, *Peloponnesian war*, 1.98.

The Lacedaemonians, having appointed Pausanias, who had held the command at Plataea, admiral of their fleet, instructed him to liberate the Greek cities which were still held by barbarian garrisons And taking fifty triremes from the Peloponnesus and summoning from the Athenians thirty commanded by Aristeides, he first of all sailed to Cyprus and liberated those cities which still had Persian garrisons and after this he sailed to the Hellespont and took Byzantium.

Diodorus Siculus, *Library, Book XI, Chapter 44. 1-3.*

b. What were the results of this action?

Like the Ionians in 498 B.C., the Greeks realised that the Persians had two entry points to the Aegean: the straits of the Hellespont and the Eastern Mediterranean. They used the first point to transport the largest part of their army – like Xerxes did – and the second served as a passage for their fleet, which was largely composed of Phoenician and Cypriot ships.

The control of these two strategic points was of capital importance to the Greeks, for they could thus:

a. maintain peace in the Greek world and

b. gain supremacy in the Aegean. The destruction of Persian forces in Cyprus and the control of the straits of the Hellespont would prevent – at least in the near future – Persians from invading Greece. Also the secure hold of Cyprus seemed vital to Greek recovery of the coastal cities of Asia Minor.

The Spartan general Pausanias and the Athenian Aristeides led Greek forces, whereas the young aristocrat Cimon, whose name would later remain linked to great victories in Cyprus against the Persians, also took part in the campaign. The forces assembled by the Greeks were not as great as one would expect – approximately 20 ships from Peloponnesus and 30 from Athens – which indicates that they did not expect the Persians to resist.

According to the two historians the campaign was a great success. Despite the small size of the reconvened Greek fleet, the Greeks conquered most of Cyprus, which was rid of the presence of Persian armies while the control of the Hellespont was also secured. The great tragic poet Aeschylus retained these facts; in his work *Persians* he mentions the cities liberated by the Greeks following the Persians' defeat at Mycale, starting from Byzantium, and continuing through the coast of Asia Minor and the kingdoms of Cyprus:

And he [Xerxes] held under his sway the sea-girt islands midway between the continents, [890] Lemnos, and the settlement of Icarus, and Rhodes, and Cnidos, and the Cyprian cities Paphos, Soli, and Salamis, [895] whose mother-city is now the cause of our lament

Aeschylus. *Persians*. Trans. Herbert Weir Smyth, Ph. D. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press. 1926

• The Athenians in the Eastern Mediterranean

Following the end of the campaigns in Cyprus and Byzantium, the Greek Alliance was dissolved. Internal problems and a reticence to extend the war against the Persians to Asia Minor, forced Sparta to cede leadership of the Alliance to Athens. This was also what most of the cities wanted, especially those of Ionia. The Lacedemonians were left with the control of Peloponnesus.

Thus, in 477 B.C. a new alliance of cities was formed, under the name of « Delian Alliance ». It was however but an alliance of independent states with Athens, whose official objective was the continuation of the war with Persia and the liberation of Asia Minor. In reality it was an ambitious Athenian attempt to extend its political and economical influence beyond the Aegean, to Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean. It is bearing this in mind that we must examine Athens' attempt, at least twice, to gain control over Cyprus, in 460 and 450 B.C.

• The Athenians in Cyprus

In 467 B.C. Cimon defeated the Persians at the Eurymedon river; thus allowing the Athenians to undertake, in 460 B.C., a great military campaign in the Eastern Mediterranean, whose unique target was the conquest of Cyprus. The general Charitimides led the expedition, as his political rivals had forced Cimon out of Athens for a decade (461-451).

According to Thucydides the Athenians sent 200 triremes. However part of them – roughly 40 – were sent to aid the Egyptian prince Inaros who was revolting against the Great King. It is known with certainty that Athenian forces were engaged in numerous expeditions in the areas around Cyprus, thanks to an important Athenian inscription: a casualty-list of the Erechtheid tribe proudly proclaims that all the men whose names are inscribed on the stele 'died in the war in Cyprus, Egypt, Phoenicia, Halieis, Aigina, and Megara in the same year', probably in 460/59 B.C.

There is no information concerning the position taken by the Cypriot kingdoms and their reaction to the Athenian presence in Cyprus. It is nevertheless a fact that the

Released from Hellenic war, the Athenians made an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred vessels of their own and their allies, under the command of Cimon. [3] Sixty of these were detached to Egypt at the instance of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes; the rest laid siege to Kitium, from which, however, [4] they were compelled to retire by the death of Cimon and by scarcity of provisions. Sailing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought with the Phoenicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians by land and sea, and being victorious on both elements departed home, and with them the returned squadron from Egypt.

Thucydides, 1.112.

Great King's interests were in danger and that his control over the island must have suffered greatly. However, the situation would soon be reversed, as the Athenians, trapped in the Delta of the Nile in 454 suffered a devastating defeat by the Persians and were forced to retreat, abandoning their strategic advantage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus.

They are to return before long, this time under the command of the famous general Cimon himself.

After securing peace with Sparta, Cimon is free to concentrate on regaining what Athens had lost in Egypt some years before, and of course Cyprus. Thus, in 451 B.C. an Athenian fleet of 200 ships sets sail for the Eastern Mediterranean. Cimon's strategy may be considered to have included three major objectives: 1. Effective control of the waters around Cyprus; 2. Capture of the key ports of the island; 3. Defeat of the Persian and Phoenician land and sea forces.

Cimon primarily attempted to secure control of the wider area of the Eastern Mediterranean, which is why he sent part of his fleet to help the revolt in Egypt. Upon his arrival in Cyprus, at the northeastern coast of the island, he took control of the kingdom of Marion. Meanwhile, Artabazos, the Persian general who was in Cyprus at the time with a large fleet decided, after Cimon's initial success, to flee to Phoenicia. Cimon pursued him, winning on the coast of Phoenicia where he unfortunately lost the general Anaximenis.

However, the control of Cyprus was not yet secured. Although once again we know nothing of the Cypriots' reactions to these events – it is noteworthy that none of the ancient historians bothered describing them or even mentioning the Cypriot kings – it is certain that Cimon succeeded in dominating the largest part of the island. There were however at least two cities where the Persians fought bravely to the end

One of them was Kition, where fierce battles were fought between Greeks and Persians, and the city's own population. The siege, which lasted for months, finally ended with Cimon's unexpected death, leaving the Greeks to search for a compromise with the Great King. After one more victory of the Athenians and their allies at Salamis, the famous Peace of Callias was signed.

This treaty officially marks the end of the Medean Wars. Cimon's death and the appearance of Pericles on the political scene also signal an important turn in Athenian external politics. Pericles was against great expeditions and above all against the continuation of the war against Persia. He preferred to concentrate on the internal restructuring of Athens and its defence against the Spartan menace. Thus Cyprus, host to some of the fiercest battles of the 5th century B.C., comes once again under the Great King's rule.

• The Kingship of Evagoras

Evagoras is perhaps the most important figure of Ancient Cypriot History. For no other king of the Archaic or Classical period is there such a plethora of information, found in the works of Greek historians and archaeological findings such as inscriptions and coins. However we know very little about Evagoras' life and action before he became king of Salamis.

Evagoras was born around 440 B.C. and was definitely part of the Salaminian royal family. We do not have any information regarding his childhood or his education. It is however certain that he was raised in a hostile environment, since in the middle of the 450s a Phoenician king, who neglected Greek elements and supported those of his own kind, ruled a Salamis. This is partly confirmed by the fact that one of his courtiers, Abdemon the Tyrian, took over the throne for a short while (c. 415-413)

before being overthrown himself by Evagoras.

According to Isocrates and Diodorus, after failing in his first attempt to overthrow Abdemon, fearing for his life the young Evagoras took refuge in Soloi in Cilicia. This was a city with a strong Greek element, and it seems that he was able to better organize his return to Salamis from there. Followed by a small group of mercenaries he sailed back to Cyprus, overthrew Abdemon and restored order. Thus in 413 B.C. a descendant of the Teukrides heroically rises to the throne of Salamis.

The first important piece of information relating to Evagoras' kingship comes from an Athenian

In Cyprus Evagoras of Salamis, who was of most noble birth, since he was descended from the founders of the city, but had previously been banished because of some factional quarrels and had later returned in company with a small group, drove out Abdemon of Tyre, who was lord of the city and a friend of the King of the Persians. When he took control of the city, Evagoras was at first king only of Salamis, the largest and strongest of the cities of Cyprus; but when he soon acquired great resources and mobilized an army, he set out to make the whole island his own.

Diodorus Siculus, 14.98.1

inscription, which although in very bad condition reveals his political and ideological preoccupations Athens was in an extremely difficult position during that period. The ambitious plans to conquer Sicily and the great expedition undertaken in 415 B.C. ended tragically. In 413 B.C. Athens suffered one of the most devastating defeats in its history, with the destruction of the largest part of its fleet and the loss of thousands of men. It is at this moment that Evagoras decides to aid the city,

with which he had close relations, by sending material help such as copper, timber and wheat. The inscription mentioned above is thus a resolution by which Evagoras is decreed *benefactor* of Athens, and given the title of *citizen*. This was the highest honour the Athenian *Demos* could bestow upon non-Athenians and the title was transferred to the honoured one's descendants.

Evagoras' ties with Athens were of course not short-lived. It is also during this period (412?) that he must have met the great Athenian general Conon, responsible of Athenian affairs relating to the cities of Ionia. The two men were tied by a strong friendship. This is why, after the Athenian defeat at *Aigos Potamos* (405 B.C.), fearing his countrymen's reactions, Conon did not return to Athens but took refuge in Evagoras' court. He took with him 8 manned triremes and a significant number of Athenian citizens, and was also followed by the Athenian general Nikofemos. The presence of these two men beside Evagoras is critical for the evolution of classical Salamis. Their political and military experience must have been very precious, mainly regarding his efforts to transform his kingdom into a modern city, making it the most powerful political, military and cultural centre of the island.

Unfortunately the international situation was not very favourable to the execution of Evagoras' and Conon's plans. They could expect no help from Athens, which was in a very weak position since its defeat by Sparta at the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 B.C. Spartan hegemony was spreading to areas in Greece formerly ruled by Athens, and this deprived the once great city of many of its resources and benefits. On top of this the Persian Empire continued to intervene in Greek affairs, supporting and strengthening Sparta's hegemony.

The situation makes a complete turn in 399 B.C. The Spartan king's Agesilaos II intervention in Persian internal affairs and his military presence in Asia Minor caused great tension in the relations between

Sparta and the Great King. Sparta's growing power and influence started to worry Artaxerxes, a sentiment Evagoras and Conon tried to use in order to approach the Satrap of Asia Minor, Farnabaze. They proposed to lead a great campaign against Sparta and asked for Persian assistance. A victory would suit all parties, Conon would return to Athens victorious, Artaxerxes would be rid of the presence of Sparta and the Salaminian presence on the international political scene would now be secured and strengthened.

Thus in 398 B.C. Conon was placed at the head of a large fleet of triremes, built by Evagoras and funded by Farnabaze – Diodorus mentions a large amount, approximately 500 golden talents. The crews were comprised of Cypriots and Greek mercenaries.

Near the portico stand Conon, Timotheus his son and Evagoras King of Cyprus, who caused the Phoenician men-of-war to be given to Conon by King Artaxerxes. This he did as an Athenian whose ancestry connected him with Salamis, for he traced his pedigree back to Teucer and the daughter of Cinyras. Here stands Zeus, called Zeus of Freedom, and the Emperor Hadrian, a benefactor to all his subjects and especially to the city of the Athenians.

Pausanias, 1.3.2

The decisive sea battle took place in 394 B.C. in Knidos. Conon crushed the Spartan fleet, led by Pisandre, thus ending its hegemony and ridding the city of the suffocating supervision imposed by the Lacedemonians.

This victory's repercussions were such that Conon returned triumphant to Athens a decade later and was celebrated as *Saviour* and *Liberator* of the city, while the financial aid he

secured from the Persians allowed him to rebuild the *Long Walls*. In gratitude to his home town he offered a sacrifice of 100 oxen to Aphrodite the Knidian, in honour of whom he founded a sanctuary in Piraeus, thus honouring at the same time his new home, Salamis of Cyprus, birth place, according to the legend, of the goddess Aphrodite.

Furthermore, the honours bestowed upon Evagoras and Conon by the Athenians were very impressive. By decree of the Demos two bronze statues were placed in the Agora, beside the image of Zeus Soter and facing the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherious. They were the first mortals thus honoured after the tyrant killers Armodius and Aristogeiton.

Evagoras and Conon did not rest after this success. They had grand plans seeking to redefine the Athenian hegemony in Greece and mainly to expand the rule of the kingdom of Salamis to the whole of Cyprus. In 392 B.C. Conon's actions in Asia Minor and his efforts to bring the Greek cities there under the Athenian sphere of influence upset Artaxerxes. He was imprisoned, but managed to escape to Salamis where he died in 390 B.C.

Evagoras continued his plans methodically. Working closely with his son Pnytagoras, he started expanding his rule to the whole of the island. A recently found Phoenician inscription, discovered in Kition dated in the year one of Milkyaton (392), king of Kition, commemorates the erection of a monument after a victory won by the king and the people of Kition over their enemies and their Paphian auxiliaries. There can hardly be any doubt that the term enemy designates Evagoras and his allies. This proves that from 392 B.C. the Salaminian king was taking coordinated military action against other Cypriot kingdoms. At least three of them, Soloi, Amathus and Kition immediately reacted and asked Artaxerxes' intervention. This is not, however, why the Persian king decided to

take action against Evagoras. As Diodorus Siculus correctly points out:

The King, not only because he did not wish Evagoras to grow any stronger, but also because he appreciated the strategic position of Cyprus and its great naval strength whereby it would be able to protect Asia in front, decided to accept the alliance. He dismissed the ambassadors and for himself sent letters to the cities situated on the sea and to their commanding satraps to construct triremes and with all speed to make ready everything the fleet might need; and he commanded Hecatomnus, the ruler of Caria, to make war upon Evagoras.

Diodorus Siculus, 14.98.3

Thus starts the so-called *Cypriot War*, which lasted approximately ten years, from 390 to 380. During the first years Evagoras was successful. With the help of Athens and the general Chabrias, who landed in Cyprus with an army of 800 *peltasts*, he gained control of almost the whole of the island in 387 B.C. However the following year the situation changed dramatically, when the *Peace of Antalcidas* (386), signed between Sparta and the Great King forced Athens to withdraw its

troops from Cyprus and forbade any Greek military corps to sail east of Rhodes. Evagoras was thus deprived of the help of his most faithful ally.

He nevertheless pursued with the war, taking advantage, on the one hand, of the Persian Empire's internal problems and on the other of the alliances he had established with other rulers of the East Mediterranean. He was defeated in the last critical battle against the Persians, in the sea of Kition, and was forced to retreat to Salamis. Supported by the king of Egypt Akoris and relying on the city's fortifications, Evagoras refused to surrender. The Persians besieged Salamis for months; the final agreement allowed Evagoras to keep his throne and continue to be recognised by Artawxerxes and his heirs as king of Salamis.

We know very little of his life during subsequent years. The kingdom's difficult financial situation after the long years of war must have limited his scope of action. There must have been discord between members of the royal family, culminating in the murder of Evagoras and his son Pnytagoras in 374/3 B.C. Nikokles, known through Isocrates' *Cypriot Dialogues* was heir to the throne. Thus ends one of the most interesting and exciting chapters of ancient Cypriot History.

• From Evagoras to Alexander

Our knowledge around Cypriot kingdoms, up to the appearance of Alexander III (336-323) is incomplete. We know nothing of their political action or the balances in place on the island. However, Kition must have been, after Evagoras' death, the most powerful kingdom, from a political and military point of view.

During the reign of Nikokles (373-361 B.C.) Salamis appears to have resurfaced economically after the decade of war with the Great King. Nikokles' political strategy was different from his father's; he avoided interfering in Persian and Greek affairs although he was faithful to Evagoras' cultural orientation. Athens was still the reference point for Salamis. From what we do know, neither did the rest of the Cypriot kingdoms – Paphos ruled by Timocharis, Amathus under the reign of Lyssandros or Soloi – engage in any political action provoking the Great King's reaction. After the tumultuous

years of Evagoras' reign, the Cypriot kings seemed to seek internal peace and stability.

There was also another reason for this apparent peace, and that was the fact that the Persian Empire was facing serious problems, at least until the arrival of Artaxerxes III Ochus (358-338). The satraps, mainly those of Asia Minor, revolted against central power and thus disrupted the functioning of the Persian Empire.

Once again, the most information we dispose of concerns Salamis and the action of its kings. After Nikokles' death his son Evagoras II rose to the throne (360-351). The new king does not seem to have digressed from his father's political orientation, favouring at the same time the kingdom's financial development, and good relations with Persia. Things started becoming complicated for Evagoras II and other Cypriot kings during the crisis in the Persian Empire caused by the **Satrap Revolt**. Problems in Asia Minor began in 356 B.C., however when the revolution was generalized in 351 and the king of Sidon in Phoenicia radically challenged Persian authority in the area, the situation became crucial. The real reasons behind the revolt, at least in Phoenicia, must be searched in the dissatisfaction caused by the actions of *Satraps* and Persian generals.

According to Diodorus Siculus, the upheaval in Phoenicia resulted in the Cypriot kings' revolt, who considered it a good opportunity to rid themselves of the Great King's rule. The latter's failure to subdue the revolt in Egypt must have reinforced the Cypriots' and Phoenicians' hopes of a positive outcome for their uprising. It appears however that Evagoras II was not convinced that Persian authority could be overthrown so easily; he thus refused to revolt. The Salaminians then rioted, led by Pnytagoras – probably the grandson of Evagoras I – who overthrew Evagoras II and seized the throne. Pnytagoras supported the revolt against the Persians, but he had to face Evagoras II first, who marched against Salamis with the aid of the Satrap of Karia Idrieus, and Athenian mercenaries led by Phokion. When he failed to seize the city Artaxerxes was dissatisfied and ceased to support his efforts to regain the throne. He obviously preferred to concentrate on subduing the revolt in Phoenicia and Egypt, after which he could force the Cypriot kings to capitulate. He was proven right: following the regain of Persian control in Phoenicia, Pnytagoras accepted – followed by the rest of the island's kings – the Great King's authority, simultaneously retaining his throne and autonomy. These events took place approximately in 345 B.C.

The situation changes dramatically when Alexander the Great reaches the region of the East Mediterranean. In 332 B.C. the Macedonian king had already conquered Asia Minor and Cilicia, while he aimed to capture Phoenicia and Egypt before proceeding further East. The Cypriot kingdoms thus found themselves subdued to the new ruler of Asia, Alexander III Macedon.

• Alexander and the Cypriot Kingdoms (332-323)

The Cypriot kings' relationship with Alexander was established when he was besieging the city of Tyre and was in need of support. At this point the Kings of Cyprus went over to Alexander, sailing in to the harbour of Sidon with a fleet of 150 ships, as did the powers of Rhodes and Phoenicia. Pnytagoras of Salamis, Androcles of Amathus and Pascretetes of Soloi were but some of the kings who rendered

Alexander invaluable service in one of the most difficult battles he had given up to then.

Pnytagoras was special to Alexander, not only because he was king of a powerful city known to the Greeks, but also because the two kings shared a common ascendance. The Salaminian royal family descended from Teukros, descendant of Aiakos, and Alexander had the same roots from his mother's

side, as Olympia was also a descendant of Aiakos. Thus during the crucial battle at Tyre (332) Pnytagoras was asked to take command of the left side of the fleet – with the Macedonian Krateros – while Alexander himself led the Cypriot and Phoenician ships.

Not long after, too, the kings of Cyprus put into Sidon with about 120 ships, since they had heard of the defeat of Darius at Issus, and were terrified, because the whole of Phoenicia was already in the possession of Alexander. To all these Alexander granted indemnity for their previous conduct, because they seemed to have joined the Persian fleet rather by necessity than by their own choice [...] He then started from Sidon and sailed towards Tyre with his ships arranged in proper order, himself being on the right wing which stretched out seaward; and with him were the kings of the Cyprians, and all those of the Phoenicians except Pnytagoras, who with Craterus was commanding the left wing of the whole line. The Tyrians had previously resolved to fight a sea-battle, if Alexander should sail against them by sea. But then with surprise they beheld the vast multitude of his ships; for they had not yet learned that Alexander had all the ships of the Cyprians and Phoenicians.

Arrian, II, 20. *The Anabasis of Alexander, together with the Indica*, E. J. Chinnock, tr. (London: George Bell and Sons, 1893)

After the successful siege of Tyre, Alexander richly rewarded the Salaminian king. He thus fulfilled his wish, to possess the kingdom of Tamassos, whose king had sold it to Kition some years earlier.

The king of Kition Pumiathon, having probably refused to aid Alexander in the battle of Tyre, now willingly accepted to give up Tamassos. Desiring to gain the favour of the “New Achilles”, Pumiathon presented the Macedonian with a gift, a knife he was said to have used, according to Arrian, in the battle of Gaugamela (331). Following the death of Pnytagoras in 331 B.C., Nikokreon, the last king of Salamis, rose to the throne. He would prove himself one of the finest Cypriot kings of all time. He quickly attracted Alexander's attention when, together with the king of Soloi, Stasikrates, he presented himself in the Macedonian court as one of the major *choregos* of the magnificent festivals organised by Alexander in Phoenicia after his return from Egypt.

The Cypriots continued to follow Alexander in his military expeditions: the Cypriot and Phoenician fleets sailed against Sparta while Arrian preserves the information that the son of Pnytagoras and brother of Nikokreon, Nithaphon led the Cypriot squadrons when Alexander was crossing the river Indus (326 BC). Nikokles, the son of Stasikates the king of Soloi, was in the same expedition. Furthermore Stasanor, prince of Soloi was later named by Alexander satrap of Areia and Dragiane.

The Cypriot kingdoms' regime does not appear to have been modified during the reign of Alexander III. As in the Persian period they remained outside the satrapal system. However a great change had occurred, since for the first time in their history the Cypriot Kingdoms had to accept and adapt to the principles and values of a Greek royal ideology. They had to search the past, rediscover and promote the symbols and elements connecting them to the Greek world.

Things change dramatically after Alexander's death in Babylon in 323 B.C. His *Successors* were less willing to tolerate independent kings on the outskirts of the areas under their control. The kingdoms did not have much time left.

• The end of the Cypriot Kingdoms (323-294 B.C.)

Cypriot kingdoms dissolved between 333 and 310 B.C. It is almost certain that when Demetrios Poliorketes conquered the island in 306 B.C. none of them had survived. The major problem regarding the information given by the written sources on the end of the Cypriot kingdoms is that the authors' priority is the action of Alexander in the area and the conflict between his *Successors*, and not necessarily the reasons which led to the disappearance of the kingdoms. However, the narrative of Diodorus Siculus is beyond doubt the most complete historical description we have concerning the Archaic and Classical Cypriot Kingdoms. The main reason for this is their involvement in the struggles that broke out between the Successors. Disagreements about the assignment of satrapies and the powers of the regent soon led to open conflict.

When Alexander's generals met in *Tripuradeisus* in 321/320 B.C. to redistribute the conquered territories, Cyprus was not mentioned and there is no information confirming the island belonged to a satrapy. This is an indication of the respect of the kingdoms' autonomy, but it was only a matter of time before Cyprus was dragged into the conflict by the ambitious *Successors*. Cyprus was a privileged share for Alexander's generals; due to its geographical position, it was like a floating fortress. It was thus in the centre of the clash between two of Alexander's most important *Successors*, Antigonos I Monophthalmos and Ptolemy I Soter. The events that took place in Cyprus can be divided in three phases:

323-313: none of the *Successors* appear to successfully control the island;

313-306: Ptolemy imposes his reign destroying most of the kingdoms;

306-294: Antigonos Monophthalmos I and Demetrios Poliorketes conquer Cyprus, using its ports as bases for the military control of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The changes occurring in the international scene also affected the kings' political behaviour: for the first time they were forced to make a choice between two equal foreign powers. In this extremely polarised context coalitions were formed and the island seemed to have been separated in two camps.

In 321 Salamis, Paphos, Soloi and Amathus participate in the generalised conflict against the *Successors*, fighting beside Ptolemy, while Perdikkas who was preparing to invade Egypt despatched an expedition to Cyprus. The island was in the core of the conflicts. The situation changes in 316-315 B.C. when these same kingdoms, probably under Nikokreon's command, continue to support Ptolemy, but now have to face a powerful new coalition of cities: Kition, Lapithos and Marion allied with Antigonos.

After three years of battle, Ptolemy and his allies prevail in 314/3 B.C. The island became – with Cyrene – Ptolemy's naval base in the Mediterranean, but that did not seem to be enough. In order to eliminate all resistance on the island, he led his army in 312, destroyed the kingdoms of Lapithos, Marion and Kition, whose kings and probably all the members of the royal families was executed. This was the first major change on the island's political and geographical map in five centuries. And it was due to an external intervention.

Following these events Nikokreon was appointed by Ptolemy in 312 *strategos* of the island and was given extra privileges. The Salaminian king was now in control of two thirds of the island. This did not last for long. Ptolemy knew well that to definitively prevail he needed to eliminate every form of power reminiscent of the island's old regime.

The king of Paphos Nikokles ended his and the members of his family's life and in 311 B.C., after being accused of conspiring with Antigonos against Ptolemy. Fearing the violent death suffered by the king of Kition he preferred to take matters into his own hands before Ptolemy had a chance to act. The king and all the members of his family committed suicide. Let us ask ourselves why Ptolemy attempted, and finally succeeded, to destroy the Cypriot royal ideology. We can but speculate that Ptolemy knew that the destruction of the old royal ideology, which kept urban centres separated, was necessary, in order to institute a unified, flexible, effective, and stable administration,. Let us not forget that each kingdom was deeply attached to its local elite and its population had for centuries only recognised the power of its legitimate king. The practical Macedonians, and in this case Ptolemy, realised that it would not be possible to successfully rule the island if the multicentred system of power would not collapse; this way they would be able to institute their unified administration and bring peace and order to Cyprus, which was central to their interests.

After the death of Nikokreon in 310 B.C., Ptolemy placed his brother Menelaos on the throne of Salamis, the last of the Cypriot kingdoms. Thus when the Antigonides conquered Cyprus after Demetrios Poliorketes' great naval victory against Ptolemy in the sea of Salamis in 306 B.C., probably none of the Cypriot kings were masters of their legitimate thrones. Demetrius was however unable to preserve his conquests and resist Ptolemy's methodical expansion in Syria and other areas, eventually losing the control of Cyprus. By the time of Ptolemy's recapture of the island in 294 no kings survived. Cyprus will remain a part of the Empire of the Lagides until the coming of the Romans in the Eastern Mediterranean (30 BC).

• Classical Cyprus: culture, economy and religion

The worship of Olympian gods in Cyprus is more clearly tainted by the Greek colour during Classical years. Thus are worshipped with various Greek epithets Athena in Idalion, Zeus in Salamis and Apollo in Curium. It is nevertheless mainly during the fourth century that the worship of Cypriot and Phoenician gods and goddesses started to be identified with Greek deities. At the same time the Cypriot kingdoms' effort to mark their presence in panhellenic sanctuaries is obvious. The dedication of Pnytagoras is well known – a gold crown of bay leaves – in Delos, and Nikokreon was appointed *theorodokos* for the Pan-Hellenic **Nemean Games** in 330 BC.

The Phoenicians identified their gods with the Greeks deities:

Astarte = Aphrodite,
Anat = Athena
Reshef = Apollon,
Melqart = Heraclus
Baal = Zeus

The Cypriot kings' coinage during this period is relatively rich. Archaeological evidences enlighten us regarding the royal ideology and the names of certain kings of the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. Most of the 5th century coins have engraved symbols in cyprosyllabic or Phoenician, whereas from the 4th

century, when Evagoras starts using the Greek alphabet coins bear inscriptions in both cyprosyllabic and alphabetic writing.

Before the end of Cypriot kingdoms, at the end of the 4th century, other kings besides Evagoras such as Stasicrates of Soloi, Nikokles of Paphos and Androkles of Amathus used the alphabet.

The appearance of illustrative subjects inspired by the Greek pantheon also becomes more frequent. Zeus, Artemis and of course Aphrodite are present on 4th century coins. On the coin of Nikokreon, for example, we see the head of Aphrodite facing to the right, wearing a diadem and to the left the inscription NK. On the other side is the head of Apollo bearing a crown of bay leaves. Proof of the Cypriot kingdoms' autonomy, coinage will not cease until their destruction by Ptolemy I Soter.

The Greek influence is predominant in clothing, pottery, illustrations, sculpture and architecture. Even the Phoenicians were in the last decades of the fourth century completely in tune with the Classical Greek world. The spiritual influence of Athens in the Eastern Mediterranean is such that even cities like Kition adopt elements of Greek art and culture.

The recent discovery in Kition of two beautiful sarcophagi, decorated with images from the Greek mythology confirms the gradual hellenization of the Phoenicians of Cyprus.

Close cultural relations between Athens and areas of the Eastern Mediterranean during the 4th century B.C. are a fact. However we can maintain that in Cyprus, the progressive domination of Classical culture was signalled by the life and actions of Evagoras I.

The Salaminian royal court was home to many important Athenians such as Conon and Nikomache, technicians, musicians, poets and architects. However the orator Isocrates may be exaggerating in his description of the Salaminian king's accomplishments, he did describe the following reality:

Academic interest was very vivid in Cyprus. Cypriots went to Athens to attend famous philosophical schools. Nikokles, king of Salamis studied with Isocrates, Klearchos from Soloi was a disciple of Aristotle and so was Eudimos, to whom the philosopher dedicated his work *De anima*. The Phoenician from Kition, Zenon, moved to Athens at the end of the 4th century where he founded stoic philosophy.

51-52: The most convincing proof of the character and uprightness of Evagoras is this—that many of the most reputable Greeks left their own fatherlands and came to Cyprus to dwell, because they considered Evagoras's rule less burdensome and more equitable than that of their own governments at home. To mention all the others by name would be too great a task: [52] but who does not know about Conon, first among the Greeks for his very many glorious deeds, that when his own city had met with ill-fortune, he chose out of all the world Evagoras and came to him, believing that for himself Evagoras would provide the most secure asylum and for his country the most speedy assistance.

Isocrates. *Isocrates with an English Translation in three volumes*, by George Norlin, Ph.D., LL.D. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1980.

Hellenistic Cyprus

Aims

The third section deals with Hellenistic years. The presentation of events begins with Ptolemy I's conquest of the island and is completed with the establishment of the Hellenistic kingdoms by the Romans. Special reference is made to the reasons why it was essential for the Ptolemies to maintain control over Cyprus. Short mention is made of the social and cultural changes observed during the period in question.

After studying the third section the student should:

- Be aware of the primary facets of Ptolemaic administration in Cyprus and more specifically know the names and duties of the highest officials.
- Recognise the island's importance for the military safety of the Ptolemaic kingdom and its prime position concerning its economic activity.

Cyprus was one of the most important Ptolemaic conquests. Firstly its strategic position helped sustain the Ptolemaic sphere of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and secure stronghold over Egypt. Secondly the Ptolemies had an interest in assuring a continuous supply of key commodities not readily available in Egypt. The control of Cyprus also offered Ptolemaic kings an abundance of natural resources such as timber, necessary for buildings and ships.

The island's naval tradition was such that most of its largest cities were built on the sea, and this meant that amongst its population could be found experienced naval technicians and ship crews. Towards the last years of Ptolemaic administration, Paphos became the administrative centre, as it offered a port and an excellent geographical position. On the other hand copper, timber, agriculture and cattle breeding were an important part of Ptolemaic economy, which was greatly based on commerce, the import and export of products through the port of Alexandria. For these reasons the island was a possession of the Ptolemaic Empire longer than any land except Egypt.

Indeed we know very little about the economic administration of Cyprus. Alexander's and his *Successors'* typical practice of founding cities in conquered areas was also applied in Cyprus. Ptolemy II Philadelphos (283-246) founded three new cities bearing the name of his sister Arsinoë, who greatly influenced his policy. The ones built in the areas of Marion and Salamis were the most important. Even though such practices served financial purposes, we must not oversee their ideological ramifications. The new kings shall want to taint the conquered land with their own identity, connect to older local traditions and create new ones.

Ptolemaic administration

The command of such an important territory for the empire necessitated a strong administration, disposing of authority and prestige. This is why Ptolemy I Soter appointed his brother Menelaos *strategos* of Cyprus (c.310), based in Salamis. In fact Menelaos was the king of Salamis in the years after the death of Nikokreon and asserted the fact by issuing a small amount of royal coinage in addition to the large quantities of Alexander's coinage that continued to be emitted. Later, at the end of the 3rd century central administration and high officials' residencies were transferred to New Paphos, which was easily accessible by sea from Alexandria.

The **Strategos**, responsible for the governorship of the island was the person trusted by the royal court – that is why from the time of Ptolemaios Makron, the *stratego*i bore the highest rank of the Ptolemaic aulic hierarchy, “kinsman (syggeneis)” of the King –, sometimes part of the royal family and most of the time a Macedonian, although there are accounts of generals from other areas of Greece. For these officers of the Ptolemaic Empire, the governorship of Cyprus was usually the culminating point of a long career of service to the crown.

More often than not, the governorship of the island was offered to personalities capable of commanding armies and managing economical funds, but also able to adapt to the specificities of a place with ancient religious traditions, forever linked with the rhythms of people's lives. We have little information on the governors' duties during the 3rd century B.C., as most of the inscriptions

are dated after 217 B.C. The title “general of the island” appears towards the end of the 3rd century B.C. when Pelops occupies the position, while we also know the names of certain generals of the 2nd century B.C.

During the 2nd century B.C. the **strategos** appears to receive the title of **nauarch** (admiral of the Ptolemaic fleet) and **archiereus** (*high priest*) as well, undoubtedly due to the growing complexity of the Ptolemaic state’s administration, as well as the difficulty of controlling overseas areas. By the last decades of the 2nd century Cyprus became not only a military stronghold of importance but also the base for the royal fleet.

The first **strategos archiereus** is Polyktrates, during the reign of Ptolemy V Epiphanes (203-181). A more meticulous control of financial matters, also dates in this period, despite that there was a person responsible for the economy of the island. This was a delicate issue for the Ptolemies, who did not consider their conquered areas as colonies, the natural resources of which were to be completely drained. Rather, they were genuinely interested in their prosperity. The example of Ptolemy III (246-221) is indicative of this: during a long period of draught in Egypt he bought extra wheat from Cyprus and the Cyrene and had it shipped there

A court, whose members reported to him, accompanied the governor: the **phourarchos** were responsible for city security, the **hegemones** and **hipparchs** commanded military units – the Ptolemies kept a large number of mercenaries in Cyprus –, the **grammateis** and other administrative officers were under his supervision. However this court was more than just an administrative council. During Hellenistic years social and economic hierarchies of this type were in fact a reflection of the king’s ideas, values and behaviours, as well as a means by which royal ideology was transmitted to the whole of the empire. In addition the cities of the island seemed to enjoy limited self-rule. Various inscriptions witness the existence of a certain form of *boule* and *demos* and a person in charge of civic education who was called **gymnasiarch**. The Ptolemies themselves took over control of the mines, placing an official called an anti-strategos in charge.

Until the end of the 3rd century B.C. the Ptolemaic kingdom had succeeded in preserving the majority of the conquests from the years of Ptolemy I Soter. The long-lived Ptolemy II Philadelphos created, or enjoyed stability, during which the cultural reputation of Alexandria rose to spectacular heights. Cyprus was not an exception.

During the 2nd century however it faced serious internal problems – older historiography mentions great decadence, which is not confirmed to such an extent by the sources. Much of the recorded history of Ptolemaic Egypt of this period (217-30) consists of repetitious dynastic scandals and revolts. Discord in the royal family, continuous revolts of local populations in Egypt and relative financial problems were but a few of the issues the Ptolemies had to face during the 2nd and 1st centuries. This resulted in the loss of some of their major conquests, but not Cyprus – which remained, with Cyrene and certain areas of Syria, Ptolemaic until the arrival of the Romans – although the distance to Alexandria now seemed to have grown significantly.

Unwanted members of the royal family were expelled to the island, and pretenders to the throne found refuge there to escape conspiracies and threats. That is probably how Arsinoë III, sister and

wife of Ptolemy IV Philopator was exiled to Cyprus in 220 B.C. Ptolemy V's son Ptolemy VI Philometor tried to recapture Syria in an all too well-signalled attack in late 170 or early 169. He provoked a spectacular response from his uncle Antiochos IV, who invaded Egypt in the sixth Syrian war and won a conclusive battle at Pelousion, seizing Cyprus and the whole of Egypt except Alexandria. In 168 Antiochos invaded again to besiege Alexandria, but in July the Roman commander Gaius Popillius Laenas compelled him to abandon the invasion and give up Cyprus.

In 164 Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II Physkon, overthrew Ptolemy VI Philometor who took refuge in Rome and subsequently in Cyprus, before returning to Alexandria in 163 B.C. The removal of the two brothers fighting for power brought stability to Egypt. Distance did not however lessen their fury. The two brothers were intense rivals and each sought support from Rome. Ptolemy VIII attempted to conquer Cyprus twice, with the help of the Romans (in 155 and 153 B.C.). He was captured in Lapethos and as only saved thanks to his ingenious idea to make a will stating that if he died, his legitimate possession, Cyrene, would be passed on to Rome. In 146/5 B.C. the island is under the control of Ptolemy VIII, who following the death of the king Ptolemy VI murdered his legitimate heirs, Ptolemy VII Eupator, and seized the throne of the Empire in 144 B.C.

After eight years of ruthless battling with his sister Cleopatra II he left Alexandria and took refuge, once again in Cyprus, accompanied by Cleopatra III and the son of his great rival, Cleopatra II. Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II returned to Egypt in 130 B.C. but the situation was not sorted until 118 B.C. when he declared a general amnesty.

This truce did not last for long. Cleopatra III had to choose a king between her two sons, Ptolemy IX Soter II and Ptolemy X Alexander I. Her choice upset Alexander, who auto proclaimed himself king in Cyprus in 114 – he had been **strategos** of the island since 116 B.C. When Alexander was proclaimed king of Egypt in 107 B.C. it was his brother's Ptolemy IX turn to leave for Cyprus. Consequently, during a certain period of time the island was run by a separate administration and the presence of a Ptolemaic king – though self proclaimed – signified the existence of a specific social and political hierarchy more akin to that of a separate kingdom than a district of the empire.


Cyprus will again become part of the Ptolemaic Empire state in 88 B.C. When Ptolemy XII Auletes lost the island to the Romans in 58 B.C. the Alexandrians revolted and overthrew their king. This is indicative of how important Cyprus was to the security and the economy of Egypt.

Subsequent years are marked by the struggle for power in Rome between Anthony and Octave. In 40 B.C. Anthony offers Cyprus as a gift to Cleopatra II. The Ptolemaic defeat against Octave in 30 B.C. at Action marked the definitive dissolution of the Ptolemaic kingdom and the island's incorporation in the Roman administrative system.

Hellenistic Cyprus: culture, religion, and society

Salamis, Paphos, Kition Amathus, Kourion, continued to be the most important urban centres on the island. The Ptolemies pursued Alexander the Great's policy regarding coinage and the most important

mint was in Paphos. Some coins depicted the Cypriot goddess Aphrodite; others have designs simply copying the Ptolemaic bronze coins of Egypt. We can mention however the remarkable, large golden coins of Arsinoë II and the coinage issued by Cleopatra VII in Cyprus (47-30 BC) which includes a beautiful bronze coin depicting the famous Cleopatra with her child, the son of Julius Caesar.



The Hellenistic Gymnasium of Salamis

There is proof of the practice of various cultural activities in the *gymnasiums* of large cities such as Salamis, Paphos and Kition, for example theatrical representations that are accounted for on inscriptions. Cypriot athletes participated in *panhellenic* games and were also present in sanctuaries such as Delphi, where they were accepted as consuls. Hellenistic tendencies are dominant in art and the Attic influence, visible in the whole of the East Mediterranean is also present in Cyprus.

In the Hellenistic period some finger-rings became mounts for engraved or precious stones of glass set in large bezels. They indicated the official status of the owner. Snake finder –rings were common through the eastern Mediterranean, but Cyprus imported its glass finger-rings from Syrian workshops. Earrings of twisted wire, sometimes threaded with coloured beads and with elaborate terminals, were perhaps a Cypriot creation. A new motif, the ‘Heracles knot’, was adopted throughout the Hellenistic world from Egypt. Eros was a favourite motif on the island. Much of the jewellery found in Cyprus at this time, such as chain necklaces terminating in a Herakles knot or animal heads and earrings with pendants are also common elsewhere.

Cyprus BC – 7000 Years of History, Veronica Tatton-Brown, London, 1979, p.60.

Representations of Greek Gods are everywhere: Zeus, Apollo, Aphrodite and Artemis are now part of the Cypriot pantheon. However towards the end of the Ptolemaic period, certain cities founded a *Koinon* – *Koinon Kyprion* – for the worship of kings. The Ptolemies built their own temples, the *Ptolemaia*, and were worshipped alongside traditional deities. The worship of the Ptolemaic dynasty had taken two forms: 1. The official worship of the whole dynasty, which was imposed and promoted by the state, and 2. That practiced by the populations

towards their ruler and his family, which was their own initiative.



Statue of Aphrodite from Soli (Cyprus Archaeological Museum)

During this period Greek architecture developed, although little remains today because of the construction of Roman forums, theatres, and market places, on the ruins and foundations of buildings from the Hellenistic era. There are some majestic monuments of this era too, among which are the well-known Tombs of the Kings in Paphos, and the Theatre of Kourion. The latter was built in the 2nd century B.C. on a Greek plan and had an *orchestra* and a high *proskenion* supported by half-columns. At Soloi the walls of the palace, residence of a Ptolemaic official, were decorated with painted stucco, as were buildings in Alexandria. Paphos was planned on a grid system with particular functions assigned to different districts. Greek architectural fragments include Corinthian capitals, and Doric and Ionic mouldings.

In ceramics, sculpture, and jewellery the Cypriots followed the styles of the Hellenistic *koine*, inspired by the Alexandrian school. Stone sculpture continued to be produced, and portraiture, especially

depictions of the royal family, became the main form of representation.

For the first time the island had achieved linguistic coherence but Greek, the island's administrative language under the Ptolemies, was the same Greek koine and it was written in the Greek alphabet, not the Cypriot syllabary. Therefore, despite this unquestionable change in language and writing, we have evidence like papyrus documents from Nea Paphos confirming the fact that syllabic Greek was still in use in the first century B.C. This demonstrates the originality of the identity of Greek Cypriots who were neither related to Classical Athens nor to Hellenistic Alexandria. It was an exclusive Greek identity.

Roman Cyprus

Aims

The fourth section presents a very crucial period of the island's history: it is during this time that the population of Cyprus is christianised. The facts leading to the conquest of the island by the Romans are described, as well as features of Roman administration and the cultural background which made possible the acceptance of the Gospel by the population of Cyprus.

After studying the fourth section the student should:

- Comprehend the characteristics of the Roman administration of the island and recognise the titles borne by the dignitaries and officials of the time.
- Grasp the new economic, social and cultural structures created by the Roman empire in the East and in Cyprus.

Roman conquest of Ptolemaic Cyprus

During the first years of the 2nd century B.C. Antiochus III, king of the Seleucids and Rome were fighting over the area of the East Mediterranean, with the exception of Egypt. In 196 B.C. at the *Isthmia* Rome declared Greek freedom and independence. This balance of powers changes significantly after Antiochus' defeat and the Peace of *Apameia* (188), when he gave up most of Asia Minor. Roman presence in Asia Minor is hereafter established and Roman administrative order is imposed on the area.

The *Senate's* intervention in internal affairs of the Hellenistic kingdoms, mainly those of the Eastern Mediterranean, gradually becomes more direct. This was also caused by the constant conflicts between the kingdoms of the Seleucids and the Ptolemies, who would appeal to Rome very often, either to ask for help or for its mediation in their quarrels. We thus know that one of the first Roman interventions in Cyprus was in 168 B.C. when Popillius Laenas, the *Senate's* emissary, imposed on Antiochus IV the retreat of his forces from Cyprus and its surrender to the Ptolemies. Towards the end of the 2nd century B.C. Rome expanded its sphere of influence to Phrygia, Pamphylia and Kilikia, which were close to Cyprus. During this period the island is included in a list of "friends and allies of Rome", which seemed to be more and more preoccupied by the presence of pirates in the Eastern Mediterranean – a result of Ptolemaic and Seleucid incompetence and inability to control the area – and especially in Cyprus.

Roman intervention on the island became more permanent when Cyprus came under the control of the Senate from 58 to 48 B.C. and was included in the district of Kilikia. Caesar's adjutant, the Senator Clodius Pulcher, a very controversial personality of Roman history, demanded the annexation of the island after he was kidnapped by pirates in the large of Cyprus. He also delegated the famous orator Marcus Cato – accompanied by M. Junius Brutus (85-41 B.C.) – to transfer the royal treasury to Rome. Sources mention that the treasury contained an enormous amount, indicating the island's economic prosperity at the period.

We know very little of the Roman administration of the island at the time. Some information is given by Cicero, first *proconsul* of Cyprus in 51/50 B.C. – in fact *proconsul* of Kilikia, although he never actually resided in Cyprus. Neither do we know the regime of Cypriot cities or the tax system in place.

For approximately a decade the island kept changing hands between Rome and the Ptolemies, its regime changing depending on developments in the wider area. In 48 B.C., trapped in his involvement in Egypt, Julius Cesar relinquished control of the island to Arsinoe IV and Ptolemy XIII, whereas between 42 and 39 B.C. there is proof of the presence on the island of a Roman, M. Vehilius, as *pontifex* and *proconsul*. The following year Cyprus was again in the hands of the Ptolemies due to the relationship between Mark Anthony and Cleopatra.

This period of uncertainty ends in August of 30 B.C. when Octave, after his victory at Action against Cleopatra and Mark Anthony, conquers Alexandria and destroys the Ptolemaic kingdom. The Roman history of Cyprus begins at this moment.

Roman administration

In 23/2 B.C. August – Octave was thus named after his victory over Anthony and Cleopatra – ceded the control of Cyprus to the *Senate*. Up to that moment the island had been under his direct jurisdiction and was governed by the *legati* of the *Princeps*, while its population was considered *dediticii*. Under the *Senate* Cyprus was administered by a *proconsul*, who was over 40 and whose term lasted for a year. The *proconsul* was usually a Roman senator of praetorian status, determined by lot, which suggests that the central administration did not consider the presence of an exceptionally capable or talented proconsul to be of great importance. Thus, contrary to the Ptolemaic period, the commander of Roman Cyprus was probably not important. We have information regarding several dignitaries who governed Cyprus – 48 proconsuls for the years 22BC to AD 293.

The *proconsul* was assigned to his duties every 1st of July. He was responsible for the security of the island, had extensive administrative and legislative power and transmitted through his actions and decisions the values of Roman administration. He also expressed and applied the Senate's policy and later that of the Emperor. He was accompanied by lower dignitaries, such as the *quaestor provinciae* and a *legatus pro praetore*, who were also accompanied by their personal administrative staff. The abundant inscriptions inform us that the proconsul was responsible for the cities' embellishment with imperial statues, new constructions and the providing of funding for public works, road development and the preservation of public buildings such as baths, gymnasiums, theatres etc. The successful execution of the proconsul's duties was judged by the number of problems his successor in the area was called upon to deal with.

The *quaestor provinciae* was the financial administrator and answered directly to the Senate. From the 1st century AD there is a modification, as a *procurator* assigned directly by the Emperor appears on the island. This is perhaps an indication of the competitive relation between the Senate and the Emperor, and the latter's effort to better control the district's financial issues. The cities of Cyprus were also assigned a *curator civitatis* – his existence is confirmed in Paphos, Soloi and Kition – responsible for monitoring and controlling expenses. The *limenarcha Cypri* overlooked the functioning of ports and the export of products. There were of course a number of other dignitaries responsible for city and province administration. The proper cooperation between the three officials *proconsul*, *quaestor provinciae* and *legatus pro praetor* was the necessary condition for the smooth governance of the island.

The Romans did however attempt to divide Cyprus into four administrative areas: Salamis, Lapethos, Amathous and Paphos, where there were approximately 12 to 13 large or small cities: Lapethos, Amathous, Paphos, Curium, Amathous, Kition, Salamis, Carpasia, Keryneia, Soloi, Arsinoe, Chytri, Tamassos.

As in the Ptolemaic period, the aristocracy governed these cities,. The Romans had no reason to disrupt the pre-existing system. The *council*, the *magistrates* and the *assembly* all functioned properly, with the *gymnasiarches*, who supervised education, the *secretary* and the *treasurer*, assuming important responsibilities. The demos does not appear to have had significant powers, though it elected the archon, who presided its sessions for a year. Contrary to other cities of the Greek

region or eastern Roman provinces, Cypriot cities were not free, and it appears that pre-existing institutions took on a Roman character. We know, for example, of the existence of a Senate in Salamis, serving mainly religious purposes, but also being responsible for bestowing honours on exceptional citizens.

Again, as in the Ptolemaic period, Nea Paphos was the island's administrative centre where military, economic, legislative and military powers concentrated. It was home to the proconsul and the great majority of Roman state officials. The ancient sanctuary of Aphrodite in the area also attracted Roman attention. In fact Venus, the Roman Aphrodite, became the mother and chief goddess of Rome and its empire, and specifically the mother of the Julio-Claudian Gens Veneris (27BC-68AD).

The Jews of Cyprus, who following the example of Judea very often revolted, caused most of the problems the Roman administration on the island had to face. There were Jewish communities in Antiochia, Alexandria, Egypt, Cyrene and Cyprus, where their numbers grew significantly during the last years of Ptolemaic rule and of course the Roman period. It was spread to Cyprus from other provinces. Sources mention hecatombs of victims. Even though the account is exaggerated, we can assume that this was one of the bloodiest and disastrous events in ancient Cypriot history. The proconsul's inability to dynamically face the revolt was due to the inexistence of a military force. Luisus Quietus, who was assigned by the Emperor to subdue the uprising throughout the East, also ended the Jewish revolt in Cyprus.

Artemion, leader of the revolutionaries, massively slaughtered local populations, whilst Salamis was greatly destroyed but later rebuilt through the Emperor Trajan's beneficence. The final restoration of order by the Romans was made through the imposing of strict measures against Jews that stayed in force long after the end of the revolt.

The Roman Empire's great period of instability (180-235) did not leave Cyprus unaffected, particularly as the eastern Roman provinces were facing the risk of passing under Sassanide rule. Karakalla's famous decree of 212, by which all subjects of the Empire were granted the rights of Roman citizens, did little to ease the situation.

Diocletian's rise to the throne (284-305) brought significant modifications to the Roman Empire's administrative system, which also affected Cyprus. After the division of the Empire into East and West in 293 (the so called **system of tetrarchy**), the island was included in the Eastern part of the Roman State. This development had a major ramification: Cyprus no longer had a *proconsul* but a *consularis*, who was under the jurisdiction of the *Praetorian Prefect of the Orient* (*praefectus praetorio orientis*) residing in Syrian Antioch

In the following years the Empire was torn between continuous struggles amongst aspiring emperors. Constantine was the ultimate victor, the man whose name is forever linked with Christianity and the transfer of the capital from West to East, from Rome to ancient Byzantium, now named Constantinople.

A great earthquake destroyed Salamis (332) and ten years later another, even greater, earthquake caused part of the city to sink into the sea. Constantius II (AD 337-361) exempted the citizens from payment of tax for four years and rebuilt a large part of the city, which became the capital and was

renamed **Constantia**. This change marks the end of an era, the rise of Christianity and the end of the Ancient world.

Throughout these years Cyprus was under the jurisdiction of the *Vicar of the Orient*, who was based in Antiochia. This continued until the time of Justinian (527-565), when the commander of the island is in direct relation to the Empire's administrative headquarters.

Roman Cyprus: economy, society, and religion

Cyprus was important to the Romans, but never as important as it was to the Ptolemies. The island's geographical position, as a passageway between the East and the West, its ports and anchorages, the copper mines, the timber, and the natural medicaments, still made it significant to the Romans, particularly for economic reasons. The economic significance of the island is for example evidenced in the re-building of Paphos by Augustus, following its destruction by the earthquake.

However, during the Roman period, the element that had for centuries been connected to the island's name, copper, appears to have been less important than in the previous periods. Like the Ptolemies, nevertheless, the Romans obtained for themselves the direct benefit from the copper mines that were under imperial control. In fact, *imperial procurators* were responsible for their proper functioning. The historian Flavius Josephus reports that in 12 B.C., with the permission of Augustus, half the production of the Soloi mines was leased to Herod the Great of Judea.

It is noteworthy that even though Cypriot communities were powerful and prosperous, they did not bring forth any important dignitaries, neither locally nor in the general Roman administration, with the exception of Cl. Leontichus Illyrius from Lapethos, who became *proconsul* of Cyprus and Achaea. This is perhaps due to the fact that the Cypriot population, due to taxation, occupied itself with farming and agriculture, as well as other sorts of manual work, such as metallurgy, and was attached to its land. The culture of Cyprus remained predominantly insular.

Cypriots produced excellent wine, olive oil and fabrics, and the great majority of the inhabitants must have been involved in their production. This probably resulted in the absence of a middle class, capable of rendering personalities for administrative tasks. However, the economic prosperity during the larger part of the Roman period led to the rise of a local aristocracy, dealing with commerce and the exploitation of fertile land. As for the lower class, it appears to have remained completely subdued, both politically and socially, to the aristocracy and the Roman administration.

There is a large number of inscriptions bearing the names of local musicians, philosophers, poets, doctors, but very rarely dignitaries or public officials dealing with practical matters. Amongst illustrious personalities is the philosopher Bacchion from Paphos, who was so famous for his brilliant mind that he was honoured by the great oracle of Delphi in 150-160 AD. In fact one of Rome's most educated emperors, Marcus Aurelius, was his disciple. There was also the famous doctor Zenon from Kition, who lived in Alexandria during the 4th century. Medical science must have been especially popular in Cyprus, judging from the number of names of Cypriot doctors mentioned on inscriptions, as well as the abundance of medical-related objects found in archaeological sites. The great sanctuary

of Asklepios in Paphos also attests to this assertion.

The island's cultural identity, its language and script, as they had been defined during the Ptolemaic period, through the systematic use of the Greek alphabet and the gradual adoption of the *Common* Greek language, were not threatened by the Romans. Roman imperial policy in general seems to have had little interest in Romanising Cyprus. In fact the only inscriptions in Latin found are the ones relating to the construction and inauguration of public buildings. Skilled artisans working in Cyprus were responsible for a fine series of mosaics. Sculptors, bronze-workers and jewellers remained active, though specifically Cypriot products are often difficult to identify.

From what actually survives in the ruins of Paphos and Salamis it is clear that these two cities were the leaders in the development of culture and arts in Roman Cyprus. Excavations in the other cities, however, show quite clearly that the flowering of the arts was by no means the prerogative of Paphos and Salamis only. The architecture art of Roman Cyprus is marked by a mixture of local and foreign styles and trends that also characterized the art and architecture of the Hellenistic period. There is for example, imported sculpture of the highest quality in marble and in metal which clearly belong to mainstream imperial art or at least to the art of world – famous artistic centres.

Michaelides, D. 1982, 'The Roman Period – 30BC – AD330', in: *Footprints in Cyprus – An illustrated History*, David Hunt (ed.), p. 110-133.

The *Koino Kyprion*, based in Paphos, pursued its activities throughout the Roman period, through the worship of Aphrodite and the organisation of games in her honour. The *Koinon* struck coins using the Greek language and representing either the temple of Aphrodite in Paphos or the cult statue of the Olympian Zeus of Salamis, which indicates that these were the two most important cities. The *Koinon* was their primary representative and according to the inscription found in the Olympion temple of Zeus in Athens, in 132 AD the Cypriot cities – as well as other Greek cities – honoured the emperor Adrian for the

reconstruction of this important Greek temple (IG II/1112 3296:). Many of the decisions made by this institution were related to the worship of the gods and the emperor.

For the island's population, the passage from the worship of Ptolemaic kings to that of the Roman emperor and specifically August, the conqueror of Cyprus, was not difficult. As an illustrious scholar of Roman Cyprus wrote: «There is abundant evidence that the Cypriots faced these religious obligations with fidelity and indeed with enthusiasm». The priests of the temples of Paphos and Salamis assured that the necessary importance was accorded, not only to the religious, but also the political and ideological dimension of the honours to the emperor. An inscription was found in Paphos, revealing exactly the way in which the Cypriots officially expressed their devotion to the emperor. This oath was taken every year by the *Koinon* at the temple of Aphrodite in Old Paphos (Palaepaphos). The cities' high priests elected a priest for a year, who would be responsible for the correct organisation and fulfilment of the *Koinon Kyprion* religious matters.

By our own Aphrodite of the Headland, our own Maiden, our own Apollo of Hyle, our own Apollo of Ceryneia, our own Saving Dioscouri, the Common Hearth of Cyprus within the Council House, the Gods and Goddesses of our fathers that are common to this Island, the Offspring of Aphrodite who is the God Caesar Augustus, Rome the Everlasting and all other Gods and Goddesses: we, ourselves and our children, [swear]: to harken unto and to obey alike by land and sea, to regard with loyalty and worship TIBERIUS CAESAR AUGUSTUS son of AUGUSTUS, with all HIS HOUSE, to have the same friends and the same foes as they, to propose the voting of [Divine Honours] to ROME and to TIBERIUS CAESAR AUGUSTUS, son of AUGUSTUS, and to the SONS of his BLOOD, to these only, together with the other GODS, and to none other at all. If we keep this oath, may prosperity be ours; if we break it, may the opposite befall us.

Cypriot oath to Tiberius, discovered near Paphos in 1959, trans. T. B. Mitford, *Roman Cyprus*, p. 1348

We can assume that the archaeological material and written evidence, though limited, present a fairly consistent picture of public religion in Roman Cyprus. More than 20 temples, in addition to houses of the imperial cult, were scattered across the island. As already mentioned there were three great temples: the sanctuary of Aphrodite at Palaepaphos, the temple of Aphrodite at Amathous and the temple of Zeus Olympios at Salamis. Tacitus conserves the information that the *Senate* confirmed their rights of amnesty (*asylia*) in 22 AD. This indicates the importance of worshiping sites, not only for local population but also for the Romans. They became monumental during the Ptolemaic and the Roman period, while the Roman act of

promoting these sanctuaries through imperial and Roman worshiping practices is perhaps indicative of their effort to unify and consolidate the island.

The broader conditions prevailing in Roman Cyprus, began to change with the rapid spreading of Christianity in the area of Syria and Palestine. In 45 AD a Cypriot Jew, the Apostle Barnabas, his friend and covoyager Apostle Paul, and his nephew Mark, reached the island to preach the gospel. They were not very successful, judging from the reactions of pagans and Jews who were quite hostile towards them. A few years later, in 49 AD, Barnabas and Mark returned to Cyprus, this time ordaining bishops, for example Lazarus in Kition. However, the Apostle Barnabas, founder of the Church of Cyprus, died tragically in 57 AD when he was stoned to death by the island's Jews. He was buried by Mark near ancient Salamis. Therefore despite the coming of St. Paul and St. Barnabas the surviving evidence shows undeniably that Christianity had made very little progress in Cyprus during the first three centuries of our era. Christianity spread rapidly on the island after the 4th century and this was also due to the significant *authority bestowed upon bishops*. In fact *“although politically subordinate to the Imperial government, the archbishop of mid-4th century Cyprus was the unquestioned representative not merely of his metropolis but of the entire island. This autonomy, which bordered on the despotic, is well illustrated by Epiphanius, who campaigned throughout his long career against the writings of Origen; was active in the persecution of Chrysostom; and for his immediate opponents had Gnostics of the Marchianist heresy, who at one point reduced Salamis to a state of siege – while his death was the signal for savage rioting. For his memorial Epiphanius, an avowed enemy of Hellenic culture, has not merely his great basilica, but the final extinction of ancient Hellenism in Cyprus”*[Terence Bruce Mitford, *Roman Cyprus*, p. 1382].

Two illustrious bishops are worth mentioning: Spiridon of Trimithounta who died martyrically shortly after his participation in the Nikaia Ecumenical Synod, and Epiphanius (368–403), bishop of Konstantia and Archbishop of Cyprus.

After the fourth century AD the previous centres of religious life were abandoned and replaced by new monuments marking the dawn of a new era, that of Christianity. After fifteen centuries of uninterrupted use the sanctuary of Aphrodite in Palaipaphos collapsed after the great earthquake (370); the Apollo Hylates sanctuary in Kourion declined a few decades before the erection of a civil basilica (420s); the impressive roman temple of Aphrodite in the acropolis of Amathus was replaced in the mid 3rd century by a large basilica; the Zeus temple in Salamis ceased to exist as a religious centre around 350 BC. A few years later a monumental church was built in honour of St. Epiphanius. This evidence demonstrates the dynamic of the new religion and its impressive propagation in Cyprus, which by the end of the 4th century became one of the most notable centres of Christianity.

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CHAPTER 2

**Cyprus under the Byzantine
Empire, 324-1191**

V a s i l i k i N e r a n t z i - V a r m a z i

Aims

This unit aims to examine the various political and social changes in Cyprus from the 4th to the end of the 12th centuries.

After studying this unit, students will be in a position to

- Understand the continuity of the events in a such a long period
- Understand the particularities of the history of Cyprus during the Byzantine period

Keywords

- Administration
- Arab raids
- Treaty of 686
- Annexation
- Cypriot Church
- Rebel movements
- Crusades
- Isaacius Komnenus

Introduction

Cyprus played an important role in the history of the Eastern Mediterranean during the middle Ages. It was an almost compulsory station for the pilgrims traveling to the Holy Land and a place of conflicting interests between the Byzantines and the Arabs from the middle of the 7th to the middle of the 10th century. Later it was used by the crusaders as a base for every kind of supplies and it finally became a commercial center for the Italian naval cities, especially Venice and Genoa.

For all these reasons Cyprus is present to many medieval sources of all kinds--historical and literary works, ecclesiastical and hagiological texts, law documents, archives etc., written in Greek, Latin, Arabic and occasionally in a new language of Latin origin. Among all, the Greek sources are most reliable and best dated and they form the ground on which all other information can be based. That is valid especially for the period from the 4th to the 12th century. For the following centuries (13th-15th) the Byzantine sources are supplementary to the Latin, Italian, French and the authentic Cypriot sources.

First Byzantine Period (324-648)

Cyprus in the 4th and 5th century

According to the provincial administrative system of the Roman Empire, introduced by Diocletian (284-305) and completed by Constantine the Great (324-337), Cyprus was a province (*provincia*) of the *diocesis* of the East, whose capital was Antioch by the river Orontes in Syria. That *diocesis* was part of the big *praefecture* of the East (*praefectura praetorio per Orientem*), the largest administrative periphery of the whole Empire.

In the conflict between Licinius and Constantine the Great (323-324) Cypriots stood by Licinius, to whose jurisdiction Cyprus belonged. However, following Licinius's defeat, Constantine remained the sole ruler of the Empire and Cyprus became part of his large State.

Isolated in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea at that time, Cyprus was often victim of incursions by the pirates. For that reason Constantine took care and deployed as new governor of the island an ambitious general named Kalokairos, who only some years later (in 333) revolted against the emperor and proclaimed himself independent ruler of Cyprus. His attempt was unsuccessful and Kalokairos was captured and punished to death by fire. His punishment was executed in Cilician Tarsos. Nevertheless, Kalokairos inaugurated in Cyprus a line of revolutionary movements run by local ambitious Byzantine governors, who took the chance to revolt against the central government of the Empire--they took advantage of the distance that separated them from the capital, Constantinople, and also of the readiness of the inhabitants of the island to become independent.

Kalokairos is also known through a Cypriot folk tradition that connects him with the "cats of the monastery of St. Nicholas" in the south coast of the island. According to this tradition, in the beginning of the 4th century, Cyprus passed a long period of drought, fact which led to the land remain uncultivated, and thus, get replete with snakes. As soon as this period was over, Kalokairos brought to Cyprus a great number of cats in order for them to combat with (weird) the snakes. The monks of the monastery of St. Nicholas undertook the responsibility to feed these cats.

In 332 and in 342 earthquakes hit Cyprus and many cities were destroyed, among which was also the capital Salamis. This city was rebuilt during the reign of Constantius (337-361), son and successor of Constantine the Great, in whose honor the city was renamed Constantia. The same emperor exempted from taxes for a period of four years the surviving inhabitants of Salamis, in order to give them the opportunity to recover from the earthquake of 342.

During the middle of the 4th century, governor of Cyprus was Kyrinos, whom the contemporary orator Livanios praises both as a good archon and a sophist.

Many other physical catastrophes hit Cyprus by the end of the 4th and the beginning of the 5th century. The worst of them occurred in the last years of the 4th century, when a big famine stroke the island and the inhabitants were saved only thanks to the help of saint Epiphanius, bishop of Salamis. Some years later, an Isaurian invasion from the south coast of Asia Minor caused further troubles to the Cypriots.

Cyprus was also used as a place of exile. Emperor Arkadios (395-408) exiled to Cyprus Eutropios, a highly ranked court officer (he was *praepositus sacri cubiculi*), as soon as the latter fell in disgrace. Eutropios is more known through his controversy with Ioannes Chrysostomos, the patriarch of Constantinople at that time.

The Cypriot Church

The history of the Christian church of Cyprus during the first Byzantine centuries is of special interest. Christianity was spread in Cyprus early on by Apostle Barnabas, pupil of Apostle Paul. Nevertheless, the appearance of a large number of heresies caused problems to the population, fact which called for the need of a Great Father of the Church that would root out the various heresies and ensure the predominance of orthodoxy in Cyprus. The most important of these ecclesiastical Fathers were Spyridon of Trimithous (who took part in the First Ecumenical Council of Nikaia in 325 and was one of the essential adversaries of Arius and his heresy Arianism) and Epiphanius, bishop of Salamis, an inspired theologian and writer.



Fresco from the church of Panaghia Asinou (1106 AD)

Around the same period, many saints of the Eastern Christian church lived in Cyprus or worked there for a long time, like Saint Therapon, Saint Ilarion, Saint Trifyllios and others. All these contributed to the final victory of Christianity over paganism and the heresies.

Excavations pertinent to buildings that were constructed after the earthquake of 342 show that paganism had almost disappeared from Cyprus by the end of the 4th century and that the problems caused by the various heresies were over as soon as Epiphanius of Salamis asked from the emperor Theodosios to expel from Cyprus all the heretics--Savelians, Simonians, Nicolaites and many others--something which he attained. From that time onwards the Church of Cyprus was devoted to its Christian purpose.

In the early 4th century, the Patriarchate of Antioch required to include the Church of Cyprus in the area of its jurisdiction. The leadership of the Cypriot Church reacted and showed its resolution to stand away from Antioch. Its representatives strongly supported their rights and independence against the Patriarch of Antioch during the 3rd Ecumenical Synod at Ephesus in 431. At the same time, Constantinople wanted to weaken the other Patriarchates, and especially the Patriarchate of Antioch, and for that reason encouraged the trends for independence. Before the end of the 5th century, when Emperor in Constantinople was Zeno, namely between 485 and 489, a miracle came

to help solve the religious problems. Beneath a locust tree (*kerataia*) near Salamis, were found the relics of St. Barnabas having on his chest a copy of the Matthew Gospel written in his own hand. This event reinforced the Cypriot position and promoted the independence and autonomy of the Church of Cyprus. As a result, from the time of emperor Zeno (476-491), the Cypriot Church was an autocephalous archbishopric. The archbishop was elected by the fourteen bishops holding the seats of the largest cities of the island and his election was certified by the emperor himself and not by the patriarch or the Holy Synod of Constantinople. His position was very high in the ecclesiastical hierarchy; the Archbishop of Cyprus was mentioned immediately after the five patriarchs.

Administrative changes in the 6th and the 7th century

Administrative changes occurred in the political situation in Cyprus just before the mid-6th century. According to the administrative manual, known as Synekdemosis of Hierokles, in the year 535 Cyprus remained a separate province under a “consularius” and included the following cities: Constantia (the capital), Tamassos, Kitis, Amathus, Korin (Kourion), Paphos, Arsinoe, Soloi, Lapithos, Kythroi, Karpasin, Trimithous, Lefkousia. A novel (new Law, novella) of Justinian I, issued in the same year, notifies the annual financial obligations of the ruler of Cyprus to the central government of the state amounting to 76 golden coins, an amount of money quite high for that period.

A few years later the situation changed dramatically. Justinian (527-565) tried to militarize the administration in some remote areas of his state, thereby reforming the provincial administrative system of Constantine the Great based on the complete separation of the political from the military power. Part of these efforts was the strange civilian / military administration created in 537, the “quaestura iustiniana exercitus”, which included Cyprus together with the northern peripheries of the state and the Aegean islands. This administration was apparently created in order to strengthen the financially weakened--due to barbarian invasions--districts of the Danube with the income of the richest areas of Cyprus and of the other islands, which were experiencing at the time a period of relative calm and prosperity. In any case, this administration does not appear to have been maintained for a long time and must have been abolished immediately after Justinian’s death (565).

We do not possess specific information regarding the administrative system in Cyprus for the period between the mid-6th and the mid-7th century. But we know that during the Byzantine-Persian war, at the time of Heraklius’ reign (610-641) and especially in the second decade of the 7th century, Christian refugees from Palestine and Egypt had fled to the island seeking peace and security. Among these was the patriarch of Alexandria John the Merciful (610-619), who was a Cypriot. In the 7th century, the militarization of the government in several provinces of the Empire was continued with the division of the State into “themata” (= large political and military regions) and the appointment of a governor as a general (“strategos”) having gradually begun--the governor gathered in himself the political and military power. Cyprus was not included in that division, because in the meantime, the Arab invasions had started, which by the mid-7th century had created a new situation on the island.

Economic life

Although information is scarce, it seems that the main factor of economic life in Cyprus during the early Byzantine period (Late Antiquity) was the cultivation of land, and therefore, both the residents and the state based their major income and higher tax revenues on agrarian economy. Of course there was trade, although it was not always strongly developed. The maritime communication of the island with the opposite shores of Asia Minor and Palestine and with the capital, Constantinople, was frequent. This is the picture offered in the numerous Lives of saints relating to early Byzantine Cyprus and in the archaeological findings of the period. Moreover, the southwest coast of Cyprus was a trade station for the transport of grain from Egypt to Constantinople, since the plains of Egypt supplied Constantinople --like ancient Rome--with grain until the time of the conquest of Egypt by the Arabs (640-642 AD).

It is clear from the sources that many disasters hit Cyprus in the early Byzantine period, including droughts, earthquakes, famines, and piracy, as well as population movements, but all these did not substantially affect the vitality of the island, since the inhabitants managed to recover from each natural disaster and attack.

Period of Arab raids

The first Arab raids

The Arabs adopted Islam in 622 AD and soon after they extended their rule outside the Arabic peninsula. They prevailed in Syria after the battle in the river Yarmuk in 636, conquered Jerusalem in 638, and became masters of Egypt in 641-642. Thus, they arrived on the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean, where they began to build ships by exploiting the maritime knowledge of the local residents. Aiming at dominating the Mediterranean, Cyprus was one of their primary navigational goals.

The exact date of the first invasion of Arabs in Cyprus is dubious. In the 10th century, the emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus mentions in his work "De thematibus" an Arab invasion in Cyprus as having occurred in the reign of Heraklios (610-641) and Caliph Abu Bakhr (632-634). This testimony is obviously wrong, because when Abu Bakhr was Caliph, between 632 and 634, the Arabs had not completed the conquest of Syria and had not yet reached the Mediterranean coast.

According to Theophanes the Confessor, who wrote his Chronography in the early years of the 9th century, the first Arab invasion in Cyprus had occurred in 648/9.

Leader of the Arabs was Moavia, who was not at that time caliph (he became caliph only in 661), but commander of an area in Syria. The Arabs campaigned against Cyprus with a large fleet of 1700 ships. They destroyed the capital Salamis and pillaged the country, but when they heard that a large Byzantine fleet was coming against them, they left the island and went back to the Syrian coast.

This information by Theophanes is supported by the testimony of Arab sources and of a fragmentary inscription found in an excavation in Cyprus (1974).

The attacks of the Arabs on Cyprus continued during the next years, but none of them ended up in a complete conquest of the island.

The first Arab attacks on Cyprus are also present in the Lives of Cypriot Saints, describing the unsuccessful efforts of the Arab invaders to abuse relics of saints. In the same texts are mentioned the transferrings of relics out of Cyprus (especially in Constantinople) under the threat of the Muslims.

The treaty of 686 and its consequences

An important landmark in the history of Cyprus is the treaty of 686 between the Byzantines and Arabs. This treaty was a renewal of the treaty that was first signed in 678 after the defeat of the Arabs in the siege of Constantinople (673-678). According to that treaty, the Arabs were obliged to pay to the Byzantine emperor 365,000 golden coins, 365 horses, and 365 slaves per year. In the renewal of

the treaty in 686 a new term was added, namely the sharing of taxes between the Byzantines and the Arabs that live border regions: Cyprus, Armenia and Iberia (Caucasus).

This latter term caused a lot of trouble to the Cypriots. The equal distribution of taxes was making Cyprus neutral and vulnerable both to the Arabs and the Byzantines.

The emperor Justinian II (685-695 and 705-711), the last member of the Heraklios' dynasty, inaugurated a period of upheaval on Cyprus and its inhabitants. In 691 Justinian II got furious with the Arab caliph Avimelech, who paid the tax of 365,000 coins not in Byzantine golden coins but in newly cut Arab golden coins. As a result, Justinian II called off the peace with the Arabs and wanting to punish them by depriving them from the taxes of Cyprus forced the Cypriots to abandon their island and immigrate to Asia Minor. Most of the Cypriots who were obliged to immigrate settled in the northwest of Asia Minor, in the region of Kyzikos, near the Hellespont. Among them were bishops of the cities of Cyprus and the archbishop John. The emperor Justinian II gave to the archbishop large jurisdiction, even more than that of the bishop of Kyzikos. The ecumenical Council of 691/692 certified the privileges of the archbishop John in his new region, where a new town was built named Ioustinianoupolis in honor of the emperor Justinian II.

The Cypriots remained in Ioustinianoupolis and the surrounding area for seven years (until 698), when one of the successors of Justinian II, the emperor Tiberios III (698-705) repatriated them to Cyprus. This emperor had previously served as a commander (*droungarios*) of the *theme of Kibyraiotes* in southwest Asia Minor and was fully aware of the situation in the eastern Mediterranean sea. Certainly he believed that the repatriation of Cypriots on their island could help the defense of the eastern Mediterranean against the Arabs who at that time were spreading rapidly in North Africa and the Mediterranean.

Before the final repatriation of the Cypriots, negotiations had taken place between the Byzantines and the Arabs. The latter were forced to allow the return home of the Cypriots who were probably prisoners in Syria and Palestine. Only after the Arabs fulfilled this obligation did the Byzantine emperor help the Cypriots who lived near Hellespont and in other Asia Minor regions to return to Cyprus.

To these events is related another information given by the Byzantine writer Anastasios of Sinai, who wrote during the second half of the 7th century. His testimony has to do with the presence of Cypriot prisoners near the Dead Sea. Anastasios Sinaitis insists that the Cypriots were the only prisoners capable of withstanding the harsh climatic conditions of the Dead Sea, because the climate there was similar to the climate of their homeland Cyprus.

Writing in the 10th century, the emperor Constantine Porfyrogennetus testifies that Cyprus had remained uninhabited for seven years in the last decade of the 7th century. This of course is an exaggeration. Nevertheless we have to believe that the population of the island in this period had been reduced to the minimum, because Cypriots were living in many parts of Asia Minor and also in Syria and Palestine.

Cyprus between Byzantines and Arabs in 8th and 9th century

Since the first decades of the 8th century the relations between the Byzantines and the Arabs experienced a new phase. The rise of the Isaurian dynasty to the Byzantine throne in 717 and the failure of the Arabs to conquer Constantinople after its second siege in 717-718, encouraged the Byzantines to take aggressive actions against Muslims during the next years. In 740 the Arabs were defeated in the battle of Akroinon (Frygia) and after that they were obliged to evacuate the largest part of Asia Minor. Since then the struggle between Byzantium and the Caliphate was confined in border conflicts.

The fights around Cyprus belong within the framework of these border conflicts. They depended essentially upon the action of the Byzantine and Arab fleets in the eastern Mediterranean.

The interest of Arabs in the eastern Mediterranean remained strong until the mid-8th century. That is as long as the dynasty of Omaiads lasted and the capital of the caliphate was Damascus. After 750 and especially after the transfer of the capital of the caliphate from Damascus to Baghdad the interest in the Mediterranean Sea came in second place.

In the first half of the 8th century, however, Arabs made their presence in Cyprus felt. We know that in 718, after the inglorious end of the second siege of Constantinople by the Arabs, the winds caused their ships--that were leaving Bosphorus and Marmara--to scatter and several of them to arrive at Cyprus.

According to another testimony, that of Theophanes' Chronography, in 742 Arabs had tried another transfer of Cypriot population to Syria. The exact number of this population is unknown neither is it known whether they stayed in Syria for a short time or permanently.

In 746 the Byzantine fleet moored in Cyprus and a little later came to the same place a large Saracen fleet. The conflict was inevitable and in the sea battle that followed the Byzantine navy defeated the Arabs--the Greek fire burnt most of their ships and allowed for the capturing of the rest, so that from the thousand Arab ships it was only three that escaped. The simultaneous presence of Byzantines and Arabs in Cypriot coasts probably indicates that we are still in a period of condominium of the two powers on the island. However, there are testimonies that manifest that, during the first period of the iconoclast crisis, iconoclasm never spread in Cyprus and many believers of the icons were exiled to the island or fled there. Especially in the years of the reign of the Emperor Constantine V (741-775), Cyprus was used as a place for exile of the monks who insisted in venerating icons and they denied leaving the monastic life.

All these pieces of information suggest that during this period the Byzantines had a kind of control of the island. About the same time Christian refugees from Syria and Palestine resorted to Cyprus or used Cyprus as a first stopping point in their wondering into Byzantine territory. To all those, the emperor Michael I Rangabe (811-813) and the patriarch Nikephoros gave financial aid and took care of them in other ways.

New raids of the Arabs against Cyprus took place when Caliph was Harun al Rashid (786-809), one of the most important sovereigns of the Abbasid Dynasty. At that period the Byzantine Empire had serious internal problems and was unable to keep a firm stance against its enemies. Especially in 790, a sea battle took place between the Byzantines and the Saracens near the Cypriot coast. The Byzantines were defeated and the general Theophilos was captured and taken in front of Harun al Rashid. He was punished with a martyr's death because he denied changing faith and becoming a Muslim.

Some years later Harun al Rashid leading a numerous army carried out a major campaign in Asia Minor, captured some border Byzantine castles and destroyed them, while another part of his army proceeded until Ankara. The Emperor Nikephoros I (802-811) was unable to fight him decisively and after negotiations a treaty was signed. According to the treaty, the Byzantine Emperor was obliged to pay to the Caliph 30,000 golden coins every year. Another term of the treaty forbade the Byzantines to rebuild the castles that the Arabs had captured during their last campaign in Asia Minor. Emperor Nikephoros I did not obey to this term and soon later rebuilt the destroyed castles. Then Harun al Rashid revenged by ordering a new raid in Cyprus. In 806 the Arab navy arrived in Cyprus and the soldiers who debarked from the ships captured towns, destroyed churches and transferred many of the inhabitants to Syria.

Once again the installation of Arabs in Cyprus was not permanent, since we know that during the next years contacts between Cyprus and Byzantium were often. An "Archon of Cyprus" is referred to in a catalog of Byzantine officials in the middle of the 9th century (Taktikon Uspenskij of 842/43). A little later in 878 a letter of the Patriarch Photios was sent to Stavrakios "archon" (Eparchon) of Cyprus.

During the reign of Basil I (867-886), the founder of the Macedonian Dynasty, Cyprus is referred to as a "theme" (military and administrative unity) for seven years. The information is given by Constantine Porphyrogenitus in his work "De tematibus". We do not know for the exact years that this took place but we do know that a general named Alexios Armenios served as a "strategos" of Cyprus. Immediately after these seven years the Arabs interfered again and the island paid taxes to them as in the previous centuries. However, it is clear that for a short period between 867-886 Cyprus was intergraded totally in the Byzantine provincial administrative system.

From the *Life* of Saint Constantine the Jew, who lived for a few years in Cyprus in the second half of the 9th century, we learn that the saint was obliged to interrupt his peregrination because of an invasion of Saracens who taxed the island together with the Byzantines for centuries. This is one more testimony for the fact that the condominium in Cyprus lasted yet in this period.

The crisis of the 10th century

During the first years of the 10th century Cyprus had close relations with the capital of the Byzantine Empire. In 901-2 the relics of St. Lazaros were moved from Cyprus (namely the Kition) and were placed in the church which had just been built in Constantinople by Emperor Leo VI the Wise (886-912). About the same period, in a Byzantine textbook teaching the tactics of war, Cyprus is marked as a strategically important site for the Byzantine naval forces. The generals had to gather their ships in Cyprus and from there to attack enemy ships were coming from Syria, Palestine and Egypt. It is therefore obvious that in a case of crisis Cyprus was used as a center of the Byzantine war fleet.

A little later the emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogennitos (944-959) in his work “De ceremoniis” notes the obligation of the ruler of Cyprus to send spies in the Gulf of Tarsos and in Tripoli and the Syrian Laodicea, who would gather information on the movements of the Saracens.



Fresco in Lampadistis Monastery, Kalopanagiotis

All these testimonies show a kind of cooperation between Constantinople and Cyprus. Nevertheless in the same time the Arabs also had a basis in Cyprus. In the autumn of 904 the Saracen ships carrying prisoners that the pirates had captured two months earlier in Thessaloniki stopped for supply in the area of Paphos. The testimony is given by John Kaminiates, a priest from Thessaloniki, who was one of the prisoners.

The fall of Thessaloniki, the second city of the Empire, to the Arabs was not an isolated event. Following the third decade of the 9th century, since the Arabs had captured Crete, the Aegean islands and the coasts of Greece and Asia Minor suffered a lot from the pirates' raids. After the fall of Thessaloniki the Byzantine government decided to take drastic measures against the pirates. In head of a large fleet, general Imerios toured around the Aegean Sea and then went on to the eastern Mediterranean and stopped in Cyprus. There he treated violently the Arabs who lived on the island. After his departure, for retaliation, the leader of the Arab fleet Damianos, an ex Christian who had become Muslim, arrived in Cyprus and caused a lot of disasters. He burned the fields, ruined cities and took many prisoners. Among the prisoners was the bishop of the small town Chytri, Demetrianos, who was very old but voluntarily followed his congregation to Baghdad, capital of the Arab State at this period (911-912). Nikolaos Mystikos, patriarch of Constantinople, assumed the role of mediator and with a long letter to the Caliph of Baghdad managed to persuade him to liberate saint Dimitrianos and the Cypriot prisoners and allow their return home.

All these events are known from two main sources, the *vita* of saint Dimitrianos and the Letter of the patriarch Nicolaos Mystikos to the Caliph of the Arabs. Both sources insist that Cypriots still paid tax on the Arabs and the Byzantines, according to the old treaties, and only the bad behavior of the two leaders of the Arab and the Byzantine fleet were responsible for the tragedy. Luckily at the end all the prisoners returned home within two or three years and another adventure of the Cypriots ended relatively soon thanks to Saint Demetrianos and the patriarch Nikolaos.

The annexation of Cyprus to the Byzantine Sovereignty

In the following years, owing to internal problems, the Arabs stopped the invasions to Byzantine territories. Byzantium on the contrary passed to a period of counterattacks and won many victories. French scholar Gustav Schlumberger has characterized this period as “épopée byzantine”. Among the greatest successes of these years was a) the recapture of Crete in 961 and b) the removal of any Arab threat from Cyprus and the annexation of the island to the Byzantine Empire in 965, when emperor of the Romans was Nikephoros II Phokas (963-969). The Byzantine sources consider the fact a natural consequence of Byzantine expansion eastwards. They simply say that in the second year of the reign of Nikephoros Phokas in Constantinople, the general Niketas Chalkoutzis annexed Cyprus to the Byzantine Empire, finally expelling the Arabs from the island. It is known from another source, the *vita* of saint Athanasios, the founder of the monastery of Lavra in Athos, that when the saint visited Cyprus in about 960, the island was in no trouble with the Arabs and he could travel easily around.

Summary – Conclusions

A long period of suffering for the Cypriots had come to an end. Since the first Arab invasion in Cyprus in 648/9 and until 965, year of the final annexation to the Byzantine Sovereign, there have been around twenty Saracen invasions in the island. Most of this time Cyprus was in a kind of condominium, so that the two powers (the Empire and the Caliphate) shared the taxes of its inhabitants. Cypriots themselves at times preferred this option and tried to complete their tax obligations, in order to avoid new invasions and upheavals.

It is easy to come to the conclusion that the relation of Cyprus with the Arabs was clearly economic and sometimes turned hostile, when the Arabs expanded their raids to Cyprus in order to revenge the Byzantines or to seize prey.

It is more difficult to specify what exactly the relation of Cyprus with Byzantium was during these three centuries. The Orthodox Christian and Greek speaking population of the island had spiritual and emotional ties with Constantinople. On the other hand the government of Constantinople collected taxes from the residents of the island according to the old treaties while at the same time it expected the help of the Orthodox Cypriots in its fights against the Muslims. During this long period Cyprus was a complete section of the Byzantine Empire only for seven years, when Emperor was Basil I (867-886) and “strategos of the theme” of Cyprus was Alexios Armenios.

The terms “archon” or “eparchon” used by the Greek sources during these centuries for the person responsible of the government on Cyprus have a very wide meaning in the Byzantine hierarchy of officials. Probably, therefore, the relation of the Cypriots to Constantinople was a relaxed one and at times the rulers of Cyprus were primarily interested in their island rather than in the Empire.

The evidence, however, we obtain from contemporary sources have many holes, thereby raising a

lot of questions not easily answered. It is certain, however, that the Arab invasions of three centuries (648-965), although they did not make Cyprus a section of the Arab world, they did cause tremendous damage, reduced the population and destroyed many important monuments on the island. The large and prosperous coastal cities were devastated and its residents spread to smaller settlements in the interior of the island. Commercial activities were limited to a minimum and occasional farming was virtually the only source of living for the inhabitants of the island, while rural economy was the base of tax revenues for sovereignties in Cyprus. A most commercial hub, like Cyprus, between Europe, Asia and Africa, was transformed for three centuries into a purely agricultural area.

Late Byzantine Period

Administration and rebel movements in Cyprus until the time of the 1st Crusade

Since 965 Cyprus was ruled by Byzantine governors and officials were sent to the island from Constantinople. In a catalog of Byzantine officials (Escorial) dated between 971-975 the “strategos” of Cyprus is mentioned among the other generals of naval territories. That means that Cyprus was already a “theme”, that is to say, a military and administrative unity of the Byzantine Empire.



The ancient church of St. Euphemianos in Lysi

However, the distance from the center and the isolation of the island favored the abuses and facilitated the rebellions of Byzantine officials. Since 1040, general of Cyprus was Theofilos Erotikos, known by his previous military activity in the North of the Balkans. In 1042 he took advantage of some problems in the central government in Constantinople and he rebelled and proclaimed himself independent governor of Cyprus. To get the people of Cyprus (the nation of Cypriots) in his part, he blamed “the judge and agent of public taxes”, the protospatharios Theophylaktos as responsible

for the serious tax obligations imposed on the residents of the island. However, the rebellion of Theophilos had not successful results for himself and his associates. The new Byzantine government of Constantine Monomachos, who meanwhile had stabilized his position in Constantinople, sent the Byzantine fleet against Theophilos Erotikos. The leader of the navy, Constantine Chage, easily restored order in Cyprus and captured Theophilos Erotikos as prisoner. The rebel was driven to Constantinople, where he became a subject of derision in the Hippodrome.

Most dangerous was the rebellion of another Byzantine strategos in Cyprus fifty years later, in 1092. Initiator of this new rebellion was the Governor of Cyprus at that time, whose family name was Rapsomates. He was well prepared and coordinated his actions with those of another rebel, the general Karykes in Crete. The emperor Alexios Komnenos I (1081-1118), despite the many problems he had to face at that time, managed to dispatch army and navy under the leadership of Ioannes Doukas, who suppressed the rebellion, first in Crete and then in Cyprus. Rapsomate, after a series of strategic errors, failed to raise effective resistance to the imperial troops and was eventually captured prisoner.

It is characteristic that Rapsomatis had his headquarters in Nicosia (Lefkousia, according to the history of Anna Komnena, who narrates all these events in much detail) and not in Salamis, the ancient capital of the island. The landing of the imperial troops occurred initially in Kyrene, which they occupied, but the real conflict was in the central plain. Rapsomates attempted to retreat south to

Limassol (Nemeso by Anna Komnena), but he did not succeed. It is therefore obvious that the focus at this time fell within the island and Nicosia was the seat of the government. The ports of Cyprus and the old capital Salamis (or Constantia) had not recovered yet after the Arab invasions neither had they reached the boom that they would have later in the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries.

Immediately after the defeat of Rapsomates the emperor Alexios Komnenos sent capable officials, to restore order and ensure the administration of the island. Eumathios Philokales is the best known of the governors of Cyprus in the coming years. As Duke of Cyprus he strengthened the defense of the island with new fortresses and extended Byzantine influence to the opposite coast of Syria and Asia Minor. At the same time, Alexios Komnenos, in an effort to limit the power of the governor on the island, attempted to separate military from political power and appointed as “krites and exisotes” of Cyprus, (namely political officer with responsibilities in justice and taxation) Kalliparios, a man not descending from an illustrious Byzantine family, but very well known for his integrity, justice and modesty. We are in the period that the institution of the “themes” is abandoned, the governors of the provinces are called “doukas” (duke) and not “strategos” (general) and the political officials of every province become independent from the local military officer, thereby depending directly on the central government in Constantinople.

The island’s economy in the 11th century was still predominantly rural and farmers were groaning under heavy taxation imposed by the Byzantine government. This was necessitated by the increased costs for the defense of the island and the whole Empire.

Katakalon Kekaumenos, a Byzantine writer of the second half of the 11th century, gives an impressive testimony for the tax obligations of the inhabitants of the islands belonging to the Byzantine Empire. He writes that the war ships that protected the islands gathered from the inhabitants every kind of food (wheat, wine, oil, beans, meat, cheese etc.) and a lot of money. That happened not only with effect to the small islands, but also to Crete and Cyprus.

It is well known that during the 11th century the Byzantine Empire was in a big crisis and the situation did not improve in the course of time. Especially in the Middle East external factors contributed to aggravate the situation.

Cyprus at the time of the 1st Crusade

As a result of the First Crusade in the last years of the 11th century, the political scene in the eastern Mediterranean changed dramatically. The 1st Crusade started from Central Europe in 1096 and concluded with the capture of Jerusalem three years later (July 1099). In Palestine the crusaders founded the Kingdom of Jerusalem and around it smaller principalities under a feudal system. The presence of these states in the East coast of the Mediterranean Sea brought Cyprus in the center of attention of all the surrounding people, while in the same time Cypriots undertook more obligations. For more than a century Cyprus was the main channel of communication between Byzantium and the Frankish States of Palestine and Syria.

Already before the end of the 1st crusade Cyprus was connected with the crusaders. During the siege of Antioch (Syria) in 1098 the crusaders faced major problems of supply and lack of food. The orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem Symeon, who lived at that time self-exiled in Cyprus, was concerned to gather from Cyprus wine and various kinds of food and to send all these to the camp of the Christian army outside the walls of Antioch. Given the fact that the testimony comes from a Western source, it renders it indisputable.

In February 1098 the Byzantine general Tatikios, who, leading a small number of soldiers, had accompanied the crusaders all the way through Asia Minor, left the camp of the besiegers outside Antioch and proceeded to the Syrian coast, where he met the Byzantine navy. Together with the "Roman ships," he and his soldiers sailed to Cyprus. There were many reasons for the departure of Tatikios and his army from the camp of the Christians: first the hunger that prevailed in the camp, secondly his disappointment about the potential capture of Antioch, and mainly the hostility of Bohemund, the leader of the Normans from South Italy, who planned to keep Antioch as his own principality.

The crusaders continued their fight without help from the Byzantine army. They captured Antioch in June 1098 and Jerusalem in July 1099. In their way from Antioch to Jerusalem they stopped to Latakia (Laodikeia, at the North coast of Syria), which they surrendered to the Byzantine general Andronikos Tzintziloukes, while the governor of Cyprus Eumathios Philokales received two smaller fortresses in the same area. All these happened after the intervention of the emperor Alexios Komnenos, who continued to have good relations with some of the leaders of the crusaders and especially with Raymond de Saint Gilles from Toulouse (whom the historian Anna Komnena calls Issageles).

New problems were caused by a small fleet from Pisa that accompanied bishop Daimbertus, who a little later was elected catholic patriarch of Jerusalem. The ships from Pisa made pirate raids to the coasts, trying to land on Cyprus. The Duke of Cyprus Eumathios Philokales was obliged to attack them and forced them to sail to the Syrian coast.

A little later the Byzantine generals of the fleet, Tatikios and Landoulfos, arrived in Cyprus and together with the governor of the island decided to open negotiations with Bohemund, prince of Antioch. Negotiations were unsuccessful and after some time Latakia surrendered to the Normans of Antioch, because it did not receive help from Cyprus.

Then the emperor Alexios Komnenos decided to fortify Kourikon and Selefkia in the South of Asia Minor. Bohemund did not succeed to capture the two castles and Cyprus was effectively protected from the North.

At about the same time the governor of Cyprus facilitated the return of two of the leaders of the crusaders to West Europe. Robert of Flanders and Robert of Normandy had finished their pilgrimage to the Holy Land and returned home via Cyprus and Constantinople.

The governors of Cyprus maintained friendly relations with Raymond de Saint Giles during the following years. In 1102 Raymond besieged Tripolis and prepared his principality around this city. To strengthen his position he asked for help from Cyprus in order to build a new fortress on the hills

near Tripolis. Eumathios Philokales, who was still “Duke of Cyprus”, responded to his demand and sent to Raymond building materials and workers from the island. The castle was completed in 1104 and Raymond named it Mont Pèlerin (Castle of the Pilgrim), but Muslims called it Qalat Sanjil from the name of its founder. So, one of the most famous castles of the Middle East was built by Cypriots.

In 1103/4 Byzantine soldiers were transported from Cilicia to Cyprus, because there was need for more army on the island. Duke of Cyprus at that time was Constantine Euphorbenos.

The jurisdiction of the Duke of Cyprus was not only military, but was mainly diplomatic. When in 1105 the death of Raymond de Saint Giles became known, the emperor assigned the Duke of Cyprus with the task to maintain friendship with the rulers of Tripolis. A small delegation carrying great amounts of money set off from Cyprus to meet William, nephew and successor of Raymond, in order to persuade him to take an oath of loyalty to the Byzantine emperor.



Church at the monastery of Panaghia Apsinthiotissa

The same effort was repeated a few years later, when Bertrand took the place of William in the principality of Tripolis. Then Alexios Komnenos sent to Cyprus a high official from Constantinople to receive from the Duke of the island ships and money and go to Tripolis, where he had to remind Bertrand of the friendship and loyalty of his father Raymond to the Byzantine emperor. At the same time the ambassador had to convince Bertrand to support together with the king of Jerusalem and his counts the war of the Byzantine army against Tankred, prince of Antioch. According to the historian Anna

Comnena, the fundraising was necessary, because the Latins were particularly eager for money. For that reason the Duke of Cyprus had to raise all the money he could from his area (1111-1112).

All these years plenty of food and goods for every day use were sent from Cyprus to Tripolis, so that the Byzantine emperor could threaten the residents of the city that they would die of hunger in case all these benefits from Cyprus stopped.

It is obvious that Cypriots struggled under heavy taxation all these years and many of them, in order to meet all the requirements of the ambitious foreign policy, found themselves in the extreme point of poverty. A text written by a highly ranked clergyman, Nikolaos Mouzalon, gives a harsh picture of the situation at Cyprus in that period. Nikolaos Mouzalon served as archbishop of Cyprus for three years from 1107 to 1110. In a long poem of 1,057 verses he sets forth the miserable conditions on the island. These were due to the bad administration of the imperial officials and the greed of the tax collectors, who deprived the farmers from everything they had. The poem is written in an archaic, sophisticated language, but it is easy to follow the dramatic way in which the life in Cyprus is described. The island is beautiful and the land productive, but the residents are even unhappier than the mythical Tantalus. They cultivate the land and have no food, they work in the vineyards and have not wine and every kind of wealth is foreign to them. Even the clergy has been corrupted and moral order is reversed. Elder bishops are left resourceless, while young deacons behave as great lords. Priests are forced to pay

heavy taxes, while the descendants of the Jews exploit pious Christians. Collectors of the public taxes make brutal raptures and abuses without being punished for their actions. Especially the peasants are very poor and they have no food to eat, house to sleep and clothes to wear. Even the churches are left without arable land, deprived of their sacred relics and unprotected.

Under these conditions Nikolaos Mouzalon could not remain archbishop of the Cypriot Church for a long period. He resigned from his sea after three years, because, as he says, he could not give any help to the people of his congregation.

Cyprus between East and West

Since the last years of the 11th century and especially in the 12th century new enemies (Turks and Normans) and the neglect of the Byzantine navy obliged the Byzantine emperors to ask for help from the naval cities of Italy, first from Venice in 1081, and later from Pisa (1111) and Genoa (1155). In return for their help the Byzantine State offered to the naval cities commercial privileges and tax exemptions in the ports of the Empire. The granting of privileges generally damaged the Byzantine State and especially Cyprus, which the Westerners began to exploit economically while intervening also in other issues of the island.

Besides, the new Frankish States in Palestine and Syria caused substantial changes in the international trade movements and the transportation of products from East to West. The activities of the Franks transferred the commercial roads to the southern Mediterranean and created new trading conditions, leaving Constantinople and the other large cities of the Empire (Thessaloniki, Trebizond etc.) outside the orbit of international trade.

Clear evidence for the expansion of Venetian privileges in Cyprus and in Crete provides an edict (chrysoboullon) of Manuel Komnenos dated to 1147. The chrysoboullon survives only in Latin and validates privileges, which the father of Manuel, John II Komnenos, had already granted to Venice. According to the edict, Venetian traders could trade in Cyprus and Crete having the same privileges as in the other ports of the Empire.

However, it is certain that the presence of the Italian dealers in Cyprus had not only negative consequences. The strong commercial activity that was developed mainly by the Venetians helped the development of the Cypriot ports. Gradually, the urban population of the island found new areas of employment, significantly ones in which the State had already granted tax exemptions and could not impose new taxation. Being so dependent on Italian money, Cypriots turned to urban occupations, found new jobs and some of them managed to prosper.

The Byzantine government continued to have great interest in Cyprus throughout the 12th century. This interest became more obvious in 1142, when emperor John II Komnenos considered giving Cyprus and Cilicia to his younger son Manuel as his own territory. Finally this thought was not realized and Manuel succeeded his father to the throne after the death of his elder brother.

In the second half of the 12th century Cyprus received significant blows by Western adventurers, who having their base in the Frankish States of Syria and Palestine, attempted incursions and pirate raids to Cypriot territories. In 1156 Renal, (Renauld de Chatillon) prince of Antioch at that time, gathered ships and with the help of the Armenians from South Asia Minor attacked Cyprus in order to grab prey. The governor of the island, John Komnenos, nephew of the emperor Manuel, rushed to the shore and initially repelled the invaders. But when he returned to the capital Nicosia, the invaders came back and they managed to proceed in the interior of the island. In the battle that followed John Komnenos was defeated and captured along with many of his officers and soldiers. The winners, Franks and Armenians, remained on the island for three weeks grabbing and looting. They destroyed small towns and villages and they captured prisoners asking large sums of money to release them. When finally the invaders left, the country was devastated and the Cypriots were left poor. An earthquake that stroke Cyprus the next year (1157) deteriorated even more the situation of the residents.



Panaghia Asinou

It is worth noting that the emperor Manuel Komnenos punished and humiliated the prince of Antioch, when in Easter of 1159 he made his solemn entry in Antioch and forced Renal to accept the suzerainty of the Byzantine Emperor.

Five years after the invasion of Renal in Cyprus, another Frank prince attempted incursions to the Cypriot shores. He was Raynald III of Tripolis. Wanting to revenge the emperor Manuel for his decision to choose as his wife Mary of Antioch and not the sister of the count of Tripolis, Melissanthi, he plundered the coasts of Cyprus and caused a great deal of disaster. Duke of Cyprus at that period was Alexios Doukovlastos, a man of noble origin and good manners. The Byzantine writer Constantine Manasses, who gives all the relevant information in a long poem called “Odoiporikon” (travelogue, itinerary), praises the beauty of the island and the productivity of the earth, but he is moderate when he refers to the people of Cyprus.

In these years Egypt was a rising Muslim power. For that reason in 1169 the Byzantines and the Franks of Palestine attempted to conclude an alliance against Egypt that was threatening both. Under the leadership of Andronikos Kontostephanos the Byzantine navy sailed to Cyprus and succeeded to push away six Egyptian ships. Then the admiral of the Byzantine fleet began negotiations with king Amalarich of Jerusalem. The negotiations ultimately failed and the Byzantine fleet returned to its base.

The Church of Cyprus in the last Byzantine centuries

The position of the Cypriot Church is emphasized in the Late Byzantine period. The sources of the time point out the “autokephalon” and the possibilities of auto-government of the Church in Cyprus according to the ancient rules. In the middle of the 12th century the ecclesiastical author Neilos Doxopatres notes in his work “*Order of the patriarchal thrones*” that in his days the Church of Cyprus

was an autocephalous Archbishopric as in the old days. The fourteen bishops of Cyprus elected their archbishop and the emperor himself confirmed his election in Constantinople.

During this period the Archbishopric of Cyprus is related to the Archbishopric of Achriss (Ochrid) in the central Balkans, which was founded in 1018 by the emperor Basil II (976-1025) after the defeat of the Bulgarians and the annexation of Tsar Samuel's state in the Byzantine Empire. During the next few years, the Archbishopric of Achriss was identified with "Iustiniana Prima" that was founded in the same area by the emperor Justinian I in the 6th century. This Archbishopric, as a place of origin of the emperor, enjoyed many privileges. This was the "*1st Justiniana*". After that the Church of Cyprus was characterized "*2nd Justiniana*" or "*New Justiniana*". Probably the Church of Cyprus owes this characterization to Justinian II (685-695 and 705-711), who had developed particular relations with the Cypriots during the years of the Arab raids. Nevertheless there is also the view that the Archbishopric of Cyprus took the name 2nd Justiniana in honor of Empress Theodora, wife of Justinian I, who was of Cypriot origin from her father's side. This opinion is less probable, because the term 2nd or New Justiniana appears from the 13th century onwards, while the term 1st Justiniana is in use from the 6th century and is certified by a novel (law) of Justinian I.

Many worthy prelates occupied the archiepiscopal throne of Cyprus in the 11th and 12th century. The scholar Nicolaos Mouzalon, who served in Cyprus from 1007 to 1010 and became later patriarch of Constantinople, is already mentioned in a previous chapter. Another significant clergyman was John II Kretikos. As archbishop of Cyprus he participated in two councils taking place in Constantinople in 1157 and 1170. He supported the doctrines of the Orthodox Church and signing the proceedings of the Councils he defended the unique position of the Cypriot Church.

In the 11th and 12th centuries major monasteries were established in Cyprus, of which the most famous are the Monasteries of Kykkos and Machairas. All monasteries, endowed with estates and supported by tax exemptions, played an important role as pillars of Orthodoxy during the Frankish and Venetian rule in the island (1191-1571) and were significant cultural centers in the years of the Ottoman occupation from 1571 afterwards.

The rebellion of Isaakios Komnenos and its consequences

During the reign of Andronikos I Komnenos (1183-1185), there was a new rebellion in Cyprus. A relative of the emperor, Isaakios Komnenos, using false documents, managed to expel the legitimate governor of the island, take the power, and become independent ruler of Cyprus (1184). Emperor Andronikos was not indifferent for the event, but because of the distance that separated Cyprus from Constantinople he delayed to send army against the rebel.

In the next year (1185), once Andronikos lost his throne, his successor Isaakios II Aggelos sent an army against Isaakios Komnenos in Cyprus, because he continued to be independent and denied to pay taxes in Constantinople. The imperial army was completely defeated by Isaakios Komnenos in

1186. The ruler of Cyprus was helped by the navy of the Normans from South Italy and in that way Isaakios had strengthened his forces. Many soldiers of the imperial army were killed whereas others were taken as captives.

After his victory, Isaakios Komnenos became a real tyrant. He usurped the title of “basileus”, imposed heavy taxes, seized properties, and killed potential opponents. Under these circumstances a number of the residents of the island were obliged to leave their country.

The contemporary sources are very austere against Isaakios Komnenos. Both the Byzantine historian Niketas Choniates and the Cypriot monk Neophytos Egkleistos (the Recluse) describe the situation in Cyprus under the command of Isaakios Komnenos as very miserable.

Then new events in the East created new circumstances, which determined the fate of Cyprus. In 1187 the Sultan of Egypt Saladin defeated the Knights of Palestine in the battle of Tiverias, occupied Jerusalem, and reduced the Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem to a few coastal cities. Immediately afterwards a new crusade was organized in Western Europe. In this 3rd Crusade (1189-1192) participated the three major sovereigns of Europe, that is, the emperor of Germany, the king of France and the king of England. The king of England, Richard the Lionheart, decided to follow the sea route to the Holy Land.

During the voyage bad weather forced Richard and his army to stop on the south coast of Cyprus (Limassol). From there he started negotiations for supplies with the ruler of Cyprus Isaakios Komnenos. The negotiations proved unsuccessful and resulted in complete hostility. In a decisive battle near Trimithous the English knights defeated Isaakios’ army. Isaakios himself was captured and taken as a prisoner in Syria. After his victory Richard took one after the other the castles of Cyprus, and became master of the whole island.

That was the end of Byzantine sovereignty in Cyprus. It is worth noting that not only the foreign traders based in Cyprus but also the Cypriots themselves did not react initially to the conquest by Richard. They were content to escape a tyrant like Isaakios.

Summary

The Late Byzantine Period in Cyprus covers a period of about 225 years and is marked by repeated rebellions of governors of the island. Only the last one of the rebellions, this of Isaakios Komnenos, succeeded to cut off Cyprus from the rest of the Empire for seven years, thereby opening the road to foreign conquerors.

Since the last years of the 11th century Cyprus had close relations with the Frankish States founded by the crusaders of the 1st Crusade in Syria and Palestine. As a center of negotiations between East and West, Cyprus had many obligations and its residents were pressed by heavy taxation. About the same period, the granting of trade privileges to the maritime cities of Italy helped the development of the Cypriot ports and the resulting commercial activities benefited a part of the Cypriot population.

Throughout this period, becomes apparent the importance of the autocephalous Church of Cyprus as well as its high position in the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the East.

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CHAPTER 03

**Frankish and Venetian Cyprus,
1191-1571**

C h r i s S c h a b e l

Aims

This unit examines the social, economic, ecclesiastical, and political history of Frankish and Venetian Cyprus in the context of Europe and the Near East in the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

After studying this unit, students will be in a position to

- Understand the transformations that Cyprus underwent in the transition to Frankish rule
- Understand the evolution of Cypriot society against the background of the events that accelerated, hindered, or redirected those changes

Keywords

- fief
- dynasty
- serfdom
- crusades
- refugees
- plague
- schism
- bourgeois
- *Bulla Cypria*
- tithes
- Assizes
- papacy
- Mamluks
- ban on trade
- Genoa
- Venice
- aristocracy
- clergy

Introduction

For almost four centuries Cyprus was ruled by a dynasty and then a foreign power of the Latin rite, ecclesiastically subordinate to the pope in Rome, and for this reason the entire period is called locally “Latinocracy,” made up of the “Francocracy” (1191-1474/89) and the “Venetocracy” (1474/89-1571). A large majority of the general population was of the Greek rite throughout, speaking a dialect of the Greek language, while there were numerous Eastern Christian minorities speaking Arabic and Armenian, a small Jewish community, and some Muslim slaves. Significant changes occurred over time, however, and under the French-speaking Lusignan dynasty the Kingdom of Cyprus gradually evolved from this fragmented cluster of indigenous and alien linguistic and religious communities to a more unified yet still multicultural society of Cypriots by the end of the reign of King Hugh IV (1324-59). This process was redirected in the wake of the Genoese and Mamluk invasions in the 1370s and 1420s and again with the Venetian takeover in the 1470s. Thus we can best follow these developments and those of a political nature by dividing the period into four phases: first, from the Frankish conquest to the fall of Acre, 1191-1291; second, until the incident that provoked the Genoese invasion, 1291-1372; third, until the death of the last Lusignan monarch 1372-1474; fourth, the period of Venetian rule, 1474-1571.

The First Century, 1191-1291

King Richard the Lionheart of England conquered Cyprus in the spring of 1191, en route to the Holy Land during the Third Crusade, following Saladin's decisive victory at the Battle of Hattin and capture of Jerusalem in 1187. Historians still debate whether Richard planned the conquest beforehand. Given the value of the island and its potential utility to the Holy Land, Richard certainly had motive. Having wintered in Messina, Sicily, he could easily have learned about the situation on the island from the locals, since Isaac Comnenos, who had usurped power from Byzantium in 1184 and proclaimed himself emperor, had formed an alliance with Norman Sicily to defend successfully against reconquest from Constantinople. Richard is also said to have inquired about Isaac when he stopped on Rhodes on his way east, and Isaac seems to have been prepared for the attack. But being well informed was just common sense, and it would have been foolish for Richard to agree, as he did, to sharing the spoils of the crusade with King Philip II of France if he planned to conquer Cyprus singlehandedly. In any event, the explanation that one finds in most chronicles of the Third Crusade is that a storm scattered Richard's fleet, some ships were wrecked off Cyprus and the survivors were imprisoned by Isaac, Richard's sister Joanna and fiancée Berengaria anchored offshore at Limassol and refused Isaac's treacherous invitation to land, Richard arrived on 5 May, and, after a hostile reception, he exacted his revenge, taking Isaac into custody by the end of the month and leaving to join the siege of Acre on 5 June.

Isaac's rule had been oppressive and was seen as illegitimate, which facilitated and helped justify Richard's conquest of a 'former' Byzantine territory. The people of Limassol and Nicosia were said to be pleased, and the Cypriot upper class went over to Richard, coming to an agreement by which they relinquished half their property in exchange for a return to the laws and tax regime under Emperor Manuel I Comnenos (†1180). Richard therefore left few troops on the island, but they soon faced a minor uprising of Greeks and Armenians who had not accepted the compromise. Although Richard's representative, Robert of Thornham, easily put down the revolt and executed the leader, by 12 July Richard had sold the island to the Knights Templar for 100,000 Saracen bezants. The Templars paid 40,000 up front, but their cruelty in extracting the remainder from the island's populace provoked the more serious revolt that took place in April 1192. Only about one hundred strong, the Templars managed to surprise the Greeks on Easter morning and crush the rebellion, but they opted to return the island to Richard, who did not refund their downpayment. On 5 May 1192 the French-speaking Richard sold the island to another Frenchman, the dispossessed king of Jerusalem by marriage, Guy of Lusignan, from Poitou, who de facto paid only the remaining 60,000 bezants. Guy was able to establish a dynasty on Cyprus that lasted almost three centuries.

There were numerous real and potential claimants to Cyprus, and Guy was aware of the experiences of Thornham and the Templars. To create a loyal military force, therefore, Guy immediately began distributing fiefs on the Western feudal model. The basic unit was the village, the *casale*, and Cyprus

consisted of 800 or 900 of them. A fief could be one or more villages or *casalia*, or a fraction of one. The enfeoffment entailed the confiscation of villages formerly in the possession of various landlords, including the Byzantine State and Greek nobles, especially those with holdings elsewhere who had left the island during Isaac's tyranny or, particularly, in the turbulence of the first year of Latin rule. If the agreement between Richard and the Cypriots included immovable property, this too went to Guy. Richard and the Templars had surely confiscated additional lands of local Cypriots following the revolts, and Guy may have as well, while there is evidence that Guy seized some possessions belonging to Orthodox churches and monasteries, although it is impossible to tell how much. Finally, a large number of Venetians owned urban and rural property, notably in and around Limassol, much if not most of which was also taken, for reasons that are unknown. Guy is said to have given fiefs to hundreds of knights and more lightly armed troops, mostly Frenchmen dispossessed after 1187 who had supported him in Palestine, in addition to urban incomes to Syrian and other refugees, including Guy's Pisan allies. The Templars retained much property, and rather quickly the other great military order in the East, the Hospitallers, was endowed with numerous estates in the south of the island, in both cases some former Venetian properties. Guy also granted income to Jubin Abbey in Syria and probably founded Bellapais Abbey.



Colossi Castle

In the Byzantine period, the Greeks of Cyprus were divided into social classes, and this remained the case in the Frankish period. Some members of the local Greek *archontes*, aristocrats, kept a share of their wealth, although nowhere near the level of the Frankish military ruling class, from which they were excluded. Members of this class would have continued to occupy the important positions in the Greek churches and monasteries, which retained a portion of their estates, in some cases without any losses, according to the *Typika* of Makhairas and Neophytos Abbeys. While Guy and his successors applied the laws of the Kingdom of Jerusalem to the nobility and bourgeois, for the specifics of land units, taxation, and the like, in addition to relations with Byzantium and the Muslim states, it was necessary to retain much of the Byzantine system and even Greek administrative personnel, for example in the *Secrète*, the royal finance office. The notebook of one family of Greek administrators from the early period, the Anagnostes, still survives. Individual Franks also employed Greek stewards on their estates. There were Greek city dwellers termed *perpyriarioi* as well, owing an annual tax, but not labor obligations. The status of these classes steadily rose over time.

Most of the Greek population were peasants, divided into two broad classes, the *francomati* and the *paroikoi*. The *francomati* were the Byzantine free peasants, the *lefteroi*, who rented land but had certain obligations. Near the bottom of the social scale were the *paroikoi*, serfs, the vast majority, although they were subdivided into different echelons. Given that they had already been attached to villages owned by secular and ecclesiastical landlords, the *paroikoi* saw little change in their everyday lives, with similar labor and tax obligations, although as legally unfree they had a lower status under the Franks. Finally, there were slaves. Such class distinctions were a traditional part of society, not a foreign import, and it was not uncommon in the Frankish period for Greek serfs to be subject to Greek

landlords, even Greek bishops and abbots.

Guy remained simply lord of Cyprus, keeping the title of king of Jerusalem, until his death in late 1194 or early 1195. His vassals chose his brother Aimery (1195-1205) to succeed him as lord of Cyprus. Aimery quickly found that Guy had been overly generous in granting fiefs. Aimery had no choice but to demand that the vassals return a portion of their fiefs to the *regale*, the royal demesne, using other means to increase his income. In late 1195, Aimery also began negotiations with the Holy Roman Emperor, Henry VI of Hohenstaufen, the highest secular authority in the Latin world, for the creation of the Kingdom of Cyprus, and with Pope Celestine III for the establishment of a Latin ecclesiastical hierarchy on the island. A crown would not only enhance his own standing, but it would help silence other claimants and gain a powerful ally, who was planning a crusade. Bishop Conrad of Hildesheim crowned Aimery in September 1197, and 'officially' Cyprus became a client kingdom of the German Emperor. Henry died the same month, before setting off to the East, but serious threats to Aimery and Cyprus did not materialize, so Aimery had his crown and security seemingly without giving up real sovereignty. But when Henry's infant son, Frederick II, came of age, civil war would ensue.

Aimery organized his new kingdom along western lines, with a seneschal, constable, marshal, and chamberlain, and the Haute Cour to advise the king on important matters and serve as the highest court of justice. The nobles and bourgeois were governed by the customs of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, described in thirteenth-century French legal writings called *Assizes*, those for the feudal aristocracy and those for the subjects of the Cour des Bourgeois. The legal system was much more complicated than this, since Latin, Byzantine, and other religious laws applied, the Syrians had their own court, and the Italian merchants had special legal privileges as well. For economic matters, the king had the *Secrète*, run by a bailli, and the *Comerc*.

To join the ranks of western kingdoms, Cyprus needed Latin bishops subject to the pope. Aimery wrote to Pope Celestine suggesting that he was returning the island from schism, but Celestine was more concerned about the organization and independence of the local church from the crown and nobility, and he left the Greek Church untouched. With the advice of Aimery's chancellor, Archdeacon Alan of Lydda, and nuncio, Archdeacon B. of Latakia, Celestine set up the Latin ecclesiastical province of Cyprus with an archbishop of Nicosia and suffragan bishops of Paphos, Limassol, and Famagusta, in order of importance, with Alan elected the first archbishop and B. settling for the Paphos diocese. Rather than a salary, the prelates were to have an endowment of landed property and to receive tithes, ten percent of the incomes of the Frankish aristocracy. Following Guy's distribution of fiefs, however, there was little left for the king, let alone the Church. Aimery used property confiscated from Venetians to endow the bishop of Limassol, while Archbishop Alan and the bishops of Famagusta and probably Paphos received estates held by Frankish nobles, two villages for Alan and only one for the other two dioceses. Thus the Latin Church on Cyprus started out rather poor. It was probably only the huge size of the Nicosia diocese, together with donations from the crown and aristocracy living in the capital, that permitted the archbishops to begin a cathedral of modest proportions by western standards, although impressive for the Eastern Mediterranean. According to documents preserved in the *Cartulary of Nicosia Cathedral*, Archbishop Eustorge (by 1216 to 1250) was able to increase its income with wise investments, partly by exploiting those in need of cash following the Civil War.

The Civil War of 1228-33 occurred as a result of a phenomenon that plagued Cyprus in the first two thirds of the thirteenth century: the succession of child-kings. When the ruler of Jerusalem died in 1197, Aimery married his widow, Queen Isabel, and Aimery remained king of Jerusalem by marriage until his death in 1205, devoting much of his time to the mainland. Aimery could not pass his title to Jerusalem to his son Hugh (1205-18), who became king of Cyprus at the age of nine. The regent, Walter of Montbéliard, and then Hugh when he came of age continued to occupy themselves ably with Jerusalem, although the transition from Walter's to Hugh's rule was anything but smooth. Hugh participated in the Fifth Crusade (1217-21), dying in Tripoli in early 1218.

Hugh had married Alice of Champagne in 1210, and her uncles Philip and John of Ibelin accompanied the girl to Cyprus from Syria. At Hugh's death, his son Henry (1218-53) was an infant, and Alice was named regent. Philip of Ibelin was associated with the regency, but he and his niece had a falling out in 1223-24 and Alice began shopping for new husbands in order to remove Philip from power, including the future Prince Bohemond V of Antioch. The popes did not cooperate by giving the necessary dispensations, however, and Philip would not step down. At the same time, a group of older Frankish-Cypriot families opposed what they considered the tyrannous rule of the newcomer Ibelins. They were led by what would be called the "Five Baillis," with whom Alice allied, granting at least one of them, William of Rivet, a fief, and designating another, Aimery Barlais, as her bailli in place of Philip. Philip still clung to power, and when he died in 1227 or 1228 his brother John took over, surely without Alice's permission. Perhaps with Alice's connivance, Emperor Frederick II now decided to exercise his rights over Cyprus, stopping on the island in 1228 on his way to the Holy Land on crusade. At a banquet Frederick held in Limassol, the emperor demanded that John of Ibelin turn over the profits from the regency, which had already lasted a decade. John replied that he did not have them, so Frederick signaled his waiting troops to surround John, taking two of his sons hostage until John would present himself before the High Court of Jerusalem. Frederick's actions set off the lengthy Civil War that lasted until 1233, described in detail by one of the participants, Philip of Novara, in his French chronicle *The Wars of Frederick II against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus*.

At first John of Ibelin retreated with his allies to St Hilarion Castle, but the two sides reached a compromise. When Frederick returned to the West, he left the Five Baillis in charge in exchange for a large sum of money, and in the meantime the emperor's men held the fortifications. In their efforts to come up with the money, however, the Five Baillis lost local support. To make matters worse, Frederick himself had been excommunicated, so they faced papal opposition. The conflict came to a head at the Battle of Nicosia on 14 July 1229, an Ibelin victory, after which the Baillis' faction fled to the castles. Surprisingly, the Ibelins took Kyrenia quickly, but St Hilarion and Kantara Castle held out until the spring of 1230, when the Ibelins agreed to allow the Baillis to keep their fiefs, fearing the emperor's return. In the fall of 1231, Frederick sent Richard Filangieri with an army to the East. Contrary to feudal law, in early 1232 John of Ibelin persuaded the Cypriots to defend his fief of Beirut on the mainland against Filangieri, but Aimery Barlais managed to return to Cyprus with eighty followers, taking control. The Ibelin supporters took refuge in the castles of Buffavento and St Hilarion, to the latter of which Aimery laid siege. When Filangieri came to assist, John of Ibelin gathered troops to raise the siege. With the help of the Genoese, to whom King Henry had to grant significant trading privileges, the Ibelins sailed to Cyprus, took Famagusta at night, marched to Nicosia, and set off for St

Hilarion. Ascending the narrow pass in the mountains on the road to Kyrenia, the Ibelins met up with the imperial forces and, despite their disadvantageous position, won a dramatic victory at the Battle of Agridi. The surviving supporters of the Five Baillis retreated to Kyrenia, which was besieged until it fell at Easter 1233, with Genoese assistance.

The Civil War had significant repercussions. Henry expelled the Five Baillis and seized their fiefs, thus effecting a change in the composition of the Cypriot aristocracy. The Ibelins emerged stronger than ever, and the Genoese were on their way to becoming a powerful force in Cypriot affairs. Not only did Frederick lose the war, but his troubles with the papacy would lead Pope Innocent IV to declare Henry and Cyprus free of imperial hegemony in 1247, after which Cyprus was truly independent. But the war had been destructive in terms of property and lives, and Henry's treasury was empty, the tithes still unpaid. Henry was forced to sell crown lands to deal with the crisis. It was also during the chaos of the Civil War that the bloodiest incident in the history of Greek-Latin ecclesiastical relations occurred, the execution of thirteen Greek monks in Nicosia in 1231.

For a quarter century, the Greek and Latin Churches had existed side-by-side in Cyprus, but this changed in 1220 in the context of an internal dispute among the Franks. The main source of income for the Latin Church was tithes, but the initial arrangement with King Aimery did not function well in the first decades. The Frankish landlords found various ways to reduce their tithe obligations. For example, since the Greeks did not have this system and were exempt from paying, some Franks refused to calculate the produce of Greek labor on their estates. In October 1220 an agreement was reached in Limassol between the Latin archbishop and bishops, on the one hand, and the crown and nobility, on the other, over tithes, but another pact was required two years later, when the same groups met in Famagusta, with the mediation of the masters of the Templars and Hospitallers, and implemented the tithe system of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Even then, the Franks made excuses not to observe the 1222 accord, and another arbitrated settlement was accepted in 1232. The Frankish nobility continued to circumvent the system, by assigning Greek and Syrian stewards to run their estates, by leasing their lands to Templars and Hospitallers, who were exempt from tithes, or by claiming to be exempt themselves because they dwelt in other dioceses. It was not until after 1260, with compromises between Archbishop Hugh of Nicosia and the military orders, that we cease hearing general complaints about non-payment of tithes, although of course individual tax dodgers were as numerous then as they are now.

Gathering in Limassol in 1220, however, the Latin prelates and the leading Franks took the opportunity to decide on the fate of the Greek clergy, at the instigation of the papal legate in the East, Cardinal Pelagius. Following the so-called Gregorian Reform of the eleventh century, the Latin Church strove for ecclesiastical liberty from secular control as well as a clear church hierarchy subject to the universal jurisdiction of the pope. On Cyprus, the Latin clergy had achieved this, with inalienable landed estates and free episcopal elections by the cathedral chapters, after a failed attempt by King Hugh I to intervene in the election of the archbishop of Nicosia in the early 1210s. Many of the lower Greek clerics were serfs belonging to Frankish lords, however, and there was no guarantee that the Lusignan crown would avoid further confiscations of Greek church property. On the other hand, the Greeks were in no way subject to the local Latin Church or the pope. Church and State reached a

compromise in 1220: Greek priests and deacons would henceforth be free of servile obligations to the Franks, and like Latin clerics they would be subject to the Latin archbishop and bishops. In return, the Latin prelates would have to control the number and movement of priests, deacons, and monks, so that they would not join the clergy in order to avoid their obligations on the estates. If the Latins allowed the ordination or movement of Greeks who were formerly serfs, they had to find replacement serfs for the Frankish landlords. Finally, henceforth the Frankish nobles would respect Greek clerical property, guaranteeing it in the future. In 1222 further specifications were made, but, probably again at Pelagius' urging, it was also decided to enforce the canon of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 forbidding more than one bishop from occupying the same see but providing for assistants to deal with linguistically diverse flocks. To match the number of Latin sees, the Greek bishops were thus reduced from about fourteen to four, who would have their seats in existing Greek episcopal towns that were located within each of the Latin dioceses, Solea for Nicosia, Arsinoe for Paphos, Lefkara for Limassol, and Karpasia for Famagusta. In practice, other bishops were probably allowed to keep their titles until their deaths, after which the remaining four called themselves, for example, "Bishop of Arsinoe and *proedros* of Paphos," thus taking over the defunct titles.

The sudden reduction of the number of bishops and general subjugation to the Latins and the pope threw the Greek clergy into confusion. They sent Bishop Leontios of Solea and Abbot Leontios of Absinthi to Nicaea to seek the advice of the new Patriarch Germanos II, two of whose letters on the issue survive. The 1222 accord put the Greeks of Cyprus in a privileged position in comparison to their co-religious in the Kingdom of Sicily, Frankish Greece, the Holy Land, and in most Venetian territories, and Germanos was prepared to compromise on some items, but he ended up urging resistance. The Greek clerics on Cyprus were split, with some accepting the situation, others choosing exile, and still others opting for forms of passive or active resistance; the Greek laity was similarly divided. The exciting career of Archbishop Neophytos (by 1221 to 1250/1) reflects these internal divisions, since he went into exile two or three times and it was on his watch that the monks were martyred.

According to a hagiographical text known as the *Martyrion Kyprion*, two monks from Kalon Oros in Cilician Armenia, John and Conon, came to Cyprus, gathered a following of several Cypriots and three others from Kalon Oros, and settled down in the monastery of Kantara in the east of the Kyrenia Mountains. At the same time, the first members of the newly created mendicant or "begging" orders of Franciscans and Dominicans arrived on the island. The latter would come to be known as the "hounds of God," a pun on their Latin name, "Domini-cani," because of their activities against heretics, often as part of the new papal inquisitorial procedure. Probably in 1227, one of these hounds, a Master Andrew, along with a companion named William, paid a visit to Kantara and engaged the monks in a theological discussion. When the Greeks accused the Latins of heresy for their use of unleavened bread in the sacrament of the Eucharist and challenged Andrew to a trial by fire, Andrew instead cited them to appear before Archbishop Eustorge of Nicosia. The monks obeyed, but upon refusing to recant their accusations against the Latins they were imprisoned and subjected to harsh conditions and physical abuse for three years. Each year they were interviewed, but they would not budge without permission from Patriarch Germanos. Finally Eustorge appealed to Pope Gregory IX for a solution, and with Eustorge away in exile in Acre, Master Andrew received the papal orders to treat the monks as heretics, gave them one more chance, and then summoned the king and Haute

Cour, persuading them to execute the monks. One of the monks died in prison in the meantime, and on 19 May 1231 the remaining twelve were dispensed with in a public and brutal fashion.

Papal letters in the Vatican Archives describe the aftermath. The event was at the centre of the diplomatic discussions between Germanos II and Gregory IX over the next few years. In 1238 Gregory ordered Latin prelates in the East not to allow Greek priests to celebrate the divine offices unless they first took an oath to the Roman Church and swore that the Latins were not heretics for using unleavened bread. Archbishop Neophytos and many of the Greek higher clergy chose exile in Armenia rather than take the oath. It was not until a decade later, in the context of the preparations for King Louis IX of France's crusade, that the Greeks were enticed to return. In 1250 Pope Innocent IV was at least willing to consider their requests for a return to the pre-1220 situation, and the following year he permitted them to elect Archbishop Germanos after Neophytos' death. When the archbishop of Nicosia, Hugh of Fagiano, complained about the rites of the Greeks that he considered problematic, Innocent's lengthy response of 1254 mostly vindicated the Greeks and must have annoyed Hugh. Relations with Archbishop Hugh only worsened, and Germanos and the Greek bishops appealed to Rome against his actions. As a result of discussions at the papal curia, in 1260 Pope Alexander IV issued the *Bulla Cypria*, the constitution of the Greek clergy on Cyprus for the next three centuries. Although Germanos would be the last archbishop, and the four Greek bishops would remain subordinate to their Latin counterparts and take oaths to them and to the pope, the Greeks retained their hierarchy, jurisdiction over their flock, and much autonomy. Nevertheless, the arrangement provoked a period of strife within the Greek community and between the Latin and Greek hierarchies. As late as the 1280s, Archbishop Ranulph imprisoned the leading Greek cleric, Bishop Neophytos of Solea, and Bishop Berard of Limassol accused Bishop Matthew of Lefkara of heresy over unleavened bread. By the end of the century, however, all sides came to accept the document, which was fully implemented.

During the Civil War, Frederick II had regained Jerusalem by diplomacy in 1229, but in 1244 the city fell for the last time. Louis IX responded with a crusade, and his army wintered in Cyprus in 1248-49. The Chronicle of John of Joinville informs us about such things as provisioning and the negotiations conducted with Mongol representatives in the hopes of an alliance against the Muslims. The crusade ended in disaster and the Mongol alliance came to nothing, however, and although Louis was able to repair fortifications, starting in 1263 Sultan Baybars of the new Mamluk state in Egypt whittled away at the remaining Frankish outposts in Syria-Palestine. In 1271, the year the future King Edward I of England stopped on Cyprus while on crusade, Baybars sent a fleet against Cyprus itself, but it was wrecked off Limassol. The declining situation on the mainland affected Cyprus in various other ways. We hear of refugees from Antioch (which fell in 1268) and other cities fleeing to Cyprus. The evidence is most conspicuous in the many monastic communities, especially Benedictines, that relocated to Cyprus, with several nunneries in Nicosia and Stavrovouni growing in importance. Cypriot ecclesiastical positions were also used to support exiled prelates from the mainland.

From the 1240s, Queen Alice (†1246), King Henry I (†1253), Queen Plaisance of Antioch (1258-61) and the future King Hugh III (1263 on) were at least nominally in charge of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. At Henry I's death in 1253, his son, Hugh II (1253-67), was an infant, so Plaisance, the queen-mother, acted as regent, as had Alice for Henry himself, until her death in 1261, and Henry's cousin Hugh of

Antioch-Lusignan succeeded her as regent. When the young Hugh II died in 1267, the regent was crowned Hugh III (1267-84). Then, in 1269, after Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily, executed the last Hohenstaufen king of Jerusalem, Conrad V, Hugh III of Cyprus actually became king of Jerusalem. Hugh now had to commit even more Cypriot resources to the defense of Syria against the Muslim tide. In 1271 the Cypriot knights refused to continue to fight off the island, asserting that they were not obliged, and Hugh was forced to accept a compromise in 1273, whereby they would serve four months per year. Hugh III's succession did not go uncontested either in Cyprus or in Jerusalem. His cousin, Maria of Antioch, was pressing her claim to Jerusalem and in 1277 sold her rights to Charles of Anjou, whose representative took charge in Acre, the *de facto* capital. When the Templars sided with Charles, Hugh confiscated the order's property on Cyprus and razed their castle at Gastria. Hugh III died in 1284 in Tyre while trying to regain control.

Hugh's son John reigned for only one year, dying in 1285. John's brother, Henry II (1285-1324), was finally able to take advantage of the chaos in Charles of Anjou's kingdom following the great revolt of 1282 called the Sicilian Vespers, and, patching it up with the Templars, Henry was crowned king of Jerusalem in Tyre in 1286. The Angevins did not give up their claims, but for the moment Henry was in power. Five years later, however, a truce with the Mamluks that had held since 1272 was broken and, despite the efforts of Henry II and the Cypriots, Acre fell in 1291.

The Zenith of Medieval Cyprus, 1291-1372

The fall of Acre and the other Christian outposts on the Syro-Palestinian coast was a disaster for the West and seemed that way at first for Cyprus as well. King Henry II of Cyprus was now king of Jerusalem in name only. It was only a matter of time before the sultan's military might would be focused on Cyprus and the nearby Kingdom of Armenia. Refugees from the mainland, who had been fleeing to Cyprus for decades before the Muslim advance, now flooded into the island. The result was predictable: prices rose, the dispossessed were often reduced to poverty, and local resources were strained to meet the demands, a situation made worse by crop failures during the last decade of the century. The crown resorted to various forms of charity and price controls to alleviate the distress, as surviving ordinances bear witness.

Yet there was also excitement in the expectation of a new crusade to recover the Holy Land, with renewed hopes that an alliance with the Mongols would deal a severe blow to the Mamluks. The great military orders, the Templars and Hospitallers, relocated to Limassol, which must have taken on the aspect of a boom town. Other refugees, Franks and Syrians, settled there and in Paphos, as tombs from the era attest, but Nicosia received many more refugees. The mendicant orders, hitherto concentrated in the capital, established convents in Limassol and Paphos as well. The export of the traditional Cypriot products, salt, wine, sugar, and cotton, increased to the benefit of Limassol and Paphos and their hinterlands in particular, while the manufacture of camlet and other products flourished in Nicosia.



Cyprus and nearby region in 1355

Nothing matched the spectacular growth of Famagusta, the port city closest to the Levantine coast. Soon all four main mendicant orders, Franciscans, Dominicans, Carmelites, and Augustinians, founded convents there, and several Nicosia convents of Benedictine, Cistercian, and Franciscan nuns has sister houses in Famagusta as well. The Syrian and later Armenian population of the city rose dramatically, as did the Greek and Italian constituents, due to new trading opportunities. A large portion of international trade between East and West was now redirected to pass through Famagusta, assisted in part by a papal ban on trade with Mamluk lands, which Nicholas IV issued soon after the fall of Acre. It seems that, while Henry II tried to enforce this ban, merchants based on Cyprus actually increased their own volume of trade with the Muslims, and Famagusta became a great emporium. The Italian mercantile cities, above all Genoa and Venice, made Famagusta an important part of their international trade networks, and the chance survival of some fifteen hundred charters of the notary Lamberto di Sambuceto from around 1300 provides much information on the life and extent of the Genoese community.

Henry II responded to this development by raising Famagusta's status to a capital-in-exile for the

Kingdom of Jerusalem. Until the Holy Land could be retaken, the king of Jerusalem was to be crowned in Famagusta Cathedral. Pope Boniface VIII in a way assisted by joining the episcopal see of Famagusta with that of Tortosa on the mainland. The old cathedral of St Nicholas the Confessor was much too small for the growing Latin-rite population, even if it was only a fraction of the total populace, and so a new structure was begun around 1300 which, despite financial vicissitudes, was completed in a quarter century and still stands magnificent today. Henry also busied himself with Famagusta's city walls, which the capital would also receive during his reign.

But all this could change at any moment. Cyprus was engulfed in a sea of Muslims, and if the Templars and Hospitallers rivaled the kingdom itself in military might, Venice and Genoa certainly exceeded it. The kings of Sicily continued to lay claim to the title of Jerusalem, and in 1303 Pope Boniface VIII even ratified the Treaty of Caltabellotta, which contemplated giving Cyprus itself to Frederick of Aragon in exchange for the return of Sicily to King Charles II. Governing Cyprus was thus a delicate balancing act, one that a number of nobles and the king's own brother thought Henry incapable of performing. On 26 April 1306 Henry was removed from power and his brother Amaury, lord of Tyre, was appointed governor. According to documents the nobles sent to the pope, Henry had done nothing to prepare for the expected Mamluk invasion, to defend the neighboring Kingdom of Armenia, to alleviate food shortages, to assist Amaury against the Saracens, or to provide justice, especially to the Templars and Hospitallers. The nobles also asserted that Henry was gravely ill and could not rule.

Perhaps the most serious charge was that Henry failed to court friendly relations with Genoa. Queen Alice had granted the Genoese their first privileges in 1218, and in 1232 Henry I added exemption from local jurisdiction in most cases. The Genoese asked for even more rights in the late 1280's, but Henry II and Genoa failed to come to a new trade agreement, and relations steadily declined from there. During a war between Genoa and Venice in the 1290s, Cyprus favored Venice in the skirmishes that took place around Cyprus. After the Genoese victory, they requested that Henry pay an indemnity, but Henry refused. The Genoese then moved to boycott the island, and Henry retaliated. At this point Genoese pirates began to threaten Cyprus' new prosperity, even raiding the island on occasion. Since this prosperity in turn depended in part on the papal ban on trade with Egypt, Henry sometimes enforced this by seizing Genoese shipping. Numerous Genoese pirates were executed in 1303, and Cyprus and Genoa almost went to war in late 1305.

Amaury did what he could to earn the pope's support for his coup, including attempts to 'reform' Greek, Latin, and Georgian monasteries, succeeding only in achieving the change to a more appropriate dress for a Latin nunnery. We are exceptionally well informed about the coup, although our Cypriot narrative sources were written from the perspective of the eventual victor, King Henry. Amaury's support gradually began to erode, until he was forced to enlist the aid of his brother-in-law, King Oshin of Armenia, to whose court he exiled Henry in February 1310.

Meanwhile, two momentous events were taking place that would have a profound impact on Cyprus. First, just as Amaury took power, the Hospitallers, allied with Genoese privateers, set off to conquer Rhodes, a process that was completed in 1310. The uncomfortable relationship between the Cypriot crown and an international military order headquartered in Limassol thus eventually ended when the Hospitallers moved to Rhodes, leaving only enough personnel to manage their Cypriot properties.

These properties were soon to grow in number because of the second event: the arrest, trial, and dissolution of the Templars, which began in France in late 1307. Amaury had got on well with the Templars and was reluctant to carry out the papal orders he received in early 1308. After a brief period of tension, the members of the order on Cyprus were arrested and imprisoned. Soon after the trial began in May 1310, Amaury was murdered on 5 June.

The repercussions of the coup and Templar dissolution remained for several years. Amaury's supporters named another brother, Aimery, as his successor, but eventually the Hospitallers tipped the scales in favor of the king. Yet the king was in exile in Armenia with King Oshin, brother of Amaury's widow, Isabel. In 1308 the pope had assigned a papal legate, Peter of Pleine-Chassagne, bishop of Rodez, and two nuncios to deal with the usurpation and then the trial of the Templars. The legate and one of the nuncios, Raymond of Pins, with the assistance of the Hospitaller master, eventually secured Henry's release in August 1310, and Aimery and the other rebels were captured. In 1316 they were moved to Kyrenia Castle where they soon died. Cyprus had retained close relations with Armenia for decades, including marriage ties between the royal houses. Several high-ranking members of the Armenian royal family, such as Amaury's agent Hayton of Gorhigos, even joined Latin monasteries on Cyprus. But Henry's experience and the terms of his release spoiled these relations, and the two powers were almost at war in 1318, although later the situation improved.

According to the nearly complete surviving record of the Templar trial, those sent to investigate the order had failed to find the incriminating evidence that Pope Clement V and King Philip IV of France were seeking, even from non-Templar witnesses. So in 1311 the pope sent inquisitors with instructions to apply torture. Although a number of the Templars on Cyprus were eventually released, by 1316 many of them, including the marshal, had died in the dungeons of Kyrenia Castle. Most of their property was given to the Hospitallers, who became easily the wealthiest landowners on the island after the crown.

While legate on Cyprus, Peter of Pleine-Chassagne also busied himself with ecclesiastical reform, holding a provincial synod in Nicosia in June 1313. He had already made new regulations for the Greeks, most of which were contrary to the *Bulla Cypria*, and a riot broke out in Nicosia on 1 May in which a mob tried to kill the legate, but failed to find him. Three Greek bishops were held responsible and jailed, Bishop Hilarion of Karpasia dying in prison. Several years later Pope John XXII released Bishops Leo of Solea and Olbianos of Lefkara, having summoned them to Avignon, granting them privileges and nullifying the new regulations, but warning them to respect papal legates in the future.

The problems with Genoa that in part lay behind Amaury's coup returned and never completely disappeared. Henry refused to repay the balance of a large loan his brother had taken from Genoa, and Genoa seriously considered invasion. Following continued Genoese piracy and plundering expeditions near Paphos in the early 1310s, and more confiscations of cargos from Henry, the king supposedly imprisoned all 460 Genoese inhabitants of Nicosia in 1316 and only released them in 1320. Finally Genoa and Henry's successor Hugh IV concluded a peace treaty in 1329, although it was not until a new treaty of 1338 that Genoese piracy ceased to be a major preoccupation.

The reign of Hugh IV (1324-59) is often seen as the high point of Frankish Cyprus, an era of peace

and prosperity. Contemporaries were full of praise for Hugh, a patron of the arts and learning who enjoyed the company of the wealthy Greek Cypriot intellectual George Lapithis, some of whose writings are preserved. Lapithis debated Latin scholars in Hugh's court, perhaps the Parisian masters of theology who lived in Nicosia during his reign, above all the Franciscan archbishop of Nicosia Elias of Nabinaux. Learned Arabs from Mamluk Egypt also frequented the court, which was a haven for the Byzantine opponents of Gregory Palamas as well. Giovanni Boccaccio, famous author of the *Decameron*, in which Cyprus figures prominently, was busy for years composing *The Genealogy of the Pagan Gods* at Hugh's request.

Contrary to the modern image of Hugh as cruel and weak, the king was known above all to contemporaries as just. From 1334, he was active in the international naval leagues established to halt the advance of the Turks in the Aegean and Southern Anatolia, the Turks having replaced the Mamluks as the main Muslim threat to Christendom. Hugh first joined Venice, the Hospitallers, France, the Byzantines, and the pope, and in 1337 Benedict XII congratulated Hugh for a victory over the Turks, as a result of which four cities on the coast paid Hugh tribute. Hugh himself organized the second naval league in 1341, this time without France and Byzantium, and in 1344 they captured the important town of Smyrna, which remained in Western hands until 1402, with Cyprus paying its share for the defense.

It was in Hugh's reign, in 1340, that Archbishop Elias held a unique provincial council in Nicosia attended by the Latin, Greek, Maronite, and Armenian bishops, the religious leaders of the Syrian Jacobites and Nestorians, and many other Latin, Greek, Arabic, and Armenian-speaking clerics and laymen. The acts are recorded in the *Synodicum Nicosiense*, a record of local ecclesiastical legislation. Nothing could symbolize better the harmonic relations between the various religious and linguistic groups of Cyprus, who all looked to Hugh as their leader, than the common profession of faith they adopted. One should not exaggerate the unity of the Cypriot population, but by Hugh's reign there had developed a true sense of identity under the Lusignan dynasty, which patronized churches and monasteries of the various communities, best illustrated in the story of the Cross of Tochni as told by Leontios Makhairas. A disruption did occur the year after Hugh's death, but as in 1313 it was the fault of an overzealous outsider and was just as brief. Soon after his arrival at the end of 1359, the papal legate Peter Thomas, a Carmelite, had the Greek bishops and many priests gathered in Nicosia Cathedral to "correct" them and to confirm them in Latin. Once again a mob caught wind of what was happening, which went against local tradition, and they burst into the cathedral to kill the legate, who was only saved by the timely arrival of Prince John and the viscount. As before, the Greeks were told to go about their business as usual and King Peter I informed the pope about the legate's provocations.

The latter years of Hugh's reign were marred by a noticeable decline in Cyprus' role as an entrepôt in East-West trade, as a result of changing trade routes and the complete lapse of the papal ban on commerce with the sultan in the 1340s. This decline was exacerbated by the Black Death of 1347-48, which probably carried off a third of the island's population and continued to return in waves well into the next century. The overall volume of international commerce in luxury items declined with the population. The demographic contraction had disastrous effects on the Latin monasteries, as numerous tombs attest. Noble status was usually required for entrance into monastic orders, and

on Cyprus the nobility was Latin-rite and concentrated in the cities, which explains the unusually high number of Latin monasteries in Nicosia and Famagusta. After 1348 the population of monks and nuns dropped dramatically and could not be replenished, a further Cypriot catalyst for a pan-European decline in Latin monasticism in the late Middle Ages.

During Hugh's final years occurred the second of the two events that have led modern historians to characterize Hugh as cruel. In 1340-42, Hugh had treated his son-in-law, Ferrand of Majorca, rather harshly, but this may have been prompted by Ferrand's treasonous recognition of his uncle, King Robert the Wise of Sicily, as king of Jerusalem, which Ferrand's own secret report reveals. Then, in 1349, Princes Peter and John set off on a clandestine journey west, and when Hugh had hunted them down and brought them back, he imprisoned them for seventy days in Kyrenia Castle. Given that Peter was heir to the throne and had gone against the king's wishes, we can attribute his punishment to Hugh's sense of justice and concern for the succession. The episode illustrates an important aspect of the character of Hugh's successor, the most famous of all kings of Cyprus, Peter I (1359-69). Peter Edbury has argued convincingly that it was in part to reverse Cyprus' economic decline that King Peter led the last great victorious crusade in 1365, taking and sacking Cyprus' main commercial rival, Alexandria. Yet Peter was also a romantic, as his actions in 1349 demonstrate. He took pilgrimage and fasting vows, founded his own chivalrous order, the Order of the Sword, and is said to have had visions of the Cross. Medieval authors, among them Chaucer and Guillaume de Machaut, considered him a model crusader, celebrating his exploits.

At first Peter followed his father's policy of focusing on Anatolia; in 1360 the Armenians handed him Gorchigos and the following year he took Antalya from the Turks, who continued to pay tribute. In 1362 he finally succeeded in going west, the first reigning king of Cyprus to do so. Accompanied by his chancellor, the famous knight and writer Philip of Mézières, and the papal legate Peter Thomas, King Peter's primary task was to deal with the claim to the throne of his nephew Hugh, the son of King Hugh IV's first son, Guy, who had died in 1343. Peter satisfied Hugh with the title of prince of Galilee and 50,000 bezants. But Peter was also heavily involved in drumming up support for a planned crusade, traveling all over Europe: Venice, Genoa, Avignon, France, England, Germany, Bohemia, Poland, and back to Venice. At first King John of France was to lead the campaign, but when John died in 1364 Peter took over. Yet Peter went to extraordinary lengths to carry out the plan, offering to help Venice put down a revolt on Crete in 1363 and giving in to all Genoese demands in April 1365 following an episode of violence in Cyprus.

Peter finally traveled from Venice to Rhodes in August 1365. There he gathered his forces, estimated at 10,000 men, 1,400 horse, and 165 ships, a large fleet, but not massive. Most of the troops, moreover, were Cypriots and others who were already in the East, such as Hospitallers, so the extensive wandering in Europe had not been a great success. Nevertheless, departing on 4 October, Peter's actions the next few days were to secure his name in history. The Cypriot chroniclers, Mézières, and Machaut describe the events. Once they had set sail, Peter revealed their destination: Alexandria. Five days later the fleet arrived at the unprepared city, Peter entered easily, and his troops put it to the sack. But in doing so they destroyed two of the three land gates, rendering the city indefensible from the Mamluk relief army that would come from Cairo. The king, his chancellor, and the legate were

furious, having wished to hold the city, but the soldiers insisted on leaving with their tremendous booty. Peter reluctantly withdrew on 16 October.

The Mamluks sought peace. The sack of Alexandria had harmed Venetian and Genoese commercial interests, and even subjects, so they undermined Peter's efforts to continue the war. Peter agreed to negotiate in 1366, but he kept up the pressure at the same time, sending a large fleet of 116 ships to Syria in January 1367, although it only managed to pillage Tripoli. Throughout the year negotiations continued without result, and Peter raided Syrian ports in the autumn. Toward the end of the year, Peter went west again. On the surface, the motivation for the trip seems to have been that a nobleman, Florimond of Lesparre, had challenged him to a duel in the court of the king of France, because of an argument, which Pope Urban V ended up settling in favor of Peter. It is likely, however, that Peter sought backing for a new crusade. This never came to pass, and eventually the Cypriots and Mamluks agreed to peace in 1370, after Peter's death.

Peter's demise was no less dramatic than his life. He returned to Cyprus from the West in October 1368, disappointed and perhaps slightly insane. He had been informed of rumors that his wife, Eleanor of Aragon, had taken a lover, but when the nobles denied it, the unfortunate informant was imprisoned and died. Peter became angry, paranoid, and tyrannical, subjecting nobles to all sorts of indignities, in particular the Gibelet family. On 15 January 1369 Peter imprisoned the steward of the palace, John Gorap, for forgetting to buy oil for the asparagus, threatening to behead him the following morning. Instead, in the morning, faced with this abuse of power, Princes John and James, Peter's brothers, decided to accompany some nobles to visit the king and have him renew the oaths he had taken on his coronation. On the way they released Gorap and others wrongly imprisoned. Leontios Makhairas describes the drama in graphic detail. In short, when the group arrived, one of the king's mistresses, Eschive of Scandelion, was in bed with him, and she covered herself and left. John entered the bedroom and presented the king with the group's written demands. When John left so that the king could dress, Gorap, Henry of Gibelet, and others rushed in, stabbed Peter to death, and mutilated his body. Since Queen Eleanor engineered Prince John's assassination in 1375 to avenge her husband's murder, it is likely that Peter's brothers were co-conspirators.

This was the second coup d'état of the century, but this time, as happened elsewhere in Europe in these decades, overbearing rule was met with regicide. Later that day the princes and nobles passed an ordinance with thirteen clauses, no doubt having composed it the evening before. The thirteen clauses together address what the nobles considered Peter's abuses of power and dangerous policies over the previous years, calling for the rule of law with the counsel of the Haute Cour. To this end, they ordered that the thirteenth-century jurist John of Ibelin's *The Book of the Assizes* would become the reference work for the law of the realm.

Kingdom in Decline, 1372-1474

The dramatic events of the last four years of Peter's life left a profound imprint on the final two centuries of Latin rule. Perhaps because of the disruption of Genoese (and Venetian) trading interests in the area that resulted from the sack of Alexandria, the Genoese invaded Cyprus a few years later. The immediate cause of the invasion stemmed from a violent incident between Genoese and Venetian citizens in Famagusta. The Italian merchant communities had been involved in such clashes for over half a century. Some Genoese were killed in rioting in Famagusta in 1310, and there was more trouble with the Genoese in 1331. In 1349 an argument between a Sicilian and a Venetian in Famagusta turned ugly, but the Venetians left it to Hugh IV to deal with the Cypriots and others who had damaged their property and injured some thirty Venetians, which is indicative of the differing attitudes of the Genoese and Venetians toward the crown. Genoa, on the other hand, nearly went to war with Cyprus in 1343-44 and 1364-65, in the latter case because of another violent episode. After this last, Peter I was forced to placate Genoa with extensive new privileges to avoid having to abandon his cherished crusade, including the right to build an administrative loggia in Famagusta and the right to intervene militarily in case the Cypriots went back on their word. Although the differences between Venice, Genoa, and Cyprus concerning the war with Egypt seem have been resolved by treaty in 1370, we should not be surprised that a disagreement between citizens of the two Italian cities led to a Genoese invasion in the 1370s.

The violence began after the coronation of Peter II (1369-82) as king of Jerusalem in St Nicholas Cathedral in Famagusta in October of 1372. Struggles between Genoese and Venetians in Famagusta occurred in the 1340s and 1360s. Now they quarreled over a seemingly trivial element of the ceremonies, and the Cypriots took the side of the Venetians in the chaos that followed. In rioting Genoese property was destroyed and lives were lost, but since Peter blamed the Genoese for the incident, they received no redress. From there things escalated rapidly: many Genoese left the island, the city prepared for war, and it issued demands that could hardly be met in full. The Cypriots, for their part, were not disposed to give in and excluded Genoese ships from Cyprus. Despite intense papal and Hospitaller efforts to find a peaceful solution, an advance fleet sailed from Genoa in early 1373. Genoese pillaging was met with reprisals against the Genoese remaining in Cyprus, until the situation deteriorated to the point that the Cypriots actually handed the port of Antalya in Asia Minor back to the Turks rather than lose it to Genoa. Limassol was burned and Paphos captured.

The main Genoese fleet of 36 galleys and over 14,000 men arrived in late 1373 to join the seven galleys that had come earlier. The Cypriots decided to negotiate, but through Genoese deceit King Peter II, his uncle Prince John, and his mother Eleanor of Aragon were imprisoned. Peter's uncle Prince James, however, refused to be lured into a trap and continued the fight, taking Kyrenia. Nicosia was pillaged, but James inflicted great losses on the Genoese until they decided that total victory was not worth the cost. For their part, the Cypriots realized that they could not win the war and saw that

the continued destruction of the countryside and cities would only worsen matters.

The negotiated settlement was harsh for the Cypriots, who agreed to pay a huge indemnity of over two million gold florins in installments, 90,000 gold florins for the expenses of the invasion fleet, and an annual tribute of 40,000 gold florins, offering many important hostages to Genoa and ceding Famagusta as further security until the indemnity was paid, which never happened. James accepted voluntary exile wherever he wished, but again through trickery the Genoese had him brought to Genoa where the future King James I remained for many years. Although the Cypriot economy did not collapse completely, the war signaled the end of the era of affluence that had been based on its strategic trading position.

The invasion and partition of Cyprus in 1374 ushered in a new phase of Cypriot history in more ways than one. Paphos and Limassol never really recovered. Not only was Famagusta under the direct rule of Genoa, but the death or exile of much of the French-speaking population as a result of the war radically changed the demographic make-up of the nobility. From now on Greeks, Italians, and others played an increasingly predominant role in society, with Greeks and Syrians finally joining the feudal nobility. The Greek bourgeois class, the *perpyriarioi*, had already become significant enough by the mid-fourteenth century for the *Assizes* of the Cour des Bourgeois to be translated into Cypriot Greek, and when Peter I was desperate for cash, many *perpyriarioi* purchased their freedom. These trends continued during the last century of Lusignan rule, in which the Cypriot dialect of Greek was without question the *lingua franca* for all Cypriots, represented in literature by the chronicles of Leontios Makhairas and George Boustronios. In these and other local narratives, the use of new terms equivalent to 'Cypriots' — *Kypriotes*, *Ciprici*, *Chiprois* — to describe the inhabitants of the island in various languages heralded the nascent development of a common Cypriot identity united around the monarchy. Nevertheless, foreshadowing things to come, we also see the gradual rise of the Italian language – even its influence on Greek – helped in part by James' long captivity in Genoa. The *Livre des remembrances*, the only volume that survives of the royal Secrète, the financial office of the Lusignan state, dates from 1468-69 and contains documents in Latin, French, Italian, and Greek.

Religiously, the troubles of the West had a greater impact than the Genoese invasion, although the Genoese did control the see of Famagusta. In 1378 the Great Schism began, and for almost forty years there were two and then three popes, a situation that returned during the Council of Basel (1431-49). Cyprus switched allegiances, but on the local level this set in motion the 'Cyprification' of the church. The kings saw the opportunity to take control over ecclesiastical appointments and revenues, naming members of the royal family archbishops of Nicosia, no matter how unsuitable they were, and interfering in the other dioceses. The popes' own candidates often remained in the West anyway, and the Greek bishop of Solea may have taken over the role of religious leader, in processions, for example. Except for Lefkara, the Greek bishops had returned to the capitals of the Latin diocese in the fourteenth century, and in 1472 Pope Sixtus IV had to complain about this situation, which undermined the authority of the Latin Church.

During this time of western distraction, some members of the Greek higher clergy took the opportunity to approach the patriarchate of Constantinople to seek reunion with the Greek Church. In 1405 Joseph Bryennios, an experienced representative of the patriarch, came to Cyprus to investigate the request,

and a detailed record has survived. The internal divisions of the thirteenth century were still evident, since only three of the four Greek bishops sought reunion. Although the Greek clerics present insisted that they were Greek Orthodox in faith and rite, Bryennios considered them Roman Catholic, for they took an oath to the pope and Latin bishop, participated in common ceremonies and processions with the Latin clergy, and had recourse to the pope for appeals in ecclesiastical court cases. The Greeks replied that these things were superficial and necessary under the circumstances, but Bryennios rejected their application, and in 1412 a similar request was refused. In general, Greek Cypriots were excluded by the Orthodox, not only in Constantinople, but also in Jerusalem, although some Greek priests pursued ordination off the island rather than at the hands of Greek bishops who had sworn allegiance to Rome. This situation obtained until the Ottoman Conquest.

The religious status of non-Greeks was no less vague. Peter I had already complained that Latin ladies were frequenting Greek and schismatic churches. Cardinal Hugh of Lusignan was at ease speaking with the Greeks at the Council of Basil. King Janus asked for an office for the local St Hilarion, the result being preserved in a famous musical manuscript housed in Turin. Positions below the level of bishop in the Latin Church were often occupied by Cypriot Greeks and Syrians. The Syrian Audeth family provides an interesting illustration of the blurring of lines, patronizing non-Chalcedonian churches and joining the Greek and Latin clergy. One member, Nicholas, became the head and reformer of the Carmelite Order in the sixteenth century. The common processions and ceremonies that Bryennios complained about, which had taken place since the early fourteenth century, were paralleled by common pilgrimages and places of worship, the examples of Stavrovouni, St Mamas, and la Cava, and a series of sites linked to St Catherine in and around Famagusta, being the most conspicuous in the reports of pilgrims.

Genoa now had a colony in Famagusta, with a Genoese bishop and a substantial Genoese community, although the Greek population outnumbered them. For his release from captivity in 1383, King James I (1382-98) was forced, among other things, to give up sovereignty of the city and the surrounding area, what has been described as a state within a state, now ruled by a captain. Documents in the Genoese archives record its ninety-year history. The Genoese required all major international shipping to go through Famagusta. Still, in the fifteenth century the city did not enjoy the prosperity it had had in the fourteenth. Other trading groups stayed away from the port, reducing its income. Some of the population emigrated, and in 1394 an Italian visitor, Niccolo da Martoni, noted that “a great part, almost a third, is uninhabited, and the houses are destroyed, and this has been done since the date of the Genoese lordship.” The bishop’s revenues were only half what they had been before the war, and there were complaints that the city was unhealthy. Moreover, defense against external threats from the Cypriot troops, Catalan pirates, and Mamluk invaders cost money, even if the city did have a military value. By 1447 Genoa decided to turn the administration of the colony over to the Banco di San Giorgio of Genoa. Famagusta continued to decline, however, and even some citizens chose to leave and join the Genoese communities in Limassol and Nicosia instead.

The Cypriots tried and failed to retake Famagusta already in Peter II’s reign, despite the help of Venetians and Catalans. James I’s coronation as king of Jerusalem thus took place in Nicosia in 1389, and not in Famagusta as was tradition. In 1393 he gained the empty title of king of Armenia, which

had disappeared completely, and from then on the Lusignans had three crowns. James' son Janus (1398-1432) received all three in one ceremony. Janus was born in Genoa, being named after the Roman God of the city, so James had to exercise caution with until his son's release. Not long after Janus came to power, however, he laid siege to Famagusta in 1402, but gave up in 1403 upon the arrival of a Genoese fleet. He tried again in 1404, but the two sides agreed to a peace treaty in 1410. Janus' efforts were expensive and he was in no position to continue, let alone accept Genoa's offer in 1420 to sell Famagusta, at a price the Venetians found so exorbitant that they would not lend Janus the money.

Janus' ambitions thus came to nothing. Worse still, his kingdom suffered from returns of the plague in 1409, 1419-20, and 1422, and swarms of locusts in 1409-12. The ultimate catastrophe was still to come, however. Janus allowed Catalan pirates to pillage Mamluk coastal areas from Cypriot bases, and the Genoese did as well. In 1422 such attacks on Syria and Egypt reached new heights, and Sultan Barsbay (1422-37) had enough, deciding that it was also time to avenge Peter I's sack of Alexandria in 1365. He sent five ships and a thousand men to attack Limassol in 1424, sinking pirate vessels, taking hostages, and seizing booty. Encouraged by the ease of the venture, Barsbay built a larger fleet, sending forty ships in 1425. Genoese Famagusta offered symbolic submission, so the Mamluks pillaged the surroundings and moved to sack Larnaca, where they fought a pitched battle, inflicting a serious defeat on the Cypriots. Limassol and the surroundings were again looted, and the fleet returned with more booty and over a thousand Cypriot captives who were sold into slavery. The full-scale invasion came in 1426, after King Janus refused a peace initiative. Over a hundred ships reached Limassol, sacking the town yet again, for several days, beginning 1 July. On the 7th the Mamluks met the Cypriots at Khirokitia, crushing a large Cypriot army, and King Janus himself was soon taken captive. Hugh of Lusignan, archbishop of Nicosia and the king's brother, retired to Kyrenia and Nicosia was turned over to the invasion forces for security, but the Mamluk troops could not resist. After pillaging, destroying, raping, and killing, the Mamluks set sail from Larnaca with 6000 captives on 18 July. The destruction and further decimation of the Frankish population was another great blow to Latin monasticism on Cyprus. Two of the three leading abbeys, Benedictine Stavrovouni and Cistercian Beaulieu, did not survive the Lusignan period, and in contrast to the flourishing Greek houses, the Latin monasteries that lasted until Venetian rule were largely empty of inmates.

Leontios Makhairas relates how, in the chaos and absence of royal control, rebellions sprung up throughout the island. An Italian named Sforza tried to take power in Paphos using Spanish troops. Peasants revolted in groups, robbing the estates of the aristocracy and committing the occasional atrocity. A certain Alexis even proclaimed himself king. The nobles and wealthy bourgeois, Franks and Greeks, appointed Hugh of Lusignan regent, and Hugh managed to establish order, executing 'Re Alexis' in 1427. Despite the traditional explanation, it is clear that these revolts had no national character, nor were they directed at the king, who was in captivity. Rather the peasants' anger was aimed at the upper classes, regardless of background, as in similar revolts in Europe in the fourteenth century.

Janus remained in Egypt for almost a year while his kingdom tried to raise the half of his 200,000 dinar ransom required for his release, an interesting story in itself. After his return, Cyprus would

have to pay the balance and an annual tribute of 10,000 dinars as well, so Cyprus now suffered the humiliation of being subject to two different powers. Janus thus died an unhappy man in 1432, leaving his only son, John II (1432-58), with an uncertain future.

The humanist Pope Pius II, i.e., Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, described John II as more or less useless, so it is probably best that during the early years of his reign he played little part in government. At his succession John was only fourteen, so his able second cousin Peter of Lusignan acted as regent. One wise move Janus managed to make after his return from captivity was to send his brother Hugh, who was raised to the cardinalate in 1426, to the West in 1427 as ambassador, and Cardinal Hugh continued to serve in that capacity, playing an important role at the Council of Basel (1431-39), where he secured financial support for Cyprus from the Church. After Hugh died in 1442, John's illegitimate cousins Lancelot and Phoebus of Lusignan assisted. The kingdom continued to face returns of the plague, crop failures, and Genoese demands for payment, but luckily Genoese power in the Eastern Mediterranean was in decline in the 1440s and 1450s.

Even the Genoese realized that Cyprus had to be protected from another Mamluk invasion and from the attacks of a new menace, the Turks. The Mamluks sent troops to collect the tribute for the sultan, the 'Lord of Cyprus', but they also raided Hospitaller estates on the island in retaliation for their allowing Catalan pirates to operate out of Rhodes. Small Turkish states threatened Cyprus starting in the 1440s, and in 1448, after more than eighty years in Cypriot hands, Gorchigos in Asia Minor fell. Karpasia suffered a major attack in 1451. While Venice stood idle, Genoa, Aragon, France, and the pope sent assistance, including via the sale of an indulgence for works on the walls of Nicosia in 1454-55, an early example of the use of movable type. The external situation stabilized after 1455, but the economic difficulties continued, with a cycle of loans, delayed payments, negotiations, interventions, and new demands from the creditors. John had wanted to implement a universal tax, but the Venetians threatened to withdraw and to enforce an embargo, so John had to revoke his plan.

Another crisis arose. Gradually the families descended from Hugh IV's male children failed in the male line, and it was crucial that John produce a legitimate male heir. John is best known in history for the women in his life, three Greeks, or at least they all had much Greek blood. In 1440 Cardinal Hugh arranged his first marriage, to Amadea of Montferrat, whose mother was of the house of Savoy but whose father was a Palaiologan, but she died within months. In 1442 John married Helen Palaiologina, daughter of the despot of the Morea, another indication of the dilution of Latin exclusivity among the Lusignans, the culmination of Lusignan-Palaiologan marriage negotiations that had begun as early as 1372 with Peter II. Traditionally Helen has been seen as the real power in Cyprus and a fanatic champion of the Greeks in both the Church and the government, but this is an exaggeration based on a misinterpretation of the sources. Indeed, Helen's mother was Italian, her uncle the Latin archbishop of Patras. She did patronize Greek refugees from Constantinople, but the Latin bishop of Limassol also counted on her support. Helen bore King John two daughters, Charlotte and Cleopa, although the latter died young. Before his marriages, King John had a son by a mistress, Marietta of Patras (†1503), whom Helen is said to have bitten and whose nose the queen ordered to be cut off.

Marietta's child was James "the bastard," whom in 1453 John appointed archbishop of Nicosia at the age of fourteen, excluding the pope's (canonically legitimate) candidate, the Greek Dominican

scholar Andreas Chrysoberges. Had he been of legitimate birth and age, James would still have lacked the temperament, preferring women, horses, and war to churches. A strange series of events led to the Cypriot Civil War of 1460, described in the chronicle of George Boustronios, who takes us down to the end of the Lusignan dynasty. Charlotte married John of Coimbra, who was murdered in 1457. Archbishop James killed the murderer, but, not finding support, he went into exile in Rhodes. The following year saw James' secret return and murder of the popular viscount, Charlotte's marriage to Duke Louis of Savoy, and the death of King John and Queen Helen. Charlotte enjoyed the loyalty of the majority of the nobles, and although she did not agree with them, her advisors wanted James out of the way permanently. After a failed coup attempt, James sought the backing of none other than the Mamluk sultan to take Cyprus by force.

James and Charlotte both wooed the Mamluks in 1459, and Charlotte — perhaps speaking in Greek through interpreters — also courted support in the West from the papacy, Genoa, and Savoy. James carried the day with the sultan and invaded Cyprus with his Egyptian troops in 1460, and Charlotte and Louis retreated to Kyrenia Castle, which was besieged for four years. But the Mamluks left James with a small force of only four hundred men, forcing him to take extreme measures to finance his campaign, including sacking Greek monasteries, and this earned him the enmity of the Hospitallers and the Genoese. Thus James resumed the effort to recover Famagusta in 1461. Charlotte was winning the propaganda war in the West, where James was viewed as an apostate, but she derived little concrete benefit. She even turned to the sultan herself, but to no avail. In 1464, after a long siege, James succeeded both in ending Genoese rule in Famagusta and in driving Louis and Charlotte into exile. For the first time in ninety years Cyprus was united under one ruler.



Catherine Cornaro

King James II's position was hardly secure: he lacked the recognition and legitimacy Charlotte enjoyed, he had problems with the Mamluks and now the Ottomans, and the lengthy sieges and warfare around Paphos had been catastrophic. To gain allies, he had granted estates to Catalans and Sicilians, and with the departure of many of Charlotte's supporters, this effected yet another major change in the composition of the aristocracy. He befriended the Hospitallers of Rhodes and followed a wise economic policy, but the plague, locusts, and bad harvests limited his options. Needing an ally against the Ottomans, he turned to the Venetians, who shared common interests with James against Genoa, Charlotte, Savoy, and the Turks, with whom they were at war in the Peloponnese — Euboea was about to fall in 1470. So in 1468 James was engaged to Catherine Cornaro, fourteen years old, whose

maternal grandmother was from the Greek Empire of Trebizond and whose father's family already had significant interests in the Cypriot sugar industry. She arrived in Cyprus in late 1471 and the wedding was celebrated.

It had been arranged that the Venetian state would be Catherine's heir, should she die childless, but

James III was born in 1473, the year of James II's premature death. With such an unstable situation the party of the Kingdom of Naples took the opportunity to murder Catherine's uncle and advisor, Andrew, and attempted a coup, only to be stopped by the Venetian fleet. With the death of the infant James III in 1474, Venice *de facto* came into power, already considering the island a colony, to which it sent a provveditore as its highest officer, along with other administrators. As in Genoese Famagusta, the Venetians quickly took over high ecclesiastical offices, and all four Latin sees were occupied by Venetians by 1489. *De iure* it looked as if Venice would simply inherit the island at Catherine's death, but when Charlotte's party failed an assassination attempt against Catherine in 1479, this helped persuade Venice that Catherine ought to be coaxed into abdicating earlier in favor of direct Venetian rule. This she did in 1489, living out her days in Asolo.

Venetian Recovery, 1474-1571

By 1474 Venice's association with Cyprus was more than three centuries old. Recent research has shown the intensity of Venetian settlement on the island already in the Byzantine period, with a large and wealthy Venetian community in and around Limassol in the twelfth century, and smaller groups in Paphos and Nicosia. Most of their property, it seems, was confiscated after the Frankish conquest, but by the early fourteenth century there were again numerous Venetians on the island, in Famagusta and elsewhere, with trading privileges. Later in the century members of a branch of the Cornaro family different from Catherine's arrived and became a major economic force with the produce of their casale of Episkopi. Ties with Venice were strengthened by the many Cypriots studying at the University of Padua, under Venetian rule after 1406. In 1393 Peter of Caffran had set up a scholarship for Cypriots in Padua and there was a significant Cypriot student population in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Even a member of the royal family, Cardinal Lancelot of Lusignan, studied at the university from 1428, before ending his days in the service of the Duke of Savoy from 1442 to 1451. This can only have served to further encourage both the rise of the Italian language in Cyprus at the expense of French and, eventually, the influence of Venice over Genoa. The Cypriot presence in Padua became so strong that there was an official "Cypriot Nation" in the university, lasting beyond the Ottoman Conquest.



Famagusta Gate, Venetian Walls of Nicosia

Benjamin Arbel has dispelled the myth that the Venetian period was one of corruption, theft, oppressive taxation, neglect, and the tyrannical exploitation of the Cypriots, accompanied by demographic, industrial, agricultural, and commercial decline, an increase in sickness and poverty, and the persecution of Greeks and nobles. The historians that created and developed the myth did not exploit the unpublished archival sources, tens of thousands of documents, generally failed to examine those that had been published, neglected to read the narrative sources carefully, and simply copied and then embellished each others' accounts.

Proper historical research since World War II has in fact shown that, for the most part, Venetian rule ushered in a period of rebirth and renewal for Cyprus, after over a century of demographic and economic decline following the Black Death and returns of the plague, exacerbated by the Genoese and Mamluk invasions and the annexation of Famagusta. Despite the colonial nature of Venetian rule and the Serenissima's focus on commercial profit, Cyprus benefited in various ways as the empire's commercial focus in the Eastern Mediterranean. Venice's powerful navy provided security from invasion, and during the last century of Latin rule the island enjoyed internal peace, in stark contrast to the previous century. Before the negative effects of the new trade routes around Africa and to the Americas could be felt, the Venetian trading network reached its zenith in the mid-sixteenth century,

which maximized opportunities for the export of Cypriot agricultural products, grain, salt, sugar, wine, carobs, and cotton. Naturally Cypriot farmers and the landed aristocracy saw a share of the profits, but so did the urban elite and middle class. Many Cypriots actually transferred to Venice, such as the Greek Cypriot members of the Hellenic Fraternity of Venice, while others worked on ships in the trade routes. Much of the trade between Famagusta and the Levantine coast was left to Cypriot seamen, especially Arabic speakers, while the Venetians themselves concentrated on the island's links with the West. Meanwhile in some ways the lot of Greek serfs improved as well, with the abolition of certain servile obligations, for example.

At the end of the Lusignan period, about ten Greek families belonged to the Cypriot aristocracy. Venice approached the Greek nobles the same way it did all the others. One family stands out: the Syngliticos. This family had been part of the bureaucracy of the Frankish state in the fourteenth century and steadily rose in power and wealth. In the sixteenth century it was perhaps the richest family in Cyprus. Seizing opportunities for gain, they were able to purchase the rich casalia of Aradhippou and Morphou. Through their wealth and marriages with the Venetian aristocracy, they also became powerful in local government, exceeded in influence only by two Venetian families. The leading Syngliticos was in charge of the defense of Nicosia in 1570. In an age of blurred lines between Greeks and Franks, Orthodox and Catholics, where some individuals followed mixed traditions, the Syngliticos held high offices in both the Greek and the Latin Church. Thus even Greek Cypriots had a hand in the military, ecclesiastical, and political government of the island.



The so-called Othello Tower at the Venetian Walls of Famagusta

The most telling and important proof against the myth of general decay is the great increase in population in the Venetian period, more than doubling, and this was accompanied by the growth of the cities and the expansion of arable land. Venetian policy was directed at reversing the population decline of 1348 to 1470. Public health improved with quarantine measures, the removal of malarial swamps, and the cleaning of harbors, and we read of doctors and hospitals. The government and private citizens encouraged immigration from Greece, the Balkans, and the Levant. Fields that had been abandoned were cultivated again, and the amount of agricultural land actually increased beyond previous highs, while in times of bad harvests the mother city could step in to assist. The

Venetians were the first rulers of Cyprus to keep extensive statistics, so we learn that the population, probably around 100,000 at the beginning of Venetian rule, rose steadily to 200,000 by 1570, despite the continuing return of the plague. The population would not reach that level again until the English period. Nicosia's population also doubled to 25,000, returning to its pre-1348 height, which it would not match again until the 1930s. The Venetians poured money into the restoration of Famagusta after the decline of the Genoese period, and by 1570 the population had reached 10,000. They made similar efforts in Paphos and Limassol, but here the success was more limited, with populations of 2000 and 1000 respectively, but several other villages had 1000 inhabitants by the Ottoman Conquest, including the Greek episcopal sees of Rizokarpaso and Lefkara. Statistics also show a dramatic increase in agricultural production in grains, wine, and cotton, and while sugar production held steady, the carob became important and the state monopoly on salt, inherited from

the Lusignans, continued to be lucrative, much more than enough to pay the tribute.

Although in many respects the earlier system of government was retained, to accomplish its goals Venice had to restructure the administration to some degree. Venetian Cyprus was governed by a council, the *Regimento*, headed by the *Luogotenente*, who had two advisors. The Captain of Famagusta was the military leader, unless Venice thought it necessary to send a *Provveditore*. By 1480 the language of government, at least in its communication with Venice, changed from French to Italian. Venetian rule was thus accompanied by the Italian Renaissance, until then only superficially present in Cyprus. Art historians have identified an “Italo-Byzantine” style of painting, found in wall paintings and icons. Greek artists continued to follow Byzantine models, while showing an awareness of Italian developments. Good examples are in Galata and Kalopanayiotis. Renaissance architectural details are to be found in many structures of the period, although for Greek churches the “Franco-Byzantine” style was not eclipsed. Pure Renaissance elements are in the hospice attached to the Augustinian convent in Nicosia, the palace of Famagusta, and the ciborium found in the excavations of Paphos Cathedral, now housed in the district museum. The greatest works without doubt are the classical fortifications in Kyrenia, Famagusta, and, above all, Nicosia. The walls of Nicosia, designed by Ascanio Savorgnano and constructed just before the Turkish invasion of 1570, form a perfect circle with eleven evenly spaced arrowhead bastions.

In literature the poetry of Petrarch influenced sixteenth-century Greek Cypriot works, but for most surviving works Italian was now the dominant language of learning and literature. Cypriot schools were linked to the Venetian network. Upon completion of their higher studies in Italy, especially Padua, several Cypriots of varying backgrounds chose to stay as professors, authors, and editors of medieval works for printing, whereas others returned to play a role in the government bureaucracy. In 1531 a commission was set up for the Italian translation of the *Assizes* of the *Cour des bourgeois*, accomplished by Florio Bustron in 1534. More importantly, the sixteenth century was the Italian century in Cypriot historiography. Florio Bustron himself composed an important chronicle in Italian. The similar chronicle known as *Amadi* was also written in Italian, perhaps largely translated from earlier French sources now lost. One version of the *Chronicle of Leontios Machairas* was translated into Italian as the *Chronicle of Strambali*. A Dominican friar from a cadet line of the royal family, Etienne de Lusignan, began to compose his important *Chorografia et breve historia dell' isola de Cipro* in 1570 in Naples, having left Cyprus before the Ottoman conquest on a voyage. There are other, less significant Cypriot chronicles in Italian, as well as numerous Italian-language accounts of the conquest itself.

Peaceful rule meant uneventful rule, but the Ottoman threat became more and more palpable over time. Venice was at war with the Ottoman Empire in 1499-1501, although Cyprus remained unscathed. Mamluk Egypt fell in 1517, but Venice continued to pay the annual tribute of 8000 ducats, only now to a different sultan. Five years later Hospitaller Rhodes was conquered. In 1537-41 there was again a state of war between the *Serenissima* and the *Sublime Porte*, and this time the Turks raided Limassol in 1539, but the city was by then ruined and mostly deserted. The only real disaster came at the end, with the Ottoman Conquest itself. Before that, however, there were a few years of internal unrest, perhaps exacerbated by the increased international tension.

It was once thought that the Venetians so feared rebellion that they destroyed the castles of the nobles and the mountaintop fortifications of the Kyrenia Mountains, planning to turn the site of ancient Curium into a kind of giant fortified prison for the Cypriot nobles. In reality, Cypriot nobles had never owned castles, while in anticipation of the Ottoman invasion the Venetians actually repaired former royal castles in the mountains, sending non-combatants to St Hilarion and Buffavento in 1570. As for Curium, the Venetian senate and Cypriot nobles are actually said to have cooperated in planning to turn Curium into a fortification against the Ottomans, but they abandoned the project because of the lack of water supplies. The construction of the new walls of Nicosia, and the necessary destruction of many outlying buildings, including palaces, churches, and monasteries, was also the product of cooperation between Venice and the Cypriot aristocracy. In this way fortifications elsewhere were also strengthened and modernized. In short, there is little evidence for civil unrest or anxiety about it before the 1560s.

In the 1560s the Ottomans stepped up their efforts to create disturbances in preparation for the invasion. Jacob Diassorinos, a Greek from Rhodes with links to Moldavia, tried to lead the Greeks of Cyprus to revolt 1563, apparently in the hopes of becoming king with the support of the Ottomans, but he was quickly executed after failing to heed the warnings of the Venetians to desist and depart. Inciting the Greeks against the Latin Venetians would have been made easier by the foolish actions of the last archbishop of Nicosia, Filippo Mocenigo. Filippo came to Cyprus after attending the Council of Trent, filled with the militant spirit of the Counter Reformation. Ignoring the Greeks' rights as spelled out in the *Bulla Cypria*, and putting aside the terms of the Council of Florence, Mocenigo attempted to implement the harsher decisions of Trent and commissioned a study of the errors of the various Christian sects on the island, preserved in an unpublished manuscript. In 1567 he convoked a council in Nicosia Cathedral that resembled Elias of Nabinaux's council of 1340, with the higher clergy of all these groups participating. In contrast to Elias' success, Mocenigo repeated the folly of the papal legate Peter Thomas two centuries earlier, provoking the Nicosia mob to break down the door and rescue "the disobedient" Bishop Neophytos Logaras of Solea. The population increase also had its downside, and the authorities executed the ringleaders — including a Greek priest — of riots that occurred in 1566 during a food shortage, when it was thought that Venice was exporting grain. The Ottomans encouraged other conspiracies and rebellions, holding out promises of better years to come under Turkish rule. Some peasants living far from the walled towns decided to cooperate. Meanwhile, the complete restructuring of Nicosia and its defenses in the last three years of the Venetian period caused further hardships for the lower classes.

The new walls of Nicosia did not work. The Lieutenant Niccolo Dandolo led Venetians and Cypriots of all types in defending the city for six weeks in the summer of 1570, but the capital fell and the defenders were slaughtered. Then it was Famagusta's turn. There the Captain, Marcantonio Bragadino, was in charge, and for almost a year the city held out, until the remaining members of the Venetian and Cypriot garrison surrendered on the condition that their lives be spared. Instead they too were slaughtered, except that Bragadino merely lost his nose and ears. Two weeks later, however, he was flayed alive. His skin was stuffed with straw and sent to Constantinople as a trophy, but the Venetians managed to retrieve it in 1580 and bring it back to Venice. Thus ended almost four centuries of Latin rule on Cyprus. While economically and demographically the island would not recover until the

twentieth century, the death of one multicultural society was the birth of another.

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CHAPTER 04

The Ottoman Period, 1571-1878

Theocharis Stavrides

Conquest and integration: the background and aftermath of the War of Cyprus

Aims

This unit examines the situation in the Ottoman Empire and Cyprus on the eve of the conquest of the island by the Ottomans, the events of the War of Cyprus, as well as the policies adopted by the new rulers of the island.

After studying this unit, students will be in a position to

- Understand the historical background which led to the Ottoman conquest
- Understand the ways, in which the Ottomans attempted to integrate the island into the Empire

Keywords

- Serfs
- *Francomati*
- Conquest
- Incorporation
- Survey (*tahrir*)
- Colonization (*sürgün*)
- Pious Foundations (*vakıf*)
- *Devşirme*
- Islamizations
- Church of Cyprus

Introductory Comments

This unit consists of three sections:

- The *first* analyzes the conditions prevailing in the Ottoman Empire and Cyprus in the 16th century
- The *second* relates the events of the War of Cyprus
- The *third* studies the policies adopted by the Ottomans in Cyprus after the conquest

The Ottoman Empire and Cyprus in the 16th century

- **The Ottoman Empire at the time of the War of Cyprus**

Towards the middle of the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire had reached **the limits of its territorial expansion** and the first signs of a transformation in its classical institutions started to become visible.

From the **economic point of view**, this period is characterized by **decline of commerce** due to the discovery of new trade routes, permitting the Europeans to circumvent the Middle East. Moreover, in the last decades of the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire suffered a serious **financial and monetary crisis**, which caused inflation, rise in prices and devaluation of the Ottoman silver coin, the *akçe*.

Also, in this period, the Ottomans were involved in **long and costly wars on various fronts**, with the *Habsburgs* in Europe, the *Safavids* of Iran in the East, as well as the *Venetians* in the Mediterranean. As a result, **military successes became much more rare** and **Ottoman expansion**, which had hitherto been continuous, **virtually stopped**.

A result of economic crisis and military failure was the gradual **loosening of the central government's control over the provinces**. Moreover, fundamental institutions, which were considered an integral part of the Ottoman system, like the *timariot system*, the *Janissaries*, and even the character of the office of the *Sultan*, **were distorted and eroded**, creating a sense of malaise in Ottoman society.

- **Cyprus under Venetian Rule**

Before the Ottoman conquest, Cyprus was part of the **Venetian dominions**. At that time, *Venice* faced economic problems, especially due to the decline of Mediterranean trade, caused by the discovery of new sea routes. **Economic necessity** forced the Venetians to attempt to **financially exploit the island to the limit**.

In this period, the agrarian society of Cyprus was organized under a **feudal regime**: Around 40% of the inhabitants of the island were *serfs*; they were regarded as part of the property of the *feudal lord* and were obliged to work for him. Another category were the *francomati*, who had to pay heavy taxes to the feudal lord, in order to preserve their liberty, while they had to perform public service on specific days each year.

Social discontent was aggravated by the **religious subjugation** of the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of the island. The highest administrative offices were occupied by Catholics, while the authorities attempted to impose the Latin dogma and culture, suppressing the *Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus*.

Foreseeing the imminent Ottoman operation in Cyprus, the Venetians tried to **organize the defences of the island**. Their most important action in this respect was the **rebuilding of the fortifications of Nicosia**, which involved the demolition of the medieval walls and the construction of new ones,

adapted to the military technology of the times.

The War of Cyprus (1570-1571)

The Ottoman forces landed at **Larnaca** in July 1570. The town had been left undefended, since the Venetians chose **to focus the defence of the island on two heavily fortified cities, Nicosia and Famagusta.**

• The Siege of Nicosia

The Ottomans chose to strike first at **Nicosia**, due to its **strategic position** at the centre of the island, and expecting that, as the capital, its fall would have significant **psychological repercussions.**



Lala Mustafa Pasha

In the end of July 1570, the Ottoman army, under General **Lala Mustafa Pasha**, arrived at Nicosia and was positioned along the southern and southeastern side of the city walls. With constant **raids and bombardments**, the Ottomans succeeded in **eroding the morale of the defenders**, already suffering from disease, ill-discipline and **discontent**, due to the refusal of the authorities to distribute provisions.

The final assault came on September 9, 1570 and resulted in the **conquest of Nicosia.** According to Ottoman practice, after the conquest, the city was subjected to **three-day looting** and enslavement of its inhabitants.

• The Siege of Famagusta

After the fall of Nicosia, the Ottoman forces turned their attention **to Famagusta.** The defenders of the city were **less numerous** than those of Nicosia, however they were **better organized**, with **higher morale**, and with **able and popular leaders.**

Thus, they managed to resist the Ottoman assaults for **almost one year.** In the summer of 1571, however, they started to suffer from **lack of supplies**, which led to the **decision to surrender.** The surrender agreement guaranteed the safety and free passage of the defenders, however, it was not observed and the leaders were executed, while the city was subjected to the customary **three-day looting.**

With the peace treaty of 1573, Venice paid **indemnity** to the Ottomans and **forfeited any claim to Cyprus.**

Ottoman Policy after the Conquest

As they were interested in **incorporating Cyprus into the Empire as a thriving province**, the Ottomans, with their long experience from previous conquests, knew that it would be necessary to **revitalize the economy and agriculture** of the island and to achieve the **return to normality** as soon as possible.

- **Cyprus after the end of the War**

War had brought **disaster** to Cyprus. During the hostilities, more than half of the population of the island **had been killed, taken prisoner or had emigrated**. From the ca. **200.000** inhabitants, who were living there on the eve of the War, the census of 1572 showed that only around **60.000-70.000** remained.

But even those who had remained lived in **miserable conditions**, since, due to the hostilities, **agriculture had been abandoned** and the **economy had been destroyed**, while the island suffered from **epidemics**.

- **The First Ottoman survey**

The taking of a **survey** or *tahrir* was the first step for the return of a conquered territory to **normality** and for its **incorporation** into the Empire. Through the survey, the Ottomans became **acquainted with the resources** of a new province, **located the problems**, and could plan the measures needed for the revitalization of its economy.

The first Ottoman survey in Cyprus was initiated immediately after the conquest of Famagusta and was completed a year later. The result shows that, from the remaining inhabitants, **only a small part lived in cities**, not only because of **the agrarian character** of local society, but also as **a result of the military operations**, while certain villages were more populous than most cities.

Example 1: Number of taxpayers in selected cities and villages of Cyprus, according to the first Ottoman survey (1572):

Nicosia	235
Famagusta	1741
Larnaca	63
Limassol	177
Paphos	274
Kyrenia	198
Kilani	523
Episkopi	482
Chrysochou	340
Rizokarpaso	399
Source: Jennings (1993, pp. 200-201)	

• Measures to achieve prosperity

A fundamental component of Ottoman imperialism was the attempt **to win over the inhabitants** of a conquered province with **mild and just administration**, aiming to achieve **economic prosperity** and **smooth incorporation** into the Empire.

As the Ottomans were aware of the **adverse economic consequences** inflicted by the War on the island, they freed captives and gave incentives to those who had emigrated to return, aiming at **revitalizing the island's economy**. That is, they tried **to win over the natives by improving their economic and social conditions** and by establishing a **mild administration**, with strict control over the Governors.

Example 2

Firman, May 6, 1572, issued by Sultan Selim II towards the Ottoman officials of Cyprus: “The island of *Cyprus* has been captured by force; therefore the situation of the *reaya* somewhat deteriorated. So no violence should be done to them; they should be treated with **justice**. It is important both in the **enforcement of the decisions of the sharia (religious law)** and in the **levying of state taxes**, to regard and protect them, so that the country may thus revert to its former prosperous state”. Source: İnalçık (1973, p. 121)

In contrast to the Venetian period, the Ottomans, through a land tenure system which **favoured the small cultivator**, enabled the peasants **to appropriate the land they cultivated** and to pass it on to their children. (see 2.2)

At the same time, they applied a **milder taxation system**, reducing the **tithe** and other heavy taxes, and **abolishing forced labour**. In return, however, they imposed on the Greek Orthodox Christians of the island the **cizye, a head-tax paid by the Christian and Jewish** subjects of the Sultan.

• Policy towards the Greek Orthodox Church

In the framework of their attempt to win over the Christian inhabitants, the Ottomans followed their **regular policy of incorporating the Orthodox Church into the Ottoman order**.

The reasons which imposed this policy were, initially, **religious ones**, as **Islamic Law** required the **protection of the zimmi**, that is, Christians and Jews, who had the right to **keep their faith and practice it**, under certain conditions (see 2.3.2).

There were also **political reasons**, since, by strengthening the Greek Orthodox Church, the Ottomans attempted **to exploit the conflict between Orthodox and Catholic** by aggravating their differences, in order to minimize the possibility of a reconquest of the island by Western forces with local help.

However, **administrative reasons** were probably the most important, as the Ottomans aimed at using the Church in order to facilitate **internal administration and the preservation of order**. The mechanism of the Orthodox Church functioned for centuries in Cyprus and **preserved a network**

extending to the smallest village of the island. Thus, the Ottomans attempted to exploit the institution of the Church, in order **to facilitate administration and tax-collection, and to ensure the loyalty of the Greek Orthodox population of the island.**

• Colonization

The survey of 1572 revealed the dire **demographic effects** of the War, particularly in the cities, indicating to the Ottomans that, if they desired to turn the island into a profitable province, they had to take measures for **the increase of its population.** A fundamental tool of Ottoman social and economic policy in order to deal with this problem was **colonization** or *sürgün* —**the forced transfer of population** from other areas of the Empire.

The reason for applying the policy of colonization was, firstly, the desire of the Ottomans **to increase the population,** in the hope that this would lead **to economic development.** The **transfer of artisans** to Cyprus was an indication of their desire to revitalize the economy. A secondary objective was **the introduction to the island of a Muslim element,** which was expected to be more loyal, in order to **facilitate control** of the locals. A third motive was the desire to alleviate **the problem of overpopulation in Anatolia,** which, in the late 16th century, had led to protracted periods of unrest and instability in the area.

Example 3

Firman of Sultan Selim II to the *kadis* of provinces of Anatolia (September 21, 1572): “As a consequence of the invasion by a great number of soldiers, many parts of the island of Cyprus were destroyed, and those places which were affected were places **suitable for agriculture** and the setting up of gardens and vineyards, and the cultivation of sugar canes ... The island’s towns and villages and other lands and gardens **should once more be inhabited and tended and developed** ... As an incentive, those who arrive at the said island shall be **exempted from tithes and other duties for two years and also be pardoned of their offences** ... The following people will be sent to the said island: people **living in barren, rocky, steep places;** people who are **in need of more land;** those who are known for their **bad character and unlawful activities;** those who are **not registered in the local register;** those who are **newcomers** to a place; those who are staying in places by **paying rents** and those people who **have had land disputes** among themselves for ages; people who **emigrated to towns** from rural areas and are living there, and **those who are idle** and without definite employment and **guilty of threatening behaviour.** To these should be added the **following craftsmen and traders** on the basis of **one family out of ten** from each town and city: Shoe-makers, boot-makers, tailors, skull-cap makers, weavers, sack weavers, wool carders, silk dyers and manufacturers, cooks, soup-makers, candlestick-makers, saddlers, farriers, grocers, tanners, carpenters, master builders, stone cutters, goldsmiths, coppersmiths, and other people of crafts and trades. I order that to these, able-bodied men shall be added and all these people shall, with proper clothes upon them and **accompanied by their flocks of sheep and goats and farming equipment,** be transported to the said island **before the winter comes**”.
Source: Gazioğlu (1990, pp. 297-299)

• Islamizations

Islamizations were a basic characteristic of this period, although we do not possess adequate statistical information or the manner in which they were performed.

In certain cases, in the early years, it seems that the practice of *devşirme*, the **forced recruitment**

of young boys from Christian peasant families, may have been applied, to some extent, in Cyprus. However, islamizations were **never a permanent policy** of the Ottomans in the island and, at the time of the conquest, the practice of *devşirme* had already started to decline.

Most islamizations in Cyprus appear **to have been voluntary**, aiming at **relief from the *cizye* tax**, which was paid only by the Christians. In general, islamization was an option, which **enabled someone to preserve his property and social influence**, ensuring tax exemptions and opportunities of upward mobility in an Islamic state.

A piece of evidence, pointing to the frequency of islamizations in the first years after the conquest, is the great number of Muslims, who bear the surname "*bin Abdullah*" ("*son of Abdullah*"), which was characteristic **of those, whose father was a non-Muslim**. Data from the 1590s indicate that, at this time, **more than a third of the Muslims living in the island were islamized Christians**.

A local group which was prone to islamization were **the nobles and feudal lords of the Venetian period**, who received land and offices, **thus continuing to form part of the ruling class** of the island also under the new regime.

• Pious Foundations (Vakif)

Another way utilized by the Ottomans in order to revitalize the social and economic life of a conquered province was the *vakif* (pl. *evkaf* = pious foundations). The *vakif* was **a permanent grant of personal property for the creation and maintenance of charitable institutions**. The foundation's income was earmarked for the construction, staffing, provisioning or repair of a **charitable institution**, like a mosque, a hospital, a soup-kitchen, a school, an aqueduct, a bridge, etc.

The source of income for the *vakif* mainly came from **the dedication of urban or rural real property**, while in later years it could also come from **interest from capital**, although this was considered irregular, as Islamic Law prohibited usury.

Through the *vakif*, **centres** were created, which functioned **as nuclei for the development of a city's quarters**, therefore, the *vakif* was **the fundamental way of economic and social development of cities in the Ottoman Empire**.



The Latin Cathedral of Hagia Sophia which was turned into a mosque ca. 1570

The contribution of the pious foundations to the development of a city was multi-faceted. From a **religious point of view**, through this institution mosques and schools were founded. The *vakif* also established the most important **social centres** of a city, like baths, hospitals and soup-kitchens for the poor. Finally, the **economic infrastructure** of a city was supported through the pious foundations, with the creation of inns, hostels and markets.

Some of the most important pious foundations in Cyprus were the Latin cathedral of **Hagia Sophia**

in Nicosia, which was turned into a mosque and a *vakıf* by Sultan Selim II, the foundation of the conqueror of Nicosia *Lala Mustafa Pasha*, which was named *Ömeriye*, in honour of the Caliph Umar, as well as *the aqueduct of Bekir Pasha* in Larnaca.

SUMMARY

“The Ottoman Empire and Cyprus” gives a general presentation of the situation in the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century, on the eve of the conquest of Cyprus. At this time, the Empire had reached the limits of its territorial expansion and confronted a serious economic crisis, while its fundamental institutions were being transformed, leading to the weakening of central authority.

At the same time, in Cyprus, under Venetian rule, a feudal regime was applied and a large part of the inhabitants were serfs. The discontent of the locals was aggravated by the subjugation of the Greek Orthodox to the Catholic Church.

“The War of Cyprus (1570-1571)” gives a brief presentation of the events of the War of Cyprus (1570-1571), with particular focus on the sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta.

“Ottoman Policy after the Conquest” analyzes the various policies adopted by the Ottomans in Cyprus after the conquest, in view of their attempts to bring prosperity back to the island, after the destruction of the War.

Among the policies they adopted, was a survey, which familiarized them with the demographic and economic situation of the island, and, initially, mild administration. The incorporation of the Greek Orthodox Church into the administrative mechanism also helped in this direction. Colonization was used in order to increase the population, as well as for the creation of a nucleus of a Muslim community, while there were also islamizations, which were usually voluntary. Finally, the institution of the *vakıf* provided the foundation for the economic and social development of cities.

The Ottoman system in Cyprus in the first century after the conquest, 1571-1670

Aims

This unit examines the application of the classical Ottoman system in Cyprus, in administration, land-tenure, categories of population, as well as the position of the Church, in the first century after the conquest. It also examines the adverse conditions of life and their effects on the island's population.

After finishing this unit, the student will be in a position to

- Understand the basic Ottoman institutions, which were applied to Cyprus after the conquest
- Understand the position and ideology of the Greek Orthodox Church in the period
- Evaluate the conditions of life of the Cypriots and their demographic effects

Keywords

- *Beylerbeylik*
- *Divan*
- *Kadı*
- *Timar*
- *Tithe*
- *Reaya*
- *Cizye*
- *Locust*
- *Malaria*
- *Beylerbeyi*
- *Kaza*
- *Timariot System*
- *Sipahi*
- *Askeri*
- *Zimmi*
- *Berat*
- *Drought*
- *Plague*

Introductory Comments

This unit consists of five sections:

- The *first* is a survey of the administration of Cyprus
- The *second* describes the land-tenure system and its functioning
- The *third* describes the categories of population recognized by the Ottomans
- The *fourth* analyzes the position of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Ottoman system and the activity and ideology of the prelates
- The *fifth* describes the conditions of life and their demographic effects

Ottoman administration

After the Ottoman conquest, Cyprus became a **province** (*beylerbeylik*) under the administration of a *Beylerbeyi*, an official who was appointed by the central authorities and came to the island as its political and military Governor, with Nicosia as his seat.

The central administrative organ of the province was the *Divan*, the **administrative council**, presided by the *Beylerbeyi* and consisting of various high Ottoman officials, like the *Defterdar*, who was responsible for the economy, the *Müfti of Nicosia*, the highest legal officer, issuing **legal opinions based on Islamic Law**, and the *Ağa of the Janissaries*, the Commander of the island's Janissary force.

Main administrative districts of the island were the *kaza*, under the jurisdiction of a *kadı*, a **judge adjudicating based on the Islamic Law**. The capital of a *kaza* and seat of a *kadı* was usually a city or a large village, like Kythrea, Kilani or Lefka.

The Land-tenure system

- **The Timariot system**

In the classical Ottoman period land-tenure was based on the *timariot system*. According to this system, after a conquest, **all of the cultivable land came under the ownership of the Sultan**, and was named *miri*.

The Sultan, in turn, divided *miri* land into *timars*, that is *fiefs or military estates*, and distributed them to the *sipahi*, who enjoyed the right of *usufruct* over the land, that is, the **right to use and exploit its resources, without ownership**. The *timar* was a source of income for the *sipahi*, who, in return, had **to perform certain services to the state**.

According to the classical Ottoman system, the *sipahi* constituted the **cavalry of the Ottoman army**, being under the obligation to participate in the Sultan's campaigns, together with a number of soldiers, according to the income accrued by their *timar*. The *sipahi*, together with the *Janissaries*, formed the basis of the Ottoman army. Moreover, they were obliged to reside in the province, in which their *timar* was situated and were **responsible for the enforcement of order in it**.

The *timar* was granted to the *sipahi* through a *berat* from the Sultan, and was considered as a **personal grant to him**. The most fertile areas, like Messaoria, Lefka or Kythrea, were reserved as *sultanic hass*, that is, their income went directly to the **Imperial Treasury**.

- **Sipahi and peasants**

The *sipahi* granted the land to **peasants, who cultivated it**, in return for a tax (*tapu resmi*). The farmer who received the land in this way, **had the right of cultivation, but not ownership** of the

land. He could transfer the right of cultivation to another farmer **only with the consent of the *sipahi* and the payment of a new tax to him**, while he could directly bequeath the land **only to his male offspring**.

After receiving the right of cultivation, the peasant was committed *vis-à-vis* the *sipahi*. He could not leave the land **uncultivated for three consecutive years**, while he was obliged to give to the *sipahi* the ***tithe***, that is, **a percentage of the total production, in kind**.

The *sipahi*, who formed one of the **basic pillars of the Ottoman army**, did not receive a salary, and **lived exclusively off the taxes** and obligations the peasants owed to them. For this reason, the law wanted **the peasant to be tied to the land**. Thus, the *sipahi* could **bring back** someone who had left the *timar*, up to 20 years later or **to impose a fine (*çift-bozan*)**, for abandoning his fields.

This was the classic land-tenure system in the Ottoman Empire, which maintained the largest part of the army **without the payment of salaries**. Thus, the land-tenure system **was closely related to the military organization** of the Empire.

From the agricultural point of view, this system **favoured small cultivators**, who cultivated cereals, vegetables, legumes or other products and had as their main aim **subsistence** or **their retail sale** in cities or fairs.

Categories of population

- **Class: Askeri and Reaya**

In the Ottoman Empire, the population was divided into two classes, depending on whether a person belonged to the taxpayers or to the ruling class.

The *askeri* were the **ruling or military class**. Besides the **highest military officers**, this class included all **state officials**, the members of the Ottoman bureaucracy, the religious representatives, the members of the legal profession, etc. The *askeri* were considered as providing services to the state and **did not pay taxes**, while they consisted, for the most part, of Muslims. The *askeri* class also included **the family and servants** of these people.

The second class were the *reaya*, the “flock”, made up of **all taxpaying subjects of the Sultan regardless of religion**, that is, the large majority of the population. The Sultan considered that God had entrusted the *reaya* to him and that it was **his duty to protect them**, ensuring the reign of justice in his domains. Only towards the end of the Ottoman period did the term “*reaya*” come to mean the Sultan’s Christian subjects.

The distinction between *askeri* and *reaya* was **very strict**, and it was difficult for someone to change status.

- **Religion: Muslim and Zimmi**

The subjects of the Sultan were divided into two categories, depending on their religion: the Muslims and the *Zimmi*.

The *Zimmi* were for the Muslims the “**people of the Book**”, that is, Christians or Jews who, according to Islam, possessed a part of true religious revelation and, for that reason, enjoyed **the right to preserve their religion** and to perform their religious duties in an Islamic state under certain **conditions and limitations**.

A basic condition for the maintenance of the rights of the *zimmi* was the **paying of the *cizye* tax**, also known as “**head-tax**”, which was paid to the state by adult male non-Muslims, who could support themselves.

The Greek Orthodox Church in the 16th and 17th century

- **Berat**

The Ottomans **did not recognize corporate bodies, but only persons**, who were subjects of the Sultan. Thus, the position of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Ottoman regime was **not defined by an agreement among institutions**, but was expressed by the **personal granting of a *berat*** to a bishop. In order for a cleric to occupy a bishop’s throne, he needed to obtain **the consent of the Sultan**, through the issuing in his name of a *berat*, which was an **appointment document, enumerating the holder’s rights and obligations**.

A basic condition for the issuing of the *berat* was the **payment to the Imperial Treasury of the *peşkes***, an **institutionalized gift** to the Sultan, the sum of which corresponded to the income to be accrued by the office. Thus, there were fixed sums for specific bishoprics, according to the wealth of the province.

Other appointments of administrative officials were also made through the *berat*. Therefore, it seems that the Sultan regarded the Greek Orthodox prelates **as imperial officials**, granting them an office and receiving recompense, as he did with other members of the Ottoman bureaucracy.

In the text of the *berat* we may discern the interest of the Ottomans in immediately filling a vacant See, so that “**the collection of the government dues would not be interrupted**”.

According to the text, the obligations of the *berat’s* holder were to be **loyal**, to “**supervise the *reaya***”, that is, to ensure the docility of his flock, to pay the *peşkes*, and to **regularly deliver the yearly dues, named *miri*, to the Sultan**.

The various articles of the *berat* define the **territorial jurisdiction of the Bishop**, his **economic**

privileges, his **hierarchical and disciplinary authority over the clergy**, his **jurisdiction over his flock** and his **rights vis-à-vis the Ottoman officials**.

- **Orthodoxy and Catholicism**

It appears that, in the 16th and 17th centuries, the position of the main representatives of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus **was ambivalent between Orthodoxy and Catholicism**.

The most likely reason for this was **the hope of reconquest of the island** by a Christian force, which could only come from the West. This situation was also the result a) of the inability of the Church leaders to realize that the Ottoman conquest would be permanent and not merely a period of transition, b) of **the remnants of the long Latin domination of the island**, that is, of the **already existing relations between the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the Pope**, as well as c) of the **Latin propaganda**, through the *College of St. Athanasius* in Rome or agents sent to the Eastern Mediterranean.

- **Cypriot bishops and scholars of the 16th and 17th centuries**

After the Ottoman conquest, the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus was **on the verge of dissolution due to the War** and **the centuries of subjugation** to the Catholic Church. Due to the lack of sources, we know very little about its condition during the first years after the conquest.

The first canonical Archbishop of the island after the conquest was a certain *Timotheos* (1572-1587), who was enthroned by a Patriarchal Synod in Istanbul and came to Cyprus bearing a Patriarchal Letter and a *berat*. For the better part of the 17th century, two Archbishops held the Throne of Cyprus, *Christodoulos I* (1606-1641) and *Nikephoros I* (1641-1674). Later writers characterized these Archbishops as “*amphibious*”, considering that they remained **ambivalent between Orthodoxy and Catholicism**, while it seems that they signed **a confession of faith to the Pope**.

In spite of the close relations with the West, during this period **the Patriarchate of Constantinople intervened** in several instances in the affairs of the Church of Cyprus, deposing clerics or bishops and arranging the ecclesiastical hierarchy, since, as Cyprus was a province of the Ottoman Empire, **the Patriarch played a leading role in the internal affairs of the local Greek Orthodox Church**.

An important Archbishop of this period was *Hilarion Kigalas* (1674-1678), a scholar from Nicosia, who studied in Rome and Padova and taught in several schools in the West, as well as in Istanbul. His tenure of the archiepiscopal see of Cyprus was brief, since **he lived the largest part of his life away from his homeland**.

The case of Hilarion Kigalas provides a characteristic example of the **political and cultural ties with the West**, as almost all scholars of the island **studied in Italy or other western countries**, most **never to return to Cyprus**. Besides the desire for education, another motive for this was the **liberation of the island** by a western power, which was also the basic reason for their **pro-catholic ideas**.

In the 16th and 17th centuries we witness the attempts of Cypriots to involve western princes **in an operation of reconquest**, albeit without any tangible results. The protagonist in these endeavours was **Charles Emmanuel I** (1580-1630), Duke of Savoy, who had **dynastic claims** on Cyprus.

Example 4

Letter of the Cypriot scholar Neophytos Rodinos (1579-1659), supporting the union of the Churches for the liberation of Cyprus: «See, then, ... for **what a trifle** our compatriots insist, for so many years, in being **enemies of the peace and concord of the Churches**, and are content not to be friends with such a great, noble and prosperous race ..., with so many Christian kings, cities and princes, from whom ... after all, **we expect our freedom, rather than from oracles and useless prophecies, as some fantasize**». Source: Z. Tsirpanlis, 1999. Μορφές Επικοινωνίας του Κυπριακού Μοναχισμού με την Καθολική Δύση (17ος αι.). *Επετηρίδα Κέντρου Μελετών Ιεράς Μονής Κύκκου*, 4. Nicosia: Kykkos Monastery Research Centre, 229-230.

Life in Cyprus

• The demographic development of the population of Cyprus

In order to follow the demographic development of the population of Cyprus in the first century after the Ottoman conquest, we have to study a variety of sources, which are not always reliable. An important source in this respect is **the first Ottoman population survey**, which registered 23.000 Cypriot taxpayers, with only 25 Muslims in the entire island. This information must be complemented by the **periodic Ottoman registers of cizye-paying non-Muslims**.

According to estimations, based on the survey and the **cizye** registers, we have the following summary table, depicting the development of the population of non-Muslims in Cyprus:

1572	23.000 <i>hane</i>
1606	30.000 <i>hane</i>
1631	20.000 <i>hane</i>
1656	12.000 <i>hane</i>
Source: Jennings (1993, pp. 200-201)	

The **initial rise of population** is probably indicative of the attempt of the Ottomans to improve living conditions in the island right after the conquest.

In 1606, the population of Cyprus **was at its zenith**, with 30.000 tax-paying **zimmis**. Half a century

later, however, we observe a **sharp drop**, with fewer than half non-Muslim inhabitants remaining.

This decline was probably due to various factors, like **natural disasters** (droughts, locust attacks, epidemics and disease) and **social or political disturbances**, on which we have very little information. These factors probably caused the **death, emigration or islamization** of many inhabitants. An additional factor was **bad administration and heavy taxation**, as the attempts of the Ottomans for improving the conditions of the island (see 1.3.3) do not seem to have continued beyond the first decades after the conquest.

The demographic data we possess concern **exclusively the zimmi**. Estimating the Muslim population, on the other hand, is particularly difficult, as we possess **no reliable sources**. Based on the testimonies of travellers and other writers, we may estimate the percentage of Muslims in the island to around 18% of the total population ca. 1600, and to around 32% ca. 1640.

Example 5

Ottoman document of 1647, which refers to the taxation of Cyprus and the condition of the tax-payers: *“Formerly they were 20.000 payers of head-tax, but on account of the abundance of taxes and the weight of oppression a few thousand taxpayers fled and abandoned the country. Although only 16.500 head-tax payers remain in their places, those who are charged with collecting the head tax say that 20.000 hane is written in the new register. The collectors of the head tax are oppressive to the 16.500 head-tax payers concerning the 3.500 missing ones”*. Source: Jennings (1993, 202-203).

• Natural disasters: drought and locust attacks

The basic reasons for the population decrease were the continuous **locust attacks, the epidemics, the drought, and the consequent famine**, in the first century of the Ottoman period, which continued into the following century. These factors led to **death and emigration**, while many Christians **were islamized**, in order to avoid the *cizye* tax.

One of the greatest scourges of Cyprus were the **locust attacks**, which **destroyed agricultural production**, causing rise in prices and crises of famine. The inability of the inhabitants to deal with the problem led to the belief that this was **an evil sent from God** and could only be solved by **miraculous means**, with prayers and litanies.

The Ottoman administration tried to combat this scourge with ordinances to the inhabitants **to collect locust eggs** and hand them over to the authorities. However, this method did not produce any results, and the problem of the locusts was not solved until the last decades of the 19th century.

Example 6

The Dutch traveller Van Bruyn (1683) writes on locust in Cyprus: *“In the year 1668 throughout the island, but especially in the country round Famagusta, there was such a vast quantity of locusts that when they were on the wing they were like a dark cloud through which the sun’s rays could scarcely pierce ... I saw myself in the neighbourhood of Nicosia a great quantity of these insects, and remarked that the fields they had cropped were burnt as though by fire; my horse too at every step crushed ten or twelve”*. Source: Cobham (1908, 241-242).

Another important problem facing the Cypriot farmers was **drought**, which, like the locusts, **destroyed agricultural production**, causing famine. In this case too there was **no rational way** of tackling the problem, and the only refuge was religion, with litanies, particularly of the **Holy Icon of the Virgin of Kykkos**, which was considered miraculous against drought.

Drought, combined with locust, inflicted enormous damage on production, causing **high prices, poverty and famine**, while forcing many of the inhabitants **to emigrate**.

Example 7

The 18th century historian Archimandrite Kyprianos describes a crisis of famine: *«In 1757 great dearth in the island by reason of the drought and the locusts, so that the people were cooking wild colocasia, a noxious root, and eating them, with other wild herbs. A great number fled from the island to Syria and Asia Minor”*. Source: Cobham (1908, 355).

Disease, epidemics and life expectancy

Among the permanent residents of Cyprus **life expectancy was quite low**, particularly among the poorer classes. A man over forty was considered of fairly advanced age, while **child mortality** was particularly high.

In the course of the year various diseases dominated the land, according to the season. The most common was **malaria**, which was **endemic in Cyprus** because of the climate and the morphology of the soil, particularly in the swamp areas of Larnaca and Famagusta. Malaria had grave **repercussions on the health and life-expectancy** of the locals, and even graver on foreigners, who were not used to the local climate.

Besides endemic malaria, the island was **sporadically attacked by epidemics**, with **plague** being the most prominent until the beginning of the 19th century, to be succeeded by **cholera** in the last decades of the Ottoman period.

A great plague epidemic burst in 1692, when it is said that **two thirds of the population of Cyprus**



Traditional 19th c. costumes of (from right to left) a Christian resident of Magossa (Famagusta, Cyprus), a Christian woman of Magossa, and a Greek monk of the Monastery of Tchiko, near Lefke (Lefka, Cyprus).

died, while in 1760 another epidemic erupted, which, according to the Archimandrite Kyprianos, **killed off a third of the inhabitants** and “*left whole villages desolate*”. This latter epidemic was transmitted to Cyprus by sailors, who were saved from a wreck outside of Paphos and were transferred to Nicosia, **without the necessary precautions**.

This case highlights the **absence of a quarantine station** in Cyprus, as well as the lack of the necessary precautions taken by authorities in Western Europe for centuries. The first **quarantine station (*lazaretto*)** in Larnaca was founded in 1835. Sailors and passengers arriving from areas infected by epidemic remained in **quarantine** there for a period of time, in order to **ascertain their good health** before allowing them to circulate in Cyprus.

SUMMARY

“Ottoman Administration” is a general survey of the administrative status of Cyprus in the first century after the Ottoman conquest: the island became an independent province under the administration of a *beylerbeyi*.

“The Land-tenure System” describes the basic land-tenure system of the Ottoman Empire, the *timariot system*. Cultivable land was owned by the Sultan, who divided it into *timars* and distributed it to *sipahi*, aiming at the maintenance of part of the Ottoman army. The *sipahi*, in turn, distributed the land to cultivators, who were obliged to cultivate it and pay the tithe, in a system that favoured subsistence cultivators.

“Categories of Population” describes the categories of population recognized by the Ottomans. Socially, the subjects were divided into the *askeri* –the public servants, who did not pay taxes, and the *reaya* –the taxpayers. There was also division based on religion into Muslims and non-Muslims or *zimmi*. The latter were Christians and Jews, who retained their religious rights under certain conditions, like the payment of the *cizye* tax.

“The Greek Orthodox Church in the 16th and 17th century” analyzes the position of the Church in the first century after the conquest. Special attention is given to the *berat*, the appointment documents, which enumerated the rights and obligations of the bishops and defined their position within the Ottoman system. There is also mention of the relations of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus with Catholicism in the 17th century, which were based, to a great extent, on the hope of liberation.

“Life in Cyprus” describes the initial rise and later decline of the population of Cyprus in the decades that followed the Ottoman conquest. The explanations for this phenomenon, as well as for the low life-expectancy, may be found in the adverse conditions, due to locust attacks and drought, as well as in the bad sanitation, which contributed to the spread of disease and epidemics.

Cyprus in the age of Ottoman decentralization: the long 18th century

Aims

This unit examines the history of Cyprus in the age of Ottoman decentralization, covering the period between 1670-1830. It studies the changes in the administration, the political and social situation, as well as in the local institutions of authority in the island. It also examines the changes in classical Ottoman institutions, like the land-tenure system, with the creation of the *çiftliks*, and the consequences of the rise of commerce. Finally, it analyzes the causes and repercussions of the events of 1821 in Cyprus.

After finishing this unit, the student will be in a position to

- Know the developments in the administrative status of Cyprus;
- Understand the political and social situation in Cyprus;
- Understand the role of institutions, like the Church and the Dragoman;
- Understand the reasons and consequences of the development of the *çiftliks*;
- Understand the consequences of the rise of commerce;
- Understand the causes and repercussions of the events of 1821 in Cyprus.

Keywords

- Decline
- *Musellim*
- Church of Cyprus
- Education
- *Çiftlik*
- Decentralization
- *Muhassıl*
- Self-consciousness
- Dragoman of the Porte
- Commercialization

- *İltizam system*
- *Mukataa*
- *Sarrafi*
- Colonial Economy
- Capitulations
- Protégés
- Bourgeoisie
- *Mültezim*
- Monetization
- Coastal Shipping
- Mercantilism
- Consulate
- Ionians

Introductory Comments

This unit consists of eight sections.

- The *first* section is a survey of the decentralization of the Ottoman Empire;
- The *second* section analyzes the administrative changes in Cyprus, as a result of the broader changes in the Ottoman Empire;
- The *third* section describes the social and political situation in Cyprus;
- The *fourth* section analyzes the administrative and cultural role of the Church;
- The *fifth* section studies the role of the Dragoman of the Porte;
- The *sixth* section analyzes the changes in the classical *timariot* system, the iltizam system and the creation of the *çiftliks*;
- The *seventh* section describes the social and economic changes, as a result of the capitulations and the rise of commerce;
- The *eighth* section analyzes the causes of the events of the 1821 in Cyprus, as well as their short- and long-term consequences.

Ottoman decentralization

By the 16th-17th century, among many officials and scholars there was a **growing sense that the Ottoman state had started to decline**. The main reason for this was **the gradual transformation of many of the basic institutions**, which were considered as having contributed to the founding and expansion of the Empire, like the *Janissary corps*, the *timariot system*, etc.

Influenced by the point of view of Ottoman authors, later historians considered that, from the end of the 16th century onwards, the Ottoman Empire **entered a period of decline**. Historians today tend to rather see this period as one of **gradual transformation and adaptation of Ottoman institutions**, dictated by new conditions in technology, external relations or the weakness of the central authorities.

Important elements of the idea of “decline” were **the cessation of the conquests** and the **beginning of territorial loss**, which started from the end of the 17th century. The impression of “decline” intensified during the 18th century, **with the increasing inability of the central authorities to control the periphery**. The 18th century was a period of decentralization, a fact also **reflected in the administration of Cyprus**, which was controlled by private *muhassils*, local officials like the Dragoman, or the Church.

Administration

A century after the conquest, **around 1670**, after the completion of the conquest of Crete (1669), the Ottomans proceeded to an **administrative change** on the island: Cyprus, until then an independent province, passed under the jurisdiction of the *Kapudan Pasha, the Admiral of the Ottoman fleet*. As he was a high state official, he did not govern personally, but **administered through a representative, renting the yearly income of the island to the highest bidder**, who came to the island as a *Müsellim*, in order to administer and collect the taxes.

Soon, other administrative changes followed: **in 1703**, Cyprus was transferred to the jurisdiction of the *Grand Vezir, the highest official of the Ottoman bureaucracy*, who continued the practice of **farming out the taxes** of the island to a private individual. The latter paid a sum, and then went to Cyprus as *Muhassil (tax-collector)*, who was, at the same time, a **political and military governor**. This administrative system naturally resulted in **the oppression of the inhabitants through heavy taxation**, since the *Muhassil* was only interested in **personal gain**.

This regime was preserved in the island with minor differentiations **until the Ottoman reforms of the 1830s**, with a brief but important **interval** in the **period 1745-1750**, when Cyprus was transferred to the administration of *an independent Pasha*. The best known Governor of this period was *Ebu Bekir Pasha* (1746-1748), who constructed the *Larnaca Aqueduct* (1748-1750), probably the single most important development project of the entire Ottoman period.

Political and social conditions in the 18th century

- **The condition of the Cypriots in the 18th century**

According to the *Chronological History* of the Archimandrite Kyprianos (1788) (see 3.4.2), around the middle of the 18th century, Cyprus was **in a miserable condition**, with **high mortality rates** and **emigration** causing a **drastic reduction in the numbers of the *reaya***.

The situation was aggravated by the policies of the administration, whose only aim was **to accumulate profits through taxation**. According to a British observer of the late 18th century, “*the income of the Governor is undefined, he can amass just as much as his conscience allows*” (Cobham, 1908, 369). A result of this system was that “*in all the Turkish dominions there is probably no place where the dues paid by their subjects are heavier*” (Mariti, 1895, 6-8).

In order to deal with these phenomena, the Cypriot bishops organized an embassy to Istanbul, in 1754, which succeeded **in stabilizing taxation** at 21,5 *piastres* per capita, for 10.066 taxpayers. This development **was hailed as a great success**, which would provide relief from arbitrary taxation. Soon, however, it became clear that **this arrangement was harmful**, as the population of the island **was steadily dwindling** in the second half of the 18th century.

Example 8

The Archimandrite Kyprianos describes the situation in the island in the 1760s: “*Death had been rife, emigration frequent, men were driven from their homes by the exactions and the harvest was small. All these causes had reduced the number of rayahs liable to the payment of the twenty-one and a half piastres to hardly 7.500, without counting 1.500 cripples, blind people, old people, paupers and children of eleven years and under. The 10.066 warrants were exacted inexorably, while the extra payments extorted by the muhassils on behalf of the Vezir increased year by year ... The harvests were scanty, commerce insignificant, distress evident everywhere.*” Source: Cobham (1908, 356).

- **Political events**

One of the best known events of this period was the uprising against *Muhassıl Cil Osman Ağa*, who arrived in Cyprus in 1764, having incurred great debts **in order to obtain his appointment to that office**. Consequently, he imposed **extra taxation** on the Cypriots, in order to meet his debts and to earn “*as much as he imagined*”. His behaviour caused **an uprising in Nicosia**, and later, indirectly, **led to a revolt**, which lasted for at least two years and had **dire consequences for the island’s economy**.

A political crisis was also caused by the administration of the Cypriot *Muhassıl Haci Baki Ağa* (1777-1783), who managed to become Governor of the island through intrigue. While initially he behaved

with justice, Haci Baki later became **tyrannical**, leading the inhabitants **to seek and obtain his removal**.

Even a cursory glance at the catalogue of the Governors of Cyprus reveals that Haci Baki Ağa's governorship, lasting for about six years, **was the longest of this period**, while most other Governors usually remained in the island for one or two years. A logical consequence of **the brief sojourn of the Ottoman Governors was their limited authority** to the benefit of other institutions, which were permanently established on the island.

The Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus in the 18th century

• The Administrative role of the Church

Although in the early years after the conquest the bishops were the leaders of the Greek Orthodox of the island, they **did not play a central role in administration**. According to the Archimandrite Kyprianos, around the 1660s, **the character of the island's administration changed and the role of the prelates was upgraded**. This development seems **to be related to the administrative reform of 1670** (see 3.2).

In order to control the *Müsellims* and *Muhassils*, the Porte chose **to use the bishops as a counterweight to their absolute authority**. Thus, the prelates were appointed **as representatives of the Greek Orthodox of Cyprus**, with the right to **denounce to the central authorities in Istanbul the actions of the local administration** or **to transmit** any petitions of their flock. In this development can be **traced the origins of the social, economic and political power** of the Church.

A turning-point was **the embassy of the prelates to Istanbul in 1754**, in which the Sublime Porte officially **confirmed their role as representatives of the Greek Orthodox subjects to the central authorities**. This development contributed to **the enhancement of the political and administrative role of the bishops** in local affairs, while giving them **political authority independent of that of the local Governor**, whom they could circumvent.

This increased political authority of the Church, which allowed it to often function as **a second pole of authority**, provoked, in some instances, **conflict with the local Ottoman Governors**. Archbishop and Muhassil tried to impose their authority, using **personal ties** to high officials in Istanbul, and one such example was the removal of Muhassil Haci Baki Ağa, through the activity of the bishops.

• Education and culture

The political and economic power of the Church also gave rise to a period of **cultural blooming**, expressed by **the founding of schools** and the **funding of publications**.

The **first schools** in Cyprus in the Ottoman period were founded around the middle of the 18th

century: in 1733, *Ioannikios III, Bishop of Kition*, founded a school in Larnaca, which functioned for a few years **with funding by the Bishopric of Kition**. In 1741, *Archbishop Philotheos* (1734-1759), a scholar in his own right, founded a **school in Nicosia**, bringing to Cyprus as its Director the important scholar *Ephraim the Athenian*.

The **cultural renaissance** of the Church of Cyprus, which was at **the zenith of its power**, began at the time of Philotheos. This was period of **self-consciousness** for the Church, exemplified by its attempts to **highlight its history**, thus increasing its prestige and stressing its role as the head of the Greek Orthodox community.

An example of this self-consciousness was the interest displayed by Archbishop Philotheos in the **autocephalous** character of the Church of Cyprus and in its **imperial privileges**, expressed in an essay he wrote on that topic, as well as through the **iconography** of the frescos of the **cathedral of St. John of Nicosia**. The same ideology found its expression in the **renovation of the Monastery of St. Barnabas**, the founder of the Church of Cyprus, as well as in the publication of his Service, with funding and editing by Archbishop Philotheos himself. A clear indication of the **new self-consciousness** of the Church was the creation of the *Grand Codex of the Archbishopric*, registering documents and proceedings, **so that the decisions of the Church would be preserved in writing**.

In the years that followed, Cypriot prelates, and particularly *Archbishop Chrysanthos* (1767-1810), **funded the publication of books in Europe**, mainly of church interest, or aided **Cypriot authors**, as subscribers.

Probably the most important Cypriot author of the 18th century was the *Archimandrite Kyprianos*, who published his book *Chronological History of the Island of Cyprus* in Venice in 1788. In this book, Kyprianos gave an abundance of information on the history of the island, aiming at **familiarizing the Cypriots with their historical** past in order to enhance their **self-consciousness**. Besides its value as **an expression of the cultural production of this period**, the history of Kyprianos is particularly important for the **information that it provides on the later 18th century**, a period on which sources are scant.

• **Archbishop Kyprianos (1810-1821)**

Rising to the throne of Cyprus in 1810, *Archbishop Kyprianos* (1810-1821) aspired to realize an ambitious plan for **the cultural renaissance of Cyprus**. The **Danubian Principalities**, where he had been educated, and which were administered by **Phanariots**, with particular **interest in Greek letters, the founding of schools and the promotion of culture**, served as **his model**.

In 1812, barely two years after his accession, Kyprianos founded a **Greek School** in Nicosia, in the **founding document** of which he presented his **cultural programme**.

Example 9

Founding document of the Greek School of Archbishop Kyprianos (January 1st, 1812): The basic reasons for his decision to found the School was his notion that education was lacking from Cyprus and that *“even the smallest islands and the smallest towns have founded common schools, and in the famed Cyprus, they are not capable of founding even an elementary school, so that the island’s children may be able to study, and improve their barbaric dialect; but you go and see a lack of knowledge generally in everyone, and in the clerics, and in the laymen, and certain habits almost unbearable”*.

Source: L. Philippou (1930). Τα Ελληνικά Γράμματα εν Κύπρω κατά την Περίοδον της Τουρκοκρατίας (1571-1878). Nicosia, 95).

Even more revealing of the ideology of Kyprianos was the iconography degrading his **ink-well**, which presented a considerable number of **symbols of the temporal and spiritual authority of the Archbishop of Cyprus**, including a depiction of Kyprianos himself **raising a fallen woman, symbolizing Cyprus**. The ink-well aimed at elevating and praising the Archbishop as **saviour and redeemer of Cyprus**, and may be interpreted **within the framework of the self-consciousness of the Church**, which had begun around the mid-18th century.

With Kyprianos in power, the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus reached **the zenith of its power** and the Archbishop appeared to **overshadow the local Ottoman Governor**. Contemporary observers, like the British traveller **William Turner** (1815), wrote that *“Cyprus, though nominally under the authority of a Bey appointed by the Qapudan Pasha, is in fact governed by the Greek Archbishop and his subordinate clergy”* (Cobham, 1908, 447).

The Dragomans of the Porte

The **Dragoman of the Saray** or **of the Porte** constituted a **third source of authority** in Cyprus in the second half of the 18th century. The **Dragoman** was an **official of the state and a part of Ottoman administration**.

- **The Dragomans of the Porte in Istanbul**

The title **Dragoman** comes from the Ottoman word **tercüman**, which means **translator**. While the **Dragomans** were initially simple translators, they later assumed various responsibilities, the most important one being to **help the Ottomans in the administration of Christian populations**, with their knowledge of the place, the language and local conditions. Another important responsibility of the **Dragomans** was **contact with Christian states** as, since the 17th century, the office of the **Grand Dragoman of the Porte** was the equivalent of the **Foreign Minister of the Empire**.

The **Dragomans** enjoyed **special privileges**: they were **exempt from taxation**, they wore an official uniform, and could appear in front of the Sultan, even in private. They were considered a part of state bureaucracy and, consequently, they **belonged to the askeri class**, as they were servants of the state.

From the end of the 17th century, the office of the Grand Dragoman of the Porte **was monopolized by Phanariot families**. These were **Greek Orthodox aristocratic families of Istanbul** in the entourage of the Patriarch of Constantinople, the best known being those of Mavrokordatos, Ypsilantis, Karatzas, Soutsos, etc.

Parallel with the Grand Dragoman of the Porte, there was also, in some provinces of the Empire, the institution of the **local Dragoman**, who was the **intermediary between local administration and the Christian subjects**.

• Dragomans in Cyprus

The office of the Dragoman in Cyprus was similar to that in Istanbul. The earliest references to the existence of a Dragoman in Cyprus date to the beginning of the 17th century, but there is no information on the role of the office in administration.

The Dragoman was **appointed by the Porte** and his salary came from the imperial treasury, as he was regarded as **an administrative official**.

It appears that this institution developed through the years. The fact that the names of Dragomans before the middle of the 18th century are not known indicates that this office did not have the significance it acquired later. The authority of the Dragoman was possibly **extended in conjunction with the increasing autonomy of the provinces** during the period of Ottoman decentralization.

At the end of the 18th century, the Dragoman acted as an intermediary between the administration and local society, while he seems to have had certain fiscal duties. As a member of the askeri, the Dragoman, together with his family and servants, **was exempt from taxation**.

The Dragomans exploited the opportunities provided by this office to become **economically and politically powerful**, through *çiftliks*, **tax-farming, trade**, connections with high officials, etc.

Some of the best known Cypriot Dragomans of the 18th century were **Christofakis**, who was assassinated by Hacı Baki Ağa in 1750, and **Hadji Iossif**, whom the Archimandrite Kyprianos characterized as a “*monarch*” among the Christians, due to his wealth. None of them, however, possessed the financial and political power of Dragoman Hadjigeorgakis Kornesios.

• Hadjigeorgakis Kornesios

The most famous and powerful Dragoman of this period, and also the most important personality in Cyprus towards the end of the 18th century, was the *Dragoman Hadjigeorgakis Kornesios*.

Hadjigeorgakis became a Dragoman around 1779, obtaining his office through **personal connections that he maintained with influential persons in Istanbul**. Besides these, Hadjigeorgakis also forged **close ties with the Church of Cyprus**, marrying a niece of Archbishop Chrysanthos.

Due to **his personality, his connections**, and as a result of the political situation in Cyprus, with **Ottoman decentralization and a de facto power vacuum in the Church**, with an extremely old

Archbishop, Hadjigeorgakis found **the opportunity to expand his authority**. Thus, by the beginning of the 19th century, he had become by far the most powerful, influential and wealthy man in Cyprus.

The **wealth of Hadjigeorgakis** was proverbial and constituted a basic **prop to his political authority**. **Tax farming** was one of the basic activities in which he engaged, and he had at his disposal his own private network of tax-collectors, while he also earned money through **lending activities**. From a manuscript, which registers the property of Hadjigeorgakis, we learn that it included **real estate** in all the towns of Cyprus, fields, gardens, *çiftliks*, olive groves, water-mills, even **ships**. The opulence of his **residence**, which still stands in Nicosia, is indicative of his great wealth.

The Dragoman also donated part of his wealth to churches and monasteries, as well as for the creation of charitable institutions, like schools, a leper-farm and an aqueduct in Nicosia.

His contemporaries were in awe of his authority and influence: the Spanish traveller **Ali Bey** wrote in 1806 that the Dragoman was **the most important political authority in the island**, while two years later, the French Consul characterized him as *“a tyrant of his country, and the cause of all unrest”*.

This last observation is indicative of the fact that Hadjigeorgakis' great power had also earned him several **enemies**, one whom was the French Consul, due to the Dragoman's **pro-Russian** stance.

The **events of 1804** marked the beginning of the end for Hadjigeorgakis. An uprising of Ottoman soldiers and Muslims of Nicosia, which included an assault on his residence, was provoked by his great power and expressed the more general **discontent of local Muslims for the power accumulated by Christians**.

A testimony written on the back of an icon by the Cretan painter **Ioannis Kornaros**, who lived in Cyprus at the time of **the events**, **attributes the riots to the envy of the Muslims for the “glory” and “prosperity” of the Christians** who, based on the power of Hadjigeorgakis, **provoked the Muslims with their luxurious cloths and residences**. According to Kornaros, the worst of all provocations had been a **scandal**, in which the Dragoman and his close entourage **bought cereals cheaply from the peasants and sold them abroad at double the price**, making enormous profit, at a time when the island suffered from **famine** and the local authorities had to import grain, in order to cover local needs.

The **fall of Hadjigeorgakis** came a few years later, in 1809, as a result of the **political crisis**, erupting in Istanbul after the revolt, which overthrew **Sultan Selim III** (1789-1807) and of the **accusations** from the part of the **Muhassıl and the French Consul**, and resulted in **his execution** in March 1809.

Example 10

Extract from a folk song, which describes the power of Dragoman Hadjigeorgakis and the causes the revolt of 1804: *“... he was Dragoman for thirty years, / the Sultan had given him great power. / The Turks were afraid of him / because he had a hatt-i hümayûn from the state. / The Turks were jealous and held a meeting, / and thought a cunning plan ...”*. Source: Th. Papadopoulos, 1975. *Δημιώδη Κυπριακά Άσματα εξ Ανεκδότων Συλλογών του ΙΘ' Αιώνοϋ*. Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 133.

The İltizam system and the creation of the Çiftliks

The 18th century was a **period of transition for the society and economy of Cyprus**. One of the most important changes of the period was **the transformation of the land-holding system**, as we observe the gradual **abandonment of the timariot system**, which favoured subsistence agriculture, in favour of a new kind of farm, the *çiftlik*, reflecting a series of important **social and economic changes**.

- **The Çiftlik**

Çiftlik initially denoted a **field which may be cultivated by a pair (*çift*) of oxen with a plough**. Despite the original meaning of the term, however, **in the later Ottoman period**, the *çiftliks* were **large farms, which needed many hands, and whose produce aimed to supply commerce and not the subsistence of the farmer**.

The creation of the *çiftliks* was a **fundamental change** in the Ottoman land-tenure regime and indicates the introduction of a new kind of agriculture, which focussed on the **commercial exploitation of agricultural production**.

- **Reasons for the creation of Çiftliks**

The creation of *çiftliks* in Cyprus, particularly in the 18th century, was the result of a combination of causes.

The **development of commerce** in the Eastern Mediterranean (see 3.7.1), as well as the increased **prominence of capital**, resulted in the **commercialization of agricultural production**. That is, a large part of agricultural production did not aim simply at the **subsistence of the producers** or at its **retail sale**, but at **its wholesale commercial exploitation** by large merchants.

This development fundamentally influenced the character of Cypriot agricultural production, as emphasis was given **to products catering to export trade**, like **cotton**. This change created the need for **larger farms**, which would be in a position to perform **mass cultivation**, in order to supply commerce, something which could not be met by small-time cultivators.

Another reason for the creation of the *çiftliks* was the rise of **specialized professions** and the **development of manufacture**, resulting in **the increase of city-dwellers and the decrease of farmers**. **Increased demand for agricultural products in the cities** was a factor which contributed to the creation of the *çiftliks*. This created an **interdependence between agriculture and the economy of the city**, with sectors **like commerce and manufacture**.

A final factor, contributing to the creation of the *çiftliks*, was **Ottoman decentralization**, which gave the opportunity to individuals **to gradually appropriate public lands**, thus causing **the decline of the timariot system**.

• The İltizam system and lending activities

The *iltizam system*, the farming out of public taxes by auction to private individuals called *mültezim*, provided one of the two main ways of creating çiftliks. This system arose from **the need of the state for cash**, which was necessary for the payment of the salaries of an increasing bureaucracy, in conjunction with **its inability to collect the taxes**, due to Ottoman decentralization. The *mültezim* paid the Porte a sum and assumed **the task of collecting taxes from a defined area**, called *mukataa*. This was an older system, which was expanded during the 18th century.

A result of the *iltizam* was the **increase of the economic and political influence of the mültezims**, many of whom managed to **develop into large landowners**. Thus, the land of the *timars* gradually started to **be concentrated in the hands of an élite**, while **many farmers lost their land**. This created new work relationships, as **the landless peasants started to become labourers in the çiftliks**. The creation of the *çiftliks* marks the **return to a kind of semi-feudal régime**, in which landless farmers were working, **almost like serfs**, for a large landowner.

The basic reason, which led many peasants to lose their land, was **the monetization of the economy**. While earlier economic transactions, as well as the collection of taxes, were done **in kind**, in this period, **tax-collectors demanded to be paid in cash**, which the peasants could only obtain from the *sarrafs* or *money-changers*, who were lending at a **very high interest**.

Since this period, **usury** became a great scourge of Cypriot agrarian society, since peasants made loans, **putting as guarantee their produce and land**. When they could not pay, the *sarrafs* would take their land and incorporate it into his, thus creating the **nucleus of a çiftlik**. Even if they did not lose their land, farmers often lost **their production**, which was **appropriated by the lender**, who used it to **supply commerce**. Thus the **problem of peasant debts** came into existence, which persisted, to a large extent, until the early decades of the 20th century.

Example 11

The French Consul in Thessaloniki, Félix de Beaujour, in his *Tableau du Commerce de la Grèce* (1800) described the consequences of the commercialization of production: “*Seeing this mass of exports, someone would be tempted to judge favourably the condition of the cultivators; but he would be mistaken. This over-abundance of production does not prove anything about their happiness, because it is not at all the excess of what is necessary ... Exports are never in exact proportion to abundance. Thousands of individuals work in order to produce for a very small number. The little tyrants collect the volume of the work of a whole area, in order to devour it alone: they do not leave to the poor cultivator even the bare necessities, and they sell whatever they cannot devour, in order to satisfy their fancies ...*”. Source: F. de Beaujour, 1800. *Tableau du Commerce de la Grèce*, t. I. Paris, 131-132.

Trade and capitulations

- **The commerce of Cyprus**

The 18th century saw the **revival of shipping and trade** in the Eastern Mediterranean, which was caused by the adoption of *coastal shipping*, according to which **ships made several stops in various ports**, carrying travellers and goods, thus unifying the Mediterranean into **an integral and interdependent body**.

This development affected Cyprus, which became a commercial centre, aided by its **rich variety of products** and its **favourable geographic position**, near the great port cities of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The rise of commerce produced a profound change in the character of the agricultural production of Cyprus, **from subsistence to commercialization**. Cotton, silk, wool, wine and textiles became the island's most important exportable products.

In this period, Cyprus, like the rest of the territories of the Ottoman Empire, constituted a case of *colonial economy*, mainly **exporting cheap raw materials** and **importing from Europe more expensive processed products**.

The reason for this **imbalance** was the **contrast in economic philosophies**. While, since the 16th century, the Europeans adopted *mercantilism*, **discouraging imports and encouraging exports, aiming at the accumulation of capital**, the Ottoman philosophy was based on the **old Islamic notion of commerce**, focussing on **the immediate income from customs dues**. Thus, they **discouraged not only exports**, which they considered as draining the wealth of the state, **but also local manufactures**, in order not to lose income from customs or threaten existing interests.

A result of this philosophy was **loss of competitiveness for local manufacture**, due to competition from imported goods. In Cyprus this led to the destruction of local institutions, like the thriving **textile manufacture of Nicosia**.

Thus, the Ottomans **lost their competitive advantage** over Western Europe, a development foreshadowing their **economic and political sugjugation in the 19th century**. The diametrically **opposed economic philosophies** gradually turned **Ottoman economy into a colonial one**, which **exported raw materials and imported manufactured goods**, thus incorporating the Empire into the developing *world economic system* as a *peripheral area*, simply acting as a supplier of raw materials to the centre. The *Capitulations* were instrumental in bringing about this development.

- **Capitulations**

The *Capitulations* were **agreements** of the Sultan with European states, which **regulated the rights and privileges of the subjects of those states in the Ottoman Empire**. The Capitulations were essentially **unilateral**, since the European powers did not grant to the Ottomans similar privileges.

The Ottoman Empire initially contracted such agreements in the 15th century with Italian city-states, like **Venice, Genoa** and **Florence**. From the 16th century onwards, similar agreements were also concluded with other European powers, like **France** (1535), **Britain** (1580) and *the Netherlands* (1609).

Some of the basic articles of the capitulations provided for

- **freedom of movement, supply and trade** of ships and merchants of the European state within the Empire,
- **reduced tariffs** compared to the subjects of the Sultan, as well as **exemption from various taxes and dues**, like the *cizye*,
- the **right of appointing Consuls** in the ports of the Empire,
- **arbitrating differences among Europeans by the Consul** and not by local courts,
- the right of Consuls to **place subjects of the Sultan under their protection**, enjoying the same privileges as European subjects.

Contrary to the impression created, by agreeing to the Capitulations, the Sultan was not forced to forfeit his rights of sovereignty. Instead, the agreements were a **conscious choice**, aiming at the **development of diplomatic relations** and **the promotion of commerce**, at a time when the trade routes passing through the Ottoman lands were in decline, due to the discoveries.

The Capitulations gave the subjects of the European states and their protégés the opportunity to function **with a certain degree of autonomy** within the Empire, and contributed to the **establishment of European communities** in the port cities of the Sultan's dominions. Thus, in the long run, they paved the way to the **economic and political penetration** of the Ottoman Empire by the European powers.

• Consuls and foreign merchants

The establishment of Consuls in ports and other vital areas of the Ottoman Empire was among the provisions of the Capitulations. European Consuls were established for the first time in Cyprus only a few years after the Ottoman conquest, with the **Venetians** (1588) coming first, and later the **British** (1636) and the **French** (1675). By the middle of the 18th century, various European countries, like *Britain, France, Venice, Ragusa, Naples, Tuscany, the Netherlands, Sweden*, etc., had established consulates **in Larnaca**, which was **the centre of commercial activity** in the island, while some of them maintained branches in Limassol.

In the 17th and the 18th centuries, the activity of the Consuls was focussed **on commerce** and their role was to protect the subjects of their country, acting as **intermediaries with the Ottoman authorities for the facilitation of trade**. That is, the Consuls were **not diplomats and public servants**, but were selected from the ranks of the merchants settled in Larnaca. The **political role of the Consuls** emerged later, **in the 19th century**, with the **Eastern Question**.

The main occupation of foreign merchants living in Cyprus was **trade**, as well as **lending and usurious activities**. They commanded **the respect of the inhabitants** because, in the **absence of banks**, they were the **main source of credit in the island** and the locals **depended on them** for the **funding of agricultural production**.

As they were indispensable, lenders put **high interest on loans**, which they often demanded in kind, **thus supplying their own commercial activities**. Therefore, a network of lenders and usurers, who were often foreign subjects, came **to control local production**, increasing their property.

As was mentioned above, the accumulation of wealth through trade and lending activities was one of the causes of the creation of the *çiftliks* (see 3.6.3).

Example 12

Letter of Cypriot peasant to the Consul of Ragusa, April 30, 1737: *"I dearly and immeasurably greet your Excellency and I kiss your hand, praying to God for your health and for anything that you may desire. On the 18th of the present month I received your honest letter and I was very glad to hear about your health, may God maintain it always. And I received the money that I had asked and I give many thanks to your Lordship. The reason I did not send you the cottons up to now is that I have the cotton-harvester harvesting. I was hoping that today I would have sent you four sacks, but the rains and the clouds delayed me and I did not finish, but I hope next Tuesday or Wednesday, at the latest, we will send them to you ... I remain you slave and at your command. From the village of Pyla, on the last day of April 1737. PS. I am sending a calf and four pigeons and I beg you to accept them. Your lordship's slave, Paltezaris Atzoulis"*. (Source: Kitromilides, P. M. (1992). *Κοινωνικές Σχέσεις και Νοοτροπίες στην Κύπρο του Δεκάτου Ογδούου Αιώνα*. Nicosia: Laiki Bank Cultural Centre, 13-14.)

• Protégés

At the same time, Ottoman Muslim subjects focussed on new opportunities provided by the **creation of the *çiftliks*** and the ***iltizam* system**, not showing particular interest in commercial activities. This **left the field open to the Christians of Cyprus** to engage in commerce, under **the aegis and protection of the European Consuls**. The office of the ***Dragoman*** of a Consulate, and through it, **the protection of a European power**, was one of the few routes open to Christian subjects for economic and social advancement.

The ***dragomans*** were essentially the **Consulate's translators** and functioned as **intermediaries with local Ottoman administration**. The prerequisites an Ottoman subject had to fulfill in order to receive the office of ***dragoman*** were the knowledge of languages, as well as familiarity with the conditions of the local market. Therefore, the ***dragomans*** were usually **successful local merchants**, who obtained protection **through their influence and economic power**.

Their privileges were confirmed by a ***berat*** issued by the Porte, through the mediation of the Consul. With this document, **they ceased to be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Sultan**, while **similar privileges were enjoyed by their family**, which would revert to the status of ***reaya*** after their death.

By that time, however, the protégés usually acquired enough economic and social power to **pass on the *berat*** and the association with the Consulate to **their descendants**, thus **maintaining the**

privileges within the family.

As the office of the **dragoman** brought important privileges, like **exemption from taxes**, including the cizye, as well as **privileged treatment in the payment of customs and dues**, it can be said that, essentially, the protégés were taken away from the jurisdiction of the Sultan, **acquiring the same privileges enjoyed by foreign subjects through the Capitulations**.

The tax exemptions and privileges granted to the protégés and their entourage, as well as the maintenance of the **berat** for a long period of time, led to the **accumulation of wealth** and the emergence **of families with important economic and social power**.

Example 13

Berat of Yakob Artinian, Dragoman of the Consulate of the Netherlands in Larnaca (1797): *“The Consul of the Netherlands has sent an application that Artin, son of Avak, who, by virtue of a sultanic berat, was dragoman of the Consul of the Netherlands, residing in the island of Cyprus, has died, and in his place his son, Yakob, was appointed ... The person who serves as dragoman, his children and two of his servants, to whom separate royal ordinances are given, should not be bothered with the demand for land tax, special taxes, slaughtering taxes and other taxes or customary dues ... ”*. Source: I. Theocharides (1986). *Σύμμεικτα Δραγομανικά της Κύπρου*. Ioannina: University of Ioannina School of Philosophy, 84-86.

• The Ionians and the creation of a local bourgeoisie

Despite the Porte’s ordinances forbidding foreign subjects living in the Empire to marry with subjects of the Sultan, many of them **married local Christian women** and their descendants gradually **assimilated with the island’s inhabitants**.

Around the middle of the 18th century, a **wave of immigration of Ionian Venetian subjects** started to arrive in Cyprus, particularly from **Cephalonia**. These were, for the most part, **merchants**, who found in the island favourable conditions for commerce due to the Capitulations, exploiting their Venetian citizenship.

While other European merchants did not fully integrate into local society, the Ionians, because of the shared **religion and language**, came into **closer contact with the local Christians**, through **commercial transactions, social interaction and marriages**. Thus, some of them married in the island and **fully integrated into local society**, creating great bourgeois families, like those of Peristianis, Pierides, Valsamakis, Vondiziano, Caridi, etc.

The economic and social interaction of local Christians with Ionians and other European subjects resulted in **cultural exchanges**, which brought certain Cypriots into contact with **western ideological currents**. Thus, in the 18th century, liberal ideas from the West, and particularly **the idea of national liberation**, spread to a **small but critical section of the local population**. In this way, in the second half of the 18th century, there emerged **the nucleus of a Cypriot bourgeoisie**, which was also a **carrier of the national ideology**.

The events of 1821 and their consequences

• The events and their causes

Starting from the middle of the 18th century, the Church of Cyprus developed into a **crucial component of the administration of the island** (see 3.4.1). The outbreak of the **Greek Revolution** gave *Muhassıl Küçük Mehmed* a pretext **to control the rising power of the Archbishop** and to reimpose the authority of the Governor over the island.

From certain sources, it seems that **Archbishop Kyprianos** had received representatives of the secret society **Philiki Hetaireia** and had promised financial aid, albeit **avoiding to involve Cyprus in revolutionary plans**. As the members of the Philiki Hetaireia noted, besides material help, they only expected the Archbishop *“to think how to protect his flock from the enemies resident there”*. The main reason for this was **the geographic position of the island**, located away from the epicentre of the Revolution and close to Anatolia and Syria, where there was large concentration of troops.

Despite the Archbishop's loyalist stance, the Ottoman Governor, exploiting the fears of the central authorities for the spread of the Revolution, sought and obtained from the Porte an **order for the disarmament of the Christians of Cyprus**. At a later stage, Küçük Mehmed elicited the **dispatch of troops** to the island and, finally, obtained the permission to **execute bishops and notables** in order to intimidate the local population. Among his deeper motives, however, was the **imposition of his authority over that of the prelates**, as well as **enrichment, resulting from the confiscation of properties**.

Thus, in the Summer of 1821, the local Ottoman authorities proceeded to **executions** of local personalities, including **Archbishop Kyprianos**, the **Metropolitans of Paphos, Kition and Kyrenia**, ecclesiastical officials and notables.

• The consequences of the events

Although the events of 1821 temporarily **weakened the Church of Cyprus**, the prelates **continued to be considered as representatives of the Greek Orthodox** of the island and to **maintain their institutional role** in the Ottoman system, as it appears from **the immediate reconstitution of the hierarchy** after the events. This is explained by the fact that the Ottomans considered **the maintenance of ecclesiastical hierarchy** as essential for the smooth functioning of the state (see 3.4.1).

An immediate consequence of the events of 1821 was the **economic destruction of the island** due to the **abandonment of production**, aggravated by an ensuing **two-year drought**. In 1826, the Archbishop mentioned in a letter that, because of these developments, *“one sees horses, animals, even people dying every day from hunger ...”*. The situation was further aggravated by **the activity of the Greek revolutionary navy in the area**, which resulted in the transfer of **Ottoman troops** to the island from Egypt **in order to preserve order**.

The events of 1821 and the turbulent years that followed **destroyed the economy of the island** and led many inhabitants to destitution. Thus, many Cypriots were **forced to emigrate** in order to seek elsewhere “*the safety of life and a loaf of bread, which they are not allowed to earn in their homeland anymore*”. According to calculations of the French Consul, in the five years between 1825-1829, around 20.000-25.000 Cypriots left the island.

A few years after the events, the Ottoman authorities started taking measures, including the **official acquittal** of the proscribed, executed and fugitives, aiming at **improving the conditions of life** and **encouraging the fugitives to return**.

More lasting and serious was perhaps the **psychological effect** of the events on the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of the island, for some of whom the activities of the Ottoman authorities in 1821 signalled the **delegitimization** of the Sultan’s authority. While previously the idea of national liberation affected only a fraction of Cypriot society, after the events of 1821, this demand started **to gradually extend to all classes** of the Christians. Another contributing factor was the establishment of **the Greek state, functioning as a pole of attraction** for the Greek Orthodox inhabitants.

Example 14

Statement issued by Cypriot fugitives in Europe (December 1821): “*Since the tyrannical administration of the Turks has been **completely transformed into robbery** ... we think, in front of God and men, that we have every right **not to recognize** anymore these **blood-thirsty thieves** as our government, but together with the rest of our Greek brothers, we will try to achieve the **liberation** of the formerly happy, but now most miserable island of Cyprus*”. Source: I. Theocharides, 2003. Όψεις της Ιστορίας του Ελληνισμού της Κύπρου. Επετηρίδα του Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών, 29. Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 167.

The peak of the period of turbulence, which followed the events of 1821, were three **revolts**, which broke out almost simultaneously **in 1833**. The first one occurred **in Larnaca**, in reaction to an order of the Governor for the collection of extra taxation, and its leader was **Nikolaos Theseus**, a nephew of Archbishop Kyprianos. The second one erupted in Paphos, led by the wealthy Muslim landowner Gâvur **İmam**, while the third one took place in the Carpass peninsula and was instigated by a **monk named Ioannikios**. The first revolt was ultimately successful, while the other two were suppressed and their leaders executed.

Example 15

Letter of the **French Consul**, on the revolt of **Nikolaos Theseus** in Larnaca (1833): “*All the inhabitants came to the Bishop and demanded from him to forward a petition to Nicosia, **threatening to demolish the Bishopric** if he did not act with zeal ... [The Archbishop] **was forced to flee to the Governor’s palace**, where he was followed by the people, who filed **a complaint against him to the Governor** ... In all villages there was **intense resistance**, and **Government tax-collectors were refused entry** ... The general excitation could have had serious repercussions. Mr. Nikolaos Theseus ... decided to support the claims of his compatriots and **to lead them, in order to avoid any excesses**. At the head of 400 men, Greeks and Turks, he visited the Consulates, the Bishopric and the courthouse ... On the next day, we received from the Governor the news that, with these representations, he had ordered the cancelling of the tax ... Mr. Theseus, whom the 1.000-1.500 persons who were there declared as their leader, replied that this simple order would not make the inhabitants return to their homes, as long as they received no guarantees for their safety ... The activity of Mr. Theseus in this case **is worthy of every praise**. The island owes much to him, because the movement, which erupted in the entire island, ... **could have taken a disturbing turn**”. Source: N. Kyriazis, 1930. Στιγμαί Αγώνιας εκ Στάσεων. *Κυπριακά Χρονικά*, 7, 214-216.*

Example 16

Letter of **Panaretos, Archbishop of Cyprus**, to the **Oecumenical Patriarch**, on the revolt of **Nikolaos Theseus** in Larnaca (1833): “*Ten days ago, a new taxation was imposed on both Turks and Christians, which all the inhabitants of the island **started paying without complaining**. And Nikolaos Theseus gathered the people; **he deceived**, I do not know with what lies, certain **rascals, both Turks and Christians, as well as Europeans, while with threats and violence he forced all the villagers he found there to follow him** ... And he gathered all these, who were **around three hundred**, in the Monastery of St. George Kontos, and sought **to organize an apostasy in the island**. And of course, **if the people had agreed with his evil intent, ... he could have inflicted –this patriot– a great disaster on the island**, believing that, in this way, he would serve his homeland.” Source: N. Kyriazis, 1935. Ν. Θησεύς και η Στάσις του 1833. *Κυπριακά Χρονικά*, 11, 163-165.*

SUMMARY

“Ottoman Decentralization” describes the idea of Ottoman decline, which was created by the transformation or abandonment of many of the classical institutions of the Empire. This impression was caused by the adaptation of Ottoman institutions in order to face new challenges, resulting in the increasing inability of the Government to control the periphery.

“Administration” analyzes the administrative changes in Cyprus from the end of the 17th and during the 18th century. As a result of Ottoman decentralization, the island passed to the jurisdiction of high state officials, who farmed out its taxes to private individuals. The new system facilitated the oppression of the taxpayers, as the Governor was only interested in his own financial benefits.

“Political and Social Conditions in the 18th century” describes the social situation in Cyprus in the 18th century, mentioning the demographic decline and the increasing fiscal demands of the Governors. It also describes certain political events, highlighting the political and social situation.

“The Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus in the 18th century” analyzes the increasingly prominent administrative role of the Church of Cyprus, as the position of the bishops was upgraded, in order to function as a counter-weight to the authority of the Governors. This development was linked to a cultural renaissance, which was expressed with the founding of schools and the funding of publications. The power of the Church was at its peak at the time of Archbishop Kyprianos, who desired to establish in the island an enlightened despotism, modelled on the Danubian Principalities.

“The Dragomans of the Porte” describes the office of the Dragoman of the Porte, who was an intermediary between the Ottoman administration and local society, and in the late 18th century acquired increasing responsibilities. The most important holder of this office was Hadjigeorgakis Kornesios, who, towards the end of the 18th century, was the most powerful person in Cyprus. His great authority and wealth provoked an uprising of Muslims in Nicosia in 1804, and led to his execution in Istanbul in 1809.

“The İltizam System and the Creation of the Çiftliks” analyzes the creation of a new kind of farm, the *çiftlik*, which replaced the timariot system. The main reason for its creation was increased trade and the commercialization of agricultural production in the 18th century. Ottoman decentralization contributed to the creation of the *çiftliks*, mainly through tax-farming, while another important contributing factor was the monetization of the economy, which gave rise to usury.

“Trade and Capitulations” describes the rise of the commerce of Cyprus in the 18th century and its consequences. The basis of its development was provided by the Capitulations, agreements through which the Sultan granted privileges to foreign subjects who lived and traded in the Empire. The Capitulations allowed the creation of European communities and the establishment of Consulates in ports of the Empire and through trade and lending, foreign subjects managed to control agricultural production. The development of commerce led to the creation of a class of Ottoman subjects distinguished by economic and social power, thus creating the nucleus of a bourgeoisie in Cyprus.

“The Events of 1821 and their Consequences” briefly describes the events of 1821 and analyzes their causes, which mainly had to do with the local Governor’s desire to impose his authority over the Church and to gain wealth. This section also analyzes the consequences of the events, which led to economic catastrophe and emigration, while in the long run, they contributed to the Sultan’s loss of legitimacy for a section of the population.

Cyprus in the age of Ottoman reforms, 1830-1878

Aims

This unit follows the history of Cyprus in the period of Ottoman reforms, describing how the Ottomans attempted to apply the reforms to the island, the degree of their success, as well as the reaction of the local population. It finally examines the role of Cyprus in the Eastern Question and the British Occupation of 1878.

After finishing this unit, the student will be in a position to

- Understand the ways in which Ottoman reforms affected Cyprus
- Understand the difficulties encountered by the reformers
- Understand the conditions which led to the termination of Ottoman rule

Keywords

- Reforms
- Tanzimat
- *Büyük Meclisi*
- Crimean War
- Patriarchate
- Eastern Question
- General Assembly
- *Hatt-i Şerif*
- *Küçük Meclisi*
- *Hatt-i Hümayûn*
- Kingdom of Greece
- British Occupation

Introductory Comments

This unit consists of two sections:

- The *first* one examines chronologically the application of Ottoman reforms to Cyprus, based on important historical milestones of the period, from the reforms of Sultan Mahmud II to the *Hatt-i Şerif* and the *Hatt-i Hümayûn*.
- The *second* one examines the role of Cyprus in the Eastern Question and the termination of Ottoman rule in 1878.

Cyprus and Ottoman reforms

- **The early reforms (1789-1839)**

The reforms had their roots in the **notion of the decline of Ottoman institutions** and the need of the central government to **reimpose its authority on the periphery**, stemming from **the impact of western civilization**. The reformers attempted to study the civilization and education of western states and to apply to the Empire the appropriate measures, feeling the need for **a more centralized state**. Another factor, which made reforms seem imperative, were the successive **defeats on the battlefield**, which created the sense that **military reform**, on the European model, would be a prerequisite for the revival of the Empire.

Selim III (1789-1807) was the first Ottoman Sultan to attempt reforms. He **focussed on the army**, in an effort to create a **new military corps**, under the guidance of Western instructors and based on the European model. These reforms provoked **the reaction of groups whose interests were threatened**, namely the *Janissaries*. In 1807, a *Janissary* uprising led to the **deposition and execution** of Selim III. However, these initial attempts **laid the basis for more decisive reforms, opening ways of communication with the West**.

Modern reforms actually started with the reign of **Sultan Mahmud II** (1808-1839), who, after Selim III's precedent, initially proceeded **with caution**, preparing for major and extensive reforms **in all sectors of administration and society** towards the end of his reign. In 1826, Mahmud II **abolished the Janissary corps**, which had provided the strongest reaction to the reforms, while he tried to **reimpose the control of the central authorities on the provinces** and to introduce a more just fiscal system, with the **substitution of *mültezims* with salaried public officials**.

- **Mahmud II's reforms in Cyprus**

Within the framework of the reforms of Sultan Mahmud II and the attempt of the Porte to improve conditions in Cyprus after the events of 1821, **1830s** witnessed changes in the administration of the island, aiming at **curtailing the authority of local centres of power**.

Thus, in 1830, with the initiative of the Sublime Porte, *Archbishop Panaretos* (1827-1840) called a *General Assembly*, which laid **the administration of the Christians of the island on a new basis**, creating new institutions. The *General Assembly* introduced a kind of **representative system**, with the establishment of an administrative body in the capital and the provinces, which would **co-operate with the bishops in the administration of the affairs of the Christians of the island**.

In order to curb the authority of the prelates, the Ottomans **introduced laymen in the administration of the affairs of the Orthodox community**, thus circumventing the **exclusive authority** of the the bishops. On the other hand, the prelates retained their authority, to a large extent, as it was they who **organized the *General Assemblies***, influencing the election of representatives and taking decisions together with them.

With the reforms of 1830, **the administration of the Greek Orthodox community was shared between the prelates and elected lay representatives.** These changes reflect **the development of a local bourgeoisie**, which demanded **a role in the administration** of the **economic and political affairs** of the community. Wealthy laymen now had the opportunity to exert influence on the community and some of them were regularly elected as representatives. In this way, there emerged a kind of **lay leadership** of the Greek Orthodox of Cyprus.

A few years later, in 1838, the administrative status of Cyprus was changed. The island was not to be governed by a *Muhassıl*, but by a **Governor** who would be a **salaried appointed official**. This development marked the **beginning of better administration.**

• **The Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane (1839-1856) and the Tanzimat**

On November 3, 1839, Mahmud II's successor, **Sultan Abdul-Mecid I** (1839-1861), issued an imperial rescript, a *hatt-i şerif*, which **was proclaimed formally** in the presence of foreign Ambassadors and representatives of the religious communities. This rescript became known as **the Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane** and signified the **adoption of more radical measures, aiming at the modernization** of the entire society on western models. The proclamation initiated a period of Ottoman history which was named *Tanzimat* (reordering).

The *Hatt-i Şerif* was not an analytical reform program, but rather a **general announcement** of the Sultan's intent to restore the Empire to its old glory, with the **introduction of new institutions**. The *Hatt-i Şerif* guaranteed the **safety, honour and property of the Sultan's subjects, regardless of religion**, defined a **regular system of recruitment and taxation**, with the abolition of the *iltizam* system, and introduced measures to reduce **corruption in administration**. The *Hatt-i Şerif* was **the first official attempt at abolishing the distinctions imposed by the Ottoman system among religious communities.**

A few days after the pronouncement of the *Hatt-i Şerif*, the Patriarch of Constantinople sent a translation to the Archbishop of Cyprus, with the order to **officially proclaim it** to his flock. This was indicative of the importance attributed to the ordinance by ecclesiastical leaders, as well as **of the role of the Church as an intermediary** between the central authorities and the Greek Orthodox of the island.

In the *Tanzimat* period **new basic institutions** were created, like the **Grand Council (*Büyük Meclisi*)** and the corresponding **Provincial Councils (*Küçük Meclisi*)**, consisting of both Muslims and Christians. The Archbishop or the local Bishop, together with Ottoman officials, were **ex-officio members**, while a **limited number of members were elected**. The *Council* undertook **the general administration of the island**, particularly in fiscal matters, just like the older *Divan*.

Through these institutions, the Sublime Porte expected **to exert greater control** over the local Governors. Moreover, through their participation in the administration of the affairs of the island, Greek Orthodox Christians were expected to become **loyal subjects** of the Sultan.

The reforms met with the **reaction** of various groups and individuals, who felt that their **interests were threatened**, like the **notables**, the **religious leaders**, etc. Despite the Porte's efforts, these groups, exploiting the power they already possessed, **continued to exercise their authority through the new institutions**.

Moreover, the **frequent changes of Governors** hindered the application of the reforms, since they allowed local groups and individuals, whose interest lay in **stopping the reforms**, to maintain their authority. A further restraining factor were the conflicts among the peoples of the Empire, due to the **rising wave of nationalism**.

• The Crimean War

The greater crisis in Cyprus in this period happened during the **Crimean War** (1853-1856). Tensions between the Czar and the Sultan escalated into armed conflict, when Britain and France intervened in order to **protect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire**. The main theatre of the war was the Crimean Peninsula, and particularly the siege of the naval base of Sebastopol, in an attempt of the Allies to destroy the Russian fleet. The War ended in March 1856 with the **Treaty of Paris**, in which guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

In the framework of this War, there were **tensions** in Cyprus, as well as in the whole of the Empire, between Orthodox Christians and Muslims. In 1854, the Sultan severed diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Greece and **deported all Greek Consuls and subjects** residing in his domains. This created a problem in Cyprus, as many natives had acquired **Greek citizenship** and had to either renounce it or leave.

Further problems were created by the **open support of certain Cypriots to the Czar**, particularly in Larnaca, where Greeks celebrated the early successes of the Russians. The crisis peaked with the circulation of **revolutionary pamphlets** in the island, a number of which was found in the Archbishopric, in the apartment of the Director of the Greek School, **Epameinondas Frangoudis**, a protégé of **Archbishop Kyrillos I** (1849-1854). Thus, a **crisis between the two communities** was provoked, which was defused by the intervention of the Ottoman Governor.

• Hatt-i Hümayûn (1856)

Closely related to the events of the **Crimean War** was the proclamation, in February 1856, of a new Sultanic ordinance, the **Hatt-i Hümayûn**, in an attempt to **revitalize the reforms** and to **expand the Hatt-i Şerif**.

The **Hatt-i Hümayûn** focussed mainly on the **non-Muslim subjects** of the Empire, giving **firm guarantees for religious freedom** and promising to abolish all **religious, linguistic or national distinctions**. With the **Hatt-i Hümayûn**, members of all religions could theoretically **be employed in the public service** and study in **military schools**, sectors which had hitherto belonged exclusively to the Muslims.

Moreover, the **Hatt-i Hümayûn** reiterated the declaration of the **Hatt-i Şerif** for the **abolition of the**

iltizam system and the imposition of taxation directly from the state, while it promised **modernization of infrastructure**, with the founding of banks, and the development of communications and public works.

An important role in the proclamation of the **Hatt-i Hümayûn** was played by the **pressure exerted by the Great Powers**, which had supported the Sultan against Russia, aiming, in part, to undermine Russia's claim to be the protector of the Orthodox Christian populations of the Empire.

The role of the Great Powers and the equality granted by the **Hatt-i Hümayûn** to the non-Muslims, provoked **reaction and discontent in the ranks of the Muslim subjects**, who considered that they were losing their rights and their dominant position in the Empire, leading to **tension and serious clashes** in the provinces.

Similar tensions also prevailed in Cyprus, after the official proclamation of the **Hatt-i Hümayûn**. A letter of the **French Consul** (April 1856) describes the atmosphere at the time, saying that the Muslims **were upset by the privileges granted to the Christians**, and some **ulema** stated that they would have to start **arming themselves**, in order to prevent the violation of the Koran. On the other hand, the Christians **avoided any celebrations** in order not to provoke the Muslims.

In his letter, the **French Consul** contrasted **Nicosia**, which was “*a Turkish city with medieval ideas*”, to **Larnaca**, where the **Christians lived more freely**. For that reason, he suggested that **the capital should be moved to Larnaca**, in order to facilitate the application of the reforms.

Example 17

Letter of the French Consul regarding the official proclamation of the **Hatt-i Hümayûn** in Nicosia in April 1856: “During the proclamation of the **Hatt-i Hümayûn**, the Greek Archbishop, **ignorant and cowardly**, was standing behind the Turks of the Bazaar, and despite the Pasha's invitations, did not go towards him, and in the hall of the Council he did not dare to stand on the left of the Governor, as had happened in Smyrna. To the reproofs of his flock he answered that ‘**we should not excite the Turks**’ ... Will these Greeks change with the new **Hatt**? It is not possible. **Slavery has created slaves, and they will never dare to express their opinion**, when they realize that it is contrary to that of the Turks”. (Source: N. Kyriazis (1929). Χατιχομαγιούν του 1856. Κυπριακά Χρονικά, 6, 236-251)

• The last Ottoman Governors of Cyprus (1856-1878)

In the years that followed the proclamation of the **Hatt-i Hümayûn**, Ottoman Governors attempted, not always successfully, to **initiate modernizing projects**. As had happened in previous decades, the **frequent changes of administrators hindered the application of the reforms**, leaving a free rein to **local groups and individuals** to protect their vested interests. However, a few changes were achieved, mainly due to the efforts of certain officials.

The governorship of **Mehmed Said Pasha** (1868-1871) witnessed the **most successful attempt at the modernization** of the island, its most important achievement being the **successful eradication of the locusts**. In an extended **period of drought**, Mehmed Said made efforts to **relieve the inhabitants**, leading the British Consul to **positively compare** his conduct to that of his counterpart

in a similar crisis in 1835. The Consul noted that *“the beams of the peasants’ houses were then torn down and sold to satisfy the inexorable claims of Government”*, concluding that **“the Government is now the hope of the peasant; it was then his despair”** (Papadopoulos, 1980, 127-128).

Mehmed Said Pasha’s administration undertook several **development projects**, which aimed at **the improvement of the conditions of life**, like repairs to the aqueducts, telegraphic connection to Syria, as well as the completion of the Nicosia – Larnaca road. In the same period, **regular steamship connection** of Cyprus with the neighbouring ports was introduced, ensuring that the island **was not cut off from the rest of the world anymore**.

In the framework of their reform experiments, the Ottomans made frequent **changes to the administrative régime** of Cyprus, alternating periods of **administrative dependence** on other provinces with periods of independent administration. The latter was a constant demand of the inhabitants, as dependence on distant centres of authority presented **significant disadvantages**. A fundamental factor for the improvement of the administration of the island was the influence exerted in Istanbul by the Cypriot Grand Vezir **Kıbrıslı Mehmed Pasha**. However, the **regular administrative changes undermined the attempts at reform**.

Generally, in the last decades of the Ottoman period, there was **improvement in the conditions of life**. As mentioned by contemporary authors, in the *Tanzimat* period, Cyprus, with revitalized **commerce**, improved **sanitary conditions** and **milder administration**, started to develop and to **grow demographically**, doubling in population in twenty years (1840-1862).

Example 18

George S. Frangoudis on the administration of Cyprus in the last decades of Ottoman rule: *“Since this time, Cyprus has become **the best administered province** of Turkey and the entire island starts **to recover and develop**. The population rises, commerce moves the cities and steamships connect the island with the rest of the world. Turkish administration becomes **milder**, and the mutasarrıf and the kaymakams show greater respect towards the inhabitants, and particularly towards the Greeks”*. Source: G. S. Frangoudis, 1890. Κύπρις. Athens: Alexandros Papageorgiou, 358-359.

• Church and education during the Ottoman reforms

In the *Tanzimat* period, **councils consisting of laymen** took over the administration of the economic activities of the Church, placing the bishops and their entourage under control. In spite of this, the Church continued to be considered as **the official authority of the Greek Orthodox community**. Through their participation in the Councils, the prelates **retained their role in administration**, which would continue even after the British Occupation.

However, in the 19th century, the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus focussed mainly on **education**, recognizing its importance in the formation of ideology and consciousness.

After the General Assembly of 1830, schools were founded in the most important cities of the island, mainly **with the initiative and funding of the Church**. In this respect, the most important figure was

Archbishop Makarios I (1854-1865), who founded the first **School for Girls** in Cyprus (1859) and reorganized and expanded the **Greek School of Nicosia**, while he granted **scholarships** to clerics for university education outside of the island.

• Ideological orientations

In the second half of the 19th century, the Church, as well as the entire Greek Orthodox community of Cyprus, were engaged in an **ideological struggle** between the Kingdom of Greece and the Patriarchate of Constantinople: On the one hand, the **newly founded Greek state**, characterized by **irredentism**, attempted to **become the “national centre”**, in an effort to include all Greeks in a **unified state**. The **Patriarchate of Constantinople**, on the other hand, struggled to maintain its role as the **representative of all Orthodox Christians, regardless of nationality**. In contrast to nationalist ideology, the Patriarchate emphasized **religious identity**, in the way in which the Ottomans defined “nationalities”.

In Cyprus, the progressive part of Church and society, represented by the **bourgeoisie of Larnaca and the entourage of the Bishopric of Kition**, adopted the **“nationalist” ideology**. On the other end, the more conservative part, represented by the **entourage of the Archbishopric and the notables of Nicosia**, who had closer ties to Ottoman administration, remained faithful to the **“oecumenical” ideology**.

The eventual clash of the two world-views in the beginning of the 20th century ended with the **final victory of the “nationalist” ideology**, which became a defining element of the subsequent development of Cypriot society.

The end of Ottoman rule

• Cyprus and the Eastern Question

The **Eastern Question** arose as a result of **the economic and military decline of the Ottoman Empire**, and the inability of the central authorities **to control the centrifugal forces**, which threatened to fragment the Sultan’s dominions. This situation gave rise to attempts by the Great Powers **to exploit the weakness of the Empire**, characterized as **“the Sick Man of Europe”**, in order to expand their influence there. This was one of the fundamental issues of international relations in the 19th century, and lasted from the late 18th century until the partition of the Ottoman Empire after World War I.

Within the framework of the **Eastern Question** there were several attempts and plans **for the occupation of Cyprus by a European power**. Consuls and travellers were **studying the island**, expecting that, at some point, it would revert to one of the European powers. Thus, **consular reports** of the 19th century attempted to describe in detail the island, its inhabitants, its climate and production.

One of the European leaders who desired to acquire Cyprus was Emperor **Napoleon III** (1848-1870) of France, an ambitious prince, who involved his country in adventures around the globe. In order to achieve his aims, Napoleon III commissioned to historian **Louis de Mas Latrie** to write the history of Cyprus under the medieval Lusignan kings. Mas Latrie's three-volume work (1852-1861) constitutes an exemplary case of the use of the island's "French" past in order to justify its future occupation. However, Cyprus was to end up in the hands of another European power.

- **The British occupation of Cyprus (1878)**

A phase of the *Eastern Question* was the *Turco-Russian War of 1877-1878*, in the course of which the Russians captured Edirne, arriving **at the gates of the Ottoman capital**, before being stopped by British intervention.

The War ended with the *Congress of Berlin* (June 1878), before the opening of which, **Britain**, exerting pressure, concluded a secret "**treaty of defensive alliance**" with the Ottoman Empire. According to this treaty, the British would undertake to support the Empire at the *Congress* and to **defend it in case of a Russian attack**, receiving in exchange **the administration of Cyprus**; the island's sovereignty, however, would **remain under the Sultan**.

In July 1878, the **British landed in Cyprus** and assumed its administration, terminating three centuries of Ottoman rule. When the two powers were found in opposing camps, in 1914, during the World War I, Britain **took the opportunity to annex the island**, while in 1925, every remnant of sultanic sovereignty was definitively terminated, as the island was declared **a Crown Colony**.

SUMMARY

“Cyprus and Ottoman Reforms” describes the Ottoman reforms and their application to Cyprus. The sense of decline pointed to the Ottomans the need for reforms, which would modernize the state. After the unsuccessful efforts of Sultan Selim III, Mahmud II proceeded to more extensive reforms, which affected all sectors of society. With the General Assembly of 1830, these reforms also came to Cyprus, introducing new institutions. In 1838, a state official was appointed as Governor, replacing the Muhassıl who was a tax-farmer.

The *Hatt-i Şerif* of Gülhane of 1839 guaranteed the safety of life, honour and property of the subjects of the Sultan, regardless of religion, and paved the way for the introduction to the island of new representative institutions, like the Grand Council, which included elected members. However, local interests and the frequent changes of Governors hindered the application of the reforms.

After the Crimean War, which aggravated national passions in Cyprus and other provinces, in February 1856, the Sultan issued the *Hatt-i Hümayûn*, extending the reforms and granting equality of Christians and Muslims. This declaration created tensions in Cyprus. However, Ottoman Governors of the next two decades made efforts for improvement and modernization in certain areas, so that, around the middle of the 19th century, the population of the island increased for the first time after two centuries.

Although, during the period of Ottoman reforms, the Church of Cyprus lost part of its autonomy, its authority was actually increased, as its participation in the administrative affairs of the Greek Orthodox was officially recognized. In this period, the Church showed interest in education, with the founding of schools and the granting of scholarships.

At this time there arose an ideological struggle within the Orthodox community between the supporters of the ecumenical ideology of the Patriarchate, which emphasized religious identity, and the nationalist ideology of the Greek state, which identified the nation with the state. In Cyprus, the conflict was resolved in the beginning of the 20th century in favour of the latter.

“The End of Ottoman Rule” describes the position of Cyprus in the Eastern Question, namely the attempts of the European powers to extend their influence to territories of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Finally, the island came under the administration of Great Britain, in 1878, after a secret agreement of the British with the Sultan.

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CHAPTER 05

**Cyprus under the British,
1878-1945**

A n a s t a s i a Y i a n g o u

Introduction

This chapter, which explores the history of the island from the onset of British rule in 1878 to the end of the Second World War in 1945, is divided into three units. Unit one (covering the period from 1878 to the onset of the World War in 1914) initially examines the British decision to acquire Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. It then discusses the main issues which preoccupied the British (and locals) on the island during the first decades of British rule. Without a doubt, the most important question the British faced was the demand of the Greek Cypriot majority for the union of the island with Greece (*Enosis*), and unit one sets this question in its appropriate context. The first unit also pays attention to matters of economy; the *Tribute*, it will be shown, formed one of the major grievances in Anglo-Cypriot relations until the late 1920s. The unit also examines the role of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the challenges it faced during its transition from Ottoman to British rule, as well as constitutional and educational matters.

Unit two examines the history of the island between the two world wars. It discusses how and in what ways *Enosis* politics were influenced by developments, both inside and outside Cyprus. Also central to the account is an examination of social, economic and educational developments as these were accelerated at the aftermath of World War I. By examining the above, attention is given to how each of these factors brought friction to relations between the locals and the colonial authority and how such a tense relationship finally led to the outbreak of the 1931 revolt, the first instance of open defiance against the British. The unit examines the consequences the revolt and its suppression had on the daily life of Cypriots. Particular focus is given to the period of the Governorship of Richmond Palmer.

The final unit examines the fundamental changes Cyprus witnessed during the Second World War. This unit explains how the Cypriot contribution to the Allied war effort forced the British to allow at least a partial disengagement from the post-1931 regime. This resulted in the remaking of the political scene of the island and the emergence of new parties. The unit examines the British attitude toward war developments, including the revival of *Enosis* after Greece's entry in the war and the growth of a labour movement facilitated by the war. Emphasis is given to how the war experience paved the way for future developments.

Aims

This section examines the first decades following the British acquisition of Cyprus to the onset of the First World War (1878-1914). The section begins with a discussion of the reasons which led the British Empire to occupy Cyprus. It then analyses the main issues (administration, society, economy, politics and education) which chiefly occupied both the colonial authorities and the local population on the island during the period under examination and how these issues affected future developments.

Following the study of this section, students will be able to:

- Understand the reasons which led the British to acquire Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire.
- Understand the nature and development of the *Enosis* movement during its early phase.
- Discuss the main challenges the Orthodox Church of Cyprus faced during the transition from Ottoman to British rule.
- Evaluate the role of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus in relation to the *Enosis* movement and education.
- Discuss how grievances concerning economy and politics formed the basis for future relations between the British and Greek Cypriots, and between Greek and Turkish Cypriots themselves.
- Evaluate the British attitude toward education during 1878-1914.

Keywords

- Cyprus Convention
- High Commissioner
- Legislative Council
- Enosis movement
- Tribute
- Education

The acquisition of Cyprus by the British (1878)

The British decision to acquire Cyprus was inextricably tied to diplomatic fluctuations in Europe and with the British desire to maintain the *status quo* in the Ottoman Empire as a prerequisite for European stability. In this respect, the reopening of the Eastern Question with the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, which saw Russia advance as far as the gates of Constantinople, posed a serious challenge to the British. It is against this background that the acquisition of Cyprus in 1878 must be examined.

The British Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli, sought to occupy a base in the Eastern Mediterranean which would check Russian expansion and at the same time reconfigure Asia Minor under British protection. Cyprus was identified by Disraeli as the base which would serve commercial, political, military and naval interests; it would provide the 'key of Western Asia'. As a result, at the works of the Berlin Congress (June 1878), which ended the Russo-Turkish War, Britain concluded a secret "treaty of defensive alliance" with the Ottoman Empire. Under the Cyprus Convention, the British assumed responsibility for the administration of the island from the Ottomans while sovereignty remained vested to the Sultan.

The Cyprus Convention was criticized by many circles in London, including William Gladstone, who characterized the agreement as 'an insane covenant'. Even the first High Commissioner appointed on the island, Sir Garnet Wolseley, privately expressed his reservations about the wisdom of the decision. Disraeli, however, insisted that "in taking Cyprus the movement was not Mediterranean but Indian". Possession of the island would also allow the British to respond effectively to any crisis concerning the Ottoman Empire. On 10 July 1878, the British arrived on Cyprus.

Source 1.1: Benjamin Disraeli to Queen Victoria, 5 May 1878: "...If Cyprus be conceded to your Majesty by the Porte, and England, at the same time, enters into a defensive alliance with Turkey, guaranteeing Asiatic Turkey from Russian invasion, the power of England in the Mediterranean will be absolutely increased in that region, and your Majesty's Indian Empire immensely strengthened. Cyprus is the key of Western Asia. Such an arrangement would also greatly strengthen Turkey in Europe, and altogether she would be a stronger barrier against Russia than she was before the war."

Cited in: *W.F. Money Penny, G. E. Buckle, vol.2, London: Murray, 1929, p. 1163.*



Raising the British Flag in Nicosia, Cyprus, *Illustrated London News*, 10 August 1878.

Society and administration during the early years of British rule

According to the first census to be taken during British rule, in 1881, the population of the island numbered 186,173 souls; Greek Cypriots were 73 percent of the population while Turkish Cypriots accounted for 25 percent. The rest were mainly fragments of Latins, Armenians and Maronites. The majority of Greek Cypriots lived in the countryside – testimony to the fact that the island was indeed a predominantly rural society. By 1911, assisted by the betterment of living conditions, population increased to 273,000 inhabitants; Greek Cypriots experienced a much higher growth rate than Turkish Cypriots.

Source 1.2: Population Figures in Cyprus 1881 – 1911

	Census of 1881	Census of 1891	Census of 1901	Census of 1911
Total Population of Cyprus	186,173	209,286	237,022	273,964

Languages	1891	1901	1911	Percentage in 1911
Greek	106,541	185,796	216,310	78.9
Turkish	46,449	48,864	55,213	20.1
Arabic	1,313	1,131	1,036	0.4
Armenian	216	505	551	0.2
English	273	292	490	0.2

Cited in: Luke, 1920, p. 34

Administration on the island significantly improved after 1878 and followed a path towards westernization. The British divided the island into six districts (Nicosia, Famagusta, Kyrenia, Limassol, Larnaca and Paphos) - each of which was run by a District Commissioner. The central administrative department responsible for coordinating the whole work of the Government was the Secretariat. At the head of the colonial government was the High Commissioner, who was appointed to his position directly by London. In the first half of the 1880s, the British introduced legislation establishing elected municipal councils in the six main towns of the island (Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Kyrenia, Larnaca and Paphos) and to some of the larger villages of the island. Smaller villages were run by the village authorities presided by a Mukhtar and a council of elders (*azas*).

A significant success of British rule was the elimination of corruption from all branches of the island's government. Such a task was achieved mainly by the employment of British officials in the leading administrative, financial and judicial posts; they brought order and efficiency to the conduct of public business. The British further exemplified a modernizing spirit in the reform of the island's legal and judicial system. In 1882, a Supreme Court was established in Nicosia, along with six District Courts presided over by the District Commissioner – Ottoman law continued to apply until it was gradually superseded by English law. Judicial reforms are indeed acknowledged as one of the major initiatives of the British on the island.

Source 1.3

The November 30, 1882, Cyprus Court of Justice Order-in-Council **put an end** to the faulty and corrupt organization of the Ottoman courts. It paved the way for the use of the superior British rules of court and civil and criminal procedures, and, as it vastly improved the operations of one of the most vital public services, it probably gave more **general satisfaction** to the inhabitants of Cyprus than any other comparable British reform.

Cited in: Georghallides, 1979, p.40.

The Question of *Enosis*

One of the main challenges the British had to face, even at the outset of their administration of Cyprus was the demand of the Greek Cypriot population for their political union with Greece (*Enosis*). According to Cypriot folk tradition, the first High Commissioner to be appointed in Cyprus, Sir Garnet Wolseley, was welcomed by the Bishop of Kitium with a direct plea to Britain to cede Cyprus to Greece. Greek Cypriots truly hoped that Britain, a liberal and Christian power, would demonstrate the Philhellenism it did in 1864, when it ceded the Ionian Islands to Greece. However, it is important to note that during the early years of British rule, the *Enosis* movement existed in a present their comparatively quieter form as compared to its later incarnation. Greek Cypriots often promoted their national demands concurrently with requests for the amelioration of the economic and social conditions on the island. Such requests took the form of memorandums submitted to the colonial authorities, while a number of formal delegations often visited London to petitions to the Colonial Office.

Source 1.4: An example of memoranda submitted to the High Commissioner by the Greek members of the Legislative Council, 1 December 1911, in which they express both the wish for *Enosis* and for the abolition of the Tribute.

“Forming as we do, Your Excellency, an inseparable portion of the Greek race, it is natural that we should feel in a strong and unsubduable manner the desire that **our Fatherland should be annexed to the Hellenic Kingdom**; the fulfillment of this our aspiration we expect from the strength of our rights and the magnanimity of the English nation.

...The country claims ... that it should be granted such **financial emancipation** as befits itself and is also consonant with the principles of justice and the people’s liberties and that it should **be left free to effect**, in the Legislative Council, such (financial) reforms and alterations...”

Cited in: Papadopoulos, 2009, pp. 36-37.

Enthusiasm for **Greek Cypriot volunteering** to fight in the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 and in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 understandably played an important role in shaping the *Enosis* movement. Greek victories in the Balkan Wars turned Athens into the main decision-making centre of Hellenism. Despite increasing hopes, however, the British were unwilling to satisfy Greek Cypriot national demands. Up until November 1914, when the entry of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, on the side of Germany and its allies, brought about the cancellation of the Cyprus Convention and the formal annexation of Cyprus by Britain, the British usually replied that they did not possess sovereignty over the island (the Sultan did) and were therefore not in the position to discuss any alteration of the island’s status. For their part, Turkish Cypriots were also unsettled by the prospect of *Enosis*; they believed that should Britain withdraw from the island, Cyprus should be returned to the Ottoman Empire. The gap between Greek and Turkish Cypriots widened, as the former came to advocate *Enosis* more openly. Indeed, during the Balkan War of 1912, the first large-scale physical confrontation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots took place, resulting in the death of five persons. The onset of the First World War was to have a significant impact on the *Enosis* question.

The Orthodox Church of Cyprus

During British rule, the Church continued to play a dominant part in Cypriot life. Indeed, the role of the Archbishop, as the protector and leader of the nation (*Ethnarch*), had been shaped by the various occupations the island had endured over the centuries. The hanging of Archbishop Kyprianos on 9 July 1821, along with many other members of the island’s Greek Christian intelligentsia and clergy (on the pretext of an intention to join the revolution then sweeping other Greek parts in the Ottoman Empire), gave the Archbishop’s role an iconic significance for Greek Cypriots. This role continued to evolve during British rule.

For the Church, however, the transition from Ottoman occupation to British rule posed potential challenges because the British refused to recognize the Church’s involvement the civil affairs it enjoyed during the Ottoman rule – for example, the Church lost the right to collect taxes. The Archbishop was

no longer considered to be the sole representative of Greek Cypriots, and the British restricted his responsibilities to spiritual matters. Despite this, in the following years, assisted by greater freedom in civil life under the new dispensation, the Church naturally consolidated its place as the second power on the island. Characteristically, the Archbishop was at the head of all the *Enosis* delegations sent to the Colonial Office in London.

Following the death of Archbishop Sophronios, in 1900, the Orthodox Church experienced turbulence in its circles. The Bishop of Paphos died in 1899, but his successor had not been elected by the time Sophronios passed away. This left only two Bishops in Cyprus, namely the Bishop of Kitium, Cyril Papadopoulos, and the Bishop of Kyrenia, Cyril Vasiliou, who both presented themselves as candidates for the archiepiscopal throne, and their rivalry for the archiepiscopacy dragged on for years. The ecclesiastical question had a political impact on the island; it has been suggested that the rivalry between the two Bishops reflected two different attitudes towards *Enosis*. Indeed, the Bishop of Kitium was a militant prelate and a staunch supporter of the *Enosis* movement, while the Bishop of Kyrenia was a scholarly and mild figure who represented a more moderate policy towards the British. Their antagonism split Greek Cypriot politics and society into the supporters of the “Kitium Party” (the intransigent *Enosists*) and the supporters of the “Kyrenia Party” (moderate *Enosists*). It must be noted, however, that at this point, neither side favored open confrontation with the British. Instead, both sides adopted the ‘Ionian’ pattern, a pacifist approach towards the fulfillment of their national aspirations. The archiepiscopal question ended in 1910, when the Bishop of Kitium was finally elected to the throne. Following his death in 1916, he was succeeded by his rival, Cyril, the Bishop of Kyrenia.

The Constitutional Question

At the beginning of British rule in Cyprus, administrative authority was vested in the High Commissioner, who governed the island assisted by a Legislative and an Executive Council – both were appointed by the High Commissioner and their role was purely advisory. Four years later, in 1882, the British, now under the Liberal government of William Gladstone, granted Cypriots a constitution. According to this constitutional arrangement, a new Legislative Council was formed comprising by eighteen members. The Council’s synthesis would be as follows: six members would be British officials – all appointed by the High Commissioner, who would always be a member of the Council; nine would be elected by Greek Cypriots, and three would be elected by Turkish Cypriots. The election of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to Legislative Council was made on separate electoral rolls, and the right to vote was granted to all males over the age of twenty-one who paid certain taxes. Although this was an important step towards the development of constitutional life in Cyprus, in reality the Legislative Council had no real decision-making power, since the High Commissioner had the right to annul its voted decisions.

Furthermore, Greek Cypriots soon found that their proposals could be blocked should the three Turkish Cypriot members cooperate with the six British official members: in the case of a tie, the High Commissioner had the casting vote. Indeed, over time, the British came to lean for support on Turkish

Cypriots. This frustrated Greek Cypriots, who formed the majority of the island but could hardly pass a law in the Legislative Council. The Executive Council was maintained as an advisory body.

Source 1.5.:

“Although there were cases in which Greek and Turkish Cypriot deputies did cooperate as late as 1912 – mostly against the economic policy of the colonial government – the distribution of seats in the Legislative Council tended to intensify **the antagonism** of the two communities”.

Cited in: Hatzivassiliou, 2002, p.27.

The Economic situation

The British were greeted by the locals with unmistakable enthusiasm and high hopes for the amelioration of the economic situation on the island; however, a number of factors blocked the way towards economic advance. The first and foremost factor was the so called *Tribute*. This concerned the sum of £92,000 (the annual budget of surplus of revenue over expenditure for the five years prior to 1878) which was agreed under the Cyprus Convention of 1878 to be paid every year to the Ottoman Empire. The money, however, never went to the sultan because his government had defaulted on servicing the 1855 Crimean War loan. Instead, this amount was siphoned off by the British to their own bondholders. Cypriots therefore found themselves paying a debt to which they had no connection and which further impoverished the state of their economy. To meet the needs of Tribute, heavy taxation continued to be imposed on Cypriots, including the tithe (ten percent taxation on agricultural production). The tax system was a huge burden for the peasantry, which was often exploited by usurers. Overall, the *Tribute* became a major issue in Cypriot politics – at times perhaps more dominant than *Enosis* itself; it was a serious grievance and burden for the population until its abolishment in 1927.

Another factor which barred the way to economic advancement was the British occupation of Egypt, in 1882, which undermined the strategic position of Cyprus for the British. Indeed, Egypt, not Cyprus became the centre of British activity in the Middle East. Cyprus therefore never became the *place d’arms* it was initially intended to be. This development, combined with the ambiguity of the status of the island (that sovereignty was still vested with the sultan), meant little money was spent on Cyprus’s internal progress. Nonetheless, despite their reluctance to invest money in Cyprus, the British did provide the island with an adequate infrastructure and a communications system. Cable and postal communications were developed during the early phase of British rule.

Source 1.6: Acknowledgement of the unfairness of the arrangement of the Tribute often came from British circles too. Winston Churchill visited Cyprus in 1907 as the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies. He later reported to London:

“We have **no right whatever**, except by *force majeure*, to take a penny of the Cyprus tribute to relieve us from our own just obligations, however unfortunately contracted. There is scarcely any **spectacle more detestable** than the oppression of a small community by a great Power for the purpose of pecuniary profit; and that is, in fact, the spectacle which our own financial treatment of Cyprus at this moment indisputably presents. It is in my opinion quite **unworthy of Great Britain** and altogether out of accordance with the whole principle of our colonial policy in every part of the world.”

Cited in: Hill, 2010, vol. 4, p.468.

Education and the British

At the beginning of British rule, Greek schools depended exclusively on subscriptions, fees paid by students, as well as on annual donations from the Orthodox Church, which continued to enjoy control over education during the early years of British rule. Under Church control, schools were considered the safeguard of the Greek language and Greek traditions, and they served to promote the *Enosis* ideal. This was quickly grasped by the British, who sought to minimize the interaction of education with political affairs. Robert Biddulph, who succeeded Garnet Wolseley as High Commissioner in 1879, had strongly advocated that the main language of instruction at schools would be English. Such a proposal was dismissed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Kimberley, who wanted neither to discontent the majority of the population nor to disrupt existing patterns of education. Matters of education were shared and settled by local School Committees, District Committees and the Board of Education (of which the Archbishop and three Greek members of the legislative Council were always members); Greek and Turkish Cypriots largely followed the educational policies of Greek and Ottoman education, respectively. In 1893, the Pancyprian Gymnasium was founded. It was destined to exert great influence on the island’s educational, cultural and political life thereafter. While in 1882 there were 71 Greek primary schools, by 1913 these increased to 406 and illiteracy, which was widespread in 1878, was steadily reduced.

The British grew more apprehensive about and suspicious of the role of Greek Cypriot education in reinforcing *Enosis* aspirations. In 1913, two British experts on education, J.E. Talbot and F.W. Cape, visited the island and suggested that the British should assume a significant part in the financial support of the schools (provided the communal school managers surrendered some of their powers). This proposal reflected a significant change in policy on the part of the British regarding education on the island, but the onset of the First World War halted any initiatives. Efforts for the centralization of the control of education in Cyprus were to be forcefully expressed by the British after the end of the hostilities; however, by that time education would become a crucial question in Anglo-Cypriot relations.



The High Commissioner Garnet Wolseley receives a representation of Turkish Cypriots on the occasion of the Bairam Day, *Illustrated London News*, 1879.

From World War I to World War II

Aims

This unit examines developments in Cyprus during the interval period from the onset of the First World War to the beginning of the Second World War (1914-1939). This is an important period in Cypriot colonial history because *inter alia* it witnessed – after decades of peaceful Greek Cypriot agitation – the first open revolt against the British, in 1931. Firstly, the unit examines the major developments in politics, society, economy and education and sketches the background and the main reasons which led to the revolt. Secondly, following the examination of the events of 1931, the unit focuses on the repercussions the revolt had on Cypriot life; this includes an examination of the period of oppressive rule which was established on the island after 1931. Finally, this unit delineates both the traditional and the new forces that became prominent on the island once conditions allowed.

After studying this unit, students should be in a position to:

- Follow developments concerning the Enosis movement up until 1939.
- Evaluate the impact of the First World War on Cypriot society and economy.
- Evaluate the British attitude toward education.
- Discuss how developments concerning Enosis, economy and education brought about the 1931 revolt.
- Follow events concerning the 1931 revolt.
- Discuss the British attitude towards Cypriots during the 1930s.

Keywords

- Elementary Education Laws
- National Organization
- Trade Unions
- Communist Party of Cyprus
- Rural debt
- Political Organization of Cyprus
- Οκτωβριανά
- Οκτωβριανά

The onset of the First World War

The eruption of hostilities in Europe on 4 August 1914 had a **profound impact** on the course of developments in Cyprus. For one thing, the entry of the Ottoman Empire in the War on the side of Germany, against the British Empire, brought the **immediate cancellation** of the Cyprus Convention and the **unilateral annexation of the island by the British**. Turkish Cypriots did not protest this development; instead, **they clung as tightly as possible to their new status as British subjects**. On the other hand, the inherent Greek Cypriot belief that Britain would finally consent to their national demands now became **more forceful**. A unique opportunity to fulfill the *Enosis* ideal arose in **October 1915** when the British expressed their willingness to cede Cyprus to Greece, in exchange for a Greek commitment to join the Allies and help Serbia against Germany and its ally, Bulgaria. At the time, however, the short-lived Greek Government of Premier Alexandros Zaimis opted for neutrality and **refused the offer**. Athens was not prepared to jeopardize her gains in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. In reality, this exemplified the **clashing priorities** between Greek leadership in Athens and Cypriot aspirations. While the offer of 1915 put an end to the repeated British claim that Cyprus could not be handed to Greece because it belonged to the Sultan, and was believed by Greek Cypriots to be a recognition of their national demands, it was a unique opportunity which slipped away. **It was never to be repeated again**, not even when Greece, under the Government of Eleftherios Venizelos, finally entered the War in 1917.

Cypriot society and economy during the 1920s

The island experienced an important boost in its agricultural production during the First World War because the fall in production of the belligerent countries created an **increasing demand for Cypriot exports**. This led to the **betterment of living conditions** on the island, which undoubtedly contributed to the growth of population. This is exemplified by the 1921 census, taken by the British, according to which 310,000 people lived on the island. The number of Greek Cypriots had by then significantly increased, reaching a total of about 245,000 (**78.8 percent** of the total population). By contrast, the percentage of Turkish Cypriots had decreased as, according to the same census, the community numbered about 61,000 souls, in 1921 (**19.8 percent** of the total population). This is explained primarily by the emigration of many Turkish Cypriots to Turkey. This emigration, which began hesitantly in 1878, gradually intensified after 1914, when the British annexed the island, and intensified again after the Great War, when any possibility for the return of the island to Turkey was eliminated.

Table 2.1: Evolution of Population

YEAR	P O P U - LATION	COMMUNITY			PERCENT		
		Greeks	Turks	Others	Greeks	Turks	Others
1921	310,715	244,887	61,339	4,489	78.8	19.8	1.4
1931	347,959	276,573	64,238	7,148	79.5	18.5	2.0

Cited in: Georghallides, 1979, p.427.

As it certainly did in many other parts of the world, the aftermath of the Great War brought many **economic difficulties** to Cyprus. For one thing, the aforementioned demand for agricultural exports fell significantly. This, combined with the **high debts** of many peasants, led in numerous cases to the **loss of their land to money-lenders**. Thus, there was an increase in landless labour, and it was during this period that a significant number of peasants **left their villages** to be absorbed into the larger towns. This peasant relocation to urban areas helped in the creation of the island's **first proper working class**. By the mid 1920s, the first full-fledged **Trade Unions** appeared. **Limassol**, the chief commercial town on the island, served as **an incubator** for any new ideas; this was particularly true when an **incipient communism** evolved. The British authorities confronted such developments with little sympathy and **exiled** certain labour personalities, including Nicolas Yiavopoulos, one of the founding members of the communist movement in Cyprus. Many peasants also found employment in the **mining sector** – the most important minerals being **copper and asbestos**. The mining industry was foreign-owned and examples of this include the American 'Cyprus Mines Corporation', the Anglo-Danish 'Cyprus and General Asbestos Co'; and the Hellenic Mining Co.



Natives working at the asbestos mines, Cyprus. J.P. Foscolo Collection (Image Courtesy of the Laiki Bank Cultural Centre Archive).

Agriculture remained by far the most important sector of the Cypriot economy, despite fluctuations in production. While the first law providing for the establishment of cooperative credit societies was initially enacted in 1914 (the first cooperative credit society had been founded in the village of Lefkonico in 1909), the lack of funds delayed any progress being made until the early 1920s. In 1925, the **Agricultural Bank** was finally established, with the principal aim of issuing long term loans through cooperative credit societies. A positive step the British government adopted was the abolishment of the tithes in 1926 and of the Tribute a year later. Despite some measures, the British continued to invest little money on the island. This was especially true as far as agriculture was concerned, and minimal progress was made in the sector. Cyprus continued to be very much an **underdeveloped colony**.

The worldwide **economic depression** that took shape after 1929 was bound to cause **increased frustration and economic distress** in Cyprus as well. Indeed, by 1930, the island was suffering tremendously. In the mining industry, thousands of workers were let go, and **unemployment** peaked. Even those who had a job earned little, and their living conditions were very poor. The severe **droughts** of 1930-1932 had serious effects on agricultural production and on poorer peasants in general, who saw their debts rise even higher as their situation was further exploited by local **usurers**. Indeed, according to the *Survey of Rural Life in Cyprus*, which was prepared in 1930 after government instructions, only 18 percent of Cypriot proprietors were not in debt. Such a state of extensive poverty, combined with existing taxation (land-tax, sheep-tax, salt-tax, etc.) reduced the poorer masses to a state of **absolute misery**.

In September 1931, the Government tried to **impose further taxation** to meet the increasing budget deficits. Taxation proposed by Governor Storrs, however, was not enacted by the Legislative Council because the law did not have the complete support of Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, a Turkish Cypriot, Nejadi Bey, **sided with Greek Cypriots** when they refused to vote in favour of new taxation. The British were faced with the rare occasion when Greek Cypriots actually managed to reject a proposed law. Given the general milieu on the island, it was therefore perhaps unavoidable that, when Governor Storrs completely ignored the outcome of the Legislative Council's decision and **proceeded with the enactment of a new customs tariff**, a crisis was bound to arise.

Enosis after World War I

Following the end of the Great War in 1918, Greek Cypriots sought to **exert further pressure** on the colonial authorities for the fulfillment of their national demands. Cypriots had contributed to the war effort as volunteers, and this further strengthened *Enosis* aspirations. Expectations were also boosted by Allied declarations on the **right of self determination** of subject peoples. Under these circumstances, in December 1918, a **Greek Cypriot delegation**, comprising members of the Legislative Council and with Archbishop Cyril at its head, departed for Paris, where the post-war Peace Conference was taking place. There, the delegation met with the Greek Premier **Eleftherios Venizelos**, who encouraged the delegation to go to London in order to come to a direct understanding with the British. Venizelos firmly believed that *Enosis* would be achieved in the frame of Anglo-Hellenic

friendship. Greek Cypriots were under the moderate rule of Britain, a Greek ally and a western power. According to Venizelos Greece ought to turn her focus toward other irredentist Greek populations in Macedonia, Thrace and Asia Minor. Thus Greece did not officially claim Cyprus during the 1919-1920 postwar settlement. Following Venizelos's advice, the delegation arrived in London in January 1919, where it stayed for the greater part of the year. Despite their efforts, its members **returned home empty-handed, disillusioned and frustrated**.

Source 2.2: The British official response to the Cypriot deputation, November 1919

"...He (the Prime Minister) is fully aware of the sentiment which exists among the Greek population in Cyprus in favour of the Union of the island with Greece. He directs me to make it clear to you that the wishes of the inhabitants of the Island of Cyprus will be taken in the most careful and sympathetic consideration by His Majesty's Government when they consider its future. He is unable, however, at the present time, owing to the uncertainty of the international situation in the Middle East, to give any definite reply to the petition of the Cyprus Mission."

Cited in: Papadopoulos, 2009, p.103.

The British were **immobile** regarding Cyprus because their strategic interests pertaining to the island remained the same. It is true that initial plans for the development of the island into a military base were abandoned once the British acquired Egypt and its strategic harbor of Alexandria in 1882. The British were **not prepared to hand the island** over to another power; however, this was particularly true during the last years of the Great War, when Cyprus was adjacent to the new lands conquered by the British in the Middle East, and even more so after the War, when aviation became an important strategic consideration since the island was well suited for such facilities.

Source 2.3: Lord Curzon, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on the significance of the strategic importance of Cyprus, 1919:

"The history of the island shows...that none but a strong power has ever succeeded in holding (Cyprus)... Its cession to Greece would offer a **tempting spoil** for those who are stronger than Greece... [I] hope that **we shall not lightly throw away** an asset which, though it may seem of relatively small value now, may turn out...to possess a very great and powerful significance."

Cited in: Kelling, 1990, p.2.

Such rebuffs were a **turning point** for the *Enosis* movement; Greek Cypriots realized they were on their own in their demand for union with Greece, and this would become a crucial component of the movement. Indeed, it is during the early 1920s that the demand for *Enosis* acquired more **organizational complexity**. Under such circumstances, it was only natural that the **Church** would come to the foreground as the movement's undisputed leader. Greek Cypriot members resigned from the Legislative Council on 8 December 1920, and a year later (December 1921), under Church leadership, a "**Political Organization**" was formed to achieve *Enosis* through **non co-operation** with the colonial authorities and by a **boycott** of the Legislative Council (this lasted until 1925). The British reacted by deporting two leading nationalists, Philios Zannetos and Nicolaos Katalanos. This was seen by many as a sign of a growing British absolutism.

External developments had profound repercussions on internal Cypriot politics. Following the Greek

Army’s defeat in Asia Minor in 1922, the dream of a Greater Greece was **dashed** and Greece was in no position to support the *Enosis* movement in Cyprus. Furthermore, with the Lausanne Treaty, in 1923, Turkey acknowledged British possession of the island and all Cypriots now officially acquired British citizenship. Those who wanted to retain a Turkish one had to leave the island by 1927. This resulted in a minor Turkish Cypriot exodus to Turkey which worried the British.

The new reality after 1923 divided the ranks of nationalist politicians into those committed to “**Enosis and only Enosis**” and **moderates** who sought ‘autonomy’ within the British Empire since under new circumstances at least some accommodation with the British authorities had to be made; during this period, the moderates came to the forefront. Indeed, in 1925, intransigent *Enosists* were defeated in the elections for the first time since 1901. A number of factors, however, made the position of the moderates weaker in the following years and ensured the continuing **dominance of the intransigent Enosis wing**. By 1931, the ground was ripe for the first open defiance against British rule.

Source 2.4: The Treaty of Lausanne’s articles on Cyprus:

“Article 20: Turkey hereby recognizes the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on 5 November 1914.

Article 21: Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on 5 November 1914 will acquire British nationality subject to the conditions laid down in local law and will thereupon lose their Turkish nationality. They will, however, have the right to opt for Turkish nationality within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, provided that they leave Cyprus within twelve months after having so opted.”

Cited in: Panteli, 1984, p. 114

In 1925 Cyprus was officially declared a **Crown Colony** and the High Commissioner now acquired the title of **Governor**. The British, responding to continuous complains from Greek Cypriots, also decided to reform the structure of the Legislative Council. According to the 1925 reform of the Legislative Council, the number of Greek Cypriot members was now increased to twelve while the number of Turkish Cypriot members **remained the same**, three. There was also an increase in the number of British official members, who now held nine seats on the Council, instead of six. In practice, however, the balance within the Legislative Council remained the same because the combination of Turkish Cypriot members with official British members was equal to the number of Greek Cypriots. The fact that the Governor possessed the casting vote meant the majority could again hardly pass a law within the legislature. The renewed synthesis of the Council caused further disappointment and increased Greek Cypriot dissatisfaction with the colonial regime.

Table 2.5: Legislative Council synthesis **1882 and 1925**

	1882	1925
Greek Cypriots	9	12
Turkish Cypriots	3	3
British	6	9
Total	18	24

In 1926 the **Communist Party of Cyprus** (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Κύπρου – Κ.Κ.Κ.) was founded. While the party committed itself to the amelioration of economic and social conditions on the island, it nevertheless took a radical stance on the national question. Specifically, the party opted for an independent Cyprus within a Balkan Soviet Socialist Federation. This policy naturally alienated the majority of Greek Cypriots and did little to help the party challenge the well-established and essentially conservative *Enosis* movement. Changing social and economic conditions had clearly contributed to the creation of a new political force. The Left in Cyprus was to play a significant role in Cypriot affairs beginning from the early 1940s when, due to the general conditions the new World War brought to the island, the party of A.K.E.L. would emerge.

Two factors reinforced Greek Cypriot hopes for *Enosis* during the second half of the 1920s: the appointment of a new self-proclaimed philhellene Governor, Sir Ronald Storrs, in 1926, and the ascent of a British Labour Government to power in 1929. That during the governorship of Storrs the *Tribute* was abolished bolstered Greek Cypriot faith in Storrs's intentions while the election of a Labour Government in London inspired fresh efforts on the part of Greek Cypriots to make their grievances heard. A new delegation, under the Bishop of Kitium, Nicodemos Mylonas, met with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Passfield, and requested *Enosis* or, failing that, proportional assembly. Both requests were denied by Lord Passfield, who rejected even the possibility of self rule or increased autonomy. On the contrary, the Secretary of State for the Colonies hinted that it would be preferable if the Legislative Council was comprised of appointed members. Passfield also refused financial repayment for the *Tribute* extracted from the Cypriot taxpayers, another demand included in the memorandum. Passfield's decisions outraged Greek Cypriot and made union with Greece all the more desirable. The meeting with Passfield only served in augmenting the gap between the colonial authorities and the greater part of the Greek Cypriot population. Telegraphs of protest, as was the usual practice, were sent to London.

Source 2.6:

Lord Passfield's answer to the Greek Cypriot deputation on Enosis and changes in the Legislative Council, 28 November 1929:

"(The Enosis Question) is **definitely closed** and cannot profitably be further discussed...The **time has not yet come** when it would be to the grant advantage of the people of Cyprus to make a trial of a constitutional experiment in this direction.....The island's institutions with popular participation in them cannot be said to have attained that **reasonable measure of efficiency** that should be looked for before any extension of the principle is approved...Responsible observers have contended that had Cyprus possessed an **officially controlled** Legislature its progress would have been more rapid."

Cited in: Georgallides, 1985, pp. 238-239.

Indeed, such a snub was a turning point for *Enosis* politics and strengthened the position of intransigent politicians. In late January 1930, a **National Organization of Cyprus** (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κύπρου – E.O.K), itself a development of the old Political Organization, was created. E.O.K. aimed to achieve *Enosis* through multiform struggle under the leadership of the Orthodox Church. The Archbishop was at the Organization's head, while the Bishops presided over the district committees;

all Greek members of the Legislative Council were ex-officio members of the Assembly, the leading body of the Organization. The two dominant personalities of the Organization were the Bishop of Kitium, Nicodemos Mylonas, and the Bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios Myriantheas – both were to have a significant role in the 1931 uprising.

The British and education during the 1920s

Beginning in the early 1920s, education returned to the foreground as a major issue in Anglo-Cypriot relations. Even prior to 1914, the British were concerned about the role education played in strengthening the *Enosis* movement on the island, but any thought of bringing education under government control was halted by the onset of the hostilities in 1914.

A first significant step towards the centralization of Education was the Elementary Education Law of 1923, which was to a large degree based on previous suggestions made by Talbot and Cape. According to this law, an educational fund would be created through taxation (both direct and indirect), while teachers would be appointed by the High Commissioner on the recommendation of the Board of Education. The 1923 law signaled the onset of a confrontation over education and paved the way for its centralization. Indeed, government interference in education took a step further with the Elementary Education Law of 1929. With this law, responsibility for the appointment, promotion, transfer or dismissal of teachers was now vested entirely with the Governor; the law also stipulated that the members of the Boards of Education were no longer to be elected by the District Committees but would be appointed by the Governor himself. This included the three Greek members of the Legislative Council who were always members of the Board. Reformation in education, including an increase in teachers' salaries (a long term demand), was to be funded through additional taxation in what was already a heavily-taxed society, one in which the lower classes, namely the peasantry, assumed the greatest share of the tax burden. Still, at this point, responsibility for the curriculum and textbooks remained under the authority of the Boards.

Both laws, particularly the second, caused intense friction between the Government and Greek Cypriots, who believed these were strongly connected to a colonial effort to de-hellenize the island. Both laws also limited the role of the Orthodox Church traditionally held in education. The Elementary Education Law of 1929, which came into force into 1930; strengthened the position of the hard core *Enosis* wing (its members scored a major victory in elections held that year) and was a key cause for the 1931 uprising.



View of the Government House before the October events, 1931 (Image courtesy of the Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus).

The October Revolt, 1931 (Οκτωβριανά)

The events of October, 1931 or *Οκτωβριανά*, mark a turning point in the history of Cyprus under the British. It is now generally accepted by historians that the riots were **spontaneous** and by no means planned. The revolt was the first open defiance against British; although it was quickly suppressed, it nevertheless had **long term repercussions** for the local population. The reasons for the uprising are primarily found in Greek Cypriot national aspirations but also in dissatisfaction with the island's economy and with increased British control over education.

Following the government's decision to introduce a new customs tariff in 1930, the Greek members of the Legislative Council, under the leadership of the Bishop of Kitium, Nicodemos Mylonas, met at the village of Saitta, in Troodos, to discuss a possible response. It was decided to pursue a policy of civil disobedience by calling on people to refuse to pay taxes and to boycott British goods; the final call was to be made by the National Organization itself. The Organization met four times during October, but failed to reach a definite decision. At its last meeting, on 17 October 1931, the Bishop of Kitium, read to the rest of the members a manifesto in which he advocated dynamic resistance to the British. Although the other members agreed in principle with the manifesto, they nevertheless asked the Bishop for a few days to consider it. On the following day, however, the Bishop announced his manifesto publicly and resigned from the Legislative Council. This left little choice for the rest of the Greek members but to submit their resignations a couple of days later. From that point onwards, things moved at speed. The National Radical Union of Cyprus (Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωση Κύπρου

– E.P.E.K.) was also created and committed to *Enosis*. On 20 October, the Bishop addressed a large crowd in Limassol and declared the union of Cyprus with Greece. At the same time, in Nicosia, the capital, thousands of people spontaneously took to the streets, and thus the uprising began.



The burnt-out car of Governor Sir Ronald Storrs outside the ruins of the Government House, Nicosia, on 21 October 1931. Sukie Cameron Collection. (Image courtesy of Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus).

Source 2.7: The Manifesto of the Bishop of Kitium, Nicodemos Mylonas:

“Your Excellency,

I have the honour to tender my resignation as a Member of the Legislative Council of Cyprus...It is a fact, Your Excellency, that even the most Christian patience has its limits; we have suffered for fifty-three whole years an administration by people of a foreign race, foreign to our sentiments and the most elementary of our rights and indifferent to the needs of this unfortunate island in the hope that the petty colonial interests of Great Britain would at least be overcome by those considerations which had so much assisted our great mother country in regaining her liberty. We have let no occasion pass during these dark fifty years without proclaiming **our desire to be united with Mother Greece**, a desire the justice and sanctity of which England first acknowledged in October, 1915, by offering Cyprus to the Greek Government of that time. We have repeatedly sent deputations to England; union memorials and resolutions can be counted by hundred...As a member of the Council I had of necessity taken the Oath of Allegiance to King George, but as an ecclesiastical and national leader I am now obliged to recommend to the Cypriots, subjects by right of might, the **disobedience** dictated by our violated human rights. It will be my duty from now onwards to go about calling my compatriots to a non-lawful opposition to unlawful authorities and unlawful laws. The time has come for us to prove to our foreign rulers that if we have been deceived as to their liberal sentiments they are nonetheless deceived if they consider us such a depraved and debased people as to be intimidated by force and arbitrariness.

Cited in: G. S. Georghallides, 1985, pp. 688-689.

Demonstrations took place in all major towns. Nicosia naturally was a central point of local discontent; this was certainly true once news of the resignation of the Greek members of the Legislative Council became known. People went out in the streets and marched towards the Government’s House, which was **burnt down**. The event would play a central part in British colonial psychology in the years to

follow. In response, the British brought troops and warships from Egypt and Malta; soldiers were summoned from the Troodos Mountains, and air reinforcements were deployed to quickly suppress the upheaval. There were seven Greek Cypriot fatalities and many casualties; later on, hundreds were imprisoned. Although the disturbances were **quickly suppressed** and the British suffered no casualties, the repercussions for Cypriots were severe and long term.

The Communist Party of Cyprus (K.K.K.) was also seriously tested by the October events. While the rest of the island declared disobedience to the British and demanded union with Greece, Cypriot communists took an entirely different approach. The K.K.K. denounced the events as an expression of the desires of the Church and the Bourgeois. As events unfolded, however, and appeared to be a mass movement, the party realized the danger of keeping aloof from what was going on. But by the time the party's Central Committee decided announce its revised position, the revolt was already fizzling out.

The Greek Government in Athens kept its distance from events in Cyprus. Despite Greek demonstrations being organized in favour of the Greek Cypriot cause, for the Greek Prime Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, an **impeccable relationship** with the British was an absolute priority. Venizelos believed *Enosis* could be achieved through an Anglo-Hellenic friendship, and he disapproved events on the island, as they made any Greek claim on Cyprus impossible for many years to come. To this end he also recalled to Athens the Greek Consul in Cyprus, Alexis Kyrrou, who was involved in the *Enosis* campaign.



View of the Government's House, Nicosia, after its destruction by protesters. 21 October 1931. Sukey Cameron Collection. (Image courtesy of the Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus).

Source 2.8:

Extract from Governor Storr's report on the 1931 events:

"At 5:30 p.m. it was generally known that the Orthodox members of the Legislative Council in Nicosia had decided to resign. Members of the new National Union collected at the Commercial Club and sent emissaries to cause the church bells to be rung to summon the people. Others went round the town telling the shopkeepers to shut their shops and assemble at the Club. Speeches began and the crowd swelled from 300 to 3,000 persons who swarmed inside and around the Club's extensive premises. The resigning members arrived and spoke in turn. The keynote of the speeches was that all differences of opinion and party must be set aside. ... Dionysios Kykkotis, chief priest of the most important church in Nicosia, then stepped forward and "declared revolution". A Greek flag was handed to him and he swore the people to defend it. One more speech was made; the speaker kissed the flag and the cry "To Government House" was renewed with frenzy."

Governor Storrs report on the 'Disturbances in Cyprus in October, 1931', 11 February 1932, cited in The National Archives of the United Kingdom, CO 67/243/1.

Consequences of the 1931 events

Following the suppression of the disturbances the British introduced a series of **strict measures**. The Legislative Council was abolished and any kind of political advancement was halted; authority was entirely vested in the Governor, who ruled by decree. He was assisted by an Executive Council consisting of four official members (the Colonial Secretary, the Commissioner of Nicosia, the Attorney General and the Treasurer) and three non-official members nominated by the Governor. Political parties were made **illegal**, and in 1933 the Communist Party was proscribed. Municipal elections were also forbidden, and all councilors were to be **appointed** by the Governor himself. Furthermore, the press was placed under strict **censorship**, and many newspapers were at times suspended. Congregations of five or more people were not allowed to take place without the prior consent of the District Commissioner, and flying the Greek flag was prohibited, as was the ringing of church bells. Greek Cypriots were forced to **pay a tribute** of about £35,000 to cover damages caused during the events. The British were also quick to **point to the Church as the main instigator of the riots**. The Bishop of Kitium, Nicodemos Mylonas, and the Bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios Myriantheas, along with eight other persons (including both **nationalists and communists**) were deported. The new measures also affected Turkish Cypriots, even though they did not participate in the events. Ironically, however, what the British tried to suppress – the *Enosis* movement, as well as any communist activity – survived underground, only returning to the foreground when conditions permitted.

Source 2.9: *The Economist*, 19 November 1931

"After having existed for fifty years, the Cyprus Legislative Council had shown a sign of life. And how does the Colonial Office respond? Does it welcome this tardy fruit of British political education? On the contrary, it abolishes the adolescent Legislative Council six months later."

Cited in: Georghallides and Markides, 1993, p.5

Life under Palmer's Rule (1933-1939)

The measures that were introduced in Cyprus after 1931, first by Governor Ronald Storrs (1926-1931), then by Governor Edward Stubbs (1931-1932), were consolidated during the Governorship of Richmond Palmer (1933-1939). In Greek Cypriot historiography, his service is known as **Palmer's Rule** (*Παλμεροκρατία*) and has been identified with the most oppressive period of British occupation.

While many of the measures taken after the suppression of the October events were directed toward curtailing the influence of the Orthodox Church and of the *Enosis* movement, both survived. In 1933, Archbishop Cyril III died. With the two Bishops of Kitium and Kyrenia in exile, authority was vested in the only remaining Bishop on the island, Bishop of Paphos Leontios, who was named Acting Archbishop (*Locum Tenens*). During the 1931 October events, Leontios was representing the Orthodox Church of Cyprus at an ecclesiastical conference in London. Not without considerable discussion amongst British colonial authorities, he was eventually allowed to return to the island in 1932. For the election of a new Archbishop, a Holy Synod had to be formed with at least three Bishops; that the two other Bishops were in exile made the conduct of an election impossible. The introduction of two **Church Laws**, in 1937, by Governor Palmer, made an election all the more impossible and caused increased tension between the British administration and the Orthodox Church. Until 1947, when an election finally became feasible, the vacant archiepiscopal throne remained a thorny question and a **continuous source of friction** between the colonial authorities and Greek Cypriots. During that period, the *Locum Tenens* Leontios remained the sole representative of the Orthodox Church and of Greek Cypriots, and he played a significant role in keeping the *Enosis* movement alive. Leontios was tried for his national activities three times and was twice confined within the limits of the municipality of Paphos between 1938 and 1940.

Education was also an issue that caused increased **estrangement** between the British and Greek Cypriots. During the 1930s the British administration attempted to further **centralize** local education. This was exemplified by a new Education Law enacted in 1933, according to which the Governor was to be "the central authority for all matters relating to elementary education on the island"; he was charged with "the control and supervision and the performance of all duties and the exercise of all power connected therewith". **The Orthodox Church was completely excluded** from any of its traditional participation in educational affairs, which caused tremendous resentment. The Board of Education continued to exist, but it had no power virtually; it merely served as an advisory body. Furthermore, in 1935, a **new Curriculum** for elementary schools came into force which was to be common for all communities on the island and which were termed according to their religion (for example, Greeks were termed "Christian Orthodox"). Such a step frustrated the Greek Cypriot majority even more, in that they saw this as a British effort towards the creation of a Cypriot nationality. The teaching of Greek History was forbidden, replaced by World History, and the teaching of the English language was introduced to the higher forms. The British flag was hoisted above the island's schools, making the British atmosphere on the island all the more palpable. The 1935 Curriculum, which was to be revised in 1949, was attacked by the Press, the politicians of the local Right, and the Church. The onset of war and the need for cooperation would, in a way, overshadow the question of education. Education, however, always so crucial to Greek Cypriots, would return to the spotlight in the post

war years, especially during the 1950s, when the connection of education with Enosis politics would reach its peak.

Source 2.10: The Orthodox Church Reaction to the Elementary Education Law and the new curriculum: The *Locum Tenens* Leontios to Governor Palmer, 18 November 1935. Here, Leontios emphasizes the *ethnarchic* role of the religious institution as well as its traditional role in education.

"...We, however, out of duty, by this memorial emphasize that the Apostolic Church of Cyprus, the *ab antiquo* supreme, **responsible authority for the lay and religious education** of the Greek Orthodox people of the island, not only does not disown its *ab antiquo* rights and privileges, but it also sticks to all of them in claiming its sacred and inviolable right to exchange correspondence also with the temporal Government and regulate with it the educational and national questions of its spiritual flock who are still under political servitude. The education of the Greek Cypriot Orthodox not only before the English Occupation, but after it as well, for whole decades, was under the **immediate supreme responsibility, administration and supervision of the Church** since religion and education with us are inextricably connected with each other constituting one and the same thing...The new curriculum of elementary education, which was approved in 1934 on being trumped up with a view to introducing, contrary to all education rules, the foreign to us English language and of abolishing, a thing unheard of hitherto, Greek History and Geography, is a most clear proof that the intention of the Government in none else but a pernicious influence of the conscience of Cypriot Greek children...We strongly protest in all our **official ethnarchic capacity and claim all the *ab antiquo* recognized to us and to our pious people educational rights** which we demand and shall always demand to be restored to us and to our people the same as we had them before 1923..."

Cited in: The National Archives of the United Kingdom, CO 67/260/3.

As stated above, the economic distress of the late 1920s and early 1930s without a doubt affected Cyprus as it did in other parts of the world. The deterioration of the economy resulted in an increase in **rural debts during the first half of the 1930s** which, in turn, led to further loss of land and to an increase in the number of landless peasants. Such an experience was bound to have **political implications**. In 1936, the colonial authority tried to deal with the problem by restricting the interest on loans made to peasants to a maximum of 12 percent per year. The foundation of a **Cooperative Central Bank** in late 1937 was a positive step for the development and expansion of the cooperative movement and for the general economic relief for Cypriot peasants. Finally, in 1940, the colonial authority enacted further legislation, according to which most **rural debts were reduced** by one third and interest rates were capped at 5 percent.

Source 2.11: A.R. Achenson, Colonial Office official on the economic situation of Cyprus, 17.8.1938:

"Cyprus is the Cinderella of the British Empire; though it has been under British administration for nearly sixty years it lags far behind the development of other Colonies...Cyprus is the only Colony of which it can be said that the British Government has not only failed to give it any financial support, but has exacted from it heavy Tribute which has been applied to the subvention of the British taxpayer."

Cited in: Panteli, 1984, p.166.

The British also had a relatively moderate attitude towards **trade union activism** in their Empire, since it was seen as a counter weight to more dangerous political developments. In 1932 the first official law recognizing Trade Unions came into force in Cyprus; the response, however, was disappointing since, by the following year, only one Trade Union was registered, and there were no new registrations in 1933 and 1934. This was due to economic and social conditions of the time,

which were such that workers were discouraged from forming or joining Trade Unions. In the difficult milieu of the early 1930s, workers simply lacked the enthusiasm – or the experience – to combine their forces. This gradually changed during the second half of the 1930s, however, as ‘infant’ industrialization spurred the **foundation of 46 Trade Unions by the end of 1939**, creating a nascent yet vigorous labour movement.

By 1939 the colonial Government in Cyprus faced acute criticism for its practices, not only from within but also outside the island. Indeed, beginning in the mid-1930s, there was a metropolitan reaction against repressive practices adopted by the British in many of their colonies, including Cyprus. This reaction was not irrelevant to developments in Europe. The more Britain projected herself as a liberal power in an age of fascist dictators, the more any association with colonial autocracy – and colonial poverty – was potentially embarrassing. The appointment of a Governor with a liberal reputation, Sir William Battershill, in August 1939, sprung new hopes for the betterment of local affairs. The onset of the war in Europe, however, on 1 September 1939, would halt any potential liberalization of British governance of Cyprus.

Table 2.12: Trade Unions, Branches and Membership, 1939-1945

YEAR	Registered Trade Unions	Branches	Membership
1939	46	-	2,544
1940	62	-	3,389
1941	68	-	3,854
1942	73	43	9,991
1943	84	68	9,628
1944	122	71	11,865
1945	143	78	15,480

Cited in: Avraamides, 1972, p.16.

Cyprus during the second World War, 1939-1945

Aims

This unit examines crucial developments which took place in Cyprus during the Second World War. It examines the Cypriot contribution to the war effort; this contribution was a turning point which forced the British to be more flexible in their attitude toward Cypriots. The unit also discusses the formation of the main political parties, which were founded in the wake of this relaxed attitude. Without a doubt, the most important party was a party of the Left, A.K.E.L. which soon came to threaten the traditional monopoly of the right wing forces – and of the Orthodox Church – on the *Enosis* movement. The unit explains how wartime relations between the British and the local forces paved the way for the developments of the late 1940s and the 1950s. It is also during the wartime period that the process of polarization of Greek Cypriot politics began. Special emphasis is given to the renewed Greek Cypriot expectations of *Enosis*; these were augmented by their contribution to the war effort and by the overlap of British and Greek interests following Greece's entry in the war on the Allied side. The continuous disappointments Greek Cypriots experienced before and during the war became a significant element of post war Anglo-Cypriot relations.

After studying this unit, students should be in a position to:

- Understand how and in what ways the war altered political realities on the island.
- Discuss the British attitude toward the local political forces of the Right and the Left.
- Understand how polarization between the Right and the Left began during the war.
- Follow developments concerning the labour movement and appreciate its impact upon Cypriot society and economy.
- Evaluate the British attitude toward the Turkish Cypriot community.
- Evaluate the British attitude toward the *Enosis* movement.

Keywords

- Cyprus Regiment
- K.E.K
- P.S.E.
- 1943
- March 1
- A.K.E.L.
- P.E.K
- Municipal elections
- Labour movement
- 1944 strike

Cyprus during the early stages of World War II

The onset of the Second World War heralded **far reaching changes** to the situation in Cyprus. This period witnessed a revitalization of the political scene on the island and paved the way for the developments of the late 1940s and the 1950s. The arrival on the island of Governor Battershill, in August 1939, once again raised hopes at least for a move towards gradual representation. As events in Europe after September 1939 unfolded, however, any British intentions towards representative reforms were to remain essentially restricted, since the absolute priority was the Allied victory over the Axis powers. Despite the post 1931 experience, Greek Cypriots responded to the colonial call for help and unanimously stood by the British Empire's war effort. Despite previous volunteering during the Great War, Cypriot contribution during World War II had no precedent and, in February 1940, a Cyprus Regiment was formed in which Cypriots served as volunteers in the British forces.

Source 3.1: "The people of the island whether Greeks or Turks, have shown enthusiastic loyalty. Two volunteer transports units are already serving overseas. Before February 18, when the King approved the formation of a Cyprus Regiment consisting of combatant troops, pioneers and transport, 6000 men had volunteered for service. The number of volunteers is understood to have been nearly doubled since".

Cited in: The Times, 'The Cypriots' War Record', 15 April 1940.

The entry of Greece in the war had a significant impact on the course of events on the island. Following the delivery of the Italian ultimatum to the Greek Premier, General Ioannis Metaxas, and the latter's **refusal to allow Italian troops** to transit over Greek soil, Greece entered the war, on **28 October 1940**, on the side of Britain and its allies. The overlap of British and Greek interests brought about by the war created a new dynamic in the internal politics of the island. Indeed, Greek participation in the war marked the revival of the *Enosis* movement with all its old vigor and forced the British to abandon some of the illiberal laws which had been enacted after 1931. Demonstrations took place in all major towns on the island. The Acting Archbishop, Leontios, was the **central figure** in all pro-Hellenic demonstrations and events on the island. By the middle of 1941, donations to the Greek War Fund had reached a total sum of £100,000. Such contribution continued with the same zeal during the second half of the year but more significantly there was a movement for volunteering in the Greek Army instead of the Cyprus Regiment; this movement was led by the Acting Archbishop. Such an alternative, however, was unacceptable to the British, who eventually refused to let such an option materialize. The war experience strengthened Greek Cypriot belief as to what was a just reward for their loyalty and contribution to the war effort; such a reward could be nothing less than the union of the island with Greece.

Sources 3.2 and 3.3: Governor Battershill's comments on the Cypriot contribution to the Red Cross (before the entry of Greece) and to the Greek War Fund (after October 1940) in his private correspondence with his mother.

a) "You will be surprised to hear that the Red Cross collections which I started here at the beginning of the war now amount to £4500, an amazing sum for such a small and poor country as this. I did not believe it to be possible". 15 November 1939.

b) "There is tremendous excitement here about the success of the Greek Army against the Italians. It is indeed a wonderful success. People are pawing their wedding rings to give the money to the Greek War Fund. I'm afraid any British war charity will fare ill here at the moment when all the local inhabitants are giving to the Greek War Fund", 18 November 1940.

Both sources cited in: Rhodes House Library, Oxford, Private Papers of Sir William Battershill, MSS Brit. Emp. S467, Box 4, file III.

Political parties during the Second World War

One of the significant changes the island experienced during the 1939-1945 period was the **remaking of its political landscape**. Precisely because Cypriots had widely contributed to the Allied war effort, and because this effort was made in the name of Freedom and Democracy, the British had at least to appear more flexible with regard to the island's internal situation. As a consequence, during the war years a number of political parties emerged. Undoubtedly, the most important party formed during this period was A.K.E.L. (Progressive Party of Working People – Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζομένου Λαού), which was founded in April 1941 by communists, as well as by people from a wider ideological spectrum. Ploutis Servas was the party's first General Secretary. A.K.E.L. was indeed destined to play a critical role in the island's political scene. It presented a coherent program of social and labour policy and, by December 1941, it also **committed itself to the goal of Enosis**. Such an attachment, combined with the party's rapidly growing influence within Cypriot society, posed a serious **challenge** to local Right wing politicians and to the British administration and both confronted the party with increasing suspicion. The Communist Party of Cyprus (K.K.K.) **existed in parallel** with A.K.E.L. – although underground – for a few more years before its final dissolution; the simultaneous existence of both parties, a fresh leftist one which included 'moderate' elements and an older formation retaining its radical character, was bound to create some confusion.

A.K.E.L.'s expanding influence in the rural areas, however, resulted in friction between the party and more conservative elements. Indeed, in May 1942, the Pan Cyprian Farmer's Union (Παναγροτική Ένωση Κύπρου – Π.Ε.Κ.) was formed in the village of Athienou and was thenceforth the bastion of conservative rural elements on the island. That P.E.K. promoted the amelioration of social conditions in the countryside but also embraced *Enosis* forced the British into an uneasy position.

Increasing pressures within and outside Cyprus during the war, and Britain's refusal to relinquish the island, forced the British administration to grant limited representation to Cypriots in their internal affairs. This included the re-introduction of the municipal elections which had been abolished in 1931. The municipal elections of 1943, the first to be held in twelve years, marked the **first open confrontation** between the two opposing ideological camps of Cyprus. While the results confirmed

the influence of the Right as the traditional power in Cyprus, they also proved the Left was a new power on the island and not to be underestimated, since A.K.E.L. took possession of Limassol and **Famagusta**. In June 1943 A.K.E.L. called its members to enroll in the Cyprus Regiment – the immediate response of 700 members proved again the party’s ability to mobilize its membership. A.K.E.L.’s successes, however, exacerbated the estrangement between the Left and the Right and proved that traditional politicians needed to improve their organization in order to counter A.K.E.L.’s advancing popularity. As a consequence, under the leadership of the Nicosia Mayor, Themistocles Dervis, June 1943 witnessed the foundation of the **Cypriot National Party** (Κυπριακό Εθνικό Κόμμα – Κ.Ε.Κ.) which represented the traditional political forces of the island and was naturally committed to the achievement of *Enosis*. Κ.Ε.Κ. refused to cooperate with the Left, however, and this deprived Greek Cypriots of the opportunity to form a common front against the British. Tensions soon appeared elsewhere, as the gap in the political field also emerged in the Trade Union sector. Beginning in October 1943, a number of workers ideologically closer to the Right decided to depart from the Trade Unions and form their own ‘New’ Trade Unions under a conservative leadership. By October 1944, the founding of more ‘New’ Trade Unions led to the establishment of the **Confederation of Cyprus’ Workers** (Συννομοσπονδία Εργατών Κύπρου – Σ.Ε.Κ.). All in all, by the end of the war, the process of polarization – itself a reflection of the dramatic events of the civil war between the Left and the Right then unfolding in Greece – was well under way. Testimony to this was the Lefkoniko incident, which occurred on Greek Independence Day, on 25 March 1945, where a physical confrontation between supporters of the two ideological camps caused police intervention and resulted in the death of two persons, with several wounded. This polarization would reach its climax in the post war milieu.

The Labour Movement during the War

The onset of hostilities in Europe and the new milieu it fostered in Cyprus created more opportunities for the nascent labour movement to interfere in local affairs. The intense economic dislocation which Cyprus experienced helped the Trade Unions to acknowledge the need for collective action. Such action necessarily involved **strikes**. The growth of the labour movement was also accelerated by increasing **unemployment**, a result of the closure of many foreign markets, and it became a major issue during the war. Indeed, already on the day the war broke out, the employees of the Public Works Department went on strike. Such phenomena became even more intense during the first months of 1940 when strikes occurred in many public departments, resulting in the arrest of many workers. Problems also arose in the mining industry, since half of the employees engaged in the industry – around 4000 persons – were let go. That the Cyprus Mines Corporation (C.M.C.) ceased operations at the mines of Skouriotissa and Mavrovouni put a serious burden on the working class. To such rising challenges the colonial authority responded by the organizing **relief works**. The authorities also introduced **labour legislation** which was welcomed by the working people of the island but generally Government–labour relations remained tense throughout the war. The British believed the Trade Unions were under the influence of communist forces (either the K.K.K. or, following its foundation in April 1941, A.K.E.L.) and became **increasingly anxious** about their activities. Indeed, what began as a rather disparate Trade Union response to the inevitable economic upset caused

by the war steadily evolved into a movement that threatened to disrupt the normal pattern of the island's local affairs.

Trade Union attitude toward the war caused some friction within Greek Cypriot society because while Trade Unionists generally refrained from enlisting in the Cyprus Regiment, they insisted on this stance even after Greece entered the war in October 1940. At a time when Cypriot society was mobilized to contribute to the Hellenic war effort, such a position was bound to cause pressure on the Trade Unions, and there was division within their ranks, with moderates prepared to pledge their loyalty to the national cause and radical members maintaining an anti-war position. Such an attitude, in the early stages of the war, made any fixed position on the part of the Trade Unions clearly impossible. Things changed in June 1941 when the Soviet Union, following an invasion by German forces, entered the war on the side of the Allies. This allowed both A.K.E.L. and the Trade Unions to become more engaged with the war. Indeed, the Trade Unions, in tandem with A.K.E.L., became the spearhead of 'anti-fascism' on the island. In November 1941, Trade Unions were organized under one leading organ, the Pan Cyprian Trade Union Committee (Παγκύπρια Συντεχνιακή Επιτροπή – P.S.E.); this was clearly an important step towards effective cooperation between the Unions.

Throughout the war the labour movement remained occupied with the deteriorating economy, especially with the continued rise of the **cost of living** on the island; this evolved into a thorny issue between workers and the government. Despite anti-inflationary efforts the cost of living continued to increase, fomenting Trade Union militancy. The cost of living strike which began on **1 March 1944** and lasted until the 23rd was a critical moment in wartime Government-labour relations. The strike involved 1800 workers and was supported by the great majority of the public, the press and political parties. Under such mounting pressure, the Government was eventually forced to agree to significantly improve general economic conditions on the island. The March 1944 strike demonstrated the power of the labour movement and the pressure it could exert on the colonial authority.

Source 3.4:

Andreas Ziartides, General Secretary of P.S.E. in a speech he addressed in Nicosia underlined the **political dimension** of the March 1944 strike, including A.K.E.L.'s role in its success.

(Translated from Greek):

"...Following a glorious 23 days struggle...which under the guidance of our party, the Progressive Party of Working People, was transformed into a pan Cyprian struggle, the Pan Cyprian Trade Union Committee believes the course of the struggle so far is a partial but important political victory not only of those unemployed but of Cypriot people as a whole".

Cited in: *Anexartitos* newspaper, "Truce declared at the Government works' strike", 24 March 1944.

Cypriot economy during the war

Despite problems arising on the labour front, signs of a **growing economy** were evident on the island during the last stages of the war. As discussed above, following the onset of hostilities the island

experienced a dislocation of its economy since its traditional export markets, now in Axis countries, were closed to Cyprus. The island's mining companies ceased operations, which had a serious effect on the labor class and increased unemployment. Nevertheless, the military works established on the island, after the fall of Greece to the Germans in the spring of 1941, provided **job opportunities** for many and brought significant relief to the unemployed. The air base construction and the stationing of soldiers on the island also brought a transfusion of money to Cyprus and a general improvement of public health conditions.

Problems with import products led to the development of small enterprises on the island. Prior to the war there was virtually no industry in Cyprus. During the war, however, Cyprus saw an expansion of its **industrial production**, although no heavy industry appeared on the island due to limited investment. Instead, small enterprises mainly produced goods which did not require much capital investment. Despite serious inflation, which resulted in labor discontent, the **military work expenditure** on the island resulted in the **betterment** of the island's economic situation in the later stages of the war and opened the way to post war economic expansion. The war also witnessed a significant development of the cooperative movement which by 1945 numbered 412 societies. In addition, a significant number of local and foreign banks also operated on the island. For example a branch of the Barclays Bank was established in 1937 and the Bank of Cyprus also expanded noticeably over the 1940s and the 1950s.

Table 3.5: Growth of cooperative movement

	1934	1938	1940	1943	1945
Number of Societies	324	353	343	32	412
Number of members	16,035	24,079	31,286	45,000	56,881

Cited in: Government of Cyprus, *Ten Year Development Plan*, 1946, p.62.

Table 3.6: Main Economic indicators 1901-1950

	1901	1931	1950
Total GDP, £ m.	1,2	2,8	38,7
Contribution to GDP (% of total) by:			
Agriculture	70	50	27,4
Mining and quarrying	-	24	12,4
Manufacturing	-	-	15,2
Construction	-	-	3,3
Gainfully employed population (%) in:			
Agriculture	85	68,1	60,1
Manufacturing	-	1,4	-

Cited in: Angelides, 1996, p.224.

The Turkish Cypriot community

While the Turkish Cypriot minority felt unsettled by the alteration of regime during the early stages of British rule in Cyprus, over time it discovered its position was not without advantage under the British. Gradually, the British came to lean on Turkish Cypriots for support – such tendency, as we have seen, was strongly exemplified by the mechanisms of the Legislative Council. The importance given to the Turkish Cypriot minority by the British is demonstrated time and again during British rule. After 1914, when Britain annexed the island from the Ottoman Empire, Turkish Cypriots held tightly to their new status as British subjects.

The revival of *Enosis* had direct repercussions on Turkish Cypriots, as it sparked an immediate **opposition** toward any prospect of the union of the island with Greece. As the war evolved, and the force of the *Enosis* movement became even more intense, Turkish Cypriots naturally felt a certain anxiety. Though they declared their loyalty to Great Britain, the war also accelerated the emergence of a Turkish Cypriot political consciousness, a phenomenon which certainly continued to evolve even after the war subsided. Turkish Cypriots **began looking to Turkey** for protection, instead of to Britain, and this tendency was intensified over the following years. The first actual institutional reaction to the growing reinvigoration of the *Enosis* movement was expressed in 1943. That year witnessed the foundation of the ‘Association for the Protection of the Turkish Cypriot Minority’ (K.A.T.A.K) – one of the party’s founders was Fazıl Küçük, later vice president of the Republic of Cyprus. A year later, in April 1944, Küçük moved on to establish the Turkish Cypriot National Party (K.T.M.B.P.). It was a step which signaled the community’s readiness to respond with greater vigor to political developments on the island.

The British took the wishes of Turkish Cypriots under serious consideration and tried to ease their anxieties. As early as 1907, when Winston Churchill visited the island as Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, he was careful to stress both the just national demands of Greek Cypriots and the importance of the wishes of Turkish Cypriots. The British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, also stressed the importance of the Turkish factor to the Greek Premier, Emmanouil Tsouderos, when he made his November 1941 speech (discussed below). That year, Churchill, as Prime Minister, put an end to discussions on whether the Greek government could establish itself in Cyprus following Greece’s surrender to the Axis because of the Turkish Cypriot presence on the island. In the following decades the role of Turkish Cypriots – and of Turkey – would indeed prove to be a **perplexing part** of the ‘Cyprus Question’.

Sources 3.7 and 3.8: Winston's Churchill comments on the importance Britain placed on the Turkish Cypriot community is demonstrated in two examples. The first was made during his 1907 visit to the island and the second following official discussion as to whether the Greek Government should be allowed to establish itself in Cyprus (following Greece's occupation by Germany).

1907: Churchill's reply to the Greek elected members to the Legislative Council in which he also exaggerated the number of Turkish Cypriots on the island.

"It (The *Enosis* question) involves not only an absolute change in the Government of the island but also the abrogation of the Treaty with Turkey. It involves further the **setting aside of the views of nearly one third of the population**, and the creation of what would probably be a permanent and dangerous antagonism between the two sections of the community... I think it only natural that the Cypriot people who are of Greek descent should regard their incorporation with what may be called their mother country **as an ideal to be earnestly, devoutly, and fervently cherished**. Such a feeling is an example the patriotic devotion which so nobly characterizes the Greek nation... On the other hand, the opinion held by the Moslem population on the island, that the British occupation of Cyprus should not lead to dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and that the mission of Great Britain in the Levant should not be to impair the sovereignty of the Sultan, **is one which His Majesty's Government are equally bound to regard with respect**."

Cited in: Georghalides, 1970, p. 211.

2 June 1941, Winston Churchill:

"I have followed very closely all that has happened in Cyprus since I visited the island in 1907. I suppose you are aware there is a substantial Moslem population in Cyprus, **who have (sic) been very loyal to us and who would resent being handed over to the Greeks**".

Cited in: The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister's Personal Minute, 2 June 1941, FO 371/29846, R 5841/198/19.

British policy toward growing challenges in Cyprus, 1939-1945

The British administration was taken aback by the overwhelming Cypriot contribution to the war effort. The Greek entry in the war, a turning point in Cypriot history with direct repercussions on the island, resulted in an *Enosis* revival. That the interests of Greece and Britain now overlapped, combined with the former's heroic resistance to the Axis powers, had the majority of Greek Cypriots hoping things would alter after the war, should the Allies prevail. It was because Greek Cypriots expected a post war reward – and such a reward could only be the union of the island with Greece – that the British were **anxious to deflate such expectations**.

The question of *Enosis* therefore became highly problematic for the British during the war. The British had to confront the consistent *Enosis* policy of the Orthodox Church as represented by the Acting Archbishop Leontios, and after December 1941 by A.K.E.L. itself. The British had already denied the request of the Greek King George II to move his government to Cyprus after Greece was overrun by Germany in the spring of 1941, as they were determined not to do anything which might prejudice their continuous hold on the island. Such determination was stressed even further in November 1941 when the Greek Prime Minister, Emmanouil Tsouderos, sought to gently raise the *Enosis* question. At a dinner organized by the Greek community in London, the Prime Minister addressed the fate

of Greek majority territories not yet united politically with the Greek state. News of the Greek Premier's speech was soon transmitted to Cyprus and this led to a new wave of intense *Enosis* fervor as exemplified by the numerous editorials and telegrams addressed to Tsouderos.

Source 3.9

The Greek Prime Minister, Emmanouil Tsouderos's speech 15 November 1941:

"Greece...dressed in white and with the nimbus of martyrdom round her head, she is not alone; she is followed by her beloved united daughters. One easily knows them from their costumes. Look! There is the woman of Macedonia, the woman of Crete, the woman of Cyprus, the woman of Peloponese, the woman of Yanina, the woman of North Epirus...adorned with laurels they follow their mother, going forward towards victory that will unite them again in peace".

Cited in: The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/29846, R 10112/198/19.

To meet the challenges arising on multiple fronts, and to halt any further speculation, the colonial authorities in Nicosia, under new Governor Sir Charles Woolley, issued, after consultation with London, a statement in early December 1941 in which they stressed that no alteration to the status of Cyprus was being considered. The statement **strongly exemplified the British determination to check the *Enosis* movement.**

Source 3.10:

The statement issued by the colonial authorities on 2 December 1941:

"The attention of the Government had been drawn to comments which have been appearing in the press regarding a statement reported to have been made by the Greek Prime Minister in London on the 15th November, in which he included Cyprus among a number of territories which he visualized might be included in a Greater Greece after the war. In view of the conclusions which have been drawn from this statement, the Government is authorized to say that no negotiations have been, or are, in progress between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Greece, regarding the post-war status of Cyprus. The question of transferring Cyprus from Great Britain to Greece after the war **is not, therefore, under consideration.**"

Cited in: The National Archives of the United Kingdom, CO 67/311/11.

It is important to note, however, that London itself was divided as to the future of Cyprus. Certain officials at the Foreign Office were sympathetic to the Greek cause in Cyprus, and voices were heard during the war for the transfer of the island to Greece after the end of hostilities. Such an attitude on the part of some Foreign Office officials was particularly strong during 1944-1945. The Colonial Office, however, held a divergent view on Cyprus and held to its traditional belief that retaining Cyprus was an absolute necessity for British imperial interests. In July 1945, the election of a Labour Government would bring fresh hopes to Greek Cypriots. London, however, would soon decide that the island, in the midst of new global developments had to remain under British control. This would come as a disappointment to Greek Cypriots. This disappointment would be part and parcel of their ongoing relationship with Britain in the post war period.

At the same time, the British were also highly suspicious of both the Left and the Right on the island. They doubted A.K.E.L.'s commitment to the cause of *Enosis* (as did the Right) and feared that A.K.E.L. might eventually resort to open violence – a belief shaped by A.K.E.L.'s recruiting campaign of 1943 and by unfolding developments in Greece which was drawn into a bloody civil war. Simultaneously, however, the British refused to seize the opportunity for a closer cooperation with the Right because they considered the latter as unacceptable a partner as the Left. Once the war ended the British searched Trade Union premises and declared P.S.E an illegal organization, bringing about antagonism between the government and the labour movement. The late 1940s were to witness an even greater estrangement between the British authorities and Greek Cypriots, as well as within the Greek Cypriot community.



View of Limassol, 1930, Avedissian Bros Collection (Image courtesy of the Laiki Bank Cultural Centre Archive).

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CHAPTER 06

**Cyprus in the national and
international arenas,
1945-1960**

E v a n t h i s H a t z i v a s s i l i o u

Aims

This chapter aims to discuss the Cyprus question, from the end of the Second World War until the establishment of the Cyprus Republic in 1960. Analysis will involve three levels: international, regional and Cypriot developments, which affected the course of the Cyprus question.

After studying this chapter, students will be able to:

- Understand the influence of international and of Middle Eastern developments on the course of the Cyprus question
- Understand the process by which Cyprus became an international dispute in 1950-55
- Evaluate the different proposals on the future of Cyprus in 1947-59
- Interpret the Cyprus revolt of the 1950s
- Evaluate the importance of specific personalities, Greeks, Turks and British in the course of the Cyprus question

Keywords

- Internationalization
- Decolonization
- Self-government
- Enosis
- “Double self-determination”
- Internationalization
- Self-determination
- Guaranteed independence
- Partition
- Zurich-London agreements (1959)

Cyprus' entry in the post-war era, 1945-49

A new context, 1945-48

The end of the Second World War opened a new era for Cyprus as well. Greek Cypriot society had been mobilized during the war, while the common Anglo-Greek struggle against fascism raised the hopes of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis. In this context, it was doubtful whether the majority community could be content with anything less than **full exercise of its right for self-determination**.

However, by late 1947 the British had decided to **retain sovereignty** over Cyprus, mainly because the island was important to British policy in the Middle East. The granting of independence to India in 1947 meant that the Middle East was **the only strategically important region of the globe under exclusive British responsibility**. The control of such a region was indispensable in Britain's effort to remain a Great Power. **Cyprus was the only territory under full British sovereignty in the region**. Thus, Britain opted to retain Cyprus, as a part of its Middle Eastern strategy, believing that this was necessary in order to protect its own status as a Great Power. At the same time the Greek civil war rendered Athens incapable of claiming the island from one of its major Western allies. Consequently, **the aims of the British and the Greek Cypriots were becoming increasingly incompatible**.

Thus, at the moment when **decolonization** had started in other parts of the globe, in Cyprus the British were determined to resist it.

The British decision to retain Cyprus, 1945-47

In September 1945 the Greek Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, visited London and, among others, **asked for the union of Cyprus with Greece**. Although initially the British Foreign Office appeared willing to discuss the idea, the Colonial Office soon came forward against it, and was supported by the Chiefs of Staff (COS). Thus, the unionist claim was rejected. The eruption of the Greek civil war in the following year, and the intensification of Greek dependence to Britain meant that Athens was in no position to claim Cyprus from its major ally. Thus the road now opened for a British initiative in Cyprus. On 23 October 1946, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech-Jones, announced that the island would **remain under British rule**; he also referred to a development plan for Cyprus and to the calling of a **Consultative Assembly** which would discuss a new Constitution. In March 1947 a new Governor, Lord Winster, arrived in Cyprus.

The British initiative brought the Greek Cypriot community at a crossroads. The **polarization of the Greek Cypriots** between the communist-led AKEL (Rehabilitation Party of the Working People) and the Ethnarchy was speeded up after the two elections for Archbishop in 1947 and the final ascent of Archbishop Makarios II. These two poles would clash over the issue of the Consultative Assembly.

Early in 1947 a Greek Cypriot Embassy to London asked for Enosis, but the British rejected the request. At the same time, **the Turkish Cypriots came out against Enosis.**

The Winster proposals, 1947-48

In summer 1947, Governor Winster invited Cypriot representatives to the Consultative Assembly. The Turkish Cypriots accepted the invitation, but the Greek Cypriots appeared divided: AKEL nominated delegates, while the Ethnarchy refused to discuss a “pseudoconstitution”. The Assembly was convened on 1 November. The Greek Cypriot members asked for the establishment of **self-government**: this meant that Cypriots would head ministries in the government, with the exception of foreign affairs, defence and probably economics, which would be reserved for the British colonial authorities. The British refused to grant this, preferring to retain full control of the government. Indeed, in December 1947, when the British government debated the issue, the growing difficulties that it faced in the Middle East were mentioned as the main reason why it needed to retain full control in Cyprus. In May 1948 the British tabled fresh proposals. These provided for the setting up of an **Assembly with an elected Greek Cypriot majority**; however, the Assembly would not have the right to discuss the question of Enosis. The British also **rejected the request of the Greek Cypriots the creation of a self-governing sector**; instead they noted that Cypriots would be “connected” with government departments, but not as Ministers.

These British proposals fell short of Greek Cypriot expectations. The Left’s request for self-government was denied, at a time when London was granting such rights to other colonies. This meant that the position of the left-wing Greek Cypriot members of the Consultative Assembly had become untenable, and they finally rejected the offer.

The Consultative Assembly also became the testing ground for **a new mobilization of the Turkish Cypriot community**. In April 1948 a committee for the presentation of Turkish Cypriot views was set up: this committee visited Turkey and presented its case to the President of the Republic, Ismet Inonu. Rauf Denktash slowly emerged as its most dynamic member.

The aftermath of the failure of the British proposals

The rejection of the Winster proposals left Cyprus at an impasse. The Ethnarchy insisted on the “Enosis and only Enosis” line, refusing to discuss the introduction of a colonial Constitution. At the same time, AKEL’s rejection of the proposals made the British turn against the party. In autumn 1948 AKEL leaders (Fifis Ioannou and Andreas Ziartides) visited the Greek Communist Party (KKE) leader, Nicos Zachariades, and asked for advice. Zachariades, who at that moment was fighting the civil war, severely criticized the Cypriot comrades for their readiness to discuss constitutional development under British “imperialist” auspices. Following this, AKEL reverted to the “Enosis only” line. In the May 1949 municipal elections AKEL managed to retain only three large cities.

AKEL was pressed from many different directions: its moderate stance in the Consultative Assembly had been rebuffed by the British (who were now pressing the party), had caused strong attacks by the Ethnarchy for “betrayal” of the national cause, and had been criticized by its brother party in Greece.

Meanwhile, the Greek government proved unable to influence developments. Early in 1947 the Greek Parliament passed a Resolution for Enosis, which the British ignored. In summer 1948 King Paul of the Hellenes referred to the possibility of Enosis in an interview to the US press. This time the British Embassy made representations to Athens. In December 1949, a few months after the victory of the pro-Western forces in the Greek civil war, these representations were repeated. **In both cases Athens gave in to British pressure.**

Makarios and the internationalization of the Cyprus Question, 1950-55

Britain, Cyprus and the Middle East, 1950-54

In the early 1950s a major British priority was to retain the strategic control of the Middle East. This was seen as imperative if Britain were to remain among the Great Powers. However, since the first Arab-Israeli war (1948-9) British influence in the Middle East was rapidly declining. The British had already withdrawn from Palestine in 1948. Moreover, defeat at the hands of the Israelis in 1948-9 led many Arabs to consider that the British were responsible for their humiliation. Egypt became more apprehensive about British influence: Cairo appeared impatient regarding the large British military base in Suez, and in the early 1950s claimed the Sudan from the British. Egyptian hostility towards London became more intense after the Arab nationalists overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in 1952: Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser now emerged as the major enemy of Britain in the crucial region of the Middle East.



Archbishop Makarios III (1913-1977)

In 1951-3 another crisis was unfolding in Iran, where the government of Muhammad Mussadiq nationalized British oil interests. London proved unable to react against this challenge. Mussadiq was finally overthrown by a joint Anglo-American covert operation, but the episode exposed British weakness.

The major problem for London was its lack of material resources to continue to play the role of the dominant power in the Middle East. Britain proved unable to bring Egypt into line, or to organize a large regional coalition under its auspices. Cyprus was the only land in the Eastern Mediterranean under full British sovereignty, and thus the British regarded its retention necessary, both as a last bastion and as a statement of their intention to remain in the region. Thus, **at the moment when**

the Enosis movement in Cyprus was gaining impetus, London moved towards the opposite direction and ruled out any possibility of a withdrawal from Cyprus. This was a major reason why Cypriot decolonization finally came through violence.

The 1950 plebiscite and the ascent of Makarios III

In November 1949 AKEL suggested that the Greek Cypriots ask the UN to organize a plebiscite to decide the future status of Cyprus. Soon afterwards, the Ethnarchy assumed the initiative. In December 1949, the Ethnarchy asked Governor Wright to organize such a plebiscite. After Wright's refusal to do so, the Ethnarchy, and mostly the active Bishop of Kition, Makarios, called the Greek Cypriot people to vote in favour of union with Greece; AKEL also joined this effort, abandoning its own campaign. The **plebiscite** was held between 15 and 22 January 1950: 95.7 percent of the Greek Cypriots, as well as some Turks, signed the petition in favour of Enosis. When the colonial authorities indicated that there was no prospect for a change of status, AKEL invited the Ethnarchy to a joint effort for the "internationalization" of the Cyprus question through the UN. The Ethnarchy rejected cooperation with the Left, but pursued the idea itself.

By "internationalization", the Greek Cypriot leadership meant an appeal to the UN, asking for the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Cypriots. Since Cyprus was not an independent member-state of the UN, this appeal should be tabled by Greece. In spring 1950 an Ethnarchy delegation, led by the Bishop of Kyrenia, Kyprianos, visited the Greek capital. However, the Prime Minister, Nicolaos Plastiras, and the Deputy Prime Minister, George Papandreou, made clear that **Greece lacked the power to raise the issue at the UN and confront Britain**. Following this, the Ethnarchy delegation left for New York, to visit the UN. Another delegation, from AKEL, left for New York independently of the Ethnarchy Embassy.

In June 1950, Archbishop Makarios II died. On 16 October, the Bishop of Kition was elected as **Makarios III**.

Greece, Makarios and the Cyprus question, 1950-52

Following the end of the civil war, Greek society remained deeply divided, while economic and social conditions were appalling. However, many Greeks felt that the retention of Cyprus under the colonial rule of an ally was insulting. These groups were seized by Makarios' dynamism and mobilized against the government's "prudence". **In the early 1950s, Cyprus emerged as a foreign policy dilemma, but also as an internal political issue in Greece.**

In summer 1950 the Panhellenic Committee for the Struggle of Union of Cyprus (**PEAEK**) was formed, under the Archbishop of Athens, Spyridon; after 1954 the term "Union" was replaced by "self-determination". PEAEK organized rallies in Athens, and twice in 1951 demonstrations led to clashes with the police.

Makarios traveled frequently, mostly to Greece, where **he pressed the governments for an appeal to the UN**. Makarios pointed out that decolonization had already started throughout the globe, and

the Greek Cypriots could not accept colonial rule. Although the Centre governments, under Nicolaos Plastiras or Sophocles Venizelos, refused to confront the British, the Archbishop influenced and mobilized large parts of Greek society. In the face of Athens' refusal to appeal to the UN, Makarios hinted that he might accept an appeal from an Eastern bloc country or Syria.

In May 1951, under pressure from Makarios, the Greek government convened a council of political leaders. The Greek leaders suggested to the British that in exchange for Enosis within a "reasonable" period, Greece would ensure that London would retain a base in Cyprus and receive another one in Greece; in case this was not possible, London should indicate that it might discuss the issue in the future. The British ignored the proposal. In October 1951, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden rebuffed the Greek Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, who tried to raise Cyprus.

Thus, the Centre governments rejected Makarios' demand for an appeal to the UN, tried to avoid this appeal by approaching the British and faced successive British rebuffs, and ended up beating their own people who were demonstrating for a cause which the Centre leaders themselves regarded as noble. The climax of this schizophrenic situation was recorded during Makarios' visit to Athens in the summer of 1952: the government refused once more to appeal to the UN, Makarios publicly denounced them, and PEAEK organized a successful national strike.

In the November 1952 elections the Greek Rally under Alexandros Papagos, crushed the Centre and assumed the government.

The start of the popular uprising in Cyprus, 1953-54

In 1953 a frontal confrontation started between the colonial government and the Ethnarchy.

In April Makarios wrote to the Governor asking for a plebiscite through which the Cypriots would exercise their right for self-determination. When the British authorities rejected this, the Greek Cypriots boycotted the celebrations for the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II. In response, the colonial government banned the youth organization PEON. Makarios was also refused permission to organize a rally in favour of PEON. Then, he called the Greek Cypriots "for prayer" in Nicosia's Phaneromeni Church, and delivered a strong speech against the colonial regime. He also wrote to the Secretary-General of the UN asking for the application of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus, and indicated to Athens, once more, that if Greece failed to appeal to the UN another country might do it.

These events mark the start of **mass protest** of the Greek Cypriots against the colonial regime. In 1954, as Greece was moving to accept the idea of an appeal to the UN (and especially after the British statement that Cyprus would "never" become independent), Cypriot cities were shaken by popular demonstrations. When, in August 1954, the British adopted stronger sedition laws, Makarios defied them with a new **speech at Phaneromeni Church (the "oath of Phaneromeni")**, where he pledged that he would not stop his struggle until the coming of Enosis. The British did not arrest or deport the Archbishop. During the autumn, popular demonstrations against the colonial regime became a frequent occurrence in Cyprus.

Greece's road to internationalization, 1953-54

The new Greek government, under Field-Marshal Alexandros Papagos did not share the doubts of its predecessors regarding Cyprus. Papagos aimed to confirm Greek independence in foreign affairs, and believed that the British would be ready to negotiate a settlement with him. On 22 September 1953 he met Eden in Athens, but the latter refused to discuss Cyprus. In autumn 1953 Papagos and the Foreign Minister, Stefanos Stephanopoulos, raised the issue in discussions with the British Ambassador, Sir Charles Peake: they asked for the introduction of a liberal constitution, to be followed in 2-5 years by a referendum on the future status of Cyprus. However, the British failed to understand that the Greeks were now meaning their words. London continued to state that there was “no Cyprus question”.

In January 1954, Papagos' major advisor on foreign affairs, the Cypriot-born Ambassador **Alexis Kyrou** became Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry. Kyrou was a supporter of an appeal to the UN, **hoping that international pressure would compel the British to negotiate Enosis**. In February 1954 new British statements were made refusing to acknowledge the existence of a Cyprus problem, while Makarios renewed his pressure to the government for recourse to the international organization. On 15 April Papagos, Kyrou and a small group of advisers decided to proceed with the appeal. In doing so, **they ignored a US demarche advising against internationalization** (the Americans were not against Enosis in principle, but did not want an infra-NATO dispute to be discussed in New York, with Soviet participation). Moreover, **the Greeks ignored the possible interference of Turkey** in such a debate.

Internationalization was severely criticized by later scholars: as was proved, Greece was in no position to secure a favourable Resolution of the UN General Assembly, which required a majority of two-thirds. Furthermore, the appeal to the UN was the start of internationalization which also opened the road to the involvement of Turkey in the Cyprus question.

The Suez Base Agreement and its impact on Cyprus, July 1954

Britain was facing important problems in Egypt. The Anglo-Egyptian treaty which provided for the existence of the large British base in the Suez Canal Zone was going to expire in 1956. Nasser's hostility meant that the British had to give way: on 28 July 1954 the British Foreign Secretary, Eden, announced in the House of Commons the conclusion of a new treaty, according to which the British would withdraw from the Suez Zone by 1956. This was taken as a severe defeat for London: the government came under strong attacks from the “Suez rebels”, a group of Conservative MPs who accused the government for “selling out” the Empire.

The Suez Base agreement had important repercussions in Cyprus. In September 1954 the COS stressed that since leased bases had proved unreliable, Cyprus was indispensable for Britain's position in the Middle East. **Cyprus now became the seat of Britain's Middle East HQ, and was developed**

as a **major air base**, capable of supporting British forces in the Middle East or of threatening the southern Soviet Union in case of a world war.

The Anglo-Egyptian dispute and the Suez Base Agreement were misunderstood in the Greek world. Many believed that following the demise of Britain's position in Egypt, London would be more ready to discuss Enosis. In fact, the opposite was the case: having lost its large base in Suez, Britain tended to consider its sovereignty over Cyprus as absolutely necessary for the retention of its Middle Eastern position.

The constitutional offer and the “never” statement, July 1954

As the Suez base dispute with Egypt was entering its final phase, the British tried to counter a possible Greek appeal to the UN by presenting new constitutional proposals for Cyprus. These were presented in July 1954, and proved extremely restrictive: although the new plan provided for Cypriot Ministers (which the British had refused in 1948), **it set up a majority of official and appointed members in the Assembly**; this meant that the majority of the population would be permanently turned into a minority of votes in the parliament.

Moreover, this plan was accompanied by another unfortunate initiative. On 28 July 1954, in the House of Commons debate which dealt with the Suez Base Agreement, **the Minister of State for the Colonies, Henry Hopkinson, came under the attack of the “Suez rebels” for British policy in Cyprus, and responded by declaring that “there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent”.**

This statement caused an outcry in the Greek world and internationally, and finally became a focal point of the Anglo-Greek confrontation on Cyprus. The Greek government submitted its appeal to the UN in August, in the aftermath of this statement. However, the statement was an accurate description of the British position, as London had not yet decided whether small and strategically placed colonies would be granted independence. On the other hand, the Greek government had already decided to appeal to the UN. Thus, the statement became a convenient pretext for the Greeks to appeal to the international organization, but did not by itself cause the submission of the appeal.

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, early 1950s

Turkey had relinquished all rights on Cyprus in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. This led the Greeks to believe that Ankara would be a disinterested party in the post-war Cyprus question. This belief soon proved mistaken.

Turkish interest was aroused by the Turkish Cypriots. The latter became politically organized in the 1940s, while a new generation of Turkish Cypriot leaders, oriented towards Turkey became active – Rauf Denktash became the most prominent among them. The 1947-48 Consultative Assembly

became the ground where they tested their abilities.

At the same time developments in Turkey contributed to Ankara's increased interest in Cyprus. The rise to power of Adnan Menderes and the Democratic Party in 1950 brought the Turkish government under the control of a new group of leaders who did not belong to the traditional Kemalist establishment and were **more ready to interfere outside Turkish borders**. Turkish interest in Cyprus was dual: Ankara mainly was interested in the island's **strategic value** for Turkey's southern coastline; secondly, Ankara was interested for the **position of the Turkish Cypriots**.

Thus, by the early 1950s, the Turkish Cypriots were asking Turkey to protect their position, whereas the new Turkish rulers were prepared to intervene in the Cyprus question. In the following decades, the Turkish Cypriots consistently followed the lead of the Turkish state, contrary to the Greek Cypriots who often confronted Athens.

The first manifestations of Turkish interest in Cyprus, 1950-54

Since the early 1950s, the Turkish press often reported on Cyprus and suggested that Turkey should not give Greece a free hand. **In 1951 the Turkish official position hardened**: the Foreign Minister, Fuat Koprulu, made statements on these lines, and Ankara suggested to the British and the Americans that **no decision on the future of Cyprus should be taken without Turkish participation**. By mid-1952, the Greek Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, Averoff, in his report following his official visit to Turkey, suggested that Cyprus should be handled carefully, as it could endanger Greek-Turkish relations.

The next Greek government under Papagos, seemed to believe that it could secure Turkish acquiescence to Enosis. However, the Turks refused to discuss Cyprus with the Greeks, even in June 1954, when the two states were discussing their common participation in the Balkan alliance, together with Yugoslavia. **The Papagos government made the decision to appeal to the UN without having fully evaluated the Turkish response**.

Indeed, immediately after the submission of the Greek appeal in August 1954, the Turkish leadership, including Prime Minister Menderes, stepped forward to counter the Greek claim. **In autumn 1954 a de facto diplomatic front was created between Britain and Turkey**, pending discussion of the Greek appeal in the UN General Assembly.

The first appeal to the UN, December 1954

In autumn 1954 the Greeks tried to rally international support for their appeal to the UN, asking for the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Cypriots. Athens hoped to secure the votes of the Arab countries and the countries of Latin America and Asia; the communist states were certain to vote in favour of the Greek item and against Britain. Soon however, the Greeks found out that their

diplomatic standing could not balance the coordinated efforts of Britain and Turkey. Regardless of the “right” of the Greek position, most countries had more interests, political and economic, with Britain and Turkey, rather than with Greece. **The UN General Assembly was a political forum, not a court of justice.** Moreover, the Americans had already indicated that they did not object to Enosis as such, but did not want an infra-NATO issue to be discussed at New York.

In the face of such difficulties, **the Greeks were defeated at the UN:** although their appeal was inscribed in the UN General Assembly agenda (September 1954), in December the General Assembly decided not to discuss it “for the time being”, a formula inserted at the insistence of the Americans, to ameliorate the sense of Greece’s defeat.

Following the December 1954 UN debate, Alexis Kyrou resigned from the post of Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry. At the same time, the first signs of anti-western disposition became evident in Greece, where public feeling turned against the British and the other NATO allies who had failed to support the Greek appeal. Last but not least, in Cyprus a feeling of desperation prevailed: the Greek Cypriots felt that they had been rebuffed by the international organization. Greek Cypriots were now more ready to consider other options.

Britain, Turkey and the Baghdad Pact, 1954-55

Britain’s difficulties in the Middle East tended to increase the value of Cyprus for London’s effort to retain a dominant position in the region. However, **early in 1955 other developments underlined the importance of Turkey for British Middle Eastern policy and linked Britain’s strategic interests in the Middle East and Cyprus with the state of Anglo-Turkish relations.**

In February 1955 Turkey and the pro-British regime of Iraq concluded an alliance, the **Baghdad Pact**, to which Britain acceded in April, to be followed later by Iran and Pakistan. Thus, Turkey became instrumental in building a large regional alliance under British leadership: this was something which London had been striving to accomplish since the early 1950s. **Turkey now became a pivotal ally for Britain in a region of prime British interests.** Moreover, Turkey was a strong enemy of Nasser, with whom Britain also was at odds (whereas Greece was pursuing a pro-Arab policy). The reluctance of London in the following years to displease Turkey over Cyprus, had its roots in this state of affairs.

Last but not least, Cyprus’ new strategic role complemented the creation of the Baghdad Pact as a major vehicle of British influence in the Middle East. The new air bases in Cyprus were designed to support the Baghdad Pact forces, and thus Britain’s continuing sovereignty over the island was seen as essential for the success of the Baghdad Pact. At the same time, the British did not want to antagonize Turkey which claimed a stake in the island’s future. These strategic needs would dominate British policy in Cyprus in the following years.

British plans for Cyprus, spring 1955

Britain's victory in the December 1955 UN debate posed for Whitehall the challenge of formulating a new initiative, aiming to contain the Greeks in case the latter appealed again to the international organization. In February and March 1955, the Colonial Office examined various schemes for Cyprus, including an idea of recognising "special" cultural rights of Greece and Turkey on the island. In early April, a new plan for Cyprus was submitted to the Cabinet.

This new scheme implicitly abandoned the "never" position and proposed a new Constitution for colonial Cyprus. Contrary to the illiberal proposal of 1954, an elected majority of Cypriot members was envisaged in the Assembly: the Greek- and the Turkish Cypriot elected members would outnumber the official and the nominated ones. However, **the official and the nominated members, together with the Turkish Cypriot elected deputies, would have a majority over the Greek Cypriot elected ones.** Once more, the Greek Cypriot majority of the population was turned into a parliamentary minority.

Similarly to the 1954 offer, the plan was based on the assumption that there was a large body of Greek Cypriots who would accept nomination in the Assembly. Both in the July 1954 and the April 1955 plans, **these "nominated" members acquired a pivotal role as a bulwark against the Greek Cypriot elected representatives and consequently the Enosis ideal.** The British failed to realize that there were no Greek Cypriots who would accept such a role. British hopes for this imaginary group of influential "pro-British" Greek Cypriots were dashed after the outbreak of the armed rebellion.

The April 1955 plan was not presented officially. In early April Winston Churchill resigned and was replaced as Prime Minister by Anthony Eden; Harold Macmillan became Foreign Secretary and projected his own views for a Cyprus solution which were very different than the ideas examined until then. Moreover on 1 April the armed revolt started in Cyprus, creating a new political context.

Cyprus' anti-colonial struggle, 1955-59

Preparing the armed struggle: the decision


Since the early 1950s Makarios organized and coordinated the Ethnarchy's Enosis campaign. His strategy involved the creation of a mass movement, which, combined with international pressure through the UN, would bring the British to the negotiating table. However, at the same time, he was pressed by prominent Greeks and Greek Cypriots to accept the prospect of an armed struggle. This was compatible with the tradition of Greek liberation struggles of the 19th and the 20th centuries. Initially Makarios rejected the idea: both as a clergyman and as a national leader he preferred to avoid the violent path. However, in the face of British intransigence in 1951-52, he finally agreed to the start of an armed campaign, provided that it would be undertaken for a short period and would be directed against British installations, without loss of life. **He hoped that this would press the British without creating an unbridgeable gap between the colonial authorities and the Greek Cypriots: his aim still was to negotiate a settlement with Britain.**

On 7 March 1953, at a meeting of 12 prominent personalities in Athens the decision was made to proceed to an armed struggle. Among the people present were Makarios, former Minister George Stratos, General (rtd) N. Papadopoulos, Professors Gerasimos Konidaris and Dimitrios Vezeanis, Savvas and Socrates Loizides, and the Cypriot-born former Colonel of the Greek army George Grivas. The committee appointed Grivas as the head of the armed action. This meant that throughout the end of the Cyprus revolt, **Grivas was the leader of the armed wing, under the overall leadership of Makarios.** However, Grivas tended to be a divisive element: he had become known for heading the strongly anticommunist "X" organization during the German occupation, and after the war he led a similar "Party of X" which became notorious for its anticommunist paramilitary groups. He had participated in the Greek elections of 1946 and 1950, but both times had failed to secure more than one percent of the votes and to elect MPs in the Greek Parliament.

The 7 March 1953 decision led to the organization of a Greek Cypriot armed struggle, clandestinely, without support from the Greek government. Indeed, the members took care to keep their meetings secret from Greek intelligence, **believing that the Greek state was subservient to the British and the Americans.** However, it is clear that people working in government agencies gave to the committee support and material. Greek Prime Minister Papagos is reported to have warned Grivas not to proceed with these plans; Papagos even ordered Grivas' arrest in November 1954, but the latter had already left for Cyprus.

The start of the armed struggle

The preparation of the armed rebellion involved shipments of arms from Greece to Cyprus with the use of small boats (caiques). One of these, the *Ayios Georgios* was captured by the British at Chloraka on 25 January 1955. The British seized ammunition as well as proclamations by a clandestine organization named National Front for the Liberation of Cyprus (EMAK). Following the capture of the boat, Grivas changed the title of his organization to **National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA)**.



Grivas Wanted

On 1 April 1955 EOKA made its first bombing attacks, distributed leaflets and had its first casualty, Modestos Panteli. EOKA's proclamations, signed by Grivas under his war-name, "Dighenis" (a medieval Byzantine hero), called for a struggle aiming to secure the union of Cyprus with Greece. EOKA made clear that it would not turn against the Turkish Cypriots and indeed its attacks were not directed against them; yet, it asked them not to become involved in the Anglo-Greek confrontation in Cyprus.

According to the original planning and the decisions of March 1953, **EOKA's aim was not to defeat the British: it intended to arouse international interest for Cyprus and to press the British, allowing Makarios to negotiate an acceptable settlement which would lead to Enosis.**

EOKA: organization and early action

EOKA's action was **part of the wider Cyprus revolt** – indeed, its supporters tended to refer at that time to a "revolution". The armed action complemented a popular uprising which continued in the main cities, through demonstrations or political resistance.

EOKA's action involved **three different forms of attacks** against the colonial authorities: small guerrilla groups in the mountains, sabotage, and small groups for political assassinations in the cities. Later on, in 1956-57, political organizations also emerged such as the EOKA youth (**ANE**) and the Political Committee of the Cypriot Struggle (**PEKA**). EOKA's armed sections were never numerous: it is doubtful if the armed men exceeded the number of three hundred at any specific moment. However, these were supported by a wide network of civilians who aided the organization, by a network of informants, and mostly by the popular uprising which was simultaneously unfolding. The organization's targets were mainly the British, the members of the security forces and those Greek Cypriots who collaborated with the British (the "traitors"). The organization was constantly under the strict control of Grivas who remained in the island until March 1959, hiding from the British.

EOKA's victims throughout 1955-59 included 218 Greek Cypriots, 142 British and 29 Turkish Cypriots; of the latter, 22 were policemen, and were hit in this capacity, not as members of the Turkish minority.

The first target of EOKA was the police which was systematically attacked in the summer of 1955, when the first police casualties occurred. **The Cyprus police was effectively neutralized**, and this raised for the British the question of fighting the revolt in other ways, including the use of the army.

Reactions to the emergence of EOKA, spring 1955

The start of the armed revolt had important repercussions. The British termed EOKA as a “**terrorist**” organization and pledged to destroy it. However, they soon realized that the EOKA fighters were not isolated extremists, but had the support of the Greek Cypriot population – although the British never admitted this publicly.

At the same time, **EOKA’s emergence alarmed Turkey**, which perceived the armed revolt as a systematic move by Greece to force Enosis. In mid-April 1955 Prime Minister Menderes suggested to the British Ambassador to Ankara that Britain and Turkey cooperate in fighting the clandestine organization. Thus the armed struggle tended to bring Britain and Turkey closer, at a time when their general Middle Eastern interests converged.

In Greece, the government was practically leaderless, since Prime Minister Papagos fell ill in March 1955 and a succession struggle started in his party between the two Deputy Prime Ministers, Stefanos Stefanopoulos and Panayiotis Kanellopoulos. However, the beginning of the Greek Cypriot armed revolt moved the Greek public.

The Greek Cypriot Left, **AKEL, came out strongly against the idea of the armed struggle and denounced “terrorism”**. EOKA always treated the Greek Cypriot communists with suspicion. Relations between EOKA and AKEL would deteriorate severely in 1958.

Last but not least, the Greek communist party denounced EOKA. Indeed, Grivas’ identity was disclosed through a radio broadcast by Zachariades. However, after Khrushchev’s “destalinization” speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (early 1956) and the removal of Zachariades from the leadership of the KKE, **the Greek Left changed course and strongly supported the Greek Cypriot anti-colonial revolt**, criticizing the Greek governments for their lack of support to it.

The calling of the London Tripartite Conference, April-June 1955

The advent of a new British government led to a change of London’s policy. The new Foreign Secretary, **Harold Macmillan**, took a special interest in Cyprus and aspired to effect an **international solution**. This was a dramatic departure from the previous line that Cyprus was an “internal affair” of the British Empire, but Macmillan managed to establish the Foreign Office’s competence over the traditional

Colonial Office prerogative of dealing with Cyprus.

Macmillan and the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, favoured an **“association” of Greece and Turkey with the administration of Cyprus**: Kirkpatrick expressly suggested that it was better to include the Turks in order to balance the Greeks. This new plan should be presented at a conference where Athens and Ankara would also be invited. Macmillan preferred to allow the two other states to declare their positions, which would probably prove incompatible; then Britain would step in and propose its plan as a compromise. Prime Minister Eden agreed with the idea of a conference, mentioning that this was important to prevent a new Greek appeal to the UN; he did not mention EOKA's challenge as a factor leading to this change of policy.

The British invitation was conveyed to Athens and Ankara in late June. Turkey accepted it immediately, and **this is considered as Ankara's formal entry on the Cyprus scene**. Greece appeared indecisive: Papagos was ill, the government was badly coordinated, and **Makarios had denounced the British proposal as a “trap”**. However, in the end Athens decided that a rejection of the British invitation would prejudice the international community against a new Greek appeal to the UN. Greece finally accepted the invitation, but also simultaneously submitted its appeal to the international organization.

Before the conference, the British government sought to coordinate its tactics with the Turks, and asked them to state their position strongly. However, the Turks intended to do so with an intensity which the British obviously did not expect.

The collapse of the Tripartite Conference, August-September 1955

As the Conference came nearer, the positions of the interested parties hardened. In late August the Turkish Press accused the Greek Cypriots of planning a “massacre” of the Turkish Cypriots and the “Cyprus is Turkish” organization received official support for demonstrating the strength of Turkish feelings over the future of the island.

The Conference started on the 29 of August. On the 31st Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos asked for the introduction of a liberal Constitution and for a British promise for the exercise of the right of self-determination in the future. On the following day Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rustu Zorlu asked for the retention of the status quo, opposed the introduction of constitutional government and said that in the case of a change of status the island should “revert” to Turkey. On 6 September, Macmillan presented his plan which provided for the introduction of a Constitution, envisaging **an Assembly with a small Greek Cypriot elected majority**. However, Greece and Turkey would be “associated” with the British sovereign administration of Cyprus. Greece and Turkey would appoint special representatives to the British Governor of Cyprus. **This meant that a tripartite directorate of Cypriot affairs would be created, in which the Greeks and Greek Cypriots would be overruled by a combination of Britain, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.**

However, the Conference received a fatal blow because of the **anti-Greek pogrom in Istanbul**

and in Izmir on the night of 6-7 September. Zorlu, from London, had asked for the holding of a demonstration in Istanbul which would show the strength of Turkish feelings on the matter. The affair started with the explosion of a bomb in the Turkish Consulate of Thessaloniki; this building was the family house of Kemal Ataturk himself, but it was later proved that the bomb had been planted by Turkish agents to provide a pretext for what was to follow, namely the demonstration in Istanbul. According to British reports, the Turkish government expected that “a few windows” [of property of the Greek minority] would be broken, but the demonstration got much more violent, and the police did nothing to restrain the rioters. The properties of the Greeks of Istanbul and of the Oecumenical Patriarchate, Churches and even cemeteries were destroyed, while the Greek officers serving in the NATO HQ at Izmir were also attacked. In 1961, following their overthrow by a military coup, Menderes and Zorlu were convicted for their involvement in this affair (they were executed on other charges).

The pogrom destroyed Greek-Turkish relations as well as the Conference. Both countries rejected the British proposals. Cyprus was again at a dead-end.

The aftermath of the Tripartite Conference: Harding takes over in Cyprus

Following the Conference, the Greek government tried to inscribe its item at the agenda of the UN General Assembly. However, on 22 September the Greek delegation, headed by Stefanopoulos, failed to do this, with the Americans voting against inscription. A few days earlier, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles had sent identical messages to Papagos and Menderes urging restraint; this was strongly denounced by the Greek Press for putting the culprit and the victim of the anti-Greek pogrom in the same place. Thus anti-Americanism was boosted in Greece. Early in October Papagos died and the King decided to by-pass the discredited Stefanopoulos, by appointing a popular Minister, Constantinos Karamanlis, as Prime Minister.

Meanwhile, in Cyprus **the confrontation between the colonial authorities and EOKA peaked**, at the same time when large demonstrations continued in Nicosia. Since August the Governor of Cyprus, Sir Robert Armitage seemed to lose his nerve. He was asking for special powers to deport Bishops, even Makarios himself; the collapse of the Cyprus police under EOKA's pressure made things even more difficult for him. The British government decided to replace him with **Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, the former chief of the Imperial General Staff**. The choice of a soldier was indicative of London's decision to suppress the Cyprus revolt militarily. However, Harding was also to exploit ways to reach a settlement with the Cypriots themselves.

The start of the Harding-Grivas duel, autumn 1955

As the Cyprus police had been neutralized, Harding received army reinforcements and set out to

destroy EOKA. **In the autumn of 1955 the conflict between EOKA and British troops became much more intense:** the first deaths of British soldiers occurred, while a pivotal moment for EOKA was **the death of Charalambos Mouskos**, a cousin of Makarios, on 15 December, during an operation in which Charilaos Michael and Andreas Zakos were also arrested. Two Greek Cypriots, **Andreas Dimitriou** and **Michalis Karaolis**, were arrested and condemned to death, but their sentences for the moment were not carried out. In the new phase of conflict, **Grigoris Afxentiou** and **Markos Drakos** emerged as the most capable commanders of EOKA. At the same time, agitation continued among the students of the schools, many of which were closed down by the colonial authorities.



Governor Harding

On 26 November Harding proclaimed a state of Emergency, which allowed the British authorities and the army to arrest and imprison citizens without trial, to impose curfews, to search properties, to impose collective fines to communities or to condemn young people to flogging. The possession of arms became a capital offense.

In December, Harding also banned AKEL: he hoped that the removal of the communist party from the scene would make it easier for Makarios to settle, but as often happened in the Cyprus question this was a British miscalculation. Makarios felt even more obliged to continue his hard negotiating tactics. Simultaneously, Harding launched a new operation to destroy EOKA which did not produce results. Last but not least, the death of a Turkish Cypriot policeman by EOKA fire was followed in January 1956 by Turkish Cypriot demonstrations against EOKA. This referred to the possibility of a conflict between the two major communities of the island.

The Makarios-Harding negotiations: autumn-winter, 1955-56

Despite his drive to defeat EOKA, Harding did not aim to solve the Cyprus question through military means alone. He also sought to negotiate a settlement with Makarios, or (as the British put it) to divide Makarios from EOKA. On 4 October 1955 the new Governor saw the Archbishop who insisted that Britain recognise the principle of self-determination for Cyprus and introduce a liberal constitution. The prospect of an agreement with Makarios and the apparent weakening of the Turkish position after the September Istanbul riots convinced Eden that London should satisfy some of Makarios' conditions. Simultaneously, the new Greek government under Karamanlis encouraged Britain to explore the possibilities of an Anglo-Cypriot settlement, and the US took a similar line.

On 21 November Harding presented to Makarios a formula which constituted an **indirect yet clear abandonment of the "never" position**. It stated that "it is not their [the British government's] position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus". **The exercise of self-determination, however, was subjected to many preconditions, including the obligations of Britain to allied powers in the Eastern Mediterranean.** Makarios was anxious that this wording gave Turkey a veto on Cyprus.

Despite US and British pressure, Karamanlis refused to press Makarios to agree to the formula. On 5 December the Greek government gave the British a memorandum which had been prepared after consulting Nicos Kranidiotis, the Secretary of the Ethnarchy. In late December, a Greek diplomatic envoy to Cyprus, Alexis Liatis, did not press the Archbishop to accept the formula.

The British made various alterations to the formula which Makarios finally accepted on 2 February. The Archbishop then asked for negotiations regarding the “transitory regime”.

The collapse of the Makarios-Harding negotiations, January-February 1956

In February Makarios asked that the British undertake specific obligations regarding the internal government of colonial Cyprus: he demanded a **Greek Cypriot elected majority in the Assembly**; after a short period the control of **internal security** should be transferred to the responsibility of a Cypriot Minister (the British wanted to retain it indefinitely); and an **amnesty** would be declared for EOKA fighters. Makarios had also met Grivas, who appeared reserved about the prospects for a settlement. At the same time, the British MP Francis Noel-Baker unsuccessfully tried to effect a compromise.

Meanwhile, the Greek government had turned its attention to the general election of 19 February. On the 17th Makarios asked Karamanlis’ opinion, but the Greek Prime Minister replied that he would support any decision of the Archbishop. However, the Greek election played a role in the negotiations: trying to help Karamanlis’ position (as he clashed with a coalition of all other political parties including the communists), the Americans pressed London not to terminate the negotiations. However, after 19 February and Karamanlis’ victory in the elections, this restraint was removed from British policy.

On 29 February, the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, visited Cyprus and held talks with Makarios. The Archbishop probably did not realize that this was the last chance for an agreement: he rejected the British proposals hoping to secure more advantages. However, this was followed on 1 March by the Jordan crisis, during which King Hussein dismissed General Sir John Glubb as commander of the Arab Legion. Jordan seemed to be lost for Britain, and this led to renewed attacks against Eden’s Middle Eastern policy. Feeling that he had been rebuffed by Makarios, and needing a show of strength in the Middle East, **the British arrested Makarios on 9 March (shortly before his departure for Athens) and deported him to the Seychelles.**

The aftermath of Makarios’ deportation: spring-summer 1956

Makarios’ deportation had severe destabilizing effects. Despite British hopes, **no Greek Cypriot emerged to negotiate in the Archbishop’s place.** The British Constitutional Commissioner, Lord Radcliffe, found no interlocutor in the Greek Cypriot side.

Greece also faced the prospect of destabilization: after Makarios' deportation Athens was shaken by large demonstrations, dominated by anti-Western and anti-NATO slogans, and the government came close to resign. The Greeks withdrew their Ambassador from London, and relations of the government with the British Embassy became extremely difficult.

In Cyprus itself, **a full-scale war erupted between EOKA and the British security forces and the army**. In April there even was an attempt by EOKA to assassinate Harding. **On 10 May, Andreas Dimitriou and Michael Karaolis were hanged**. This was followed by new anti-Western demonstrations in Greece, in which four people were killed (three demonstrators and a policeman). In late May, the Greek Foreign Minister, Spyros Theotokis, who had supported the Makarios-Harding negotiations, came under strong attacks by the opposition and the Cypriot Ethnarchy for being friendly to the British, and resigned. He was replaced by Averoff.

The British intensified their effort to suppress EOKA. Curfews and collective fines became usual measures in Cyprus, while concentration camps were set up for those suspected for collaboration with EOKA. Early in June Harding launched a major offensive to destroy EOKA, but failed once more; and the Auxilliary Police was created, manned by Turkish Cypriots. The latter initiative also **raised tension between the two communities**; in late May minor clashes were recorded between Greek- and Turkish Cypriots following the murder of a Turkish Cypriot policeman by EOKA members. On 9 August three more EOKA members were executed (**Andreas Zakos, Charilaos Michael and Iakovos Patatsos**).

The first EOKA truce and the renewal of violence, August-autumn 1956

On 16 August 1956 **EOKA proclaimed a truce in Cyprus**. This took place at the suggestion of the new Greek Foreign Minister, Averoff, who had now taken contact with Grivas and tried to ensure that tensions would be lowered. However, the British allowed themselves to believe that they had defeated EOKA and responded by offering terms of surrender to its members.

After that, Grivas resumed his action. In late August and in early September the Acting Ethnarch, Bishop **Anthimos** of Kition and the Secretary of the Ethnarchy, **Nicos Kranidiotis**, were arrested. On 21 September three more EOKA members were hanged: **Michalis Koutsoftas, Andreas Panagidis and Stelios Mavromatis**. Autumn 1956 was a period of renewed conflict: many British troops were now in Cyprus preparing for the invasion of Egypt (which took place in November) and EOKA launched successive attacks against them.

British plans, summer 1956

The British decision to deport Makarios also transferred the centre of discussions to the international level. Since the British now had no Greek Cypriot leader with whom to negotiate, they

needed to seek an agreement with the interested states, Greece and Turkey. During a year of Middle Eastern crisis which would also lead to an Anglo-Egyptian war over Suez, **the British felt that they could not displease Turkey.**

In June 1956 London put forward a new plan. The impact of Makarios' deportation is vividly shown by two elements of the plan: first it gave a virtual veto to Turkey on the issue of Cypriot self-determination; second the plan was presented only to Turkey (not to Greece) and was immediately withdrawn after Ankara's initial adverse reaction to it.

The British plan envisaged the introduction of a colonial Constitution, the drafting of which had been entrusted to Lord Radcliffe. On the issue of self-determination, the plan provided that 10 years after the introduction of the Constitution, the question of the exercise of self-determination would be submitted to NATO; if a two-thirds majority of the NATO members agreed that this right should be exercised, deliberations would begin for the conclusion of two tripartite Treaties between Britain Greece and Turkey, for the protection of minorities and for the military use of the island. **Since the conclusion of these Treaties was a precondition for self-determination, Turkey was given a virtual veto on the process.**

The Turks rejected the plan. Indeed, **the Turkish Ambassador to London, Suat Hayri Urguplu counterproposed the partition of the island.** After Turkey's adverse reaction, the British abandoned their scheme. In July the Permanent Under-Secretary of the FO, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, suggested to examine the possibility of partition. At the moment, however, the idea was not taken further.

Greek proposals, summer-autumn 1956

After Makarios' deportation, Greece was searching for a scheme which could satisfy British requirements and Turkish sensitivities, while leading to Enosis. Part of this search was Averoff's initiative to press Grivas for a truce, which was proclaimed by EOKA on 16 August but was practically ignored by Britain.

In July the Greek government tried to communicate its ideas to London and to Washington through the Labour MP Philip Noel-Baker and the Greek-American businessman Spyros Scouras, who aimed to mediate in the dispute. The Greek government also secured the agreement of the Bishop of Kition, Anthimos, who was now the acting Ethnarch in Cyprus. Athens proposed the introduction of a Constitution with a Greek Cypriot elected majority; internal security would remain in British hands for one year. After a period of three to five years, the NATO Council would decide the application of the right of self-determination; this should take place between five and eight years after the NATO Council's decision. Thus Britain would retain Cyprus for the following 8-13 years; the NATO Council would not decide whether, but when self-determination would be applied to Cyprus. In case of Enosis, Britain would retain a base in Cyprus and would receive another in Greece; in Cyprus two or three free ports would be established, so that Turkish trade would not pass through Greek customs; the Turkish Cypriots would be guaranteed minority rights, would not serve in the Greek army, and would have the right to opt for dual nationality. Cyprus would be partially demilitarized.

At the same time, the Greeks intensified their efforts to convince the American to mediate in the dispute. In September and October a special representative of President Eisenhower, Julius C. Holmes, was appointed, to whom the Greeks repeated their proposal. However, the prospects of US mediation were destroyed by the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, which finally led to a conflict between the British and the Americans.

Britain, Cyprus and the Suez crisis, summer-autumn 1956

In summer 1956 the Suez crisis erupted following Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal company. **The British leaders, especially Eden, now felt that they were facing the ultimate challenge in their Middle Eastern policy:** if they failed to react, their prestige throughout the region would be destroyed. However, initially they refrained from armed action as the Americans were clearly against it. Thus in August Britain called a conference of the maritime powers which used the Suez Canal.

Turkey sided with Britain, but Greece refused to participate in the conference. Athens needed to protect the large **Greek community in Egypt**, while it also counted on **Arab support for Cyprus at the UN**. Moreover, the Greeks found it impossible to side with colonialist Britain which was keeping Cyprus under its rule. This, however, convinced the British that the Greeks were siding with their worst enemy and **widened the gap between London and Athens**.

The Suez crisis led to the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in November (the French suspected Nasser of aiding the anti-colonial rebellion in Algeria). The Anglo-French invasion was finally dwarfed by Soviet and US pressure. This meant that a crisis of confidence had now occurred between the British and the Americans; consequently the US mediation on Cyprus was practically destroyed. Furthermore, the British regarded Turkey as a faithful ally and Greece as an enemy. This would prove important in the decisions regarding Cyprus.

Britain accepts the principle of partition, October-December 1956

Following the Anglo-Turkish exchanges in the summer, **the Turkish government came out in favour of the partition of Cyprus**. The suggestion was made on 12 October 1956 during a meeting between the Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Nuri Birgi, and the British Ambassador to Ankara. Throughout the autumn the Turks continued to press the British to accept such a solution.

By that time, its growing difficulties in the Middle East made it impossible for London to reject the Turkish suggestion. However, it was not easy to make such a decision, and there were powerful figures within the British establishment, including Harding, who had severe doubts whether it was wise to provide for the partition of a Crown Colony. The Colonial Office also was against the idea. Finally, the Foreign Office's view prevailed. The British government decided to recognise the principle of "double

self-determination” in Cyprus. This meant that Greek- and Turkish Cypriots would vote separately; a majority of the Turkish Cypriot vote (9 per cent of the population) would thus be enough to impose partition. There also was another problem in this scheme: the Turkish Cypriots were not a majority in any Cypriot district. Thus their vote would not be cast in terms of an electoral district, but would in fact decide a territorial question.

It is important to note that according to the British decision of autumn 1956, this “double self-determination” pledge would be presented as a threat; it was not given to be implemented. The British hoped that this pledge would scare the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots into accepting the continuation of British rule, and at the same time assure Turkey that Britain would not agree to Enosis. However, as would be proved, this pledge legitimized the Turkish claim for the partition of Cyprus,

Later on, the Turks claimed that the Greek Foreign Minister, Averoff, had proposed partition to the Turkish Ambassador to Athens. The Greek record of this conversation has been published and does not support the allegation.

The Radcliffe Plan and the partition statement, December 1956

The Radcliffe proposals were submitted in November 1956 and were **the most liberal British constitutional plan of the 1950s**. Radcliffe suggested the setting up of **a self-governing and a retained sector of government**; the latter would also include internal security. There was going to be a clear majority of Greek Cypriot elected members in the Assembly. Turkish Cypriot rights would be protected by a Ministry of Turkish Cypriot Affairs; legislation regarding this Ministry would require a two-thirds majority of the Turkish members of the Assembly. **Radcliffe also examined and rejected the Turkish Cypriot claim for a federal system in Cyprus. He noted that Cypriot population was mixed and it was impossible to separate the two communities.**

However, the British government had decided otherwise. Before presenting the proposals to the House of Commons, Lennox-Boyd visited Athens and Ankara. In Athens he suggested that his statement would recognise the principle of self-determination, and would make it clear that partition would be among the options; the Greek leaders did not object to this, as they were certain that there would not be a majority of the Cypriot voters in favour of partition; but Lennox-Boyd did not make it clear that this would require a majority of the Turkish Cypriot voters only. In Ankara, on the contrary, the British Foreign Secretary told the Turks that British would not present Turkey with a united Cyprus under Greek rule.

On 19 December 1956 Lennox-Boyd presented the Radcliffe constitution, and also stated that **Britain now accepted the principle of “double self-determination”, namely, partition**. It was this statement that led Greece to reject the plan, and Turkey to accept it. However, this statement would now become the Greeks’ worst nightmare.

Reactions to the partition statement: Greece and Turkey

Turkey accepted the Radcliffe plan, but the British knew that Ankara hoped in time to drop constitutional government and go straight to partition. **Throughout 1957 the Turks insisted that partition was the only solution for Cyprus.** The creation of a Turkish military organization, (**Turkish Resistance Organization – TMT**) in 1957, under the control of Turkish army officers, was meant to support this claim, but making clear that co-existence of Greeks and Turks was impossible in Cyprus.

Greece was found in an extremely difficult position, and now needed to formulate a response to the danger of partition. The Greek government, especially Averoff, lobbied the Americans and the NATO allies against this eventuality, pointing out that **partition with the vote of a part of the minority was incompatible with western political culture, that it would result in forced population transfers (in order to create a Turkish majority somewhere in the island) and would destroy Cyprus' social and economic life.** At the same time, the Greeks knew that they needed a fall back position. This was the concept of **guaranteed (namely permanent) independence**, which Averoff presented to the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in February 1957 during the UN General Assembly session. The Greeks also lobbied the Americans to secure the release of Makarios from exile and his return to Cyprus: Athens noted that it was impossible to reach a settlement when the leader of the majority community was captive and in exile.

Enosis, partition, independence, 1957-59

The new UN debate, February 1957

Following the Greek failure to inscribe an item on Cyprus at the UN General Assembly agenda in September 1955, the focus had moved away from the international organization. The Greeks submitted another appeal after Makarios' deportation, and in autumn 1956 Prime Minister Karamanlis himself went to New York to lobby for it. The actual debate was delayed until early 1957.

That debate ended with a "colourless" resolution, which **called for new negotiations between the "interested parties"**. Yet, interpretations of this resolution varied considerably. According to the Greeks, the "interested parties" were Britain and the Cypriots; this way the Greeks suggested once more that Makarios be released. According to the British and the Turks the term "interested parties" meant the three states, Britain, Greece and Turkey. Thus, there was no agreement even on the meaning of the resolution. **This was the first time that the Greeks had not been defeated at the UN**, but the whole affair showed once more that it was unlikely that a solution would come from the international organization.

Makarios' release

Since March 1956 the Greeks kept insisting that Makarios' return on to the scene was necessary in any attempt to break the impasse. In mid-March 1957 Karamanlis sent a message to US President Dwight D. Eisenhower asking him to secure the Archbishop's release. Eisenhower made this point to the new British Prime Minister, Macmillan, during the Anglo-American Bermuda conference on 23 March.

Macmillan intended to improve Anglo-American relations and welcomed this opportunity to show that he took into account US advice. He also believed that Makarios was a liability in exile. Last but not least, the British hoped to secure a statement by Makarios condemning EOKA, which the Archbishop refused to provide. Nevertheless, Macmillan decided to proceed with the release, despite the objections raised in his Cabinet; indeed, Lord Salisbury, the Lord President, resigned over this decision. Thus, in late March 1957 the British announced the release of Makarios, but **refused to allow him back to Cyprus**, and consistently in the following years avoided another round of negotiations with him.

Makarios arrived in Athens on 17 April and remained in Greece until March 1959. His repeated efforts to initiate discussions with the British failed. The Ethnarchy also publicized the many incidents of British torture of Greek Cypriots which became known during this period. **His presence in Athens, however, contributed to a much better coordination between the Greek government and the Ethnarchy.**

Developments in Cyprus and the second EOKA truce, spring 1957

In Cyprus the confrontation between EOKA and the British authorities continued. Early in 1957 **the British scored some important successes**. The two major commanders of EOKA, **Markos Drakos** and **Grigoris Afxentiou** were killed in mid-January and early March respectively; indeed, Afxentiou's lone and long fight, which ended with the British burning him alive in his hide-out, has remained as a symbol of resistance in Greek Cypriot memory. In mid-February an EOKA group lost three men in action against the British.

In March 1957 the British decided to execute **Evagoras Pallikarides**, a young man of 19 years, who had been arrested and condemned to death for possession of arms. At that time, Averoff was trying to persuade Grivas to call a second truce, and an execution could turn the EOKA leader against the idea. Averoff frantically tried to prevent the execution, while a US Congressman offered to adopt Pallikarides in order to save him. The British however proceeded with the execution on 14 March. Only a few hours later Grivas declared that he could call another truce if London released Makarios. This was announced on 28 March; then, the EOKA truce came into effect.

Greek Foreign Minister Averoff had by now established contact with Grivas and **had started sending arms and ammunition to EOKA**; this was the first time that EOKA had an official contact with the Greek government. Averoff believed that this could allow him to exercise a **restraining influence** over Grivas.

The Greek government believed that the spectre of partition had brought a major change in the Cypriot setting: further action by EOKA could be used as a pretext by the Turks to cause inter-communal violence trying to prove that coexistence was impossible and thus that partition was the only solution. Grivas finally called a **second truce**, but in April he refused a proposal by the Greek government and Makarios to end EOKA's action. The organization remained essentially inactive for the next months.

Britain examines partition, spring 1957

The December 1956 partition pledge was given by the British, but at that time they did not intend to implement it; it was meant to function as a threat to the Greek Cypriots, which could force them to accept the continuation of British rule. However, early in 1957 Eden resigned from the premiership and was replaced by Harold Macmillan. The new leader intended to improve Anglo-American relations and to ensure that Britain would still remain a major power in the Middle East. Thus, **he still needed the cooperation of Turkey**, and indeed during the Bermuda conference he made it clear to Eisenhower that the Turks were Britain's major ally in the region, and no solution on Cyprus which offended them was acceptable.

Thus, **the Macmillan government examined the possibility to implement partition**. To this end,

the British encouraged the NATO Secretary-General, Lord Ismay (a former British general) to propose mediation; after Greece's certain refusal to accept the proposal, the road to partition would open. The British also initiated studies for bringing partition about.

This policy was resisted both by the Colonial Office (who did not want to lose another territory) and by the Chiefs of Staff (COS), who argued that British military requirements could not be met in a divided island. However, Macmillan imposed his line.

Studies of partition, however, revealed the impracticality of the idea. Two scenarios were examined: **gradual partition**, which would require many years, and **“outright” partition**, which would need the employment of British troops in order to move people forcibly and create a region with a Turkish majority; even “outright” partition would require some years. The practical difficulties of the idea, and the realization that the NATO allies would not favour partition led Macmillan to abandon the scheme.

The attitude of the US and of NATO members

Following the December 1957 British “double self-determination” (or partition) statement, the Greeks intensely lobbied the Americans and other NATO members against partition. Although initially unfavourable to the concept of guaranteed independence (as they believed that a Cypriot state would not be economically viable) the Americans realized that partition threatened also to spark a Greek-Turkish war and endanger NATO cohesion; thus they **accepted the arguments against this solution**. By April the US appeared favourable to guaranteed independence and in late May gave a paper to the British arguing against partition. However, they did not step on to the scene more strongly. **Their objections to partition played a major role in Macmillan's decision to abandon the idea of implementing this solution.**

In spring 1957 Lord Ismay was also replaced as NATO Secretary-General by Paul-Henri Spaak. An ardent supporter of European unification, Spaak disliked the concept of partition and of the forced transfers of population that it entailed. Moreover, as a Belgian he was favourable to the idea of guaranteed independence. Averoff quickly established contact with Spaak, who in autumn 1957 offered to mediate; however, the British and the Turks discouraged him.

In 1957 other NATO powers, such as West Germany and Italy, also came out against partition. This meant that the Greeks had managed to create an international climate in favour of avoiding this solution; but the question remained what would be done with Cyprus.

The proposal for a new Tripartite Conference, summer 1957

For Macmillan, the practical difficulties for the implementation of partition opened the road for the revival of his older ideas involving tripartite cooperation in the government of Cyprus. Britain

examined and rejected the idea of guaranteed independence in July 1957: the British officials stressed that a Cypriot state would be unstable, vulnerable to communist infiltration and its greatest flaw was that it would be ruled by Makarios.

Macmillan now put forward his own preference for a **tripartite (British-Greek-Turkish) condominium on Cyprus**. This would again run counter to the Greek Cypriot claim for self-determination, and would additionally create a regime in which the Greeks would be permanently overruled by the British and the Turks. Still, Macmillan decided to proceed, and suggested the calling of a new Tripartite conference.

The proposal for a new conference was rejected by the Greek government. Athens had bitter memories from the similar conference of 1955, and realized that a new one could bring the Greek government into an extremely embarrassing position. Averoff indicated to the British Ambassador to Athens that Greece preferred to reach a solution prior to any official meeting; Greece was prepared to agree to the introduction of liberal self-government, leading to guaranteed independence; this regime would not change, save by a decision of the UN or NATO. By autumn it became clear that there was little prospect for an agreement on tridominium or guaranteed independence, and thus Macmillan examined other possibilities.

The new UN debate, November-December 1957

The new debate on Cyprus at the UN General Assembly was **the closest that the Greeks came to securing a favourable Resolution**. The Greek item asked for the application of the principle of self-determination in the island, and Makarios was a member of the Greek delegation. The Greek tactic, throughout 1957, of maintaining a moderate attitude paid off, as many UN members were prepared to examine Greek suggestions.

For the first time during UN debates, the Greek item secured a majority in the Political Committee and moved to the General Assembly. This raised a new question: it was clear that the Greek draft resolution might not get the required two-thirds majority to be approved by the General Assembly. Thus the Greeks examined the possibility of dropping the reference to self-determination, and change their item to ask for independence. The Indian Foreign Minister, Krishna Menon, encouraged the Greek delegation to ask for independence, as this would secure the necessary two-thirds majority. Averoff was receptive but Makarios insisted on self-determination; the Archbishop already realized that independence might be the realistic goal, but he evidently did not want to drop the Enosis/self-determination claim at the UN, without securing some more advantages. Thus the Greeks insisted in their claim for self-determination. Their item secured 31 votes, while 23 countries voted against and 24 abstained. Thus the Greeks got a relative majority, not a two-thirds one, and their item was not approved as a Resolution.

International developments affecting Cyprus, 1957

In 1957 **Macmillan managed to improve Anglo-American relations**. At the same time, a series of crisis in the Middle East and elsewhere brought the US and Britain closer, and convinced the Americans about the need **not to displease Turkey over Cyprus**. **The Turco-Syrian war scare in late summer and early autumn convinced the Americans about the importance of Turkey in blocking Soviet penetration of the Middle East**. The Sputnik flight raised the spectre of Soviet supremacy in the new technology of inter-continental nuclear missiles and alarmed the US public. The NATO powers responded by installing US intermediate range nuclear missiles (IRBM) in European countries and Turkey, to balance the perceived Soviet capabilities in inter-continental missiles. This decision was reached at the December 1957 NATO summit in Paris. Turkey accepted the US IRBMs, whereas Greece effectively declined: the Greek government was afraid that the arrival of US missiles would fuel neutralist feelings in the country, which were already strong because the Greek public perceived that their allies had let them down regarding Cyprus.

Thus, a series of international developments seemed to point to an increased strategic importance of Turkey. By late 1957 the Americans were not prepared to accept Turkish views and the prospect of partition, but had come to appreciate the old British argument about the need not to displease Turkey over Cyprus. This meant that the two major western powers were about to find some common ground on Cyprus, mainly their priority to keep Turkey satisfied.

A new British Governor in Cyprus: the Foot plan

Trying to break the impasse, Macmillan replaced Harding, and Sir Hugh Foot, the liberal former Governor of Jamaica became Governor. Foot travelled in Cyprus with minimal guard, and **attempted to restore some confidence** between the colonial authorities and the population, Greeks and Turks.

Foot came to endorse a new approach: liberal self-government would be introduced for seven years; **the partition pledge would remain in force, but no decision on the future status would be implemented without the consent of both communities**. This practically gave a veto to the Turkish minority on the future of Cyprus, but the provision caused Turkey's mistrust. Ankara believed that the British tried to extract themselves from the partition pledge. This was why Foot examined the possibility of **offering to Turkey a base in Cyprus, in exchange for dropping partition**.

In January Foot and the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, visited Turkey to present the new proposal. The behaviour of the Turks was insulting to the British officials. The Foreign Minister, Fatin Rustu Zorlu even indicated that the government would not receive Foot; in fact, Selwyn Lloyd went to Ankara and then invited Foot to participate at the talks, making it impossible for Turks to refuse to accept him. Ankara asked for the cession of a Turkish base immediately. The Turks demanded that the partition pledge be incorporated in an Anglo-Turkish treaty – thus making it an arrangement from which Britain would not be able to disengage.

Simultaneously with the Ankara talks, the Turkish Cypriots revolted against the British authorities and started attacking the Greek Cypriots. The British officials knew that this had taken place at the instructions of Ankara. However, the British by now had become dependent on Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots for the internal security of Cyprus. **The Turkish Cypriot violence exposed Britain's dependence to Turkey on Cyprus.**

The discussion of Enosis minus a Turkish base, February-April 1958

After Ankara, Foot and Selwyn Lloyd visited Athens and aired the idea of giving Turkey a base in exchange for dropping partition. The Greek government cautiously suggested that it could not accept this vague idea. However, **Averoff indicated that Greece would discuss the scheme, provided that Enosis would be the quid-pro-quo for the Turkish base, and that the base would be given simultaneously with the proclamation of Enosis** (not before). Averoff also instructed the Greek Consul-General to Cyprus, Angelos Vlacos to find an area which could be ceded to Turkey with the minimal transfer of population.

Immediately afterwards, in late February, the Greek government fell over electoral reform and new elections were proclaimed for May. The Greeks were left with the impression that the scheme of Enosis minus a Turkish base remained on the table and would be discussed again after the election, which Karamanlis won easily.

However, in March **the Turks indicated to the British that they demanded two bases, in Larnaca and in Famagusta, while they also wanted virtual military occupation of Nicosia airport.** Facing such demands, but also being aware of the degree of their dependence on Turkey regarding internal security, the British abandoned their idea.

The EOKA-AKEL conflict, early 1958

Grivas' anti-communism was a well-known fact, and EOKA did not recruit members of the Cypriot communist party. However, by the end of 1957 and early in 1958 **relations between them took a turn for the worse.** Both organizations were banned by the British. However, EOKA accused some leftists for cooperating with the British and helping the arrest of EOKA fighters. **This led to the execution of some AKEL members as "traitors", which until today remain highly symbolic and cause considerable tension in Cypriot society.** AKEL reacted strongly to these incidents. The Karamanlis government and Makarios urged Grivas to stop these attacks and avoid splitting the Greek Cypriot front in these crucial moments, but the EOKA leader did not follow their advice. On its part the Greek Left-wing Party, EDA advised AKEL to play down its complaints, since EOKA's struggle "objectively aided the democratic forces" in Greece.

In the spring of 1958 EOKA also launched a campaign for passive resistance, which does not appear to have yielded the expected results.

The Macmillan Plan, summer 1958

In spring 1958 the diplomatic impasse and the realization of British dependence to Ankara allowed Macmillan once more to step forward and impose his own preference. The Macmillan Plan was an alternative to the condominium proposal of 1957. According to this plan, **Cyprus would remain under British sovereignty for seven years, while a “partnership” of Greece and Turkey with the British administration would be set up**; Athens and Ankara would appoint two governmental representatives to assist the governor. The constitution would be based on “**maximum communal autonomy**” and would provide for their **total institutional separation**; two Communal Chambers (a Greek- and a Turkish Cypriot) would be set up, but **there would be no common Assembly**. Furthermore, the plan provided for dual nationality for the Cypriots (British-Greek and British-Turkish); the Governor’s Council would consist of four Greek Cypriot and two Turkish Cypriot ministers, as well as the two governmental representatives of Greece and Turkey. After the implementation of the plan for seven years, the prospect of establishing a tridominium would be examined. As Macmillan announced in the House of Commons on 26 June, in case the scheme failed, **the previous British pledges remained in force**; thus the Greeks had either the option of accepting this plan, which opened the way to partition, or to accept partition itself (which was the “previous British pledge”).

Most importantly, **the Macmillan plan could be implemented partially, without the concurrence of either Greece or Turkey**: the degree of institutional separation meant that the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber could be set up independently of the Greek Cypriot one; the Turkish governmental representative could be appointed independently of the Greek one. This meant that it was not enough for the Greeks merely to reject the plan, since its partial implementation would anyway create *faits accomplis* for the Turks; the Greeks needed to block the plan by the adoption of another, acceptable solution.

TMT’s attack on the Greek Cypriots, and the first inter-communal clashes, summer 1958

Simultaneously with the presentation of the Macmillan Plan, the Turks made an all-out and determined effort to prejudice developments towards partition. On 8 June an explosion took place in the Turkish Consulate; exactly as had happened in the similar case of the explosion in the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki in 1955 (which had been the pretext for the anti-Greek pogrom at Istanbul), **this bomb was also planted by Turks in order to lead to communal violence** which would prove that co-existence was impossible.

Immediately after the explosion, **the Turkish Cypriots, headed by the TMT, attacked the Greek Cypriots throughout the island**. This violence lasted almost two months and claimed many lives. Of these incidents the most famous is the massacre of eight Greek Cypriots at the village of **Kioneli** on 12 June: indeed, the Greek Cypriots were arrested by the British and were released close to a Turkish

Cypriot village; the result was the death of all of them. EOKA remained inactive during this violence, at the insistence of the Greek government and Makarios, who realized that retaliation by EOKA would merely confirm the Turkish argument that coexistence was impossible, and would make partition appear as the only solution. Grivas reacted to the Turkish violence shortly at the end of July, but on 4 August proclaimed EOKA's **third truce**.

The British responded to the Turkish Cypriot violence by large scale arrests in late June. However, the colonial authorities arrested more than 1,200 Greek Cypriots and only 60 Turkish Cypriots, despite the fact that it was the latter who were causing the violence. The Greek Cypriots found themselves killed by the Turkish Cypriots and arrested by the British; their position was desperate.

Diplomatic developments of summer 1958

Greece and Makarios immediately rejected the Macmillan Plan. Indeed, Makarios even appeared ready to accept the introduction of a liberal Constitution without provision for self-determination; this was an indication of the sense of emergency that the plan created in the Greek side. Turkey also rejected the plan.

The Greeks tried to rally international support for their position, and NATO Secretary-General Spaak appeared ready to mediate; his views involved the introduction of a Constitution based on communal autonomy, but also the elimination of the governmental representatives of Greece and Turkey; this could lead to Cypriot independence rather than partition or condominium.

At that point, Macmillan, afraid that he would lose the initiative, visited Athens and Ankara and on 14 August presented a **revised version of his plan**. This time there was a vague reference to the desirability of setting up a common Legislature in the future (a Greek preference), but also a further tangible concession to the Turks: **the new plan provided for the setting up of separate municipalities, Greek and Turkish, in the major cities of the island**. This had been a demand of the Turkish side since 1957: the Turks regarded these municipalities as a territorial foundation of Turkish Cypriot power in the island.

Greece again rejected the plan, but Turkey now accepted it. This time, **the US also endorsed it, believing that this was the minimum that Ankara would accept to drop its claim for immediate partition**. Britain now prepared to implement the plan with the cooperation of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots only. Separate electoral rolls were prepared, a study for the separation of municipalities got under way and the appointment of the Turkish governmental representative was scheduled for 1 October.

The NATO mediation and Greece's defeat, autumn 1958

Following the presentation of the revised Macmillan Plan and the British decision to implement

it, the last resort of the Greeks was to try to involve Spaak in the process; Spaak was the last international leader who remained sceptical about this plan. Furthermore, the Greek government now faced the prospect of its resignation if the plan were implemented, and since there was no governmental alternative of the Centre (which had been crushed by the Left in the May elections) there was the danger of a military dictatorship or of a drift of Greece from NATO. On 9 September **Karamanlis wrote to Spaak that the implementation of the plan could endanger “the cohesion of the alliance” in the Eastern Mediterranean.** This was a clear reference to the danger of Greece’s disengagement from the alliance, and Spaak visited Athens on the 23rd trying to help the Greeks. After that, he suggested a NATO conference on Cyprus, causing the wrath of both the British and the Turks. However, on 1 October, the Turkish Consul-General in Nicosia took up the post of Turkish governmental representative, according to the Macmillan Plan. **Turkish state authority had returned to Cyprus for the first time since 1878.**

The Greeks had to decide whether to accept Spaak’s invitation for a NATO conference. Averoff was against acceptance, predicting that the British and the Turks would be in a position to steer the process to directions unacceptable to Athens. However, Makarios insisted that Greece should participate. During the deliberations the NATO Council, it indeed became clear that the British and the Turks were able to impose their views on the membership and the agenda of the conference. Makarios now changed his mind and forced the Greek government to decline the invitation; but this meant that Athens had now let down Spaak, its only remaining friend. By late October 1958 it appeared that the Greeks had been defeated on all possible levels.

The Makarios-Castle interview: the Archbishop drops Enosis

In August and September 1958 the Greek side was alarmed that the British were going to implement the Macmillan Plan regardless of consequences for Cyprus or Greece. The Greek side (both the government and Makarios) had already shown that they were favourable to the idea of guaranteed independence, but had refrained from proposing it officially: they believed that the proposal should come from a third party and they should “accept” it as a concession at an opportune moment; Makarios himself refused to endorse it at the UN debate in December 1957, considering that even a favourable UN Resolution was not enough as a gain from such a concession.

However, as the date (1 October) for the appointment of the Turkish governmental representative was coming closer, Makarios tried to stop the process by offering this concession. On 23 September 1958, at an interview with the British Labour MP Barbara Castle, **he said that he was ready to accept independence in perpetuity.** The gesture did not impress the British government who decided to go on implementing the Macmillan Plan.

Makarios’ initiative created some strain in his relations with the Greek government. The Greek officials accepted the prospect of guaranteed independence, but disagreed over Makarios’ tactics. They were upset that the Archbishop proceeded with the interview without informing them in

advance; they also criticized Makarios for using a British opposition MP for his move, which made it easier for the British government to ignore it.

In November Makarios went to New York for the UN debate, and stated that the US had encouraged him to drop Enosis and accept independence. This was disclaimed by the State Department and brought the Greek side once more in an embarrassing position.

The situation in Cyprus, autumn 1958

By late August, as Britain was moving towards the implementation of the Macmillan plan, EOKA resumed its action. **Autumn 1958 was a period of tense conflict in Cyprus.** Early in September four EOKA members were killed at **Liopetri** after a long battle. In early October a British citizen, Mrs. **Cutliffe** was killed in cold blood, allegedly by EOKA. The resulting British army search for the murderers (Cutliffe was the wife of a British soldier) resulted in two Greek Cypriot dead and 256 wounded. Later Grivas refused that the EOKA was responsible for the murder, but the affair made significant damage to the Greek Cypriot organization internationally. On 19 November 1958 EOKA lost another of its able leaders, **Kyriakos Matsis**, who was trapped in house at Dikomo. When the British soldiers asked him to come out and surrender, Matsis replied that if he came out, he would do so shooting.

Despite the many losses and many successes of EOKA, it became clear that it could inflict damage to the British, but could not stop the implementation of the Macmillan Plan. **EOKA had been devised as an instrument of pressure, not as an “army” which could win a war.** Autumn 1958, with all its acts of incredible bravery, sacrifice or violence, showed that EOKA's limits had been reached.

The last UN debate and the search for a solution, November-December 1958

In November and early December a new UN debate on Cyprus took place. The Greeks had now (after the Makarios-Castle interview) asked for **independence** for Cyprus. But things had changed compared to one year ago: the situation in Cyprus seemed desperate, the British and the Turks had assumed the initiative, and the Americans themselves intervened against the Greek item. This debate, the longest until then in the UN General Assembly history, ended with a Greek defeat.

It was at New York, that Averoff and Zorlu had their first exchange of views, from which it appeared that there could be ground for a solution on **guaranteed independence**. The two Ministers agreed to continue the exchange through the diplomatic channel. **In mid-December they met Selwyn Lloyd in Paris: the British reluctantly agreed that they would accept a Greek-Turkish agreement on Cyprus** (Macmillan was upset that his plan was going to be set aside). New exchanges took place through diplomatic channels in late December and in January.

In these deliberations it became clear that **the Turks wanted to set up a state which would**

only nominally be independent, but would in fact constitute a Greek-Turkish condominium; according to their proposals, this “state” would not have the right to join the UN (an unmistakable sign of statehood) and would be a federation, governed by the Greek- and the Turkish Cypriots on a 50-50 basis. The Greeks insisted on the sovereign character of the new state and on its unitary and democratic structure; the Greeks were prepared to accept communal autonomy, but not a federation or an exclusion of Cyprus from the UN.

Both Greece and Turkey had motives for accepting a compromise. Greece needed to block the implementation of the Macmillan Plan. But Turkey also needed to improve its relations with Athens. After the **Iraqi revolution** of summer 1958, the loss of Iraq for the West threatened Turkey with regional isolation. Ankara needed to re-establish its cooperation with Athens, and this could only be done through a Cyprus settlement.

The Zurich-London agreements, February 1959

By late January 1959 the Greek and the Turkish governments had reached agreement on the basic outline of a settlement. At a meeting with the Greek government leaders on 29 January, **Makarios accepted the principles of the agreement**, insisted that the Turkish claim for separate municipalities in the major cities should be accepted, and agreed that in order to reject the Turkish claim for a military base in Cyprus, the Greek government could accept a common HQ with the stationing of Turkish troops.

On 5-11 February, at Zurich, the Greek and the Turkish governments reached an agreement for guaranteed independence. On 17-19 February, at a new conference at London, in which the Greek- and the Turkish Cypriots leaderships also participated, the British accepted the Greek-Turkish agreement, provided that they would retain sovereign bases in the island.

According to the agreement for the “Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus”, a presidential regime would be established; the President would always be a Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President a Turkish Cypriot. They would be elected by their respective communities, and would have a right of veto on foreign affairs, defense and internal security. The Council of Ministers would consist of seven Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots, while one of the Ministries of Defense, Finance or Foreign Affairs would always be given to a Turkish Cypriot. Two Communal Chambers would be established to deal with communal affairs. Legislative power rested mainly with the common House of Representatives, consisting of 70 percent Greek- and 30 percent Turkish Cypriot members. However, the electoral Law, tax Bills and municipal legislation, would need the approval of the majority of both the Greek- and the Turkish Cypriot members of the House. Conflicts of competence would be settled by the Supreme Constitutional Court, consisting of one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot and a neutral member. The civil service, the police and the gendarmerie would consist of 70 percent Greek Cypriots and 30 percent Turkish Cypriots, while the ratio in the army was 60:40. The Supreme Court of Justice would consist of two Greek Cypriots, one Turkish Cypriot and a neutral member who would have two votes. Separate municipalities would be set up in the major cities.

A Treaty of Guarantee, to be signed by Britain, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus was to provide for the safeguarding of the independence, the Constitution and territorial integrity of the Cyprus Republic. In case of a violation of the regime or of the territorial integrity of Cyprus, the three guarantor powers would consult with the aim of restoring the status quo; in case agreed common action proved impossible, each guarantor power could act independently, with the “sole aim” of restoring the status quo. According to the UN Legal Department, this provision did not create a right of armed intervention: all signatories of the Treaty became members of the UN, and the Charter of the United Nations (which is compulsory International Law) prohibits the use of force even as a preventive measure.

Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey would also form an alliance. The three countries would set up a joint HQ in the island, where a Greek contingent of 950 men and a Turkish of 650 men, including officers, would be stationed.

In Zurich Karamanlis and Menderes also concluded a “gentlemen’s agreement”. It provided that Greece and Turkey would support the entry of Cyprus into NATO, and that Athens and Ankara would make representations to the President and the Vice-president of the Cyprus Republic respectively, to ban the “Communist Party” and prohibit “Communist action”.

Makarios’ doubts at London

At the London Conference Archbishop Makarios asked for some changes in the text. He stressed that he did not reject the agreements, but wanted to bring some “improvements” to them. When pressed to sign immediately he replied that “if it is now it is no”. That night the Greek government pressed Makarios’ advisers to accept the settlement, and the Archbishop signed the agreements on the next day, 19 February.

Makarios’ attitude in London has been presented as proof of the “imposition” of the agreements on him. This impression is mistaken, since he had accepted them both before and after the Zurich conference. Others portrayed Makarios as a Machiavellian figure who wanted to be seen to sign under pressure and thus avoid the blame that he had accepted the agreements in his own free will. This is also inaccurate. According to the available evidence, Makarios knew that he had to sign, but seemed to go through a personal crisis: it was very difficult for the Ethnarch of Cyprus to sign a settlement which, however necessary, was not ideal and excluded Enosis in perpetuity. At any rate, in the following years Makarios strongly defended his decision to accept the agreements, stressing that a rejection would mean the destruction of the Greek Cypriots.

Cyprus' road to independence, 1959-60

The implementation of the agreements: political arrangements, 1959

Following the conclusion of the London agreement, Makarios returned to Cyprus on 1 March and was **triumphantly received** by the Greek Cypriots. The Greek government took special care to ensure the departure of Grivas, who had shown some discomfort for the agreements; he left in mid-March for Athens. In early April, Makarios and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Fazil Kuchuk, appointed the Cypriot members of the **Transitional Committee, a kind of provisional government**. Makarios appointed mostly former EOKA men, and this caused the anger of figures of the old Right, as well as of Grivas, who saw his influence among his former subordinates to be weakened.



EOKA fighters in celebrations after the end of the struggle

In summer 1959 **Grivas, encouraged by the Greek opposition, came out publicly against the provisions of the agreements on the retention of British bases**. However, the Greek government stood firmly at the side of Makarios, and this first rift between the two men seemed to be overcome following their meeting at Rhodes in October.

In December 1959 presidential elections were held. Kuchuk was proclaimed Vice-President unopposed. On 13 December, Makarios was elected, receiving almost two-thirds of votes.

The drafting of the Constitution, 1959-60

According to the Zurich and London agreements, the Cyprus Constitution would be based on the "Basic Structure" and would be drafted by a **Constitutional Committee**. This was created in April 1959, and consisted of a Greek Cypriot representative (Glafkos Clerides), a Turkish Cypriot (Rauf Denktash), a Greek (Professor Themistocles Tsatsos) and a Turkish legal expert (Professor Nihat Erim), and a neutral expert, Professor Marcel Bridel of the University of Lausanne.

The main problem centered on the exercise of those sectors of executive power which had not been expressly mentioned in the "Basic Structure". The Turks wanted the President and the Vice-President to be "jointly" responsible for executive power; this provision would create the picture of a "condominium" between these two officials, and would run counter to the democratic principle. The final agreement, reached on 10 November 1959, provided that these sections of **executive power**

belonged to the Council of Ministers, which was a collective body with a Greek Cypriot majority.

During the drafting both the Greek- and the Turkish Cypriot sides tried to write into the Constitution everything that they regarded important. As a result, the Constitution became too long and rigid. This would prove important in the road to the new crisis in 1960-63. The Constitution was signed by Makarios and Kuchuk on 6 April 1960.

Arms traffic and the Deniz incident, autumn 1959

The existence of illegal arms at the hands of people from both communities, and the legacy of the inter-communal violence of 1958 were among the most important obstacles for the restoration of mutual confidence between Greek- and Turkish Cypriots. However, **the illegal arms traffic continued even after the conclusion of the Zurich and London agreements**, mostly by the Turkish Cypriots. In mid-March 1959 EOKA surrendered an impressive amount of arms, but the British still believed that some remained at the hands of former EOKA men.

On 18 October 1959 the British intercepted the Turkish boat *Deniz* (registered at Izmir) carrying ammunition to Cyprus. The crew scuttled the boat. This created a major crisis in Cyprus, which was fuelled by the fact that the official Turkish news agency, Anatolian, announced that the boat was fishing dolphins for which the crew needed arms; the Turkish statement created the impression that the Turkish state was behind this venture. The Greek Cypriots even temporarily suspended the work of the Constitutional Committee. The crisis was slowly overcome as both Athens and Ankara showed that they disapproved of any attempt to overthrow the agreements by force. The British deported the Turkish nationals arrested on board the *Deniz*.

In late October, at British suggestion, **Makarios and Kuchuk appealed to their respective communities to surrender their arms**. According to the British, the Greek Cypriot response was satisfactory, but the Turkish Cypriots failed to obey Kuchuk; Rauf Denktash was regarded as the main factor that this had happened. Thus, **the Deniz incident confirmed Denktash's emergence as an alternative pole in the Turkish Cypriot community**. The confidence-building measure did not work, and in fact backfired. **The problem of the lack of confidence was not solved**, and this would play a major role in the road to the new crisis of 1963.

The question of the British bases, 1959-60

According to the London agreement the British would retain **two sovereign areas in Cyprus** as well as access to some facilities throughout the island. The retention of British bases had never been questioned by the Greek governments or Makarios, but became the focal point of Grivas' attack against the settlement in summer 1959.

The issue was examined by the Joint Committee, working in London – another of the instruments

set up by the 1959 London Conference for implementing the agreements. However, the British made things even more difficult for the Archbishop when they demanded the retention of extremely large areas of Cyprus: they asked for a total area of 170 s.m. which would include a Greek Cypriot population of 16,000. Makarios counter-proposed the retention of an area of 36 s.m.

In January 1960 a conference at London was held, with the participation of Greece, Turkey, Britain, the Greek- and the Turkish Cypriots. The difference was narrowed down: Makarios now offered an area of 80 s.m. whereas the British were demanding 120 s.m. However, this disagreement made it impossible to proceed with the proclamation of independence in February 1960, as had been agreed in 1959. The proclamation of independence was moved to March and then to August 1960.

The final agreement was reached in early July 1960, and provided for the retention by the British of a total area of 99 s.m.

Cyprus becomes an independent state, August 1960

Cyprus became an independent state on the night of 15 to 16 August 1960. On 15 August the Treaty of Establishment was signed by Governor Foot, Makarios, Kuchuk and representatives of Greece and Turkey. A new era was starting in Cypriot history, when the people of the island would decide for its future without foreign imposition.

Cyprus became a member-state of the United Nations in September 1960, and later joined the British Commonwealth, the Council of Europe and the Non-Aligned Movement.

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CHAPTER 07

**Post-war Cyprus, 1945-1960:
social, political and economic
development**

E v a n t h i s H a t z i v a s s i l i o u

Aims

This chapter aims to discuss internal developments, political, economic and social, in Cyprus from the end of the Second World War until the establishment of the Cyprus Republic in 1960. The analysis will also include the demographic reality in the island, education, and the effect of the anti-colonial movement on social structures.

After studying this chapter, students will be able to:

- Understand the effect of demographic realities in the island's history and in the course of the Cyprus question
- Understand the impact of education in Cypriot society
- Follow the development of Greek- and Turkish Cypriot politics
- Understand the process of polarization in Greek Cypriot politics in the 1940s
- Evaluate the economic basis of the relations between the two major communities
- Appreciate the development of the labour movement in Cyprus and understand the response of the British authorities
- Discuss the attitude of the British toward the major Cypriot political forces
- Evaluate the impact of the anti-colonial struggle on society

Keywords

- AKEL
- Labour movement
- Elections for the Archbishop
- Education
- Ethnarchy
- Municipal elections
- Greek civil war (impact of – in Cyprus)

Background

Cyprus' demography, 1945-60

Cypriot demographic realities did not change after the Second World War. Two censuses, one by the colonial authorities in November 1946 and another immediately after independence in December 1960, showed that population grew spectacularly in the early post-war period. In 1946 the population was estimated at 450,114 and in 1960 at 573,566, with **the Greek Cypriots forming about 78 percent and the Turkish Cypriots about 18 percent of the total**. A degree of urbanization had already become evident. However, the most important aspect of Cypriot demographic realities involved the **extremely mixed character of the population**: although social intercourse and inter-marriage had never been extensive between members of the two major communities, they were living side by side. There was no area with a Turkish Cypriot majority. This would prove important after the mid-1950s, when Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots demanded partition: the implementation of this solution would necessarily involve forcible transfer of people in order to build a Turkish majority somewhere in the island.

In territorial disputes of the Eastern Mediterranean, it was usual for the contesting parties to present demographic data favourable to their positions. **This did not happen in Cyprus until much later, as the high-quality British and later Cypriot administrations provided indisputable statistics**. On the other hand, it is interesting that the British, at least at an initial stage, provided mistaken data regarding the past: In summer 1954, the Colonial Office supported its restrictive constitutional offer by claiming that the population of the Greeks and the Turks of the island was almost equal at the time of the arrival of the British in 1878. The Colonial Office recognized its mistake a month after the presentation of the proposal; this was an example of the use of statistics with the aim of supporting current political aims.

The Cypriot economy

In the early post-war period Cyprus remained a **predominantly rural society**: according to the 1946 census the largest part of the population lived in the countryside. The move of Cypriot economy from agriculture to services was accelerated only after independence. In 1960 **almost half of the population was working in agriculture, forestry or fishing**.

Despite frequent criticism against the colonial administration for its lack of interest in Cyprus' economic development, **the British improved the infrastructure of the island, aided sanitation and encouraged the modernization of agriculture**. This process was accelerated in the early post-war period. By the late 1940s the industrial sector of the economy, mostly mines or light industry, had recovered. The crisis of prices brought about by the Great Depression had been overcome, and earnings from the **export of minerals** were again substantial. However, Cyprus exported untreated minerals, which were processed elsewhere – a characteristic of an **underdeveloped economy**.

In 1946 the British authorities announced a ten-year development plan for the island, but did not encourage a radical restructuring of the Cypriot economy from agriculture to industry; still, the plan lay emphasis on **electrification**, a sector in which Cyprus was markedly underdeveloped. The **eradication of malaria** by 1950, another aim of the development plan, is a major achievement of British colonial administration. A new plan for economic development, announced by the British in 1955, mainly complemented the British effort to crush the Greek Cypriot armed revolt, and achieved little success.

The Cypriot economy grew despite the political turmoil of the early 1950s, but understandably stagnated during the armed confrontation of 1955-59. **Construction** boomed in 1950-56, both because there were urgent needs for housing, but also because of the British **construction of military installations** after the decision to develop Cyprus as a major base. The biggest growth was recorded in Nicosia, Limmasol and Larnaca.

When the island became independent, the Cypriots enjoyed one of the highest per capita incomes in the Eastern Mediterranean, second only to that of Israel. However, a constant pattern involved the **concentration of wealth mostly to the Greek Cypriot community**: Greek Cypriot contribution to the GDP and to taxation was far larger than their share in population, while the Turkish Cypriot was lower.

Education

Education was a crucial aspect of Cypriot society, reflecting the dynamism of specific social groups, the rise of nationalism, and finally the potential for social mobility.

Greek Cypriot education had gone through painful ordeals since 1931, but the restrictions had relaxed during the war. The colonial authorities had managed largely to control primary, but not secondary education. **The number of students boomed in the early post-war period.** In primary education, the number of pupils rose from 38,562 in 1938-39 to 67,591 in 1961-62; by 1961 half the pupils were women. In secondary education the rise was more impressive: the number spiralled from 4,692 in 1938-39 to 21,301 in 1959-50, while the percentage of women students rose from 19.5 to 37 percent. **This reflected new demands for knowledge and social mobility as well as for a new place of women in Greek Cypriot society.**

Teachers were politically active. In the 1940s, the Pancyprian Organization of Teachers came under the influence of AKEL; later on, when Greek Cypriot politics became polarized, the union split, first in 1945 and then again in 1948, when the majority of teachers condemned the communist revolution in Greece and set up a rival organization. In 1953 a unified body, the Pancyprian Organization of Greek Teachers (**POED**), was formed, and was followed by the **Organization of Greek Functionaries of Secondary Education (OELMEK).**

Turkish Cypriot education was less developed: according to the 1960 census, 26.2 percent of Turkish Cypriots never attended school, whereas the figure for the Greek Cypriots was 18.6. However, the

percentages of Turkish Cypriots attending secondary education or universities were similar to those of the Greeks. In the Turkish Cypriot side a number of younger people who were educated in Turkey became prominent by the second half of the 1940s and played an important role in the development of Turkish nationalism.

The social and political polarization of the 1940s

Cyprus in 1945

The Cypriot experience during the Second World War was significant on many levels. The mobilization of Cypriot society, the participation of many Cypriots in the war and the renewal of political activity ended a period of repressive rule following the 1931 revolt, and created a completely new setting.

After 1945 the Greek Cypriots expected that their old aspiration for Enosis would be met. However this did not take place because British strategic interests were now transferred to the Middle East, in which the island held an important position. **This steadily led to a constant confrontation between the Greek Cypriots and the colonial authorities, and then (in the 1950s) with the Turkish Cypriots.** The primacy of the Greek Cypriot demand for Enosis turned the question of the island's future status into the major issue of Cypriot public life, and meant that **political and social developments, as well as political cleavages were developed in interrelation with this emerging conflict.** This is why it is difficult to treat Cypriot internal political or social developments, and the evolution of the Cyprus question as completely watertight departments.

The road to the Greek Cypriots' disillusionment about British intentions was painful and bitter. On 25 March 1945, during the celebrations for Greek independence, two Greek Cypriots were killed in clashes with the police. In October 1945, the Greek Cypriot demand for the demobilization of Cypriot troops led to further clashes, in which a Greek Cypriot soldier was killed. At the same time, the presence in Cyprus of many Jewish immigrants whom the British strove to prevent from moving to Palestine, also created tension between the colonial authorities and the majority community, who suspected that London aimed to keep these people in Cyprus in order to alter its demographic reality.

AKEL's dominance in Greek Cypriot politics, 1945-47

The communist-led AKEL (Rehabilitation Party of the Working People) was the major Greek Cypriot political force. Founded in 1941, its political support grew rapidly thanks to the able leaderships of Ploutis Servas and then of Fifis Ioannou, but mostly because of its **organizational structure and its ability to mobilize social forces and develop trade unionism.**

AKEL caused significant discomfort to the colonial authorities: it was a communist-led party which in 1946 proclaimed as its aim the building of a socialist society; at the same time, in the climate

of Enosis expectations, it also made clear that it would work for the union of Cyprus with Greece. **Thus, the British were faced with a movement that, apart from well-organized, was both communist and Enosist.** AKEL's lead in trade unionism and in the projection of the demand for the demobilization of Cypriot soldiers also disturbed the colonial authorities. In July 1945 the AKEL-dominated Pancyprian Trade Union Committee (**PSE**) was banned; its leader, Andreas Ziartides, and 17 members were convicted for conspiracy to overthrow the regime in December 1945. PSE was replaced by the more dynamic Pancyprian Federation of Labour (**PEO**) in 1946. These AKEL-dominated organizations were by far the strongest in the Cypriot trade union movement. They also were one of the few social activities where **Greek - and Turkish Cypriots worked together:** by 1958 and despite the communal strife, about 3,500 Turkish Cypriots were members of PEO.

AKEL's major political victory came in the municipal elections of May 1946. The party's candidates prevailed in all major cities, including Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and even Nicosia, where the major figure of the Greek Cypriot Right, Themistocles Dervis (the leader of KEK) was defeated by the independent Ioannis Clerides who was supported by AKEL.

The polarization of Greek Cypriot politics, 1945-47

AKEL's predominance alarmed the Greek Cypriot Right, at the same time when the eruption of the Greek civil war increased tensions in the island (**see below**). In rural Cyprus the Greek Cypriot Right remained stronger than the Left. However, the Right, divided between many (often antagonistic) parties and organizations, seemed unable to assume the initiative.

By autumn 1946 this balance was disturbed by the British decision to retain the sovereignty of Cyprus. Following this decision, the British announced their intention to introduce a colonial Constitution in Cyprus. In the road to a liberalization of Cypriot public life, the colonial authorities abolished the 1937 legislation which prohibited the holding of elections for a new Archbishop of Cyprus. The exiles of 1931 were allowed to return, and Bishop Makarios Myriantheos of Kyrenia thus came back to Cyprus (Bishop Nicodemos of Kition had died in exile). In June 1947 Bishop Leontios of Pafos was elected Archbishop, with the support of AKEL. Immediately afterwards, Leontios came into a difficult position, when AKEL announced its participation in the Consultative Conference which the new Governor, Lord Winster, called; this was strongly renounced by the Greek Cypriot Right. However, Leontios died a month later; his successor was the Bishop of Kyrenia, who became Archbishop Makarios II; he was elected mainly with the support of the Right. In the following months, **the Ethnarchy and the Church took the lead in resisting participation in the Consultative Assembly and in denouncing AKEL for its decision to participate.** In the Ethnarchic Council of Makarios II AKEL was not represented. At the same time, new Bishops were elected, the more prominent among them being the young Bishop of Kition, Makarios (later Archbishop Makarios III). By late 1947 **the polarization of Greek Cypriot society between Left and Right was complete.**

Social unrest, 1948

By 1947-48 the internal Cypriot conflict occurred on many levels – political, social and within the Greek Cypriot community. AKEL participated in the Consultative Assembly, and was denounced by the Right for its “co-operation” with the British. However, AKEL strongly asked for the introduction of self-government, which the British were not prepared to concede.

This covert AKEL-British confrontation was also reflected in industrial relations. **1948 was a year of large strikes**, first the long strike of the miners of the Cyprus Mines Corporation (the workers were both Greek- and Turkish Cypriots), then of Cyprus Asbestos and finally of construction workers in the main cities. AKEL-led workers sought, among others, wage increases, an eight-hour working day and fourteen days’ holiday per year. **This AKEL campaign caused the reaction of the colonial authorities, who responded with police action and repression, but also of the Right:** at a moment when the effects of the Greek civil war were mirrored in Greek Cypriot society (**see below**), the Right, the Church and the right-wing SEK trade unions also confronted the strikers. Disturbances lasted for several days and clashes were frequent between strikers and their Greek Cypriot opponents.

The strikes of 1948 have remained in the memory of left-wing Greek Cypriots as an indication of a de facto and “unholy” alliance between the British and their right-wing opponents, who, ironically, at the same time were denouncing AKEL for its readiness to discuss the British constitutional offer.

Cyprus and the Greek civil war: the peak of the political polarization of the Greek Cypriot community

The polarization of Greek Cypriot politics, the strong disagreements over the British constitutional offer and the social tension of these years interplayed with the effects of the Greek civil war. At a time when Greece’s fate seemed to hang in the balance, in a conflict between communist and non-communist forces, **Greek Cypriot politics mirrored this cleavage**. Indeed, the confrontation during the strikes of 1948 became even more tense and relentless because it was seen as a Cypriot reflection of the Greek internal conflict.

The Greek Cypriot Right, already alarmed by AKEL’s ascendancy, rallied to the support of the anti-communist Greek regime. While denouncing the British effort to introduce a colonial Constitution, **the Greek Cypriot Right also gave its priority to the “anti-communist struggle” both in Greece and in Cyprus**. Small numbers of Cypriot volunteers joined the two camps of the civil war. On its part, AKEL undertook to print Greek Communist Party (KKE) publications and campaigned in favour of the release of political prisoners in Greece.

These led to a deep social cleavage, especially after the declaration of an **“economic war” between**

the Right and the Left in 1948. Supporters of either coalition avoided to purchase goods or employ the services produced or offered by the “other” side, while social and athletic clubs were split between right- and left-wingers. Right- and left-wing Greek Cypriots went to their “own” shops, coffee-houses or taverns, thus creating a social divide which went far beyond the political sphere. In a small society such as that of Cyprus, this relentless everyday confrontation had long-term divisive consequences.

Another unfortunate incident involved the **effort to transplant patterns of anti-communist violence from Greece to Cyprus.** In Greece, the Cypriot-born former Colonel of the Greek army, Georgios Grivas, had led an anticommunist organization, X, during the occupation; after 1945 he tried to organize a political “Party of X”, which became notorious for its anti-communist paramilitary groups. In 1948 members of the X Party made their appearance in Cyprus and tried to organize similar anti-communist violence. This effort was resented by the British authorities who managed to neutralize it, but left even more bitter memories in the minds of the Greek Cypriot leftists, which would prove important in later stages, when Grivas assumed other roles in the island.

AKEL at a cross-fire, 1948-49

The centre of political activity in 1948 was the British constitutional offer: this would largely determine the patterns of the future. AKEL tried to facilitate a major change in Cypriot public life, by asking for a Constitution which would provide for a measure of Cypriot self-government, namely, the creation of a sector of the government under Cypriot control. On their part, the British offered a Greek Cypriot elected majority in the Assembly but refused to concede self-government; thus the Greek Cypriot left was obliged to reject the offer. They had discussed the British proposal (and were denounced by the Right for doing so) and had been let down by the British. In turn, the British, who had been challenged by AKEL-led strikes and had faced the party’s rejection of their constitutional proposals, now **had the pretext for adopting harsh measures against it**, mostly under a new Governor, Sir Andrew Wright.

Moreover, the Greek Cypriot leftists were let down by their Greek comrades as well. In December 1948 AKEL leaders (Fifis Ioannou and Andreas Ziartides) visited the Greek Communist Party (KKE) leader, Nicos Zachariades, in war-torn Northern Greece, and asked for advice. Zachariades **severely criticized the Cypriot leaders for their readiness to discuss constitutional development under British “imperialist” auspices.**

Following this, AKEL reverted to the “Enosis only” line. This already was a major defeat for AKEL, which **appeared to succumb to the line of the Ethnarchy and the Right.** In March 1949 Fifis Ioannou was replaced as Secretary-General by Ezekias Papaioannou. However, this change of policy led to a severe internal crisis in AKEL which also contributed to its relative decline in the following years.

AKEL was facing multiple dead-ends: its moderate stance in the Consultative Assembly had been rebuffed by the British (who were now pressing the party), had caused strong attacks by the Ethnarchy for “betrayal” of the national cause, and had been criticized by its brother party in Greece.

The resurgence of the Greek Cypriot Right, 1948-49

AKEL's problems allowed the Right to step forward. The Greek Cypriot Right benefited from the British anti-communist repression, as well as from the fact that its own line of rejecting the British constitutional offer had prevailed.

In the May 1949 municipal elections, **AKEL lost ground for the first time since its foundation** in 1941. The elections were marked by violence between supporters of the Left and the Right. The largest cities were evenly divided between Left and Right, contrary to 1946, when AKEL had prevailed in all of them. Most importantly, Nicosia reverted to the control of the Right: KEK leader Themistocles Dervis won the municipality, whereas his old opponent, Ioannis Clerides, who had disagreed with AKEL's change of policy, was not supported by the left-wing party which preferred to put forward the candidacy of trade unionist Ziartides.

The resurgence of the Greek Cypriot Right was completed later in the year. The victory of the anti-communist camp in the Greek civil war was an important psychological boost for the pro-western forces in Cyprus, and a big disappointment for AKEL supporters. Furthermore, the Right now managed to impose its line of "Enosis and only Enosis" on the national issue, and to assume the initiative in promoting this policy by organizing the Greek Cypriot plebiscite of January 1950. Further developments in the early 1950s would contribute in the Right's domination of Greek Cypriot politics.

Developments in the Turkish Cypriot community

The development of Kemalist modern Turkish nationalism had started in Cyprus in the inter-war years, but was accelerated in the 1940s. In 1943 **the Turkish Cypriot community became organized, through the setting up of KATAK**, an organization for the projection of Turkish Cypriot views, and then of a Turkish Cypriot party (**KMTHP**) under Fazil Kuchuk.

The development of modern Turkish nationalism among the Turkish Cypriots was a slow process, and reflected the vigour of the Enosis campaign of their Greek compatriots: the Turkish Cypriots were economically weak; they did not wish to confront the British administration; and they lacked a leading group of intellectuals to cultivate a nationalist agenda.

In the late 1940 younger people, educated in Turkey, filled the gap of a new intellectual-political leadership, and assumed a role in Turkish Cypriot public life; Rauf Denktash is the most prominent of these new men, and came onto the Cyprus scene when he was appointed as one of the Turkish Cypriot representatives in the Consultative Assembly of 1947-48. At the same time, the apparent strengthening of the Greek Cypriot claim for Enosis after 1945 led to a Turkish Cypriot reaction. The Turkish Cypriot community participated in the 1947-48 Consultative Assembly, and (despite their discomfort at the provision which gave the Greek Cypriots an elected majority in Assembly) preferred not to confront the British authorities. However, they also rallied to the British rejection

of self-government: the Turkish Cypriot leadership believed that this would place them under Greek Cypriot rule.

This “loyal” attitude was duly rewarded by the British after the Greek Cypriot rejection of the constitutional offer. The British again saw the Turkish Cypriots as allies in the internal Cypriot context, and tried to approach them. A committee on Turkish Cypriot affairs was set up, with the object of examining Turkish Cypriot demands such as the reorganization of Evkaf, restructuring of education etc. The Turkish Cypriots also approached Ankara asking for support against Enosis.

Internal Developments in the 1950s

Makarios III

Following the death of Archbishop Makarios II, the Bishop of Kition was elected to replace him as Makarios III, on 20 October 1950. In the following decades his charismatic personality would dominate Cypriot history and would make a strong impact internationally. The Enosis movement now had a young and dynamic leader.

Makarios had spent the war years in Athens, studying theology and then law. He had engaged in resistance activities, in centrist (anti-communist) organizations such as the National League of Higher Schools. Contrary to a widespread myth, Makarios was not a member of Grivas' extreme X organization or of the post-war Party of X. After Greece's liberation Makarios went to the US for postgraduate studies, but was elected Bishop of Kition and returned to Cyprus in 1947.

As one of the young leaders of the Church of Cyprus, he became active in Enosis as well as in anti-communist activities. He toured north-western Greece during the civil war, providing support for the Greek army in its struggle against the KKE. In early 1950, as Secretary of the Ethnarchic Bureau, he also became the driving force behind the organization of the Ethnarchy plebiscite in 1950. A charismatic personality and extremely popular, he was elected as Archbishop at a time when the Ethnarchy had started its ascendancy, AKEL was in crisis and the Enosis agenda had dominated Greek Cypriot politics. As Archbishop of Cyprus, he was elected by popular male suffrage. Thus, he combined a strong personality, the Ethnarchic functions and power, and a popular mandate. He emerged as the strongest challenger of British rule and as the main standard-bearer of the Enosis cause. He also pressed the Greek governments to proceed to the internationalization of the Cyprus question through an appeal to the UN, asking for the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Cypriots.

Makarios' Ethnarchy

Makarios actively **restructured the Ethnarchy**, expanded its organizations, and improved its potential for mass mobilization, especially among younger people. By 1953 the Ethnarchy was a **rising force** in Greek Cypriot society.

Under Makarios, the organs of the Ethnarchy (the Ethnarchic Council, as a kind of assembly and the Ethnarchic Bureau as an executive body) became more active in the pursuit of Enosis; Makarios' Council and Bureau consisted almost exclusively of laymen. Makarios also called the Pancyprian

National Assembly, another institution which pointed to the popularity and impetus of the Enosis movement. New youth organizations were formed, **OHEN** (Christian Youth) and the Pancyprian National Organization of Youth (**PEON**). At the same time, Makarios remained a “nationalist” (namely, non-communist) leader, deeply committed to the West. At a press conference in London, in February 1953, he stated that “Cyprus belongs to the West”. He also rebuffed AKEL’s offers of cooperation in the pursuit of the goal of Enosis. Last but not least, the new Archbishop defied the sedition laws which the colonial administration enacted early in 1951; this also increased his standing in Greek Cypriot society. Thus, Makarios managed to bring his Ethnarchy to dominate the Enosis movement. Yet, his Ethnarchy was not the declining group of leading personalities of the 1932-47 years. It was **a modern, mass movement, able to draw strength from society**. It was by far the most popular institution of Greek Cypriot society.

AKEL’s internal crisis, early 1950s

As its opponents were regaining the initiative under a strong new leadership, AKEL was entering a deep internal crisis. The party’s defeat in the political processes of 1948 (when the British had ignored its moderate proposals, the Right had accused it of “treason”, and the KKE had criticized it for co-operation with the colonialists) had caused a change of policy in favour of the “Enosis only” line. Early in 1949 a new leadership under Ezekias Papaioannou took over, and supported the goal of a free Cyprus within a free (i.e. communist) Greece. The new leadership denounced the existence of “bourgeois elements” within the party. Ezekias Papaioannou, a veteran of the Spanish civil war, remained Secretary-General until 1988 and left his mark on Cypriot politics.

The 1949 change of policy caused strong disagreements within the party. Ioannis Clerides, AKEL’s most important non-communist ally, disagreed with the new policy. At the same time, a group of AKEL members under the former Secretary-General Ploutis Servas also disagreed and were forced to leave the party early in the 1950s. This split in AKEL also facilitated Makarios’ efforts to dominate the Enosis claim, which was now the central theme of Greek Cypriot politics.

Thus, the resurgence of the Right in 1949, Makarios’ ascendancy and last but not least AKEL’s internal crisis in the early 1950s effected a profound change in Greek Cypriot politics. For the first time since 1941 AKEL found itself clearly in the second place; the banner of the Enosis claim was now at the hands of Makarios and of his new Ethnarchy.

Cypriot politics, 1950-1955

The primacy of the Enosis claim and the successful introduction of mass mobilization politics by Makarios’ Ethnarchy meant that the Right became the dominant force in the Greek Cypriot political scene. Makarios was in a position to ignore AKEL’s pleas for co-operation in the pursuit of Enosis; by doing so, he also provided an “assurance” to the western powers that he remained an ardent anti-communist.

The 1953 municipal elections confirmed the 1949 balance between Right and Left. However, once more Ioannis Clerides was defeated by Dervis at Nicosia; Clerides, with his support for constitutional evolution towards Enosis, was the alternative to the “Enosis only” bid which now was a common aim of both the Ethnarchy and AKEL.

By 1953, the popular protest of the Greek Cypriots against British rule was gaining strength. The British reaction against the Enosis movement also helped Makarios retain the initiative in Greek Cypriot politics by appearing as the main challenger of colonial rule. Moreover, this British reaction proved ineffective, as it rather tended simply to increase Makarios’ standing, while the adoption of stronger sedition laws in August 1954 allowed him to defy them with the British failing to respond.

In the early 1950s the Turkish Cypriots strongly supported the continuation of British rule. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, mainly Fazil Kuchuk, kept their pressure on Ankara to step onto the Cyprus scene and protect their rights. The Turkish Cypriot leadership resented any move towards majority rule, in the form of either self-government or self-determination, and preferred arrangements which would safeguard their position as a strategic ally of the colonial administration.

Greek Cypriot politics in the years of the armed struggle

The start of the armed struggle by EOKA under Georgios Grivas created a new setting in Greek Cypriot politics. AKEL had completely lost the initiative. Moreover, the prospect of armed action under the leadership of the Right frightened the Greek Cypriot leftists, whereas the personality of the EOKA leader and his well-known combatant anti-communism made things worse. Last but not least, AKEL was in favour of the continuation of a peaceful Enosis struggle through mass mobilization, but did not appear to condone an armed confrontation. AKEL leadership denounced “terrorism” in April 1955, but this, in turn, seemed to vindicate Makarios’ refusal to co-operate with the Left in the anti-colonial struggle.

During the Cyprus Emergency (after 26 November 1955) all Greek Cypriot political forces suffered. AKEL was banned in mid-December 1955, its newspaper was closed down, and many of its members were arrested. Makarios’ deportation in March 1956, the arrest of the Acting Ethnarch, the Bishop of Kition and of the Secretary of the Ethnarchy, Nicos Kranidiotis, later in the year, display the strength of British reaction to the challenge. The ban on AKEL, the removal of Makarios and the British all-out campaign against EOKA meant that the Greek Cypriot political process was effectively frozen. In this context, traditional Greek Cypriot representation, such as the elected mayors of the large cities, was marginalized by the ongoing conflict.

Relations between the Ethnarchy and AKEL remained strained, but relations between EOKA and AKEL steadily deteriorated, until they reached a level of crisis in 1958. This referred to the possibility of civil war among Greek Cypriots.

The social impact of the Enosis Struggle – the place of women in Greek Cypriot society

The Greek Cypriot mobilization, mostly of young people (including school students), effected profound changes in society. In the context of an all-out effort to achieve the elusive Enosis, “older” generations, especially people who advocated caution, were put on the margins and were even denounced as friendly to the British. In most cases this was unjust, for these people were not against Enosis; they were simply afraid of the repercussions of a frontal confrontation with London. However, the period of the armed struggle caused a radical renewal of the Greek Cypriot political personnel, bringing to the fore a new generation of leaders, who had assumed important roles in the liberation struggle. Many of Makarios’ close associates in the post-independence period came from the ranks of the Ethnarchy and of EOKA (mostly of its political organizations): Spyros Kyprianou, Glafkos Clerides, Tassos Papadopoulos, Polykarpos Giorkadjis, Vassos Lyssarides, Nicos Kranidiotis. On the contrary, the older political class, including the two “major” political opponents of previous years, Themistocles Dervis and Ioannis Clerides (Glafkos’ father) were marginalized, especially after independence.

The anti-colonial struggle also became a turning point for the position of women in Greek Cypriot society. Some Greek Cypriot women (mainly of the upper class) had enlisted during the war; but now women participated in the liberation struggle in a scale of mass mobilization. In February 1956 a “women’s department” was organized in EOKA. Their role in the organization and support of the EOKA struggle was a strong statement of their demand for full participation in post-colonial public life. In Makarios’ first government after independence, Stella Soulioti assumed the Ministry of Justice, while other Greek Cypriot women assumed positions of influence and power in the following decades.

Education and the anti-colonial struggle



Student uprisings: the Battle of the Pancyprian Gymnasium

During the Cyprus revolt in 1954-59, **the schools became a hotbed of the Enosis struggle**; Greek Cypriot students of secondary education took part in demonstrations against the colonial regime, manned the EOKA organizations and some of them lost their lives, such as Petros Yiallourous in February 1956. Teachers were arrested or dismissed from their employment by the colonial administration. The British authorities also responded by closing down many gymnasia. A constant aim in British constitutional planning in those years

(though it was not made public) was to assume control over secondary education; the 1956 Radcliffe constitutional proposals provided for sectors for inter-communal education, and in 1957 the Colonial Office drafted a plan for the control of secondary education.

Under the 1959 Zurich-London agreements, which also outlined the basic principles of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, **education was a communal affair**, and was subjected to the competence of the communal Chambers. No inter-communal educational structure was established. In 1959 a Greek Educational Council was set up, with the object of reorganizing Greek Cypriot education. As a cultural issue, education in both communities continued to be influenced by developments, respectively, in Greece and Turkey.

Turkish Cypriot demands, 1955-59

If the resurgence of the Enosis claim after 1945 led to a nationalist reaction among the Turkish Cypriots, the emergence of EOKA and the start of the Greek Cypriot armed struggle led them to mobilize even further and in specific directions.

The Turkish Cypriots were instrumental in pressing Ankara to step onto the Cyprus scene, but during the 1950s they followed consistently Ankara's lead (contrary to the Greek Cypriots who repeatedly confronted Athens). In 1954 a British report noted that the Turkish Cypriots were lacking social and economic dynamism; economic might had concentrated in Greek Cypriot hands, and the Turkish Cypriots were finding it difficult to compete with the Greek community in the post-Ottoman context of a western administration and a free economy.

Thus, the Turkish Cypriots resented any move towards majority rule and opted to follow Ankara's lead. EOKA's emergence alarmed the Turkish Cypriots: regardless of EOKA's assurances that they would not be harmed, they were convinced that the Greek Cypriots were out to expel them from the island. The Turkish Cypriot leaders embraced the Turkish position in 1955 that the status quo should be upheld and that the island should "revert" to Turkey in case of a change of status. In 1956 they accepted Ankara's preference for partition, despite the fact that this solution would entail extreme hardships for them as well. In 1957 they also followed Ankara's lead in demanding the setting up of separate Turkish municipalities in the major cities. Early in 1958 they revolted against the British under the instructions of Ankara, and in mid-1958 they initiated communal strife again following orders by Turkey.

Turkish Cypriot armed organizations and the 1958 communal strife

Turkish Cypriots were recruited by the British in the police and the "Auxilliary Police", and this contributed in increasing tensions between the two Cypriot communities. However, in the second half of the 1950s, initially as a response to EOKA but later as a tool for the attainment of partition, a new paramilitary organization of the Turkish Cypriot community emerged. By late 1955 a Turkish Cypriot clandestine organization, "Volkan" appeared and was active in 1956. In 1957 the TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization) emerged, organized by Turkish army officers. TMT was the spearhead of the Turkish Cypriot violence in 1958. The all-out effort to attain partition also signalled the ascent of

the new nationalist Turkish Cypriot leaders, such as Denktash.

The Turkish Cypriot violence of early 1957 was extremely effective and alarmed the British, who realized that they had become dependent on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots regarding the internal security of Cyprus. Mostly, the communal strife of 1958 was a landmark in inter-communal relations. Confidence was shaken and mutual insecurity prevailed. These would prove important in the road to the post-independence crisis of 1963.

Cypriot politics during the transitory period, 1959-60

The conclusion of the Zurich-London agreements in February 1959 set Cyprus on the road to independence. In April 1959 Makarios and Kuchuk appointed the Cypriot members of the Transitional Committee, a kind of provisional government. In summer a Makarios-Grivas dispute over the implementation of the agreements was contained, also thanks to the support that the Greek government offered to the Archbishop.

AKEL denounced the 1959 agreements as an imposition of a settlement by the imperialists, but appeared ready to work under the new independence regime. The party was legalized at the insistence of Makarios early in December. The Turks were in favour of keeping AKEL illegal, but Makarios and the Greek government stressed that the Karamanlis-Menderes “gentlemen’s agreement” provided that the “Communist party” would remain banned: this was the KKK which had been banned in the 1930s; technically, AKEL was not the “Communist Party”.



Signing of the London-Zurich Agreements

In December 1959 presidential elections were held. Kuchuk was proclaimed Vice-President unopposed. On 13 December Makarios was elected, receiving almost two-thirds of votes. He prevailed over Ioannis Clerides, a figure of the old political class, who was supported both by AKEL and Grivas’ followers. Following its defeat at the presidential elections, AKEL changed course and sought to cooperate with the Archbishop and President-elect.

The first elections for the House of Representatives were held on 31 July 1960. Makarios’ “Patriotic Front”, which now included AKEL candidates, easily prevailed in the Greek Cypriot side.

Challenges in the implementation of the new regime

By 1959-60 the new Cypriot independence regime had to be prepared in a background of multiple

anxieties and mistrust between many of the protagonists of the Cypriot scene. The most important obstacle was the apparent lack of mutual confidence and the prevalence of mutual insecurity between the two major communities in the island. The Greek drive for Enosis and the Turkish drive for partition had divided them, while the Turkish Cypriot communal violence of 1958, which had claimed many lives, had resulted in creating a huge rift between them. Things became even more difficult after the Deniz incident in autumn 1959 and following the failure of the Turkish Cypriots to obey Kuchuk's appeal for the surrender of illegal arms. The apparent strengthening of Rauf Denktaş within the Turkish Cypriot community also pointed to a potentially disruptive tactic on his part after independence. Denktaş slowly emerged as a potential challenger, within the Turkish Cypriot community, of the "older" people like Kuchuk. Last but not least, there were important questions to be settled between Greek- and Turkish Cypriots regarding the implementation of the new Constitution, such as the provisions for the quotas in the civil service and the army, or separate municipalities.

However, previous Greek Cypriot cleavages had not disappeared during the anti-colonial struggle; in a sense, they became even deeper. The mistrust between Left and Right, and the legacy of the EOKA-AKEL conflict in 1958 remained. These were also complemented with the resentment of many older political figures who saw EOKA's "youngsters" by-passing them and posing as Makarios' Ministers. Last but not least, a new cleavage appeared in 1959, between the supporters of Makarios (including most of the prominent EOKA leaders) and of Grivas, regarding the 1959 settlement and its implementation. The dawn of independence was for Cyprus an era of hope and of great challenges.

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CHAPTER 08

**Cyprus, 1960-1974:
internal developments**

G e o r g e A . K a z a m i a s

Aims

This chapter aims to present the early history of the Republic of Cyprus. Created through a *sui generis* process (independence had not been among the objectives of the armed struggle and the rules governing its existence had been produced outside Cyprus), the new state was born and operated in a strange environment. The international stage (the Cold War was in full swing) was also an important factor in internal developments. All this together in the context of the events described in previous chapters created an unstable political scene. A number of challenges to the new state from home and abroad (and often simultaneously from both) came almost immediately to the fore. Structural weaknesses compounded the local problems. The efforts of the international community added another factor, sometimes stabilising, sometimes not.

After studying this chapter, students will be able to:

- Have a general overview of the political history (including party formation and election history) of the Republic of Cyprus between its creation in 1960 and the Turkish invasion in 1974 (the latter is dealt with in a separate chapter);
- Have examined the more important problems and challenges the new Republic faced and the way(s) by which it tried to overcome them;
- Will be able to see the effects of these events for later developments;
- Will be able to understand the efforts the international community made to solve the Cyprus problem.

Keywords

- 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyp.
- Intercommunal clashes
- UNFICYP
- Acheson Plan
- “National Front”
- («Ευκταίο και εφικτό»)
- Intercommunal talks
- “13 points”
- Turkish Cypriot enclaves
- Πενταμερής Διάσκεψη
- Kofinou incident
- “Desired” and “Achievable” outcome
- EOKA B

Introduction

When the Republic of Cyprus was formally created in August 1960, the future was certainly not cloudless. The last Governor himself had voiced these concerns in his valedictory speech. As is obvious from even a casual reading of the Constitution, the new Republic of Cyprus had a difficult and somewhat irregular creation. The irregularities were mainly in three areas: (a) the way its constitution was devised (b) the philosophy behind the constitution (c) the incompatibility of the outcome of the anti-British struggle (independence) with the long-term aspirations of the Greek majority of the inhabitants of Cyprus (union with Greece) amounting to a limited legitimisation of the Constitution in the eyes of the majority community and an ambivalent attitude towards it for the Turkish Cypriots.



First meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers

In normal circumstances a democratic state's constitution is the result of the internal balance of political power and should reflect the values and choices prevalent in a given point in time. A constitution is normally agreed by the political parties represented in parliament and draws its inspiration from earlier forms of related constitutional texts (either produced locally or in other political entities). Rather than being the product of the interaction of the political

and social forces in both the majority and the minority populations, the constitution was drafted by experts and agreed by the guarantor powers, each with different briefs. The overall framework within the experts had to work was indeed described by the Zurich and London Agreements.

Every Constitution includes checks and balances, to ensure fairness. The 1960 Constitution provided strong safeguards for the Turkish Cypriots who were elevated from the status of a minority to this of a constituent community and armed with the means to make sure that their rights (as defined in the Constitution) would be respected, even to the detriment of the functioning of the Republic itself: separate electoral rolls, separate state offices reserved for each community, separate vetoes for the leaders etc are some of the examples. Many in the Turkish Cypriot community saw the 1960 constitution and its provisions as the minimum they were entitled to. On the other hand, the checks and balances included (mainly to protect the minority community) were seen by many in the Greek Cypriot community as fetters, in a constitutional agreement that was imposed on the will of the majority. The constitutional 'fetters' imposed on the Greek Cypriot majority were not easy to bear. Multiple layers of checks and balances could be used to delay, hinder or stop decisions deemed to be harmful to the interests of each of the two largest communities. Hindrance and delaying tactics were a fertile breeding ground for frustration.

Fetters aside, the Greek Cypriot community also had to face a sense of failure, since independence had never been part of the demands of the anti-British struggle. Thus in the eyes of the Greek Cypriot community both the solution (independence) and the means to safeguard it (the Constitution) lacked the necessary legitimisation to make it immediately acceptable. Indeed, part of the Greek Cypriot

community believed that independence was only a stage on the road to Union with Greece. Given the beliefs and the dynamics of the recent past, this view was shared by at least part of the political elite of the community, both old and new.

Independent Cyprus was really a compromise solution between the opposing Greek Cypriot demand of *Enosis* (Union with Greece) and the Turkish Cypriot counter-demand of *Taksim* (division of the island between Greece and Turkey); despite the constitutional prohibition of both Union and Partition as options, independence was seen by many in both communities as a compromise, essentially a half way house. With the coming of independence, neither community abandoned its original aims. Both communities saw (and described) themselves as Greek or Turkish, and thus the policies of the respective motherlands (as well as local tensions) were also a factor in events in Cyprus.

Fracturing in the political field was also an issue. President Makarios was the undisputed political leader of the Greek community (and from independence onwards the easily recognisable public face of Cyprus. General Grivas, the undisputed EOKA leader had left Cyprus at the end of the anti-British struggle (but had naturally maintained an active interest in the developments on the island); the General's views often diverged from those of President Makarios.

At the lower level (in government, parliament and society at large), a very sizeable part of the new people in politics were former EOKA activists, a fact that gave them a ready-made support network and a measure of independence from state structures. The (often but not always) divergent views between President Makarios and General Grivas, allowed for a measure of fracturing among the former EOKA men (evident as early as the first presidential and parliamentary elections).

Fracturing was much less an issue in the Turkish Cypriot community. It was much smaller (under a fifth of the total population of Cyprus) and its political leadership had much closer relations with Turkey (which also exercised a closer control over it). Any dissenting voices were soon silenced and a greater degree of discipline imposed, leaving it was much less politically divided, at least openly.

Thus, attitudes on both sides of the divide were far from conducive to the compromises and trade-offs required to make any new state function effectively. It could therefore be argued that both sides used the early years of the Republic as a testing ground for some cooperation and for testing the new environment. On the other hand it is true to say that the Constitution included many features that encouraged division. All these were combined with the fears (real or perceived) created within the Turkish Cypriot minority by the exit of the British from the administration of the island; the aims and objectives of the respective motherlands (Greece and Turkey); and (for at least part of the Greek side) the quest for a solution that would radically alter the agreements on which the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus was laid. If one adds the (real or perceived) geostrategic value of Cyprus and the tensions and fault-lines caused by the Cold War, what emerges is a very complex picture. It is within this complex picture that the Republic of Cyprus was founded and invited to face the realities of the day during the period 1960 -1974.

The Constitution, the common state and the communities, 1960-1963

The early years (between the proclamation of independence in August 1960 and the breakdown of December 1963) is sometimes seen through rose-tinted glasses, as a golden period of bi-communal cooperation. However, one could argue (and research seems to indicate so) that there are alternative interpretations to this that appear better grounded on the historical facts of the case.

Among the problems of the new state was finding suitable **personnel**. The 1960 Constitution provided quotas (70% Greek Cypriots, 30% Turkish Cypriots; the quota was 60:40 for the Cyprus Army) for government positions. From the beginning, the filling of these positions was made a major issue, particularly since it was part of the spoils of power, with the generous salaries and the job security it offered. In some cases the educational requirements were low; filling the posts of soldier or even non-commissioned officer in the Cyprus Army should not have been difficult. However, some of the posts had to be filled by persons with educational or professional qualifications and these were not always available in the small Turkish Cypriot community. In addition, choice of personnel on the basis of ethnicity or religion was seen as creating inequalities. Delays to fill the posts (mainly for lack of suitable Turkish Cypriot candidates; 18% of the population had to provide personnel for 30% of government positions) caused staffing problems and considerable suspicion, the latter to the Turkish Cypriot community and leadership. What is more, the Turkish Cypriot side claimed that the quota had to be applied to all positions, including Committees and Councils, as well as to professional associations. Official Turkish Cypriot protests were voiced in the House of Representatives in December 1961 and this issue was mentioned, among others, to justify the negative Turkish Cypriot vote in the discussion for the 1961 Budget Law. The quota in public service staffing was not reached by the end of 1963 and the issue left pending, given the different views of the two sides.

There were also other dividing issues at hand. The London and Zurich Agreements had provided for **separate municipalities** for the Greek and Turkish Cypriot quarters of the major cities in Cyprus. Initially a British idea put forward during 1958, while the EOKA struggle was ongoing, the separate municipalities had been included in the agreements. However, the mixed-membership committee that had been created to set the municipal boundaries had failed to reach agreement. The Turkish Cypriots claimed for the Turkish municipalities areas that were of significant economic or strategic value despite the fact that the inhabitants were Greek Cypriots. *Ex post* interpretations attribute to the Turkish Cypriot side the strategic aim of creating, where possible, self-sustaining enclaves, with access to the sea or in control of main roads. Since the general philosophy of the constitution was against mixed institutions, Greek Cypriots refused to come under Turkish Cypriot municipal administration.

Compromise proposals submitted by President Makarios on 10 February 1961 were received favourably by Vice-President Kutchuk. However, a month later (on 10 March 1961) the Turkish Cypriot Members of the House of Representatives voted against the Law Regarding Taxation, essentially imposing a veto, since taxation legislation required separate majorities in the House for its adoption. The justification they put forward for their negative vote was not that they disagreed with

the contents of the taxation law, but mainly because the 70:30 staffing quota for Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots in public service had not yet been achieved. This move led President Makarios to refuse the legality of the existence of separate municipalities; in turn the Turkish Communal Assembly passed legislation founding separate municipal institutions. The Council of Ministers (where the Greek Cypriot members had the majority) annulled this legislation and the Turkish Communal Assembly took the issue to the High Court. In the end, both legal acts (the Turkish Assembly legislation and the act of the Council of Ministers) were declared void, leaving the issue unsolved.

The question of taxation has already been mentioned previously. In this (and in the separate majorities required for the passage of such legislation in Parliament) lies part of the blame for the decisions that led to the breakdown of the common state. Tax Laws and the Budget had to be agreed (otherwise the state would collapse) but the Turkish side used its constitutional position to block their passage, using it as a negotiating tool for concessions in other issues. On 1st April 1961, faced with a dead end, President Makarios transferred competence for taxation issues to the Greek Communal Chamber, calling income tax a 'personal contribution'. The High Court confirmed the legality of this move (the Chambers could levy contributions from the members of their Communities), and the Turkish Chamber followed suit. The issue was certainly very serious and President Makarios put it to Ismet Inonu, the President of the Republic of Turkey, in his visit at Ankara in November 1962. The answer he was given was that the question of the separate municipalities had to be solved first. It should be noted here that according to the available evidence, because of the disparity in population size and the difference in wealth between the two communities, settling of the issue of taxation would have significant advantages for the Turkish Cypriots: compromise proposals put forward in the course of the discussions offered 25% of the tax revenue to the Turkish community. In the overall climate of evolving crisis, the proposals were rejected.

The Cyprus Army was another bone of contention among the two communities. The 2000-strong army, with 60% (1200) Greek Cypriots and 40% (800) Turkish Cypriot, would be trained by Greek and Turkish officers seconded from the respective countries and staffed by Greek and Turkish Cypriot officers. It was lightly armed and of a mainly ceremonial nature (though defence and the maintenance of internal order in cases of trouble was in theory part of its remit). The Turkish Cypriot side was very much in favour of its creation and development, since it would solve the problem of unemployment among the Turkish Cypriots who had been recruited as auxiliaries in the anti-EOKA fighting. For President Makarios such an army was an expensive, unnecessary and unwanted luxury. Differences arose in relation to the character of the units to be formed. The Turkish side wanted it ethnically segregated from company level and down. The Greek side wanted an army of mixed units. A decision of the Council of Ministers in favour of the latter (in March 1961) was overturned by the Vice President but reaffirmed by the House in October 1961, at which point Dr. Kutchuk formally vetoed it. The issue of the Cyprus Army was brought up again in the discussion of the Budget at the end of 1961 and again in 1962; no solution was reached.

Makarios' 13 points

By 1963, the dysfunctional nature of the 1960 Constitution was evident and President Makarios was actively seeking a solution through constitutional changes that would alleviate the problems and allow the Republic to function effectively. Thus, the Guarantor Powers were sounded on this question (directly in the case of Britain and Greece, indirectly, through the British Embassy in Ankara in the case of Turkey). Ankara had always made clear that it objected to any constitutional change that would alter the balance struck in 1960. Greece also made its objections clear, with a letter that was sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Evangelos Averof (who was also one of the architects of the London and Zurich agreements in the government of Constantinos Karamanlis). However, the Karamanlis government fell in June 1963, a period of instability followed and the elections of 7 November led to a Centre Union government under Georgios Papandreou. Papandreou had in the past openly declared his opposition to the London and Zurich agreements and the 1960 settlement. This and the support of Sir Arthur Clark, the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, led President Makarios to his 13 Points proposals. Often the responsibility of the British side for this initiative is stressed: Sir Arthur Clark was in favour of constitutional changes and cooperated with the Archbishop in the preparation of the drafts. However, the British side was divided, with the Foreign Office at best sceptical towards the chances of success of the initiative.



The first President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III

On 30 November 1963, the text under the title “Proposals for measures that aim towards facilitating the smooth functioning of the State and the removal of some of the causes of inter-communal friction” was submitted to the Turkish side. As the text’s main thrust were the 13 proposed changes to the Constitution, it became known as ‘Makarios’ 13 Points’. It is correct to say that effort had been made to offer some compensation to the Turkish Cypriot community, but the main content of the text was proposing the abolition of some of the gains the latter had according to the Constitution. Among others, the proposals abolished the right of veto for both President and Vice President (point 1), separate majorities for some legislation in the House (point 5), separate municipalities, the right of Greeks and Turks to be judged by members of their respective communities


(point 7), the limitation of quotas for members of the public service, police and army of the Republic to the proportion of the population (point 10) etc. It should again be stressed that the 13 Points were proposals (the President could initiate a discussion but could not constitutionally impose his or his community’s wishes on the minority) bred from the paralysis caused by the dysfunctional elements embedded in the constitution. This dysfunctionality could perhaps be overcome by the close cooperation of both communities and the respective fatherlands. As we saw, bi-communal cooperation began to fail soon after independence. In Cyprus, frustration became the major influence on both communities. The 13 Points were seen as an attack on the constitutional privileges of the Turkish Cypriot community.

The Turkish side often presents this incident as justification for the events that followed. It should,

however, be borne in mind that the Constitution's character was ambivalent. It included both elements of a unitary state and others stressing its bi-communal nature. Given the choice, each community chose one of the elements. In the Cyprus tug of war, the Turks chose the state's bi-communal nature, possibly as a first step for future moves. An indication is the insistence of the Turkish side on a segregated army and separate municipalities and on their 30% share of the state structures. These would later be supplemented by claims of a third of the area of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots on the other hand chose to support the unitary character of the state, the democratic principle and the right of self determination. Each side rallied around different characteristics. The point of no return was probably the transformation of the political differences to an armed confrontation.

From the outbreak of inter-communal fighting (December 1963) to the end of 1967

On 21 December 1964, a Greek Cypriot police detachment tried to check the contents of a car with Turkish Cypriot passengers; an exchange of fire resulted where two Turkish Cypriots died. This was the pretext for the formal breakdown of the common state: most Turkish Cypriot state employees (the Vice President and Ministers included) abandoned their positions and the Turkish Cypriot community erected roadblocks and closed off the parts of the larger cities that it inhabited; similar developments were also to happen in the countryside, particularly where there were Turkish Cypriot groups of villages that could form a contiguous 'canton' (the word would be used later in connection with attempts to solve the Cyprus problem). Part of Nicosia with a number of Turkish Cypriot villages to its North, the walled city of Famagusta, the area around Tziaos (north east of Nicosia), part of the city of Pafos (the quarter of Moutalos), several groups of villages in the Pafos district, Lefka (close to Morphou), Kofinou (of 1967 fame), the strategically located medieval fortress of St. Hilarion (in the district of Kyrenia) and parts of Larnaca and Limassol, came under the control of the Turkish Cypriots and were closed off. A total of 39 areas in Cyprus (totalling approximately 6% of the area of Cyprus) thus remained outside the control of the Republic of Cyprus and generally inaccessible to the Greek Cypriots from the 1963 clashes until 1974. These areas were defended by Turkish Cypriot fighters and led by Turkish Army officers clandestinely sent from Turkey.



Turkish Cypriot enclaves

It should be noted that there were apparently prepared fixed fortifications along the 'borders' of the Turkish quarters; and preparations (military training, arms stashes and cooperation with Turkish officers in TURDYK – the Turkish Force in Cyprus and others seconded to the Cypriot Army, at the time still under formation) had apparently been prepared well in advance of the crisis. Thus the word pretext seems to be the most appropriate for the incident of 21 December 1963 that

led to the separation of the two communities.

On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot community had also made its preparations, though both the scale and the plan (if indeed there was one) are still contested. Greek Cypriot groups had formed

in anticipation of an internal crisis or even an armed intervention from Turkey. Given the right of separate intervention of all three Guarantor Powers, the numerical inferiority of the Turkish Cypriots and the geographical proximity of Turkey to Cyprus, the latter was far from impossible to envisage. Small defence groups had been forming, sometimes in a quasi-spontaneous way, for some time; often part of the initiative is attributed to mid-ranking political figures, with close ties to higher ranking political personalities, such as Polycarpus Georgadjis, Vassos Lyssaridis and Nicos Sampson. By far the largest such organisation was EOK (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion- Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων) led by Polycarpus Georgadjis, the Minister of the Interior. This organisation aspired to bring under its control all individual groups (with some success); its strength is difficult to calculate, but a figure of approximately 5.000 appears close to the truth. Despite its numerical strength, the Greek Cypriot community had serious (according to the sources) deficiencies in arms and the training levels and discipline of the irregular bands were uneven.

Polycarpus Georgadjis and others are often attributed with the ownership of the so-called Akritas Plan; it is correct that a document signed by 'Akritas' (an alias for the unnamed leader; the original use of the term describes a type of frontier guard, defending the borders of the Byzantine Empire) does exist; however, this was much more a political document describing a way out of the developing political crisis in 1963 Cyprus, than a plan for the slaughter of the Turkish Cypriots (as sometimes claimed). A last question is what was the attitude of the Greek Cypriot community to this development. The answer is still unclear. The contents of the 'Akritas plan' seem to indicate a readiness to accept the separation: in the context of 1963, this is relatively easy to explain, given the circumstances of 1963. Independence was a compromise, unwanted by many. At the same time, considerable frustration and mutual distrust was bred by what was seen as the negative Turkish Cypriot attitude towards the functioning of the common state, the privileges accorded to the Turkish Cypriots by the Constitution, and the demands -seen by many Greek Cypriots as excessive- the latter community was making on the majority. In the context of an era where the democratic principle was accorded a hallowed place and self-determination was the byword of the day in all the colonial possessions, given the significant numerical preponderance of the Greek Cypriot community, what existed in Cyprus looked like an unreasonable fetter on the exercise of the right of self-determination of the majority population (and therefore Enosis). The rest was left to the extremist elements in both communities, who provided the pretexts, the responses and the necessary ingredient, violence, political and other.

The response of the international community was relatively swift, in part due to the existence on the island of a well organised armed force. Initially the British Army assumed the role of peacemaker and armistice-keeper. However, the early attempts to stabilise the situation, either by means of contacts between President Makarios and Vice-President Kutchuk, failed. An armistice on 25 December (in which both the British and the US ambassadors were involved) also failed. On 26 December, while Turkey was threatening intervention to protect its compatriots in Cyprus, an agreement was signed that provided for the "Green Line", the division of Nicosia into Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot sectors. The division has persisted to this day. British Army forces (the British Truce Force) interposed themselves among the opposing forces beginning on 27 December 1963, until the end of March 1964, when it was replaced by the multi-national United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). This force (still in existence) was also to become one of the most long-lived UN operations.

The result of the above was a curious and uneasy situation of neither war nor peace. The enclaves controlled by the (self-proclaimed, officially at end of 1968) 'Turkish Cypriot Administration' were further strengthened, both in fortifications and population. The latter was achieved by the transfer of Turkish Cypriots from mixed villages or from areas where the Turkish population was small and the villages difficult to defend. The enclaves ran a siege economy, funded mainly by Turkey. Movement in and out of them was controlled on both sides, but the Turkish Cypriots could leave them to work their fields and continue their activities. The Republic of Cyprus forces (initially irregular, semi-irregular until June 1964 and regular army from this point onwards) kept guard on the Turkish enclaves and imposed and enforced an embargo on trade with them (mainly materials that could be used for fortifications but also petrol, chemicals etc). However, the Republic continued for example to provide electricity (though no payments for its cost were made) and to pay pensions to the Turkish Cypriots; on a local level cooperation between producers did continue. At times, throughout the period to 1974, an outwardly peaceful facade did appear to exist. However, the regular threats of invasion from Turkey (in the summer of 1964 an invasion was averted only through a strongly worded letter from the US President Lyndon Johnson) and the lack of complete control of the armed forces on both sides meant there was always a possibility of a local flare-up.

Such flare ups did happen: between January and August 1964, battles took place, among others, in Agios Sozomenos (close to Nicosia), Limassol, Pafos, Mallia (in the Limassol District) and the Pentadaktylos Ragne. In August 1964, attempts by the Turkish Cypriots to enlarge an area under their control in the north west of Cyprus (in the area of Mansura-Kokkina, in Tylliria) resulted in full scale battles and a napalm bombardment of the area by the Turkish Air Force. This was far from unexpected: in March 1964, the Parliament of Turkey had empowered the government to invade Cyprus, even at the risk of causing a generalised Greek-Turkish war. As a result of these events (but probably also for other, politically motivated goals) the Greek government secretly decided to send to Cyprus additional military forces. In 1964, the Georgios Papandreou Government decided to send 2000 military personnel (additional to the Treaty-sanctioned 950-strong ELDYK force). Probably at the initiative of then Minister of Defence, Petros Garoufalias, the force quickly grew to division strength (approx. 10000 officers and men). This move was primarily an effort to bolster the defence of Cyprus against a projected (and often threatened) Turkish invasion. The presence of the Greek Division (ELDYK-M) had a deterrent value, was a strong morale-booster for the Greek Cypriots and significantly altered the balance of forces in Cyprus, attempting to minimise the strategic and tactical advantages of Turkey. It is, however, also possible that there was an element of assuming effective control of part of the events in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot National Guard (under formation since June 1964, eventually coming under the leadership of General Georgios Grivas, the military leader of the 1955-59 struggle against the British) had the enormous task of bringing under control all armed groups and organising the defence of the island. To this effect a Higher Military Command for the Defence of Cyprus was created, under whose command all the Greek division could, in the meantime, make sure no faux pas or deliberate provocation (political or military) threatened the internal peace in Cyprus and by extension, the peace in the wider eastern Mediterranean. The overall balance sheet of military forces in Cyprus in the mid-1960s was therefore not unimpressive: a Greek-Cypriot National Guard (strength: between 8000 and 11000) faced the Turkish Cypriot Fighters (conscripted

for 4 years and reaching a reported strength of approx. 11000); the treaty forces of ELDYK (Greek, strength 950) and TURDYK (Turkish, strength 650); the Greek Division (strength almost 10000); and between the two sides, 6000 UN forces spread all over the island. Cyprus was really a place d'armes, as initially envisaged by the British planners before its acquisition, in 1878. Unfortunately, these numbers would be exceeded once more in 1974.

The quasi-peace lasted until November 1967, when an incident again brought Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to the brink of war. Kofinou, a Turkish Cypriot enclave, was sited on a strategically important section controlling the main road between Nicosia and Limassol. Local provocations led to a prolonged crisis in the summer of 1967; an escalation, which in turn led to an operation by the National Guard to clear the enclave. The military part of the operation was a success; however the heavy loss of life on the Turkish Cypriot side (22 dead, against one on the Greek side) allowed Turkey to send an ultimatum demanding, among others, the removal of both General Grivas and the Greek Division from Cyprus and the disbandment of the National Guard. The international community (led by Britain and the US) put pressure on the Greek side to comply; General Grivas left on 19 November and the Greek Division followed in December 1967; the National Guard was not disbanded, as President Makarios insisted this could only be done as part of a general demilitarisation of Cyprus. By this time, the altered situation in Greece (where a military junta had taken control following a coup on 21 April 1967) and the developments in Cyprus also signpost an official change of policy as regards the 'ultimate goal' of the Greek Cypriot controlled government of Cyprus.

The Greek junta had from the start of its time in office shown unusual activism as regards the Cyprus Question. The colonels' belief was that they could have a quick success in direct negotiations with Turkey. They proved highly deluded, with limited understanding of both international and regional affairs. An attempt in December 1967 (a meeting on the Greek-Turkish border) ended in a fiasco. Nonetheless, the Junta did advance the theory of the 'Ethniko Kentro' (Athens, as the 'National Centre' of Hellenism should be given the main say regarding issues in Cyprus, as they could involve Greece into major international issues and even lead to war).

In Cyprus, the new developments led to President Makarios proclaiming a radical change in policy. In a public speech in January 1968 he declared that union with Greece would not cease to be the desired outcome for the Greek Cypriots (το ευκταίον); however, this goal was no longer achievable, and therefore the community should now concentrate on the achievable goal (το εφικτόν), i.e. retaining and strengthening the independent state. This new set of ideas, though it was realistic, would deepen the divisions within the Greek Cypriot community to the borders of an all out civil war.

A solution for the Cyprus Problem? International efforts, local application

The intervention of the international community to stop the violence was not limited to the creation and operation of UNIFICYP.

The London Conference was convened between 15 January and 10 February 1964; in its course the

British side proposed: an international peacekeeping force for Cyprus; the transfer of approx. 4.700 Greek Cypriots and 14.000 Turkish Cypriots, so as to limit the number of mixed villages; the creation of wider administrative areas for Greek- and Turkish Cypriot villages; and the replacement of the Presidential with a Parliamentary system of government. The rejection of the proposals by President Makarios led to a US initiative, the so-called Ball Plan. Named after the US Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, George Ball, the plan provided for a 10.000-strong NATO peacekeeping force (1.200 of them would be Americans) that would come to Cyprus for three months. During this time, the Guarantor Powers would undertake not to exercise their intervention rights (during this period Turkey was threatening invasion); the Commander of the NATO force would be getting his orders from a London-based committee of representatives from the countries that would contribute contingents to the force. A European mediator would in the meantime prepare proposals for a political solution.

President Makarios rejected the Ball Plan, opting instead for the establishment of a UN Peacekeeping force. The UN, following the Republic of Cyprus' appeal, UN Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964, which affirmed the sovereignty to the Republic of Cyprus and led to the formation of UNFICYP.

The next major initiative was the so-called Acheson Plans, submitted in the course of the summer of 1964. Once more a US initiative, the Acheson Plans came after the failure of the US to persuade Greece to negotiate directly with Turkey and were the result of the need to avert a threatened Greek-Turkish war over Cyprus. Such a war would cause major problems, and could lead to the collapse of the SE wing of the NATO Alliance. Operating from Geneva, Acheson worked closely with representatives of the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, focussing on a solution that both sides could interpret as needed: for the Greek side (including the Greek Cypriots) the solution had to be seen as bringing Enosis; for the Turkish side (including the Turkish Cypriots) it had to be seen as Partition – Double Enosis (i.e. union of parts of Cyprus with the respective motherlands). The general shape of the proposed solution would be for most of Cyprus going to Greece with a base (with sufficient area) given to Turkey. The trick was balancing the demands of the two sides as regards the size and the status of the Turkish base. The first plan provided for the cession of the Karpasia peninsula to Turkey as a sovereign base area and special semi-autonomy status for the Turkish Cypriots (in areas where they were the majority) and a Turkish administrative authority with responsibility for local matters in Greek majority areas. A special UN Commissioner would act as a further safeguard. This plan was rejected by the Greek government, which refused to accept the transfer of sovereignty to Turkey. A revised Acheson Plan where the Turkish base was given on a 50 year lease was rejected by both Greece and Turkey.

With the crisis continuing (August 1964 was the time of the Tylliria clashes and the Turkish Air Force bombardments), in September 1964 the UN Secretary-General U Thant, appointed the Galo Plaza, a former (1948-52) President of Ecuador as UN mediator in Cyprus. The Galo Plaza report in March 1965, reflected the position of the two sides in Cyprus, proposed negotiations between the sides to reach a solution and noted that the demands of the Turkish side for a federal solution -that would entail geographical separation of the communities- could not be applied in Cyprus, because of “the island-wide intermingling in normal times of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot populations” [Galo Plaza Report, para. 150].

The suggestion of the Galo Plaza Report for direct negotiations between the opposing sides in Cyprus was followed up in 1968, resulting in the long drawn out (they lasted from 1968 until 1974) inter-communal negotiations. Initially involving representatives of the Greek- and Turkish Cypriots, they were later (from June 1972) enlarged to include constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey. The negotiations made some progress (particularly after they were enlarged), but the main stumbling block (the issue of municipal autonomy) proved hard to surmount. They were interrupted by the coup against President Makarios and the Turkish invasion that followed on 20 July 1974.

Persons, parties and elections, 1960-1974

As a new, post-colonial state, the new political scene in the Republic of Cyprus had its individual characteristics. Some were shared by other new states, others were particular to Cyprus. Parties in Cyprus throughout the period from 1960 up to 1974 were more in the form of groupings around individual figures. The only exception was the communist AKEL, the longest-living and best-organised political party in the pre-independence political scene. As it has failed to support the EOKA-led struggle, AKEL was initially a loser in the division of political power: it found itself in a quasi-wilderness in the transitional period leading to the proclamation of the Republic. Its consolation was the fact that the gentlemen's agreement between Karamanlis and Menderes concerning anti-communist action was never implemented in Cyprus, allowing it to function freely and participate fully in parliamentary and local politics; at the same time, its sister parties in both Greece and Turkey fare far worse.

The first **presidential** elections took place on 13 December 1959, just over 8 months before the formal establishment of the Republic. The candidates were Archbishop Makarios, Primate of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, Ethnarch and paramount political figure in the Greek Cypriot community. He was supported by a wide coalition of supporters under the name of EDMA (Ενιαίο Δημοκρατικό Μέτωπο Αναδημιουργίας- Unitary Democratic Regeneration Front), that had been formed in May 1959. He was opposed by the lawyer Ioannis Clerides (father to Glafkos Clerides, later President of the Republic). Clerides was supported by a coalition made up of AKEL and right-leaning groupings of anti-Makarios (and anti-independence) activists. Roughly two thirds of the vote (66,85%) went to Archbishop Makarios, with Clerides getting 33,15%; interestingly, Glafkos Clerides supported Makarios' candidacy against his father. Though AKEL quickly abandoned its ephemeral allies as early as the first parliamentary elections that followed, it was still viewed with some suspicion by the new political establishment, dominated as it was by former EOKA members and supporters. What the results showed was an early rift in the Greek Cypriot electorate, a rift that existed from the start of the Republic of Cyprus.

Since the electorate was divided according to ethnicity (Greek Cypriots elected the President, Turkish Cypriots the Vice-President) there was no question of joint tickets or electoral cooperation between the communities. In the Turkish Cypriot Community, only one candidate came forward, Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, who was proclaimed Vice President unopposed, without an election.

The first **parliamentary** elections took place two weeks before independence, on 30 July 1960. Three political parties contested the elections: the Patriotic Front (Πατριωτικό Μέτωπο), a pro-

Makarios grouping of personalities (Glafkos Clerides, Lellos Demetriades and Vassos Lyssarides were all members of the Front), the communist AKEL and three candidates running under the umbrella of the Pan-Cyprian Association of [EOKA] fighters; there were also 5 independent candidates. As the electoral system chosen was first-pass-the post, the Patriotic Front and AKEL formed an electoral pact whereby 30 (of 35) seats in Parliament were allocated to the former and the remaining 5 to the latter. This in effect meant that no other political group elected a candidate in the first Parliament. The Turkish Cypriot community (again voting from a separate electoral roll) elected 15 candidates, all from the Turkish National Party.

The next elections, both Presidential and Parliamentary, did not take place due to the irregular circumstances in Cyprus following the collapse of the common institutions in December 1963. Repeated postponements led to extensions in the President's as well as to the Parliament's term. Presidential elections took place in February 1968 with two candidates, President Makarios and the psychiatrist Takis Evdokas. The anti-Makarios forces were crushed, with Makarios getting 221.000 votes, or 95,45% of the total vote. There were allegations of wrongdoing by Makarios supporters (some of them most probably true) but the clear overall victory of the incumbent cannot be put into doubt. The next elections (the last before 1974) took place in February 1973; by this time Greek Cypriot politics were highly polarised; General Grivas (already at the head of EOKA B') called for abstention; no candidate other than Makarios came forward and he was elected unopposed.

Parliamentary elections delayed even longer: after 1960, elections took place on 5 July 1970 (almost a decade after the election of the first Parliament!). In the meantime, the political scene had altered radically. With the Patriotic Front long dissolved, in the period from May 1968 to February 1969, five new parties were formed. In May 1968, Takis Evdokas founded the Democratic National Party (Δημοκρατικό Εθνικό Κόμμα); it was the only party that officially opposed President Makarios. In February 1969, four parties came into existence within a few days. On 5 February, Glafkos Clerides, Polycarpos Georkadjis and Tassos Papadopoulos founded the Unitary Party (Ενιαίο Κόμμα), aspiring to succeed the defunct Patriotic Front. The same day, Vassos Lyssaridis founded the United Democratic Centre Union (Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Ένωσις Κέντρου - EDEK). On 7 February Nicos Sampson founded the Progressive Party; and the next day Odysseas Ioannidis and Andreas Azinas announced the Proodeftiki Parataxi (Προοδευτική Παράταξη - Progressive Front). All except EDEK were rightist in character; the multitude of parties vying for the same shade of the electorate together with the electoral system (again first-past-the-post) meant that electoral pacts were encouraged: AKEL and EDEK formed one. The election results gave 15 seats to the Unitary Party, 9 seats to AKEL, 7 to the Proodeftiki Parataxi (an alliance of the party of the same name and Sampson's Progressive Party), 2 seats to EDEK and 2 to independents. It is, however, notable (and indicative of the atmosphere of the time) that the abstention rate was 24%: almost one in five voters chose not to vote.

Violence and counter-violence in the Republic

Violence breeds violence; and in the Greek Cypriot community, incidents of violence were present almost from the beginning. They were in part a result of the (inevitable) power vacuum left by the

handover of power from the British to the Cypriots. The new state had to be staffed (and the prime candidates were in the first instance the persons who had fought against the British in the 1955-59 struggle). However, in all levels (and, it should be noted, in both communities) changes, at times painful, had to be made. What is more, the political personnel in both communities had to learn from scratch the art of governance, now without the mediating influence of an external power. This unrestrained exercise of power was a heady wine.

Conditions in the Turkish Cypriot community cleared relatively early. Unity was effected by the extremists, using violence and even murder. On 26 April 1963, two journalists, both from the moderate Turkish Cypriot daily *Cumhuriyet*, were murdered. Ahmet Gurkan and Ayhan Hikmet were voices in favour of moderation, who had announced revelations in their paper of extremist actions. Their murder silenced them. Later on (in February 1973), the extremists' control was made even more evident by the ease by which Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, the long term leader of the Turkish Cypriot community was replaced in power by Raouf Denktash, (a prominent figure in the extremist camp).

In the Greek community the basic division had to do with the person of the President of the Republic and the issue of Enosis. Though the latter was a goal explicitly shared by all political forces (at least until early 1968), there were from the very start voices denouncing the Zurich agreements (and independence) and asking, with lesser or greater strength, for the quick realisation of Enosis. Therefore, moves that were seen (or could be interpreted) as 'delaying action' diverting from the quickest road to Enosis, bred suspicion of ulterior motives and in some cases violence. As President Makarios was the clear and (largely) uncontested master of both the political scene and the state apparatus, all attention (and suspicion, where there was) focussed on him and his supporters. On the other side, the anti-Makarios forces were essentially excluded from mainline politics (by means of the electoral system but also as a result of the close control of the state resources by the Government), leading to a polarisation of society and ultimately to violence. It should be noted that the above statements do not automatically accept the interpretations of actions either side advanced or the allegations levelled. It is a simple fact that societies in crisis do not always act (or think) rationally. And the Republic of Cyprus found itself in a long drawn out crisis almost from the beginning of its existence.

Signs of rifts within the Greek Community became evident in the first elections, even before independence. Attacks against journalists in April 1960 were certainly politically motivated, as were the murders, in 1961 of three prominent members of a pro-Grivas group, who were agitating for immediate actions to bring about Enosis. The inter-communal clashes had a unifying effect (the hatchet was buried for the duration) but the advent of the junta in Greece and the period of relative calm in Cyprus brought the divisions to the fore again.

The first attempt to destabilise President Makarios with the use of violence was in the spring of 1969, when an organisation calling itself *Ethniko Metopo* (Εθνικό Μέτωπο – National Front) was formed. Based mainly in Limassol, the National Front first issued proclamations targeting close associates of the President (among them Glafkos Clerides) and later by bombs placed at the houses or offices of the persons it had targeted. The National Front was made illegal on 28 August 1969 but on 23 May 1970 it staged an impressive raid, occupying unopposed the Central Police Station in Limassol (it almost

certainly had 'insider' assistance), disarming the police officers and driving away with a large amount of arms and ammunition. However, it fell prey to its own success: the perpetrators were quickly found and arrested, most arms were recovered and in the trial that followed 21 of its members were given prison sentences; all were set free shortly after, with a presidential pardon in January 1971.

Undoubtedly, the most significant actions of this period were an attempted murder and a murder. On 8 March 1970, President Makarios was due to go to the Monastery of Machairas, for the memorial service for Grigoris Afxentiou, a hero of the 1955-59 struggle. As there were reports that an ambush would be staged against his car on the way to Machairas, he chose to go by helicopter. The presidential helicopter lifted off from the courtyard of the Archbishopric in Nicosia, but an armed group had set an ambush on the roof of the Pancyprian Gymnasium, just opposite. They opened fire against the helicopter and hit it, but the pilot, Zacharias Papadogiannis, managed to land it in a nearby vacant plot despite the fact he was seriously wounded. Makarios walked out of the helicopter unharmed. The perpetrators (some of whom were associates of Polycarpos Georkadjis) were arrested, tried and given prison sentences. Again they were set free with a presidential pardon.

The murder of Polycarpos Georkadjis that followed is probably the most notorious unsolved political murder in the history of post-independence Cyprus. Georkadjis had been Minister of the Interior (and probably the most influential person in Cyprus after Makarios himself) from 1960 until 2 November 1968. What led to his downfall was his involvement with Alexandros Panagoulis, an anti-junta Greek who had sought refuge in Cyprus, from where he had returned to Greece with a Cypriot passport that Georkadjis had provided. On 13 August 1968, Panagoulis had attempted to assassinate Georgios Papadopoulos, then strongman of the Greek junta. The attempt failed, Panagoulis was arrested and his links with Cyprus (and Georkadjis) were revealed. A few months later, Makarios at the request of the junta asked Polycarpos Georkadjis to resign. This led to a deterioration of their relations, to such an extent that after the assassination attempt of March 1968, Makarios ordered a search of Georkadjis' house. A week after the attempt against Makarios, and after he had unsuccessfully tried to leave Cyprus, Polycarpos Georkadjis was murdered by persons unknown, in a quiet spot close to Nicosia, where he had gone for a meeting. The murder was never solved. While contemporary sources sometimes tried to lay the blame at the feet of persons close to Makarios, more recent accounts seem to point towards Dimitrios Papapostolou, a mainland Greek Special Forces officer and associate of Dimitrios Ioannidis, then Head of the notorious Greek Military Police and later strongman of the junta; according to some sources, Papapostolou may also have been involved in the attack against Makarios.

By far the greater challenge to President Makarios was the formation, on 26 October 1971, of EOKA B'. Formed by General Grivas and using in part personnel from the first EOKA, the organisation made itself known by means of proclamations. The name of the leader was its most important asset: Grivas had very considerable political capital both for his anti-British actions and later, during his tenure as military chief in Cyprus (1964-1967). He had arrived in Cyprus secretly, on 31 August 1971, and spent the first few months for the formation of EOKA B', securing arms and recruiting cadres. What followed were demonstrations in favour of Enosis and the direct action. Direct action included arms thefts (in particular a large arms stash was formed after a theft from a National Guard camp

in Trikomo), bombing campaigns (including one against the Limassol Central Police Station, when part of the station building was demolished) etc. In an impressive operation (timed to coincide with the end of the period for submitting candidacies for the Presidential election), on the night of 7-8 February 1973, EOKA B' members simultaneously occupied 21 police stations, disarmed the police and left with the arms and blew up three police stations. During the same period, EOKA B' abducted Christos Vakis, the Minister of the Interior (on 27 July 1973; he was released on 27 August) staged an unsuccessful attempt against President Makarios (on 7 October 1973, in the village of Agios Sergios, in the district of Famagusta). A plan for a coup that was drawn up was not put into effect.

An indication of the peculiar climate in Cyprus at the time is the fact that the activities of EOKA B' were publicly condemned by Georgios Papadopoulos, the junta leader on 27 August 1973, but the organisation itself was not declared illegal until April 1974, well after the death of Grivas (in January 1974).

Parallel to direct action there were some suggestions to politicise EOKA B'; though discussions took place among its members, they came to nothing; in any event, given the strength of pro-Makarios support in Cyprus (it is safe to say that Makarios never lost the support of the vast majority of Greek Cypriots), it is doubtful if politicisation would have had any success. An attempt to find a political solution to the crisis by means of a face to face meeting of Makarios and Grivas in Nicosia in March 1972 also came to nothing.



Efedriko men in operation

Given the strength of feeling on both sides of the rift and the fact that at least part of the police apparatus was apparently unreliable and taking into account the 'distancing' of the National Guard leadership from Makarios' government (the junta had already been assuming direct control of the Army), there was the problem of how to combat EOKA B'. The solution Makarios selected was the formation of the Police Tactical Reserve (Εφεδρική Τακτική Μονάς) better known as the "Efedriko" or "Epikouriko" (both terms indicate the 'reserve' element in the title of the unit). Staffed by hand picked Makarios loyalists and directly responsible to him, the Efedriko was several hundred men strong and took over the task of anti-EOKA B' operations. With a climate of latent civil war developing, atrocities of lesser or greater extent (ranging from car bombings to beatings

of opponents to murders) were committed by both the loyalists (Makariakoi) and the pro-Grivas supporters (Grivikoi), the latter represented by the EOKA B activities, as described above. However, it is notable that both sides tried to limit the scope of their activities and avoid causing casualties. The total number of deaths attributed to EOKA B is probably under 15; the number of dead supporters of EOKA B' is probably even smaller than that. Cases taken to trial, ended with relatively light sentences. No death penalty was imposed even in cases of political murder trials. Those condemned for political crimes benefitted from presidential pardons three times between January 1971 and January 1973.

Probably the most traumatic action on the part of the Makarios government was the deep rifts caused

by the violence and counter-violence, as well as by the government purges of the public service, by which public employees suspected of anti-government activity (in some cases: anti-government feeling) were either denied promotion or in some cases fired, without given a fair trial or allowed to present their defence. Though at the time these actions were deemed necessary as part of the defence of the state against those seen to conspire against it, there is no doubt that the means employed put further stress on the society.



EOKA B strike against the Kokkinotrimithia police station (April 3rd 1973)

The same was true for another attempt to destabilise Makarios, the so-called ecclesiastical coup. On assumption of his duties as Head of State, Makarios had also retained his ecclesiastical office. On 2 March 1972, the three bishops holding the Metropolitan Sees of Pafos, Kitium and Kyrenia invited him to choose either one of the two offices (and thus either resign the Presidency or the Archbishop's position), quoting Canon Law. A war of opposing interpretations ensued, with no clear winner. The crisis spread causing a schism in the Orthodox Church of Cyprus: in places the local Christians were split between followers and opponents of Makarios, with either side attending a different church with different clergy, loyal to one or the other side. On 7 March 1973, the anti-Makarios metropolitans took the unprecedented step of deposing him from his post. In response to Makarios' request, on 14 July 1973, a Major Synod (composed of Heads of

neighbouring Orthodox Churches) convened in Cyprus and in turn deposed the three metropolitans. Though swift action ended the crisis, the schism itself took much longer to heal.

On 27 January 1974, General Georgios Grivas died of an existing heart condition. The death of such a prominent figure could offer a way out of the crisis. The House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus that had earlier asked for the condemnation of the use of force, now passed a resolution declaring the deceased "worthy of his fatherland, Cyprus" («άξιον τέκνο της ιδιαιτέρας αυτού πατρίδος Κύπρου»). Two days later, the interim leader of EOKA B' announced the cessation of its activities.

Illogical as it may appear, Grivas' death resulted in a worsening of the situation. Grivas had been the undisputed leader of EOKA B'; with his authority gone, the organisation soon disintegrated in feuding groups. The interim leader was sidelined by Ioannidis (by then in full control of the Athens junta) and EOKA B' came under the complete control of Athens. In April 1974 it resumed its activity. Security Forces operations in the period up to the July coup, led to the capture of major figures in EOKA B and even of part of its archive. By July 1974, EOKA B was but a shadow of its former self and close to disbandment. It is indicative of this condition that the coup itself was planned and staged by National

Guard units, with minimal involvement of EOKA B (though its members did take part in activities after the coup had prevailed).

Denouement: the short road to Coup

The last crisis before the Coup took place in June 1974. The pretext for the crisis was the selection process for the reserve (warrant) officers of the National Guard. This was clearly a pretext: the main



Assassination attempt against President Makarios in Aghios Sergios (October 7th 1973)

issue was (and had long been) the question of control of the Army. Dimitrios Ioannidis, strongman of the Athens junta since 1973, wanted to keep the National Guard under his control and use it to exert pressure and even topple Makarios when the moment was ripe. To this effect he was using mainland Greek officers: as there were not enough Greek Cypriot officers, even for the lower ranks of the officer corps and as there were very few officers of suitable seniority for the higher ranks, mainland Greek officers staffed the majority of positions in the

National Guard. Greek Cypriot warrant officers filled the slots of platoon leaders in the units. As these positions were sought after, both the political leadership in Cyprus and the National Guard Command (at this point: men selected by Ioannidis) wanted to keep the selection process for themselves. Generally only right-wing anti-Makarios conscripts would be selected for the warrant officer posts. The crisis developed into a direct clash between Ioannidis and Makarios, with the Government Spokesman in Cyprus levelling direct accusations that the Athens junta was directing EOKA B' activities. When President Makarios brought to the Council of Ministers a proposal to cut the national service period from 24 to 14 months, the clash became inevitable. It was clear that the proposal was aimed at cutting down the size of the National Guard, to a point where it would require far less officers; a smaller army would require far fewer officers from Greece and therefore the influence of the junta would diminish considerably. Of course, fewer men under arms also had security aspect: the strength of the National Guard would go down to approx. 5000 men, a number that according to some sources would be inadequate even for the task of manning the posts around the enclaves. However, at this point it seems this was the lesser danger.

The decision to limit the size of the National Guard was announced to Athens in a letter from Makarios to Gen. Phaidon Gizikis, at the time holding the post of 'President of the Republic of Greece'. The letter included a formal request for the recall to Greece of the mainland Greek officers of the National Guard. In an unprecedented move, the full text of the letter was also released to the press in Nicosia, on 6 July 1974. This move was designed to force the hand of the junta; it did so. The head-on clash that followed led to the coup that deposed President Makarios on 15 July 1974.

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CHAPTER 09

**The 1974 coup and
the Turkish invasion**

G e o r g e A . K a z a m i a s

Aims

After studying this chapter, students should:

- Have a general overview of the events unfolding in Cyprus, between 15 July and the end of August 1974
- Be able to understand the military and political effects of the Athens Junta Coup for Cyprus, the Turkish invasion, and its consequences for the island.
- Be better equipped to understand the changes happening in Cyprus and on the Cyprus problem, described in subsequent chapters.

Keywords

- President Makarios
- Coup
- Sampson
- Invasion
- Nicosia airport
- Ceasefire
- Geneva Talks
- Geneva Declaration
- Geneva Talks (continuation)

The 1974 coup

Introduction

The 1974 coup and the two-part Turkish invasion that followed it are probably the two most important events in the post-independence history of Cyprus. Traumatic as they are, they serve as the cause of a radical reorientation of the Greek-Cypriot political life and the gradual creation of a party system that, in its general outline, has endured well into the 21st century. The two events are also the beginning of a long struggle for the formulation of a new solution to the Cyprus problem and are followed by a most remarkable and highly successful effort at economic reconstruction that has brought Cyprus “from rags to riches” and into the EU, within three decades of a major military, social and economic disaster.

Coup deposes President Makarios

The coup that began around 0800 hrs on the morning of 15 July apparently took President Makarios by surprise. Though some measure had been taken to ensure the security of the Presidential Palace (including disarming the National Guard Commando contingent that was the ceremonial guard at the Place), expectations for a full-blown daylight coup were apparently limited. Some of the National Guard camps where units expected to be used in a coup were indeed watched during the night, but the watchers were withdrawn before 0800 hrs.



The Presidential Palace
in ruins

The coup was largely successful. In the capital, stiff resistance was put up in the Presidential Palace, in the Archbishopric (the latter within the medieval walls Nicosia and within earshot of the Turkish quarter) and in the area of RIK (the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation) where the men belonging to the Police Tactical Reserve (*Efedriki Taktiki Monas* - a special unit best known as the *Efedriko*, composed of Makarios loyalists) had its quarters. Nonetheless, by the end of the day the Coup had prevailed in Nicosia. There were some further clashes between Makarios loyalists and the military during the following days, but they were limited. In Paphos, the long time heartland of support for Makarios, loyalists formed a column of vehicles and marched on Limassol. Despite some heavy fighting in the town itself, this force had to withdraw by 0600 on 16 July. By the end of the day on 16 July, the coup appeared to have largely established effective control of Cyprus. Nonetheless a National Guard task force was sent to Paphos to secure the area in the following days. Though no major fighting eventually took place, the movement of forces certainly had an effect on the National Guard dispositions and its capacity to undertake its main task, the defence of the island from external threats.

President Makarios escapes

One of the main aims of the coup was the physical elimination of President Makarios. Indeed, on 15 July, the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC – RIK) that had passed under the control of the military authorities announced that Makarios was dead. However, in this aim, the coup operations were singularly unsuccessful. Despite a strong attack on the Presidential Palace (an attack that was met with stiff resistance), the President escaped from a gully at the back of the Presidential Palace and managed to find temporary shelter in Nicosia, escaping almost immediately to Paphos; from there, later in the day, using the transmitter of Radio Paphos, he made his famous broadcast, announcing he was alive. Not long afterwards, with the active support of the British Government, he left Cyprus through the British Sovereign Bases, going to London (via Malta) and then to New York, where he addressed the UN Assembly. In his subsequent address, among others, he demolished the Greek Junta claims that the coup was an internal matter of the Greek Cypriot community, a reaction to Makarios to which it (the Junta) had no involvement; and denounced the duplicity of the Greek Junta towards himself. More controversially he repeatedly referred to the events as an invasion (“The coup of the Greek junta is an invasion, and from its consequences the whole people of Cyprus suffers, both Greeks and Turks”) and called on the Security Council to “put an end to the invasion and restore the violated independence of Cyprus and the democratic rights of the Cypriot people”. Part of these arguments were later fraudulently used as a pretext to justify its own actions.

Internal developments



Aftermath of the Coup

The escape of the Archbishop did not stop the coup organisers from appointing their own puppet regime. Failure to secure the cooperation of major figures in Cyprus, led the coup organisers to choose Nikos Sampson, a newspaper publisher and former EOKA hit man, and leader of irregular armed bands in the 1963-4 intercommunal clashes. The choice was highly ill-advised: in the subsequent days, though the Greek junta recognised his regime, the Turkish Government repeatedly refused to have anything to do with Sampson, ostensibly because of his role in the 1960s: for the Turks, Sampson was the “butcher of Omorphita”, a Nicosia mixed suburb that his supporters had captured. Despite their declared aversion to Makarios, it is quite possible that the Turkish side would have objected to anyone chosen to head the new “government”; nonetheless the singularly unsuitable choice of “President” by the coup leaders, made it easier for Turkey to denounce the developments and even claim (for a few days) that among its aims was the return of Cyprus to constitutional rule and the restoration of President Makarios.

The talks in London and the international scene

In the meantime, these developments could not fail to attract the attention of Turkey: actions in Cyprus had provided the ideal pretext for the long-planned invasion of Cyprus. Turkey denounced both the coup and the Sampson regime and approached Britain for concerted action of the two guarantor powers in order to restore the *status quo ante* in Cyprus. On 17 July 1974, Turkey and Britain held bilateral talks in London on action on Cyprus. This was a top level meeting (both Harold Wilson and Bulend Ecevit took part) between the British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, the acting foreign minister of Turkey, Hasan Isik, another cabinet minister for each side, as well as a further 15 officials (7 British and 8 Turks, the latter group included two Army generals). According to Bulend Ecevit the minimum Turkish requirement in the future, whatever the status of Cyprus – independent or “whatever other arrangement” – would be to secure access to the sea somewhere near Turkey, which would enable his Government to prevent Turks from dying from starvation as had occurred in the past [TNA, FCO 9/1892, Military coup in Cyprus (Wednesday 17 July), “Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary”, p. 4].

The Turkish side asked for British cooperation to realise these aims, notably asking permission to use the British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in Cyprus for a military intervention. Ecevit further argued that such cooperation would be an all round bonus (the Greek and Cypriot people included): it would justify British military presence in Cyprus, bring back NATO unity in the region and even return democracy to Greece. However, active cooperation with Turkey was too great a step for the British side, which offered instead to mediate and get Greece to the negotiating table. Turkey was at best indifferent to this offer.

What did Turkey secure in the London meeting of 17 July? As stated by the British record, in the course of the meeting

“The Prime Minister [Harold Wilson] said that he understood Mr Ecevit’s remarks as an expression of the Turkish wish that Britain would not blockade an action of the kind contemplated by Turkey, but that they would blockade the Greeks. Mr Ecevit asked if Britain would be ready to do so. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said it was not impossible.” [TNA, FCO 9/1892, Military coup in Cyprus (Wednesday 17 July), “Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary”, p. 12]

Though Britain did not promise help (neither did it later deliver a blockade for or against either side), for the Turkish side this was a clear victory: by its actions, the Colonels’ junta in Greece had sidelined Greece; through diplomacy Turkey had made sure that it would be the only one of the three guarantor powers with a credible pretext and a plan for action in Cyprus.

As far as the superpowers were concerned, a similar situation was developing. The Soviet Union was interested in the events in Cyprus purely as a secondary (or less) theatre in its general policy: a squabble among NATO allies (Greece and Turkey) was a useful tool; and despite former assurances to the contrary, Cyprus itself (and its constitutional status) was not a particularly important to the Eastern Block. Since there was no significant prospect of acquiring Cyprus (the US had made this

clear), the issue was nothing but a pawn in international politics. Though we cannot be certain of actual events until the former Soviet archives are made available to research, it appears that an understanding was reached between Turkey and the USSR, allowing Turkey a relatively free hand.

Likewise, across the Atlantic, with the Watergate crisis unravelling and the effective direction of foreign policy firmly in the hands of Henry Kissinger, there was little prospect of action –neither was there any active interest for action- other than diplomatic. In fact, a few days later (on 23 July) Kissinger told the British Ambassador in Washington that “he would like to procrastinate until he could see clearly how the forces were balanced” [TNA, FCO 9/1898, Washington to FCO tel. no. 2476, 23 July 1974]

Nonetheless, Joseph Sisco, a high ranking US diplomat, was sent by Kissinger to Greece and Turkey, in order to try to defuse the developing crisis. However, he was sent to intervene in the middle of a maelstrom of tension, with no effective means to bring about a solution. The US envoy kept shuttling between Athens and Ankara but was essentially sidelined by Turkey (though after the invasion he did help secure the ineffective ceasefire). In essence, the combination of all the above developments translated to an ‘all clear’ (or at least a tacit acquiescence by the powers that were) for Turkey to proceed with the invasion.

The Turkish invasion

The Turkish invasion begins

The Turkish invasion began on the early hours of the morning of 20 July. The invasion began with the bombing of targets in Cyprus by the Turkish Air Force, the reinforcement of the large Turkish-Cypriot enclave of Nicosia-Agirdha with airborne units and the (unopposed) landing of the first wave of Turkish troops on the beach of Pente Mili, west of Kyrenia.

The Turkish bombing raids were in some cases quite effective. The airborne units dropped in the enclave were mainly aimed at reinforcing it, so that it could link with the advancing invasion forces. The main effort was put on the landing, essentially abandoning the Turkish Cypriot enclaves in the south of the island.

As far as the Greek side is concerned, plans existed that had been carefully prepared and regularly updated exactly for the defence against a Turkish invasion; they were only partially put into effect.



Turkish troops landing in Pente Mili

The beach at Pente Mili, (along with other locations suitable for landing by a sea-borne invasion force) had been identified and static defences had been prepared long before 1974. However, just before the invasion, (e.g. when the invasion fleet was assembling in Turkish harbours or even when it sailed for Cyprus, in full coverage of the international media), no minefields were laid on the invasion beaches (including Pente Mili), nor was any other kind of obstacle erected; military units were put on alert (ostensibly as a precaution), but were not ordered

to move to the areas provided by the plans, even when it was clear that the bulk of the invasion fleet was moving towards Kyrenia or when it arrived a few miles off the northern coast of Cyprus, close to or actually in Cypriot territorial waters. No troops were waiting for the landing of the enemy forces; National Guard artillery units (e.g. in Kyrenia) did not open fire on the invasion fleet; and the prepared static defences were left unmanned.

Meetings of top military commanders did take place on 19 July, with no significant results; and there are instances of units that did leave their camps for their dispersal areas on the night of the 19th July (i.e. before the hostilities began), though more often than not this was done on the initiative of local commanders. A limited call-up of reservists was also ordered on 19 July.

Some of these failures are attributable to the disorganisation caused to the National Guard by the coup: indeed, units had been moved from their base areas for the needs created by the coup. On the whole, considerable gaps have yet to be filled before we can say that we have full understanding of the events.

It is difficult to explain the lateness with which the National Guard leadership gave the order to open fire on the Turkish Forces. Neither can we easily understand the persistence by which this same leadership kept explaining away the movement of Turkish forces as ‘military manoeuvres’, just before



Turkish propaganda poster celebrating the Mehmetcik

(or in some cases: after) the invasion: was this the result of over-reliance on the US, which had, after all sent Joseph Sisco to the region in order to avert the conflict? Or was there an underlying plan for the partition of Cyprus and the ‘solution’ of the Cyprus problem? It should be noted here that Bulend Ecevit, the Prime Minister of Turkey at the time of the invasion and some of his successors have consistently claimed that the invasion and occupation of Cyprus has effectively settled the Cyprus issue.

Scholarly research (as opposed to general publications, sometimes with an element of political bias) has, as yet, been inconclusive on this subject. The uncertainty is bound to remain until all relevant sources (including US, UK, Turkish and Greek such) have been made available to research.

The military situation in Cyprus

Conventional military wisdom has it that in any sea-borne operation the early stages are those when the bridgehead is at its most vulnerable. In Cyprus this was very much the case. Indeed the defence plans drawn up for Cyprus were taking this into account. Greece had earmarked Hellenic Air and Navy forces that were to strike at the landing fleet and the bridgehead. The National Guard had allocated units that would do the same on land. Indeed artillery units at the Kyrenia area were supposed to fire on the fleet as soon as it had entered the territorial waters of Cyprus.

The Turkish army on the other hand had to effect a successful landing; to hold and strengthen the bridgehead; to break out and cross the Kyrenia range, linking with the large Turkish enclave of Nicosia; and see what steps it could take to maintain the numerous other Turkish-held enclaves in Cyprus. The *ex-post facto* examination of the operations shows that the first three were indeed Turkish military priorities, on which the Turkish army concentrated its efforts. The enclaves, particularly those in the south of the island (but also the enclave in Lefka and the large and well-fortified enclave in the walled city of Famagusta) were largely left to fend for themselves.

On the Greek side, the general mobilisation ordered on 20 July, left much to be desired. As was the case with the general mobilisation also ordered in Greece at the time, there were organisational problems, occasional problems of supply and cases where reservists failed to turn up at all at their units. The mobilisation order broadcast on the radio stated that reservists were to present themselves to the unit nearest to their place of residence (rather than the unit they were allocated to) and this probably explains many of the problems. According to the plans, the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves were to be eliminated before the invasion began. However, manpower was used in the effort

to continue besieging and on attacks against the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves throughout the island. While this would eliminate the military threat at the rear of the National Guard, with hindsight it was probably a mistake.

It is true that this effort was largely successful: the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves in Larnaca, Limassol, Paphos and Lefka and many other smaller ones were mostly captured by 22 July. The enclave in Tzaos was partly occupied and even the Kioneli-Agirdha area, within the Nicosia enclave, was seriously threatened by a Greek forces attack (which, however, failed to capture it). The Famagusta enclave also came under strong pressure, but was not occupied. The few enclaves remaining after 22 July (including Kokkina on the north coast of Cyprus and Stavrokonnos in the Paphos area) were of no military significance.

The initial Turkish landing in Cyprus was unopposed. Fighting took place on 20 July and the Greek side mounted a major attack on the evening of 20 to 21 July; however, though it put significant pressure on the invading forces, the attack failed to limit their advance; the landing of the second wave and particularly armoured reinforcements tipped the scales significantly. Further attacks by Special Forces on the fortress of Agios Ilarion (in Turkish hands since 1964) and other sites of military significance were initially successful, but the Greek side failed to retain its initial gains.

Reinforcements from Greece and the Kocatepe incident - Nicosia Airport

According to the defence plans drawn up for Cyprus, Greece had to support Cyprus with air force and navy forces. In one of the confusing moves, two modern Hellenic Navy submarines had been ordered to the area of Cyprus before the invasion. However, despite some controversial reports, they never got within striking distance of the invasion fleet and were recalled before they could play any military role. The Greek side received reinforcements on two occasions during the conflict. The first was the result of initiative shown by a Hellenic Navy captain. Eleftherios Handrinis, the captain of *Lesvos*, a troop transport, had sailed from Famagusta harbour on the eve of the hostilities, carrying about 450 men of ELDYK (ΕΛΔΥΚ-Elliniki Dynami Kyprou, Greek army contingent stationed in Cyprus according to the Zurich and London Agreements and their annexes) that were due to be rotated home. On hearing news of the invasion on the ship's radio, Handrinis entered Paphos harbour, landed the men he was carrying and also used the cannon of the ship to help in the capture of Moutallos, the Turkish-Cypriot enclave in the town. News of the presence of Hellenic Navy ships in Paphos (transmitted to Turkey by the Turkish-Cypriot radio link in Moutalos) subsequently caused an intra-Turkish engagement: a Turkish Navy destroyer, the *Kocatepe*, part of a group of three looking for the Hellenic Navy, was sunk by a direct hit from Turkish Air Force planes (looking for the same target), that mistook it for a Greek navy vessel reputed to be in the area.

Limited reinforcements were also transported from Greece. On the night of 22 to 23 July 1974, a Hellenic special forces unit was flown to Cyprus in fifteen Hellenic Air Force transports that had assembled in Crete. Flying at a low altitude (500 feet above sea level) without navigation lights or

radio aids, 13 of the 15 planes reached Nicosia airport in the early hours of 23 July (the remaining three had to land in Rhodes or return home). However, bad communication with the forces stationed around the airport led to disaster. One of the planes was hit by anti-aircraft fire and crashed (32 of the 33 passengers and crew were killed); a second aircraft was also hit but managed to land, with a further 10 casualties (2 dead and 8 wounded). Two more planes were damaged and were destroyed on the ground later. The remaining 9 planes landed their cargo and returned safely to Greece. The special forces unit was subsequently used to defend Nicosia airport.

On the night of 21 July there was another abortive attempt to reinforce Cyprus from Greece. F/B *Rethymnos*, a fast civilian ferry was commandeered and embarked a Greek Infantry battalion, a company of medium tanks and about 500 Greek Cypriot volunteers (mainly students studying in Athens). On the night of 22 to 23 July, the ship was ordered to alter its course and go to Rhodes, for reasons as yet unclear (a possible explanation is that by then the armistice in Cyprus had already come into effect). On the other side of the conflict divide, Turkey kept sending a continuous stream of reinforcements to its bridgehead, not only during the fighting but throughout the period of the armistice through to the second phase of the operations in August.



Turkish airstrike against the
Nicosia Mental Hospital

A major area of conflict developed around the possession of the Nicosia airport. The Turkish side desperately wanted to gain this very important asset (in 1974 it was the only civilian airport in Cyprus) and put significant effort towards this end. On 23 July the Turkish army mounted a daytime attack against the Greek Forces holding the airport, which ended in complete failure. On the evening of the same day, the airport was handed over to the United Nations Forces; this fact notwithstanding, the mainland Turkish mass media announced the capture of the airport and local UN commanders were told the Turkish Army would move on the airport. After some contacts with the UN and a formal request for reinforcements, James Callaghan sent British Forces from the SBAs (24 July) to join the UN force in Nicosia airport.

As many of the UN forces in the Nicosia Airport were British or Canadian, and as Turkish threats against the airport continued, he was also ready to authorise airstrikes by 12 RAF Phantoms that had been sent from Britain (arriving in Cyprus in the early morning of 25 July), should they be required. In the course of a strongly worded telephone conversation on 24 July, Bulend Ecevit was told that Britain “would not stand by” if UN forces at the airport were attacked by the Turkish Army. For a few hours it appeared Britain and Turkey might go to war, but then Ankara backed down. A few years later (in a 1979 interview) Harold Wilson confirmed the events by stating that Britain and Turkey had been “within an hour of war” with each other. The airport has remained in UN hands since 1974.

Ceasefire

Efforts for a ceasefire had begun almost immediately after the invasion. An initial proposal for a ceasefire on 21 July proved abortive as Turkey refused to comply. Following intensive pressure from

all sides and the direct (through telephone diplomacy) involvement of the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, a formal armistice came into a effect on 22 July at 1400 GMT (1600 Cyprus time). The armistice's main aim was to stop the hostilities in Cyprus and thus avoid an all out war between Greece and Turkey, with all the concomitant problems for NATO's south-eastern flank.



Greek Cypriot POWs return home

The terms of the armistice were flawed (or favouring the Turkish side, depending on the individual viewpoints). The final document agreed did not stop the Turkish army from reinforcing its forces in Cyprus, a fact that essentially altered the balance of power on the island and defined future events. In any event, ceasefire or not, the Turkish Army continued its operations almost throughout the period between 22 July and the second round of the invasion.

Negotiations in Geneva (part I)

Following diplomatic pressure, negotiations started in Geneva on 25 July. The participants were the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan and Foreign Ministers of Greece, Georgios Mavros and Turkey, Turan Gunes. The main aim of the negotiations at this stage was to stabilise the situation in Cyprus, mainly by stopping the fighting; and to prepare the ground for a second round of negotiations that would work towards a new constitutional arrangement that would eventually replace the Constitution of 1960.

The Geneva Declaration

The Geneva Declaration was signed on 30 July 1974, by the three Foreign Ministers (Callaghan, Mavros and Gunes). It provided for a cessation of hostilities, a security zone (width to be determined) between the areas controlled by the opposing forces as of 30 July, the evacuation of the Turkish enclaves held by the National Guard, and prisoner exchange; and declared the readiness of the sides to reconvene on 8 August 1974 to discuss the new constitutional framework for post-invasion Cyprus. The Declaration was a temporary measure, of dubious effectiveness: large and small scale hostilities resumed almost before the ink had dried on the agreement; the situation in Cyprus was far from stabilised; and progress on most of the points agreed was at best slow.

According to the British record of the time, the UK government considered the outcome of the negotiation a success. However, it could only have been a success if both sides consistently abided by its letter and spirit. This would not prove to be the case.

The negotiations for the demarcation of the Ceasefire line

The terms of the Geneva Declaration provided for the demarcation of a ceasefire zone that would create a no-man's-land patrolled by the UN forces. The demarcation would be undertaken by a committee, made up of a Lt. Col. J. Hunter, a British officer, Maj. E. Tsolakis (Hellenic Army and National Guard) and Col. N. Cakar (Turkish Armed Forces). From the start it ran into trouble: the Turkish side delayed appointing its representative; the UN had difficulties providing the necessary support; the Turkish side contested almost every point and in some cases refused to allow local reconnaissance. Nonetheless the committee did make some progress, including reconnaissance on foot and by car and an aerial survey of part of the front. The latter proved quite embarrassing for the Turkish Army: landing in a point that, it was claimed, was behind the Turkish lines, the committee found a National Guard unit; a later search for (and landing in) another point proved elusive. Later Col. Cakar claimed that both areas were under Turkish control because they were within range of Turkish artillery fire.



Life at the refugee camps

The task of the committee was made more difficult by the small and large scale advances the Turkish Army continued to make. Sometimes these led to exchanges of fire in others to retreat by the Greek side. A notable incident on 2 August when a Turkish armoured detachment advanced on Greek positions led to the capture of an M47 tank and an M113 armoured personnel carrier and the destruction of another two armoured vehicles.

However, the large scale Turkish attack against the

towns of Lapithos and Karavas led to their occupation on 6 August 1974. During this period the demarcation exercise almost broke down (the Greek side threatened to leave because of the Turkish violations of the ceasefire) but eventually it appears that the need to have the second round of talks in Geneva (the demarcation of the confrontation line was thought an essential prerequisite for the continuing talks) was deemed more important. Turkish incursions notwithstanding, the committee did compile a map where parts of the line separating the two sides were agreed; in many other cases, the UN and the Greek side agreed, with the Turkish side proposing a different demarcation line.

The continuation of the Geneva negotiations (part II)

The negotiations resumed in Geneva on 8 August; this time, apart from the guarantor powers, Greek- and Turkish- Cypriot delegations also took part. Again, the chairmanship was entrusted to Britain, with James Callaghan taking a very active part. From the start there were problems (including matters such as the name cards for the two Cypriot delegations, an issue raised by Turkey); however, the most

important issue was the intransigence exhibited by the Turkish side: Turkey appeared determined to get a substantial chunk in the northern part of Cyprus, either through the negotiations, or by force. This at times brought Callaghan (as well as the UN Secretary General, Curt Waldheim) close to despair, leading him to intimate on one occasion that the UK and the UN were considering military measures in Cyprus, in order to check the expected Turkish military action. In this context, measures such as interposing UN (and UK) troops between the Greek and Turkish sides in Cyprus were briefly mooted. However, such plans could not be executed without the support of the US; and the US, firmly in the grip of the Watergate scandal and the Nixon resignation, was very reluctant (indeed unwilling) to agree to the use (or the threat of use) of force to stop Turkey. Indeed, according to the published US record, on 13 August he told President Gerald Ford on that “There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus”[Memorandum of conversation between President Ford, Henry Kissinger and Major General Brent Scowcroft, Washington, August 13, 1974, in Foreign Relations of the United States -FRUS, pp. 423-424]. This stance left no room for manoeuvre (and no ‘teeth’) to either Callaghan or Waldheim. US diplomatic pressure (the only kind of pressure the US was prepared to apply) led the Turkish side to propose the “Gunes Plan” (named after the Turkish Foreign Minister) which provided for an agreed division of Cyprus (it provided for a large Turkish canton in the north and several smaller ones in the south of the island), largely along the lines of the percentage division later enforced by Turkey.


The collapse of the second round of talks

Despite desperate attempts to keep the negotiation alive, the crisis came on the early hours of 14 August 1974. Turkey had already moved very substantial military assets in Cyprus; despite a general mobilisation in the wake of the invasion, Greece (where the Junta had fallen and Constantine Karamanlis had become Prime Minister) was powerless to intervene in Cyprus, to counter the Turkish threat. No significant international reaction was on the air: the USSR was not offering any reaction and the US stance remained limited to diplomacy, imposing a similar role on the UK. In essence this amounted to another ‘all clear’ for Turkey to resume its operations. In the early hours of 14 August, Callaghan asked the delegations if they would be willing to resume negotiations after a 48 hour break; Greece and the Greek Cypriot Delegation accepted; Raouf Dentash, leader of the Turkish Cypriots replied he would come if Turkey came. Turan Gunes did not respond. By this time the codeword for the second phase of operations (“Aishe can go on holiday”) was already given; in Cyprus the engines of the Turkish tanks could be heard warming up.

The second phase of the invasion

The second phase of hostilities began on 14 August, with a major attack (including tanks) on the eastern part of the front, near Mia Milia. That section was defended by the Tasos Markou detachment, an assortment of infantry units with very limited anti tank capability. With no substantial heavy arms or armour backup, facing strong Turkish units and with the air dominated by the Turkish Air Force,

the struggle of the National Guard Forces in the area was heroic but doomed, almost from the beginning. The attack began in the early hours of the morning of the 14th. The front broke during the same morning, allowing the Turkish forces to advance in the Mesaoria plain, where the possibility of resistance was limited. The main axis of attack was eastwards, towards the town of Famagusta, with subsidiary axes towards the enclave of Tziaos and the airfield of Tymbou. The National Guard Forces deployed (the order applied for most parts of the front) were ordered to retreat, keeping contact with the enemy. In some instances the order was interpreted in a *sauve-qui-peut* spirit: some units retreated in panic, abandoning their positions. Others fought valiantly, in some cases with limited (generally: local) successes.



Operation Attilah II

the outcome of the struggle was foregone. In both fronts (and notably in the eastern sectors) the Turkish forces moved at leisurely pace. According to an interpretation, of the slow progress was pre-planned, so that fear of the Turkish Army (whose atrocities were relatively well known by this time) would drive away the Greek Cypriot inhabitants and help towards the ethnic cleansing of the occupied areas.

Advancing eastwards, the axis of advance of the Turkish forces led them to recapture the Tziaos Turkish Cypriot enclave (previously partially captured by the National Guard), by-passed the Kapasia Peninsula and occupied Famagusta, entering Varosha (the Greek quarters outside the old walled city) a full day after it had been evacuated by the National Guard. Similarly, on the eastern front, despite some delaying action by the National Guard, the whole area up to and including the enclave of Lefka was captured by 16 August.

Probably the heaviest fighting took place in the central part of the front, close to Nicosia, in the ELDYK camp and the western suburbs of the city. The ELDYK camp was captured only after heavy repeated and costly attacks, and was abandoned only when (in some cases) the Turkish tanks were literally on top of Greek positions and hand to hand fighting had ensued. In the same area, the effective defence preparation by the Greek side and spirited defence by the units assigned stopped the Turkish Forces from occupying the western suburbs of Nicosia and possibly surrounding the capital.

These and a few other instances apart, the general picture, was one of collapse. Some (mainly military) commentators note that it is quite unfortunate the National Guard forces do not seem to have taken advantage of the slow pace of advance, to prepare their defences and retain at least the Varosha area of Famagusta. Other critiques deplore the passivity of the Greek side; or the underemployment of the

The secondary axis of the attack was to the west, towards the town of Morphou and the Turkish-Cypriot enclave of Lefka (captured by the National Guard early on in the invasion). The same conditions prevailed in the western part of the front: as in the east: despite local successes (such as an armour engagement where the two captured Turkish armoured vehicles faced around a dozen of their former comrades, caused damage to several, delayed their advance and lived to tell the story)

special forces units (the *Lokadjides*) who appear to have retained their cohesion and fighting spirit (as shown in an incident in the village of Piroi, just after the armistice). In some cases, units ordered to withdraw keeping contact with the enemy dissolved in panic and ended up in the south of the island. On the whole, Turkish forces advanced facing limited (or no) resistance and occupied both their strategic and tactical targets. On 16 August a general ceasefire came into effect, on the ragged line where the Turkish Forces stopped.

The consequences of the invasion

The invasion led to the occupation of over 36% of the territory of Cyprus, a part that included substantial economic resources: 65% of hotels, over half the mineral production of the island, 46% of industrial plant (which in 1974 employed 32% of the workforce) over 40% of livestock and almost half the agricultural production. This last category included 79% of the citrus fruit production, an important export in pre-1974 Cyprus and 68% of wheat crops. Famagusta harbour (the most important harbour of Cyprus) and the smaller harbours of Kyrenia and Karavostasi, as well as the Nicosia Airport were also lost, along with 31% of Primary School and 49% of Secondary School buildings.

A well publicized consequence of the invasion is the systematic pillaging of Greek properties private and public, including cultural heritage: churches were sold or converted to other uses and movable (and in some cases immovable) art objects were sold at auctions in Europe and the US. The repeated repatriations of religious icons as well as the well known instance of the Kanakaria mosaics are such examples.

However, much more important are the effects on the population of Cyprus. Large numbers (estimated at 180.000) of Greek Cypriots were displaced from their homes, in 1974 or in the years that followed, in a systematic ethnic cleansing operation; the Turkish Cypriot population living in the south of Cyprus was also forced by its leadership and by intense pressure by Turkey to abandon their homes and move to the North of the island. Populations from Turkey were also encouraged to move to Northern Cyprus, altering the demographics. The war dead and the missing persons (now numbering approximately 1400, following DNA testing of remains dug up from mass graves) are an open wound in the collective Cypriot psyche, as are the memories of rapes, murders and massacres of the time. A wave of emigration followed, spreading Cypriots far and wide, in search of a livelihood, for shorter or longer periods. The Cypriot economic miracle that followed, with the re-settlement of the displaced population and the restarting and development of the Cypriot economy were very successful in raising the standard of living to Western European standards; they have certainly not closed the wounds caused by the events of 1974.

Appendix

Note on sources

Bibliography on the coup and the invasion is relatively plentiful, particularly in Greek and to a lesser extent in English; only a small selection is presented here, with no claims to a full presentation of all the material available.

However, the character of the publications is varied. Accounts of the coup and invasion are related (in more or less detail) in most general histories of Cyprus published post 1974, both in English and in Greek. Notable early examples of such accounts in English are Stavros Panteli, *A New History of Cyprus*, London, East-West Publications, 1984, Costas Kyrris, *History of Cyprus*, Nicosia (Nicosia), 1985 and the more recent William Mallinson, *A Modern History of Cyprus*, London, Tauris, 2005.

An interesting part of the bibliography are the histories of units of the Greek Cypriot National Guard (virtually all in Greek) and memoirs of participants, both politicians and armed forces officers, relating part or all of the period under consideration, both in Greece and in Cyprus. The military aspects are further explored in Brig. Francis Henn, *A Business of Some Heat, The United Nations Force in Cyprus before and after the 1974 Turkish Invasion*, Barnsley, S. Yorks Pen and Sword Military 2004; this is a very interesting account of (mainly military) developments in 1974-74 Cyprus, by a British UN officer; Clay Beattie (with Micheal S. Baxendale), *The Bulletproof Flag, How a small UN Force changed the concept of peacekeeping forever*, Maxville, Ottawa, Optimum Publishing International 2007, gives a less global (but no less interesting) account of the invasion, again through UN eyes (he was a Canadian officer of the UNFICYP).

Of wider recent scholarly publications one should mention Jan Asmussen, *Cyprus at War, Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis*, London and New York, Tauris, 2008, is based mainly on the British (and US record); the US record is also used by James Edward Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974*, Chapel Hill, N.C. The University of North Carolina Press 2008, which, disappointingly only devotes a relatively limited space to the coup and the invasion. A more recent work is by Andreas Constandinos, *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974*, Milton Keynes Author-House, 2009.

Primary sources on Cyprus (both US and UK) may be consulted in electronic form in the internet [request]. Limited UK material is available electronically by the UK National Archives [<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/>] -a wealth of information awaits those that consult the UK sources in person. A fuller (but by no means complete) version of the British (and the US) Record are available in <http://dbpo.chadwyck.co.uk/home.do> and <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/home.do> respectively (some material by subscription only). The volume by Laurie Van Hook (ed.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXX: *Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-76*, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 2007, gives a part of the US record (the whole volume was made available on line in <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30> , in pdf format. Sources on the events are also available from the National Archives of Australia [<http://www.naa.gov.au/>] which

has a lot of digitised material available on line.

Memoirs by protagonists have been published over the years: Kurt Waldheim, *In the eye of the storm : the memoirs of Kurt Waldheim*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1985; Brian Urquhart, *A life in peace and war*, London Weidenfeld & Nicolson, c1987; Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, London Phoenix, 2000; and his *Years of Renewal*, London Phoenix Press, 2000; James Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, London Collins, 1987; Glafkos Clerides, *Η Κατάθεσή μου*, [My Deposition], Nicosia Alitheia Publishers, 1991, available in both Greek and English. All have at least a few pages on the Cyprus crisis.

Accounts and assorted information coming from individuals is increasingly becoming available once more (there was a considerable amount of material in the years immediately after the invasion, which became a trickle later on) in Greek, through publications newspapers and magazines, either on the anniversary of the events (in July and August) or on other occasions.

Scholarly papers in conferences or journals are also available, including work by the author [the paper G. Kazamias, "From Pragmatism to Idealism to Failure: Britain in the Cyprus crisis of 1974", London School of Economics, Hellenic Observatory, *GreeSE (Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe)*, paper no. 42, pp. 1-48, December 2010 is available in http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/31090/1/GreeSE_No42.pdf as is the paper G. Kazamias, " 'Some sort of an agreed line': The negotiations for the ceasefire demarcation line, 30 July- 9 August 1974", in E. Close, G. Gouvalis, G. Frazis, M. Palaktsoglou, M. Tsianikas, (eds.) *Greek Research in Australia, Proceedings of the 6th Biennial Conference of Greek Studies, Proceedings of the 7th Biennial Conference of Greek Studies*, Adelaide (Australia), 2009 available in http://dspace.flinders.edu.au/jspui/bitstream/2328/8084/1/273-282_Kazamias.pdf].

Research is hampered from the lack of access to both Greek and Turkish state archives (both generally closed as regards the events in Cyprus) and by the language divide: work in Greek is not generally available to Turkish speakers and *vice versa*. The best known books from the Turkish side are the two by the Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, *30 Hot Days*, London, K. Rustem & Brother, 1985; translated into Greek as *Apofasi-Apovasi*, Athens, Ioannis Floros, 1985; and Mehmet Ali Birand, *Pazaremata*, Athens, Ioannis Floros, 1985.

Lastly, the internet may be a rich source of information, but is also a battleground between different viewpoints; this makes it a minefield, where facts, fiction and anything in between are freely presented as history. In some cases valuable information is freely mixed with unfounded allegations. An example is the webpage <http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/makarios-speech.html>, where the full text address of President Makarios to the UN (including a sound version!) is offered to the reader alongside references to "more than 3000 Greek Cypriot supporters of Makarios and supporters of the Communist party AKEL" allegedly killed in the coup (another webpage, <http://www.btinternet.com/~cy74/inv.htm> lowers the Greek Cypriot dead to 2000 persons); the first site further alleges that the (: long defunct by 1974) "Akritas Plan" "was put into effect to exterminate Turkish Cypriot people". Though atrocities did take place (on both sides of the divide), references to organised genocide of the Turkish Cypriots are unfounded. Unfortunately, the same does not apply to the ethnic cleansing programme applied by the Turkish side to the occupied areas.

CHAPTER 10

**The Turkish invasion:
the international community
response**

N i k o s C h r i s t o d o u l i d e s

Aims

This chapter aims to present the response of the main international and European organizations on the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974. Special reference will be made of the international community response on the consequences of the Turkish invasion, such as the issues of the missing persons, the refugees, the enclaved persons and the settlers. At the same time the chapter touches on the United States and the (then) Soviet Union response on the Turkish aggression against Cyprus in 1974.

After studying this chapter, students will be familiar with

- The tragic consequences of the 1974 Turkish invasion,
- The issue of the missing persons and how the international community dealt with the issue,
- What was the purpose behind the Turkish policy of colonization of the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus,
- The drama from the violation of basic human rights for all those that refused to leave their homes in the occupied areas (the enclaved persons),
- Landmark decisions by the European Court of Human Rights on aspects of the Cyprus Problem,
- The logic behind the United States and Soviet Union non-reaction to the Turkish invasion of 1974.

Keywords

- 36.2% of territory
- missing persons
- Council of Europe
- Third Vienna Agreement
- Resolution 550
- Resolution 541
- United Nations
- European Parliament
- Case of Loizidou v. Turkey
- Cold War
- 170,000 refugees
- destruction of the cultural and religious heritage
- colonization of the occupied areas
- change the demographic character
- “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”
- Committee of Missing Persons
- illegal exploitation of the properties
- The European Court of Human Rights
- Henry Kissinger
- Fourth Interstate Application of Cyprus against Turkey

Introduction

On 20 July 1974, using as pretext the coup by the Greek junta against the democratically elected president Makarios, Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied **36.2% of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus**. The results of the invasion were tragic: **170,000 Greek Cypriots refugees**, more than **1500 missing persons, destruction of the cultural and religious heritage** in the occupied areas of Cyprus, **illegal exploitation of the properties** of the refugees, **colonization of the occupied areas** and many more. As expected, the invasion and its tragic human consequences, led to the reaction of the international community.

The United Nations reaction

A. The Security Council

On 20 July 1974, the day of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus, the United Nations Security Council adopted unanimously Resolution 353. According to the Resolution, the Security Council, gravely concerned about the situation in the island which led to a serious threat to international peace and security and which created a most explosive situation in the whole Eastern Mediterranean area, called upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and demanded an immediate end to foreign military intervention in Cyprus, together with the withdrawal from the island of foreign military personnel (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 2006, pp. 46-47).

Few days later and after the second phase of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Security Council adopted Resolution 360 (on 16 August 1974), under which it recorded its disapproval for the unilateral military actions undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus urged the parties concerned to resume without delay negotiations whose outcome should not be impeded or prejudged by the acquisition of advantages resulting from military operations (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 2006, p. 53).

Security Council Resolution 361, adopted on 30 August 1974, was also very important. In the Resolution, among other things, the Security Council, “conscious of its special responsibilities under the United Nations Charter”, noted that a large number of people on the island had been displaced, and were in need of humanitarian assistance and called upon all parties to do everything in their power to alleviate human suffering and to ensure the respect to fundamental human rights for all persons. Furthermore, the Security Council expressed its grave concern at the plight of the refugees and other persons displaced as a result of the situation in Cyprus and urged the parties concerned, in conjunction with the Secretary-General, to search for peaceful solutions for the problems of refugees, and take appropriate measures to provide for their relief and welfare and to permit persons wishing to do so, to return to their homes in safety (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 2006, pp. 54-55).

Contrary to the above UN Resolution, Turkey unilaterally declared on 13 February 1975 the area under occupation in Cyprus as a “Turkish Federated State”. As a result of this illegal action, the Security Council adopted by consensus on 12 March 1975 Resolution 367, according to which the Council called on all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and urgently requested them, as well as the parties concerned, to refrain from any action which might prejudice that sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity

and non-alignment, as well as from any attempt at partition of the island or its unification with any other country (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 2006, pp. 59-60).

B. The General Assembly

At the same time, following the Turkish invasion in Cyprus, the United Nations General Assembly adopted numerous Resolutions on the issue of Cyprus. On 1st November, 1974, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3212(XXIX) by 117 votes in favour, none against and no abstentions, according to which the General Assembly gravely concerned about the continuation of the Cyprus crisis, which constituted a threat to international peace and security, called upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it. At the same time, the General Assembly, urged for the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 2006, pp. 192-193). Concerning the issue of refugees, the General Assembly stated that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety and called upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end.



Cultural heritage desecrated: the ruins of Panaghia Kanakaria

Despite the above mentioned Resolutions and various efforts to find a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus Problem and its tragic consequences, no real progress was achieved due to the Turkish intransigence. Furthermore, Turkey continued its policy of **colonizing the occupied areas** of Cyprus by sending thousands of Turks from mainland Turkey in order to **change the demographic character** of the island (Christos P. Ioannides, *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, New York, 1991). At the same time, through its policy of colonization Turkey attempted to change the population balance in the occupied areas in order to control the Turkish Cypriots who massively started to emigrate after 1974. Furthermore, Turkey continued its unhuman behaviour towards those Greek Cypriots and Maronites who decided in 1974 not to abandon their houses, mainly in the Karpass (Karpasia) Peninsula and in villages of the district of Kerynia. As a consequence, the number of the 20000 people who decided in 1974 to remain in their homes in the occupied areas gradually started to decrease.

The behaviour of the regime in the occupied areas against the Greek Cypriot enclaves was also in contrast to the **Third Vienna Agreement** reached in August 1975 between the two sides in the island. According to the said Agreement, "1. The Turkish Cypriots that were in the free areas of the Republic of Cyprus would be allowed, if they wanted to do so, to proceed to the occupied areas with their belongings under an organized programme and with the assistance of the United Nations

Force in Cyprus, 2. Mr. Denktash reaffirmed, and it was agreed, that the Greek Cypriots that were in the occupied areas were free to stay and that they would be given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and for the practice of their religion, as well as medical care by their own doctors and freedom of movement in the occupied areas, 3. The Greek Cypriots that were in the occupied areas could, at their own request and without having been subjected to any kind of pressure, to move to the free areas of the Republic would be permitted to do so, 4. UNFICYP would have free and normal access to Greek Cypriot villages and habitations in the occupied areas”

[http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/0658E5B2F4D1A538C22571D30034D15D/\\$file/August%201975.pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/0658E5B2F4D1A538C22571D30034D15D/$file/August%201975.pdf)). Despite the Agreement reached in Vienna, the Turkish forces in the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus continued to cause serious and inhuman problems in the everyday life of the enclaves. As a result the numbers of the enclaves is today 361 Greek Cypriots and 128 Maronites. (http://www.unficyp.org/media/SG%20Reports/UNFICYP_Report_May_2010.pdf).

The UN bodies also examined the tragic consequences of the Turkish invasion and adopted special resolutions. For example, regarding the issue of the **missing persons**, the UN General Assembly adopted on 9 December 1975 (by 106 votes to none and 26 abstentions) Resolution 3450 (XXX), according to which the General Assembly gravely concerned about the fate of a considerable number of Cypriots who were missing as a result of the armed conflict in Cyprus, reaffirmed the basic human need of families in Cyprus to be informed about missing relatives and requested the United Nations Secretary-General to exert every effort in close co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross in assisting the tracing of and accounting for missing persons (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 2006, p. 196).



The fate of Panaghia Chryseleousa in Sysklipos Kyreneia

Furthermore, on 16 December 1977 the General Assembly adopted, on the question of missing persons in Cyprus, the Resolution 32/128 according to which the General Assembly, concerned at the lack of progress towards the tracing of and accounting for missing persons in Cyprus requested the Secretary-General to support the establishment of an Investigatory Body with the participation of the International Committee of the Red Cross which would be in a position

to function impartially, effectively and speedily so as to resolve the problem without undue delay (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 2006, p. 201).

On 20 December 1978, the General Assembly adopted (by 69 votes to 6 and 55 abstentions) Resolution 33/172 urging the establishment of an investigatory body under the chairmanship of a representative of the Secretary-General with the co-operation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which would be in a position to function impartially, effectively and speedily so as to resolve the problem without delay. According to the said Resolution, the Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus

should be empowered, in case of disagreement, to reach a binding independent opinion which should be implemented and called upon the parties to cooperate fully with the investigatory body and, to this effect, to appoint their representatives (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 2006, p. 204). Following the said Resolution, the **Committee of Missing Persons (CMP)** was established. The CMP comprised of a representative of the Greek Cypriot community, a representative of the Turkish Cypriot community and a Third Member nominated by the International Committee of the Red Cross and appointed by the UN Secretary-General.

On 16 December 1981 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 36/164 reaffirming the basic human need of families to be informed, without further delay, about the fate of their missing relatives and called upon the parties concerned to facilitate, in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill, the Committee on Missing Persons in carrying out its investigative task (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 2006, p. 208).

C. The UN Commission of Human Rights

Besides the Resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, on 13 February 1975 the UN Commission of Human Rights examining the situation of Human Rights in Cyprus adopted Resolution 4 (XXXI). In the Resolution, the Commission alarmed by the continuation of the Cyprus crisis, called upon all parties concerned to adhere strictly to the principles of the United Nations Charter, the international instruments in the field of human rights, and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. At the same time, with the said Resolution, the Commission called upon all parties concerned to undertake urgent measures for the return of all refugees to their homes in safety and for the intensification of efforts aimed at tracing and accounting for missing persons (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/937D3ED64C2B0266C2256D6D0035ADF5?OpenDocument>)

The same Commission adopted on 27 February 1976 Resolution 4 (XXXII), according to which the Commission mindful, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the relevant international instruments in particular the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, renewed its call upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to facilitate the voluntary return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in safety and to settle all other aspects of the refugee problem (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/937D3ED64C2B0266C2256D6D0035ADF5?OpenDocument>). At the same time, all parties were urged to refrain from unilateral actions in contravention of the relevant United Nations resolutions, including changes in the demographic structure of Cyprus.

The “turkish republic of northern cyprus” and the UN reaction

In 1983, continuing its secessionist policy in Cyprus, Turkey illegally declared the so called “**turkish republic of northern cyprus**”. Following the illegal Turkish act, the Security Council adopted **Resolutions 541** and **550**. According to Resolution 541 (adopted by 13 votes to 1 against (Pakistan) with 1 abstention (Jordan)), the Security Council expressed its concern with the declaration of a so called “state” in occupied Cyprus and considered that this declaration was incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 2006, pp. 87-88). Furthermore with the said Resolution, the Security Council stated that the attempt to create a “turkish republic of northern cyprus”, was invalid, and would contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus and called for its withdrawal. One of the most important aspect of the said Resolution was its called upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 2006, p. 88).

According to Resolution 550, adopted by the Security Council on 11 May 1984 (adopted by 13 votes to 1 (Pakistan) with 1 abstention (United States) the Security Council, gravely concerned about the further secessionist acts in the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus (namely the purported “exchange of Ambassadors” between Turkey and the legally invalid “turkish republic of northern cyprus” and the contemplated holding of a “Constitutional referendum” and “elections” in the occupied areas of Cyprus) and deeply concerned about threats for settlement of Varosha (the fenced area of Famagusta) by people other than its inhabitants, reiterated its call upon all States not to recognise the purported state of the “turkish republic of northern cyprus” set up by secessionist acts. At the same time, the Security Council called upon all States **not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity** and to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 2006, pp. 90-91).

The reaction of the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

Throughout the years, the Council of Europe also dealt with the Cyprus issue and the consequences of the 1974 Turkish invasion. Following the first phase of the Turkish invasion, the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 573 (on 29 July 1974) which condemned the coup d'état carried out in Cyprus and called upon the signatory states to guarantee the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus. In particular, the Council of Europe called for the re-establishment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect and a formal guarantee of the rights of the ethnic communities, in order to assure a lasting peace between the Greeks and Turks of the island (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>).

At other levels, several Committees of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe examined throughout the years specific humanitarian aspects of the Cyprus Problem. For example, on a Report on refugees and missing persons in Cyprus, on 30 March 1987, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted: "Observing that, human relations between the two communities [in Cyprus] can hardly develop positively unless agreement is reached on the painful problem of missing persons [and having in mind that] the families of missing persons are entitled to know the truth, recommends that the Committee of Ministers [of the Council of Europe]: a. continue its efforts to secure the repatriation or integration of the displaced persons and national refugees in Cyprus, while trying to find a solution to the problem of compensation for these people; b. support every effort made to cast light on the fate of missing persons in which respect a general amnesty on both sides would be helpful; c. ask the leaders of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities not to alter the demographic structure of the island and especially to avoid untimely migratory movements" (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>).

Furthermore, a number of Reports from different Committees of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe took place over the years. In a Report on the issue of settlers, dated 27 April 1992, **Alfons Cuco**, Member of the **Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe**, stated that "The partition of the island, which the Council of Europe does not acknowledge, is essentially a political problem, but it also has a human dimension that is sometimes overlooked. Almost one third of the island's population has

been displaced by the conflict. The size of this population movement explains why the political and humanitarian aspects of the Cypriot question are so closely linked” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>).

In his Report, Cuco also stated that since 1975, Turkish nationals have arrived in the occupied areas of Cyprus. “[their numbers] were probably massive as, even taking the lowest estimates, they represented the arrival of a group of persons making up more than 10% of the Turkish-Cypriot population at that time” (today -2011- the settlers are at least two times the number of Turkish Cypriots). According to the Report, the Turkish settlers fall into two main categories, “The vast majority are peasants and shepherds, whose life in the north of Cyprus is similar to the one they were leading in Anatolia. The other category comprises managers, businessmen and retired Turkish army officers. They are a minority who nonetheless seem to exert considerable influence on the ruling class of Turkish Cypriots” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>).

The reference of the Rapporteur concerning the relations between the settlers and the Turkish Cypriots is also very important. As he stated “the settlers had preserved their original social, economic and cultural characteristics and were therefore viewed as foreign elements by a number of Turkish Cypriots” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>). Furthermore, Cuco examined the policy of the regime in the occupied Cyprus towards the settlers. As he stated the aim of regime’s policy towards the settlers “has been to promote their permanent establishment on the island. The settlers are granted housing, land or other properties on special terms. They are issued with a “concession certificate” which they are not entitled to sell or pass on to a third party until a period of twenty years has elapsed. Nevertheless, the most important measure for the settlers, has been the possibility of acquiring Turkish-Cypriot nationality. In 1975, the Turkish-Cypriot Administration passed Act No. 3/1975, under which nationality could be given to anyone who requested it and, in particular, to members of the Turkish armed forces who had served in Cyprus, the wives, children and brothers of members of these forces who had fallen in Cyprus between 20 July 1974 and 20 August 1974 or to persons who had served in the ‘Turkish Resistance Organisation’ in Cyprus... To complete the demographic picture of Cyprus, account must also be taken of the presence on the island of several groups of aliens, the biggest being the Turkish army in the north of the island which, according to some estimates, numbers some 30 000 men (today-2011- the number is 43,000). This is a very substantial figure, equivalent to some 15% of the total population of the northern part of Cyprus. When travelling about in this part of the island, I noted the highly conspicuous presence of the Turkish army” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>).

In his Conclusions, the Rapporteur mentioned that “The arrival and establishment of the Turkish settlers is the most notable demographic occurrence in Cyprus since 1974”. He further mentioned that the number of Turkish soldiers in the occupied areas compared to the number of people living in those areas “works out at one soldier per six civilians, a ratio that must be unique in Europe”. Finally, a very important conclusion of Cuco was his reference that Turkey’s policy of colonisation “constitutes a further barrier to a peaceful negotiated solution of the Cypriot conflict” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>).

www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument).

Few years later, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe examined the issue of the enclaved persons living in the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus. On 20 February 2003, in a Report of **Dick Marty**, member of the **Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Assembly** presented his report on the issue of the enclaves. In his Report, with the title “**Rights and fundamental freedoms of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of Cyprus**”, Marty, having examined the situation, asked Turkey to “cease all humiliation of the Greek and Maronite communities and put an end to the climate of intimidation; end the dispossessions affecting members of these communities, by returning to the members of these communities the property and possessions of which they have been arbitrarily dispossessed, individually or collectively, or failing that offer them just compensation; ensure freedom of education and worship for Orthodox Christians and Maronites; end the restrictions on movements across the demarcation line and immediately grant Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of Cyprus at least the same rights as those already granted to Maronites; grant all inhabitants the right to an effective remedy; ensure equal access to medical care; permit the communities to freely choose their representatives themselves” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>). Based on the Report of the Rapporteur, the Parliamentary Assembly expressed its concern by the status imposed upon the Greek Cypriot and Maronite living in the occupied areas of Cyprus and the violation of their basic human rights. Of great importance was the reference that the Assembly was “shocked by the imposed division of families, the prohibition on young people returning to their homes, the arbitrary confiscations and expropriations and the general climate of apprehension and uncertainty, even fear, to which members of these communities are deliberately subjected” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>).

In his explanatory memorandum, the Rapporteur paid also special attention to the issue of education of the enclaves. As he was stated “the Greek Cypriots have the problem that when their children have completed primary school in the north they have to continue their secondary and any university studies in the south, where they then settle once for all when their studies are finished in order to find work... One shocking feature is that young Greek Cypriot girls born in the northern part of the island but educated in the south can visit their parents during the holidays and at weekends up to the age of 18 but beyond that age are not entitled to return to settle in the northern part and can only return for a few weekends each year” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>). In this regard, the Rapporteur found Turkey responsible for violations principally concern freedom of circulation, freedom to choose to live in one’s area of origin, the right to education, the right to religion, the right to an effective remedy and the right to property. Marty concluded that the discrimination suffered by these persons was unacceptable and incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.

Furthermore, in his conclusions, the Rapporteur after clearly stating that the enclaves were victims of human rights violations, he considered Turkey responsible for those acts. This reference of the Rapporteur was of great importance because Turkey, in its effort to achieve recognition for the so called “trnc”, was claiming that it did not have responsibility over the occupied area of Cyprus. As

Marty specifically mentioned “These violations, some of which are serious, are imputable to the administration set up by Turkey, which carries ultimate responsibility for acts committed in the territory in question” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>).

A new Report on the issue of settlers, prepared by **Jaakko Laakso** of the **Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography of the Parliamentary Assembly** of the Council of Europe published on 2 May 2003. The Report with the title “**Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus**”, mentioned that “*Since the de facto* partition of Cyprus in 1974, the demographic structure of the island has been continuously modified” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>). At the same time, Laakso, referred to the increasing number of Turkish Cypriots leaving the occupied areas of Cyprus. This development, in connection with the increasing number of settlers resulted to the phenomenon where the “settlers have outnumbered the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population”. In his Report, the Rapporteur also touched on the issue how the continual decrease in the number of the enclaves together with the increase of settlers in the occupied areas changed the **demographic structure in the island**. As he stated, “Change in the demographic structure of Cyprus already underway, creates a real threat that in the long-term the considerable increase in the numbers of the Turkish-speaking population might be used for a justification of the inordinate claims of the Turkish side regarding territorial arrangements and political powers in a final settlement of the Cyprus problem... The presence of the settlers constitutes an additional and important obstacle to a peaceful negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>).

In the Report, Laakso agreed with the findings of the previous relevant Report of the Assembly, stating that “The settlers come mainly from the region of Anatolia, one of the less developed regions in Turkey. Their customs and traditions differ in a significant way from those in Cyprus. These differences are the main reason for the tensions and dissatisfaction of the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population who tend to view them as a foreign element” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>).

Taking under consideration the Report of the Rapporteur, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, among other, called on Turkey, as well as its Turkish Cypriot subordinate local administration in occupied Cyprus, to stop the process of colonisation by Turkish settlers, and furthermore to comply with the relevant decisions of the European Court of Human Rights” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C6DDA72FEDD6D6F0C2256D6E002C4705?OpenDocument>).

The European Court of Human Rights

On 22 July 1989, Titina Loizidou, a Greek Cypriot Refugee from Kerynia, filed an application against Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights (**Case of Loizidou v. Turkey**), for refusing her use of her property in the occupied town of Kerynia, ever since the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974. In 1996 the Court ruled out that Turkey committed a **continuing violation of the rights of Titina Loizidou to visit and enjoy her property** in occupied Kerynia. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed the validity of property deeds issued prior to the Turkish invasion of 1974 by the Republic of Cyprus (affirming therefore that is Mrs. Loizidou is still the legal owner of the property); and as a consequence, invalidated the action of Turkey to issue new title deeds after 1974. At the same time, the Court asked Turkey to pay Mrs Loizidou compensation for loss of use of her property since 1974 and to implement certain measures in order to provide Mrs Loizidou the right of the peaceful enjoyment of her property in occupied Kerynia.

On 2 December 2003, Turkey executed the monetary aspect of the judgment. Until today, Turkey has not complied with the second part of the Court's decision "regarding the individual and general measures that Turkey must implement in order to provide Mrs Loizidou with the right of the peaceful enjoyment of her property in Kerynia" ([http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/90ADC505C94B392BC22571EA00271C6?OpenDocument&highlight=Loizidou vs. Turkey](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/90ADC505C94B392BC22571EA00271C6?OpenDocument&highlight=Loizidou%20vs.%20Turkey))

On 22 November 1994, the Republic of Cyprus, for the fourth time since 1974 filed an application against Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights (**Fourth Interstate Application of Cyprus against Turkey**), with respect to the situation that has existed in Cyprus since the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in July 1974 and the continued occupation of territory of Cyprus; it's content was that the Government of Turkey have continued to violate the Human Rights Convention (in particular to the Greek-Cypriot missing persons and their relatives, the home and property of displaced persons, the right of displaced Greek Cypriots to hold free elections, the living conditions of Greek Cypriots in the occupied areas and the situation of Turkish Cypriots living in occupied Cyprus). On 10 May 2001, in its decision, the European Court of Human Rights found Turkey **guilty of massive human rights violations in the occupied part of Cyprus**. More specifically, on the issue of **Missing Persons**, the Court stated that "Turkish authorities' failure to investigate effectively with an aim to clarify the whereabouts and fate of Greek Cypriot missing persons who disappeared in life-threatening circumstances was a continuing violation of the procedural obligation under Article 2 to protect the right to life. This failure of the Turkish authorities was also a continuing violation of Article 5 of the Convention in respect of any missing persons who were arguably in custody at the time they disappeared. In addition, the Court underlined that "the silence of the authorities...in the face of the real concerns of the relatives of the missing persons attains a level of severity which can only be categorized as inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3" (<http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/>

mfa2006.nsf/All/90ADC505C94B392BC22571EA00271CC6?OpenDocument).

On the issues of the **Displaced Persons, Homes and Properties**, according to the Court findings, “The continuing and total denial of physical access by displaced Greek Cypriots to their property is a clear interference with their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol N.1. Article 13 was also violated because Greek Cypriots not residing in the occupied area of Cyprus had no remedy and could not contest interferences with their rights to property and to respect for their homes” (<http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/90ADC505C94B392BC22571EA00271CC6?OpenDocument>).

Finally, concerning the **Living Conditions of the enclaved Greek Cypriots in the occupied areas**, the Court stated that “The right to respect for family life of enclaved Greek Cypriots was seriously impeded by measures imposed by the secessionist entity to limit family reunification denying the possibility of leading a normal family life. The Court also noted that the Greek Cypriot community was monitored in respect of its contacts and movements and that surveillance even extended to the presence of State agents in homes of Greek Cypriots on the occasion of social or other visits. The Court observed the view of the UN Secretary-General that the severe restrictions entailing the exercise of basic freedoms had the effect of ensuring that inexorably, with the passage of time, the Karpas community would cease to exist, referring in particular to the prohibition on bequeathing property to non-enclaved relatives and to the denial of the right of ultimate return of children who left to obtain secondary education. The enclaved of the Karpas community have also been found to suffer from discriminatory treatment; thus the Court noted a violation of Article 3 for degrading treatment on grounds of ethnic origin, race and religion. The Court also held that the Greek Cypriots of the Karpas had had their rights to freedom of religion under Article 9 violated by restrictions which prevented organization of Greek Orthodox religious ceremonies in a normal and regular manner. In addition, Article 10, for the freedom of expression has been violated as well as Article 1 of Protocol N.1 because the enclaved Greek Cypriots are not allowed to enjoy peacefully their possessions. A particularly serious violation, having regard to its impact on family life, is the denial of appropriate secondary-school facilities to the enclaved Greek Cypriots” (<http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/90ADC505C94B392BC22571EA00271CC6?OpenDocument>).

The European Parliament reaction

Since 4th of July 1990 and the application of the Republic of Cyprus to join the then European Community the tragic consequences of the 1974 Turkish invasion were also extensively discussed in various EU bodies. For example, on 15 March 2007, the European Parliament adopted a resolution with the title “**Missing persons in Cyprus**”. According to the said Resolution, the European Parliament “1. Calls on the parties concerned to cooperate sincerely and honestly on a speedy completion of the appropriate investigations into the fate of all missing persons in Cyprus and to implement fully the ECHR judgment of 10 May 2001; 2. Calls on the parties concerned and all those who have, or are in a position to have, any information or evidence emanating from personal knowledge, archives, battlefield reports or records of detention places to pass it on to the CMP without any further delay; 3. Calls on the Council and the Commission to concern themselves actively with this problem, providing, inter alia, financial assistance to the CMP, and to take all necessary steps, in cooperation with the United Nations Secretary-General, to bring about the implementation of the aforementioned ECHR judgment and the relevant UN and European Parliament resolutions” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/D1941B95EED9D560C2256D6E002B7FDD?OpenDocument>).

Despite the above mentioned Reports, Resolutions and Opinions regarding the 1974 Turkish invasion in Cyprus and its tragic consequences by the main international and European institutions, no real progress has been achieved even in those humanitarian issues such as the missing persons and the enclaves. The main reason for this is the fact that no implementation mechanism exists for those Resolutions to be implemented. Furthermore, the lack of interest from the Great Powers in enforcing those Resolutions is another major reason for the lack of progress in the said issues.

The United States and Soviet Union reaction in the 1974 Turkish invasion

Concerning now the great powers of the era, neither the US nor the Soviet Union took any effective measures to stop the Turkish invasion in Cyprus and later, to put pressure on Turkey to either solve the Cyprus Problem or cooperate to solve the humanitarian consequences of the 1974 invasion. In fact the United States approached the Turkish actions in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 as way for “**permanently**” solving the Cyprus Problem. As Professor Van Coufoudakis correctly stated, the 1974 events in Cyprus “may have been unplanned as far as the United States was concerned, but it provided both a crisis and an opportunity for the involvement of **Henry Kissinger**. The primary task of American diplomacy was to control the risks of a broader Greco-Turkish confrontation over Cyprus and of a possible Soviet involvement. By carefully managing the crisis and controlling the risks, the United States could move to achieve the elusive peace on Cyprus. Thus, the Cypriot crisis had become another opportunity for Washington to attempt to impose stability” (Van Coufoudakis, “US Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: An Interpretation”, *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 5, no. 3, Winter 1976-1977, pp. 246-268; Βενιζέλος Κώστας και Ιγνατίου Μιχάλης, *Τα μυστικά αρχεία του Κίσιντζερ*, Αθήνα 2002).

In general, US's interest in Cyprus was the result of its concern of a possible Greek-Turkish war that would cause serious problems in the NATO south eastern flank. In this regard, the 1974 Turkish invasion was approached by Washington as a way of “permanently solving” the issue of Cyprus, and as a result avoiding a possible Greek-Turkish war over Cyprus (Coufoudakis, Van, *Cyprus and International Politics*, Nicosia, Intercollege Press, 2007; Nicolet, Claude, *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention*, Manheim 2001). Following the Turkish invasion and its tragic consequences the US did nothing than to promote a solution that in great extent would recognise the fait accompli of the invasion. Even on the humanitarian issues of the missing persons, enclaves and displaced persons, Washington did not push Turkey to cooperate in finding a solution. Over the years, it has become obvious that Ankara is considered to be one of the most valuable strategic allies of the US in the area. In this regard and even though the US Congress in different cases adopted Resolutions over the issue of Cyprus, the US government did nothing towards Turkey in order to make it cooperate for the solution of the tragic consequences of the invasion (Coulombis, Theodore A., *The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle*, New York 1983; Stearns, Monteagle, *Entangled Allies – US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*, New York

1992).

From its side the non reaction from the Soviet Union (except within the UN forum) was a clear sign that Moscow was approaching the Cyprus crisis as a NATO problem since two NATO members (Greece and Turkey) were actively involved. As Coufoudakis stated “While the coup from Athens provided the rationalizations for the invasion, the absence of a Russian threat gave Kissinger the opportunity to permanently change the negotiating balance of power in Cyprus and to satisfy Turkey’s long-standing demands on the island. The post 1972 détente with the Soviet Union and the Kissinger-Gromyko understandings about regional superpower interests made Soviet-American relations very different from those of 1964. Kissinger assessed the role of the Soviet Union during the 1974 crisis in terms of what the Russians did not do” (Coufoudakis, Van, “The Cyprus Question: International Politics and the Failure of Peacemaking”, in Theodore Couloumbis *et al.* (eds.), *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, pp. 111-135). Generally speaking, **Moscow** supported Cyprus within the UN forum but always with caution and without risking damage to its relations with its neighbour, Turkey (Norton, Richard Augustus, “The Soviet Union and Cyprus”, in Salem, Norma (ed.), *Cyprus, A Regional Conflict and its Resolution*, St. Martin’s Press-Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS), 1992, pp. 100-114).

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4. Third Vienna Agreement ([http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/0658E5B2F4D1A538C22571D30034D15D/\\$file/August%201975.pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/0658E5B2F4D1A538C22571D30034D15D/$file/August%201975.pdf))

CHAPTER 11

**In search of a settlement:
Cyprus solution plans and
international diplomacy,
1974-1999**

N i k o s C h r i s t o d o u l i d e s

Aims

This chapter aims to present the initiatives of the international community for solving the Cyprus Problem, from the end of the Turkish invasion until 1999. Special reference will be made to the agreements reached between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides and the developments that influenced the efforts for finding a comprehensive settlement.

After studying this chapter, students will be familiar with

- The main positions of the two sides in the island concerning the solution of the Cyprus Problem
- The initiatives taken by the international community for solving the Cyprus Problem
- The main reasons behind the failure to find a solution
- The role of the great powers in the efforts to find a solution
- The main changes between the proposals presented by the international community over the years

Keywords

- Makarios
- Denktash
- freedom of movement
- freedom of settlement
- Henry Kissinger
- ABC Plan
- core issues
- Executive
- European Community
- Territory
- proximity talks
- Ghali Ideas
- Spyros Kyprianou
- Butros Butros Ghali
- First High Level Agreement
- right of property
- arms embargo on Turkey
- Second High Level Agreement
- The “Cuellar Indicators”
- “turkish republic of northern cyprus”
- Resolution 541
- Resolution 550
- Legislative
- 5 points scenario
- Draft Agreement on Cyprus
- Draft Framework Agreement
- The Soviet Union Proposals
- international conference for Cyprus

- political equality
- Glafkos Clerides
- Kofi Annan
- Montreux
- Set of Ideas for an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus
- Confidence Building Measures
- Troutbeck
- George Vasiliou

Introduction

Following the Turkish invasion, the Greek Cypriot side in its effort to start negotiations and solve the Cyprus problem put forward to the Turkish Cypriot side, on 10 February 1975, certain proposals, based on the UN relevant resolutions regarding Cyprus. Negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary General took place between April 1975 and May 1976 in Nicosia, Vienna and New York, but due to the Turkish attitude in the negotiations, no progress was achieved. It was obvious, from the proposals put forward by the Turkish side and its general attitude in the negotiating table that its main purpose was to use the period of the negotiations to gain time in order to consolidate the results of the invasion and occupation in the island.

The First High Level Agreement

On 9 January 1977 (after almost a year of stalemate in the talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots) and following an interview of President Makarios in London Times in which among others he stated that he was ready to accept a **federal solution** that would safeguard the unity of the state, the Turkish Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash sent a letter to Makarios stating that he was ready to meet him to discuss the Cyprus Problem. Makarios accepted the invitation of the Turkish Cypriot leader and on a meeting between the two on 12 February 1977, in the presence of the United Nations Secretary-General Dr. Kurt Waldheim, the leaders of the two communities, concluded the **First High Level Agreement**. The four points of the Agreement which would be used as guidelines for the solution of the Cyprus Problem were as follows:

1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.
3. Questions of principles **like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property** and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot Community.
4. The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.

(<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/263FD94AA15B6F2DC2256D6D00311D48?OpenDocument>)

The acceptance of federation by Makarios was a major concession for the Greek Cypriot side. By accepting the aforementioned agreement the Greek Cypriots believed that the solution would come closer and the Turkish Cypriots would accept to alter the positions they had put forward until that time and were in favour of a confederal or two states solution. The First High Level Agreement led to the resumption of talks in Vienna during the period 31 March to 7 April 1977. By agreeing to go in Vienna, the Greek Cypriot side undertook the responsibility to submit first its proposals on the territorial aspect, accompanied by map, while the Turkish Cypriot side would submit first its proposals on the constitutional aspect (Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, *Τα Σχέδια Λύσης του Κυπριακού, 1948-1978*, Αθήνα 2009, σσ. 207-208). At the same time, both sides undertook to discuss in a meaningful and substantive way each other's proposals; and that all proposals submitted should be within the framework of the First High Level Agreement. By accepting those specific commitments the Greek Cypriot side was expecting, having in mind that in previous occasions efforts had failed, that the negotiations in Vienna would be meaningful and substantive. It is important to mention, that the

acceptance of the specific commitments by the two sides was due to the involvement of Clark Clifford who was appointed by the US President Jimmy Carter as a US Representative for Cyprus. Clifford's main objective was the resumption of talks in order for the US Government (using as a pretext the negotiations) to ask Congress to lift the arms embargo on Turkey which was imposed following the use of US military equipment in the 1974 invasion (Ioannides, Chris P, *Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean, From Kissinger and the Cyprus Crisis to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish Arms Embargo*, New York 2001, pp. 190-203).

The talks resumed in the presence of the United Nations Secretary General while the two sides were represented by interlocutors. During the talks and while the Greek Cypriot side honoured its commitments (on the territorial issue it proposed that the area under Turkish Cypriot administration would be 20% of the territory of Cyprus), the Turkish Cypriot side refused to do so, since its proposals on the constitutional aspect did not comply with the guidelines agreed on the First High Level Agreement. Instead, and following its previous attitude, the Turkish Cypriot side proposed two separate states loosely connected. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot side refused to comment on the Greek Cypriot proposals on the territorial aspect, claiming that it was not willing to give territory back. As a result the talks resulted in a new deadlock (Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, *Τα Σχέδια λύσης του Κυπριακού, 1948-1978*, Αθήνα 2009, σσ. 208-209; Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, «Διπλωματική ιστορία του Κυπριακού, 1970-1979», στο *Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, 1970-1979, Η δεκαετία της κυπριακής τραγωδίας*, τομ. 2, Φιλελεύθερος, Λευκωσία, Ιανουάριος 2011, σσ. 182-189).



President Spyros Kyprianou

On 3 August 1977, President Makarios died and Spyros Kyprianou, the then President of the House of Representatives, became President of the Republic of Cyprus. On January 1978, the UN Secretary General asked the Turkish Cypriot side to put forward concrete proposals regarding constitutional and territorial issues. Based on the content of the Turkish Cypriot proposals the Secretary General would decide if there was common ground for the resumption of the talks. The Turkish Cypriot proposals (April 1978) were of the same context as it was before: partition of Cyprus in two states, while in the territorial issue was proposing the return of approximately 1% of the territory under occupation (Συνάντηση Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή – Helmut Schmidt, 3 Μαΐου 1978, *Αρχείο Καραμανλή*, τόμ. 10, σ. 202· Γιάννης Κ. Λάμπρου, *Ιστορία του Κυπριακού, Τα Χρόνια μετά την Ανεξαρτησία, 1960-2004*, Λευκωσία 2004, σ. 677). As a result of the Turkish proposals, no common ground was achieved and the negotiations did not resumed.

The first plan for the solution of the Cyprus Problem. The ABC Plan

In the meantime, following the Turkish invasion of 1974, on February 1975 the US Congress imposed an **arms embargo** on Turkey on the grounds that US military equipment was used during the Turkish military invasion in Cyprus. According to the relevant decision of the Congress the use of US military equipment in the Turkish invasion in Cyprus violated the provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which prohibits the use of US weapons for purposes other than national self-defence. From the very beginning of the decision, the US Government, and more specifically the US Secretary of State **Henry Kissinger** initiated a campaign for the lifting of the embargo (Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, *Τα Σχέδια λύσης του Κυπριακού, 1948-1978*, Αθήνα 2009, σσ. 203-208). His main arguments were that the embargo was causing serious problem to the NATO capabilities in the Southeastern Europe, and there was a possibility for Turkey to develop its relations with the Soviet Union. During the same period and following the decision of the Congress, Turkey, in order to get the attention of the US and the Western World and push them for the lifting of the embargo, started to enhance its relations with Moscow and the communist block countries of Europe. The efforts of those in favour of lifting the embargo did not succeed due to the existence of the Cyprus Problem and the lack of progress in the efforts to find a solution to the problem due to the Turkish intransigence (Ioannides, Chris P., *Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean, From Kissinger and the Cyprus Crisis to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish Arms Embargo*, New York 2001, pp. 190-203).

In this context, during the first days of 1977 the US Department of State initiated a campaign for the the resumption of talks between the leaders of the two communities in order to make it easier for the US Government to ask from Congress the lifting of the embargo. The initiative of the State Department officials and the Pentagon (and following several failed attempts for the resumption of talks), led to the lifting of the embargo in September 1978 and the development of a joint initiative from the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada for solving the Cyprus problem. Their initiative resulted, on 10 November 1978, in a specific proposal to the two sides in Cyprus. The plan proposed would be used, if both sides agreed, for the resumption of the negotiations for finding a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus Problem.

The main points of the so called American – British – Canadian **(ABC) Plan** with the title “Framework for a Settlement”, according to which the parties to the intercommunal talks would negotiate in good faith and in a sustained manner, under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General, towards a comprehensive Cyprus settlement, were:

(1) The Republic of Cyprus shall be a bicomunal federal state with two constituent regions, one of which will be inhabited predominantly by Greek Cypriots, the other predominantly by Turkish

Cypriots. The independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus shall be assured, as shall its right to conduct a policy of nonalignment should it so choose. The incorporation of all, or part, of the Republic into any other state shall be expressly prohibited.

(2) A new constitutional structure for the Republic of Cyprus, incorporating an operative federal system of government, shall be negotiated on the basis of the provisions set forth herein. The negotiations shall be guided by the Makarios-Denktaş instructions of February 1977, shall draw upon pertinent elements of the Constitution of 1960, and shall bear in mind United Nations resolutions. Substantial powers and responsibilities will be reserved to the two constituent regions in such a manner as to protect the rights and to meet the concerns of members of both communities.

(3) Fundamental rights and liberties, to include freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and the right to property ownership, shall be embodied in the federal Constitution subject only to such modifications as are required to preserve the character of each region.

(4) The following powers and functions shall reside in the federal Government of Cyprus: Foreign Affairs, External Defense, Currency and Central Banking, Interregional and Foreign Commerce, Communications, Federal Finance, Customs, Immigration, and Civil Aviation. Powers and functions not explicitly granted to the federal government shall be reserved to the two constituent regions. Powers and functions initially exercised by the regions may be assumed by the federal government upon joint agreement of the two regions.

(5) The federal government shall be structured along the following lines:

(a) Legislative authority shall be vested in a bicameral legislature, the upper chamber to represent the two communities on a basis of equality and the lower chamber to be elected in proportion to population.

(b) In the event that a majority in the upper chamber fails to concur in a bill passed by the lower chamber, a subsequent affirmative two-thirds vote in the lower chamber shall be sufficient to enact, provided that at least three-eighths of the representatives from each community concur therein.

(c) There shall be a President and a Vice President, elected through democratic processes, one of whom shall be from one community and the other from the other community. In the event of the incapacity or temporary absence of the President, the Vice President shall act in his stead. The President and Vice President shall jointly appoint a Council of Ministers. Neither community shall have less than 30 percent of the ministerial portfolios. The President and the Vice President may jointly veto federal legislative acts, although their veto may be over-ridden by a two-thirds vote in each chamber.

(d) A Federal Supreme Court shall be established, to consist of one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot, and one non-Cypriot appointed jointly by the President and the Vice President. The Court shall have the function of interpreting the Constitution and shall act as the highest court of appeal where federal legislation is concerned.

(e) Provision shall be made for the fair participation of members of both communities in the federal civil services. Senior appointments shall be subject to approval, by the upper chamber of the legislature.

(6) The two regions shall establish regional governmental institutions for the purpose of carrying out the powers and functions reserved or assigned to them under the Constitution. The executive and legislature of each region shall be democratically elected. The parties to the intercommunal talks shall discuss ways of ensuring the necessary degree of congruity between the governmental institutions of the two regions.

(7) An Agency for Regional Cooperation and Coordination shall be established, jointly headed by a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot and staffed by an equal number of representatives of each constituent region. The Agency will foster practical cooperation between the two regions, especially in the economic and commercial field; will seek the maximum possible compatibility between the two regions; and will promote the unity of the nation.

(8) The specific territory under the administration of each region shall be negotiated on the basis of criteria such as economic viability and productivity, land ownership, security, population patterns, and historical factors. In this regard, it is understood that the Turkish Cypriot side will agree to significant geographical adjustments in favor of the Greek Cypriot side.

(9) The parties shall make provision, to the extent feasible and consistent with the bicomunal character of the Republic, for the return of displaced persons to their properties and for the settlement of claims that may be made by those who are unable or do not choose so to return.

(10) An integral part of a final settlement shall be the withdrawal of non-Cypriot armed forces (except for those specifically agreed to) from the territory of the Republic. Consideration may be given to a possible phased demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus in a manner that will best assure the security of the Republic and its citizens under a final settlement. It would be understood that demilitarization would not preclude lightly-armed regional police forces with the function of maintaining law and order within each region.

(11) There shall be established a Cyprus Reconciliation Fund, financed primarily by the federal government and administered jointly by the two regions, that will provide funds for development projects designed to assist in the process of readjustment subsequent to a settlement and to assist those sectors of the Republic that have the greatest economic and social need. Other governments and international organizations would be invited to contribute to the Fund.

(12) In order to promote an atmosphere of goodwill and to resolve pressing humanitarian problems, the Varosha area shall be resettled under UN auspices in accordance to provisions specified in a document attached to ABC Plan. Such resettlement shall be initiated in phase with the resumption of full intercommunal negotiations on a comprehensive agreement.

The attached to the Plan document with the title "The Varosha Area" under which the parties to the intercommunal talks should cooperate with the Secretary General of the United Nations and his representatives in arranging the modalities for an early resettlement of the Varosha area. The

guidelines that would obtain were:

(a) The area for resettlement shall encompass territory lying to the east of the village of Ayios Nikolaos and to the south of the old Nicosia-Famagusta road. In defining the precise area for resettlement, the concerns of the Turkish Cypriot party for the security of Old Famagusta and Famagusta Harbor shall be taken into account.

(b) The area for resettlement shall be administered under the supervision of the United Nations, and shall be considered as an extension of the present United Nations buffer zone. There shall be a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot liaison officer to the United Nations authorities for this purpose. Cypriot laws and regulations shall be in force in the area of resettlement.

(c) It is understood that as many former residents of the area of resettlement may return as choose. There shall be no fixed numerical limitation.

(d) Those who return to the area for resettlement shall not be subject to further involuntary displacement.

(Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, *Τα Σχέδια λύσης του Κυπριακού, 1948-1978*, Αθήνα 2009, σσ. 216-219; Συρίγος, Άγγελος, *Σχέδιο Ανάν: Οι κληρονομίες του παρελθόντος και οι προοπτικές του μέλλοντος*, Αθήνα 2005, σσ. 94-96; Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, «Το Αμερικανοβρετανοκαναδικό Σχέδιο για επίλυση του Κυπριακού, 1978», *Χρονικό*, τεύχος 104, Εφημερίδα Πολίτης, 21 Φεβρουαρίου 2010).

The Greek Cypriot side did not accept the Plan on the grounds that serious concessions on its side would have to take place from the first stages of the implementation phase while that was not the case with the Turkish actions. At the same time, the Greek Cypriot side claimed that the Plan had a lot of confederal provisions and at the same time stated that it wanted a Plan proposed by the UN Secretary General and not three Western countries. The Turkish Cypriot leader did not comment on the Plan. The ABC Plan even though did not achieve to solve the Cyprus Problem, it is of crucial importance since as the first detailed proposed Plan after the Turkish invasion of 1974 is used, until today, as the basis for any proposed solution for solving the Cyprus Problem (Συρίγος, Άγγελος, *Σχέδιο Ανάν: Οι κληρονομίες του παρελθόντος και οι προοπτικές του μέλλοντος*, Αθήνα 2005, σσ. 94-95).

The Second High Level Agreement

Few months after the failure of the American initiative, on 19 May 1979, in a meeting, under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General, between the leaders of the two communities, Spyros Kyprianou and Rauf Denktash, a **Second High Level Agreement** was reached. The text of the agreement which would be used as guideline for the solution of the Cyprus Problem was as follows:

1. The two sides agreed to resume the intercommunal talks on 15 June 1979.
2. The basis for the talks will be the Makarios - Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the UN relevant to the Cyprus question resolutions.
3. There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic.
4. The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.
5. Priority will be given to reaching agreement for the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem.
6. Both sides agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.
7. The demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating thereto will be discussed.
8. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.
9. The intercommunal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained matter, avoiding any delay.
10. The intercommunal talks will take place in Nicosia.

(<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/1ED21A110C7E672FC2256D6D0032A808?OpenDocument>)

The negotiations that resumed following the Second High Level Agreement, on 15 June 1979, collapsed immediately due to the Turkish stance (Ομιλία υπουργού Εξωτερικών Γεώργιου Ράλλη στη Γενική

Συνέλευση των Ηνωμένων Εθνών, 26 Σεπτεμβρίου 1979, *Αρχείο Καραμανλή*, τόμ. 10, σ. 223). As a result, the UN publicly recognized that the new deadlock was due to the positions presented by the Turkish Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash. With UN initiative, a new round of negotiations resumed in August 1980. According to the opening statement of the UN Representative, the Secretary-Generals' understanding of the common ground that was worked out in the course of consultations which took place over past several months, was that:

(a) Both parties have reaffirmed the validity of the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979,

(b) Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a bizonal solution of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem,

(c) Both parties have indicated that the matter of security can be raised and discussed in the intercommunal talks. It is understood that this matter will be discussed, having regard to certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as to the security of Cyprus as a whole

(d) Both parties have appealed to the Secretary-General for the continuation of the intercommunal talks.

(Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>)

At his opening statement, the UN Representative also stated that concerning the matters to be discussed in the negotiations, the Secretary-General understood, on the basis of the 19 May High level Agreement, that these would include: (a) Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices, in accordance with the provisions of Point 5 of the 19 May Agreement, (b) Initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the provisions of Point 6 of the Agreement, which states that special importance will be given to this matter, (c) Constitutional aspects, (d) Territorial aspects (Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>).

The first round of the talks started in Nicosia on September 1980. After the two sides expressed their ideas on the issues mentioned above, it was obvious once more, that there was no common ground for meaningful negotiations. The proposals put forward by the Turkish Cypriot side (on 5 August 1981) were outside the parameters of the High Level Agreements of both 1977 and 1979. More specifically the proposals of the Turkish Cypriot side were once again close to a confederal solution of two separate states, while on the territorial issue they proposed the return of 2.6% of the occupied territories under which it would be possible for 31,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their homes (Γιάννης Κ. Λάμπρου, *Ιστορία του Κυπριακού, Τα Χρόνια μετά την Ανεξαρτησία, 1960-2004*, Λευκωσία 2004, σσ. 685-686; Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, «Προσπάθειες διευθέτησης του κυπριακού στην δεκαετία του '80», στο *Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, 1980-1989, Η δεκαετία της ανασυγκρότησης*, τομ. 3, Φιλελεύθερος, Λευκωσία, Μάιος 2011, σσ. 75-83).

The “Cuellar Indicators”

With UN initiative, the negotiations continued, but it was obvious that there was no real progress since each side was insisting on its positions. In this regard, the UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar decided that, instead of letting the two sides put forward proposals and express their views in an unending discussion without positive outcome, he would take the initiative. On 8 August 1983, he put forward specific proposals on the **core issues** of the Cyprus problem: **Executive, Legislative** and **Territory**. The proposals were remain known as “**Cuellar Indicators**” and the purpose was for the discussions between the two sides to take place within the framework/limits of these Indicators. In this regard for each issue the Secretary General proposed two options, and asked the interested parties to inform him if they agreed to start negotiations within the limits defined by the Indicators.

On the Executive the Secretary General proposed EITHER the leader of the Greek Cypriots to be the President of the Federal Cyprus, the leader of the Turkish Cypriots to be the Vice President, together with a proportion of 60% for Greek Cypriots and 40% for Turkish Cypriots in the federal executive, OR the leaders of the two communities to be appointed head of State and Government respectively on a rotation basis together with a proportion of 70% for Greek Cypriots and 30% for Turkish Cypriots in the federal executive.

On the Legislative the Secretary General proposed EITHER a lower chamber with proportional representation and an upper chamber with equal representation, OR a lower chamber with 30% Turkish Cypriots and 70% Greek Cypriot representation and an upper chamber with equal representation.

On the issue of Territory the Secretary General proposed EITHER the territory under Greek Cypriot control to be 77% and 23% under Turkish Cypriot control, OR the territory under Greek Cypriot control to be 70% and 30% under Turkish Cypriot control.

(Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>; Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, «Προσπάθειες διευθέτησης του κυπριακού στην δεκαετία του '80», στο *Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, 1980-1989, Η δεκαετία της ανασυγκρότησης*, τομ. 3, Φιλελεύθερος, Λευκωσία, Μάιος 2011, σσ. 75-83).

The leader of the Greek Cypriot community Spyros Kyprianou without officially rejecting the UN Secretary General Indicators he put forward to the Secretary General certain preconditions in a way it was obvious that he did not agree with their content. The Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash rejected the proposal of the Secretary General.

Few days later, on 15 November 1983, Denktash announced the establishment of the so called “**turkish republic of northern cyprus**” in the area of the Republic of Cyprus under Turkish military control (Βενιζέλος, Κώστας, «Η ανακήρυξη του ψευδοκράτους, 15 Νοεμβρίου 1983», στο *Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, 1980-1989*, τομ. 3, Φιλελεύθερος, Λευκωσία, Μάιος 2011, σσ. 84-91). The same day, the so called “trnc” was recognised by Turkey which, until today, is the only country that

recognizes such a “state”. Three days after the illegal declaration of the so called “trnc” the United Nations Security Council adopted, on 18 November 1983, its **Resolution 541**, by 13 votes in favour, 1 against (from Pakistan) and 1 abstention (from Jordan). The Resolution, which has great importance until today, deplored the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus, considered such an act as legally invalid and called for its withdrawal. At the same time, with the said Resolution, the Security Council called upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus, 1960 – 2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia 2006, pp. 87-88).

On 11 May 1984, the United Nations Security Council, with 13 votes in favour, 1 against (from Pakistan) and 1 abstention (from the United States), adopted **Resolution 550** which until today is the most important UNSC Resolution on Cyprus. With this Resolution, the Security Council gravely concerned with the further secessionist acts in the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus (namely the purported “exchange of Ambassadors” between Turkey and the legally invalid “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” and the contemplated holding of a “constitutional referendum” and “elections”, as well as by other actions aimed at further consolidating the purported independent state and the division of Cyprus) and the Turkish threats for settlement of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants, reaffirmed the call upon all States not to recognise the purported state of the “turkish republic of northern cyprus” set up by secessionist acts and called upon them not to facilitate or in any way assist this the aforesaid secessionist entity. At the same time with the Resolution, the Security Council calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and considered attempts to settle any part of Varosha (the fenced area of Famagusta) by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible. Furthermore, it called for the transfer of this area to the administration of the United Nations. Moreover, the Security Council requested the Secretary General to undertake new efforts to attain an overall solution to the Cyprus problem in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions for such a settlement laid down in the pertinent United Nations resolutions (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus, 1960 – 2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia 2006, pp. 90-91).

Following the secessionist act by Turkey in the occupied areas of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot side proposed on 11 January 1984, the “**Framework for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem**”. The main points of the proposal were: on the territorial issue the region under Turkish Cypriot administration to be between 23% - 25%, on the executive the continuation of the 1960 Constitution (Greek Cypriot President and Turkish Cypriot Vice President, 7 Greek Cypriot ministers and 3 Turkish Cypriots) and on the legislature while the Greek Cypriot side was expressing its preference for one House it was ready to accept, as an alternative, the creation of two bodies, the Lower Chamber (representation based on population) and the Upper Chamber (representation would depend on the powers and functions of this body) (Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>).

The Turkish Cypriot side rejected the Framework proposed by Kyprianou and the UN Secretary General in an effort to achieve the resumption of the talks and avoid further deterioration of the situation, proposed in April 1984, a **5 points scenario**. The main points of the scenario were that (a) No further step to internationalize the Cyprus problem would be undertaken by the Greek Cypriot side, (b) there would be no follow-up to the illegal declaration of the so called “trnc” by the Turkish side, (c) the two sides would not proceed with measures that would lead to an increase to their military forces, (d) the Varosha area would be handed over to the UN within a period of 6-9 months, (e) The legal inhabitants of the said area, which would be part of the buffer zone, would return (Μιλτιάδης Χριστοδούλου, *Η Πορεία των Ελληνοτουρκικών Σχέσεων και η Κύπρος*, τομ. Β, Λευκωσία 1995, σσ. 570-571; Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>).

While the Greek Cypriot side accepted the proposals of the Secretary General, the Turkish Cypriot side, with the backing of Ankara, once more rejected it on the grounds that the UN Secretary General did not have the authority, under the relevant UN Resolutions, to put forward specific proposals regarding the solution of the Cyprus Problem. In his letter to the Secretary General, the Turkish Cypriot leader stated that “the exercise in which we are at present engaged is being conducted within the context of the mission of good offices entrusted to you by the Security Council on 12 March 1975...Such a mission of good offices clearly involves a process or consultations or soundings with both sides with a view to finding a mutually acceptable formula for the resumption of negotiations between the two sides on its existing, mutually agreed basis” (Report by Secretary General, S/16519, 1 May 1984).

Developments from the end of 1984 to August 1985

The UN Secretary General in a new effort for the resumption of the negotiations invited, on 10 September 1984, the leaders of the two communities in New York for “**proximity talks**”. Three rounds of talks took place in New York between September and December 1984. Despite that in the two first rounds no real progress was achieved, in the third round Denktash changed his attitude and expressed willingness to accept certain provisions that he rejected, even to discuss, in the past. In this regard, the Secretary General, encouraged by the developments, invited the two leaders in New York on a High Level Meeting between 17 and 20 January 1985. The meeting did not have concrete results since Kyprianou, who had the impression that the meeting in New York would be another round of talks and that he would have the opportunity to ask for clarifications in certain issues (like the guarantees and the withdrawal of foreign troops), refused to sign a document presented by the UN Secretary General. After the refusal of the Greek Cypriot leader, Denktash did not comment on the request of the Secretary General, and another initiative came to an end, with the Greek Cypriot side to be considered responsible for the deadlock (Κουφουδάκης, Βαγγέλης, «Σχέδιο Ντε Κουεγιαρ και Πολιτική της Τουρκίας», στο *Διαστάσεις των Ελληνοτουρκικών Σχέσεων: Αιγαίο – Κύπρος*, Αθήνα 1988; Evriviades, Marios, *The US and Cyprus: The Politics of Manipulation in the 1985 UN Cyprus High Meeting*, Athens 1992; Πολυβίου, Πολύβιος Γ., *Κυπριανού και Κυπριακό, Η Συνάντηση Κορυφής της Νέας Υόρκης το 1985*, Αθήνα 2010, σσ. 86-88; Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>; de Cuellar, Javier Perez, *Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary General's Memoir*, New York 1997).

In a new effort, the Secretary General proposed to the two sides on 12 April 1985 two documents with the titles “**Draft Agreement on Cyprus**” and “**Draft Statement by the Secretary General on the Agreement on Cyprus**”. The Draft Agreement was very close to what the Secretary General had proposed the two to leaders sign during the High Level Meeting on January 1985. More specifically, on the core issues, the Draft Agreement proposed: for the legislative two chambers (lower chamber 70 to 30 representation, and upper chamber 50 / 50), for the executive a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot President, 7 to 3 ratio for the ministers and for the territory 29% for the Turkish Cypriots and 71% for the Greek Cypriots. The Secretary General asked the two leaders to accept and sign the Agreement so it would be used as the basis for further negotiations ((Πολυβίου, Πολύβιος Γ., *Κυπριανού και Κυπριακό, Η Συνάντηση Κορυφής της Νέας Υόρκης το 1985*, Αθήνα 2010, σσ. 136-143; Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, «Προσπάθειες διευθέτησης του κυπριακού στην δεκαετία του '80», στο *Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, 1980-1989, Η δεκαετία της ανασυγκρότησης*, τομ. 3, Φιλελεύθερος, Λευκωσία, Μάιος 2011, σσ. 75-83; Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>). The Greek Cypriot leader, even though he had refused to sign similar


documents few months earlier, informed the Secretary General that he accepted the documents and he was ready to sign. The Turkish Cypriot leader, on August 1985, informed the Secretary General that he refused to sign the documents.

The Soviet Union proposals

On 21 January 1986, the Soviet Union announced for the first time certain proposals concerning the international aspects of the Cyprus Problem and more specifically the launching of an **international conference for Cyprus**. According to the relevant announcement from Moscow: “1. The proceedings of such a conference could result in signing a treaty or another document stipulating the following integrally interconnected components of the settlement: demilitarization of the island, including the withdrawal of all foreign troops, dismantling of all foreign military bases and installations; a system of effective international guarantees ensuring independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus; respect by all parties of its status of a non-aligned state, 2. The international guarantees of Cyprus independence should exclude the possibility of any future outside interference whatsoever into the affairs of the Republic. As guarantors might be named the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council or the Security Council as a whole, Greece and Turkey as well as some non-aligned countries. Measures towards implementing the guarantees shall be taken upon universal consent of all the guarantor-states. Cyprus should not be subject to use or threat of use of force, 3. The participants to the conference could include the Republic of Cyprus (with representation of both communities), Greece and Turkey, all member-states of the Security Council. It is also possible to engage other countries, particularly non-aligned, to participate in the conference” («Σοβιετικές Προτάσεις για λύση του Κυπριακού», *Ελευθεροτυπία* (εφημερίδα), Λευκωσία, 22 Ιανουαρίου 1986, σ. 1· «Προτάσεις της ΕΣΣΔ για το Κυπριακό», *Τα Νέα* (εφημερίδα), Αθήνα, 22 Ιανουαρίου 1986, σ. 2; *Cyprus: The 1986 Soviet Proposal*, Congressional Research Services, 1986). While the Greek Cypriot side approached favorably the Soviet proposal, especially due to its reference on the launching of an international conference which was a constant Greek Cypriot request, the Turkish side rejected it.

On 29 March 1986, the UN Secretary General in a new effort proposed to the leaders of the two communities a new “Draft Framework Agreement”. According to the new proposal of the Secretary General, the legislative would be composed by two chambers (lower chamber 70 to 30 representation, and upper chamber 50 to 50), for the executive a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot President, 7 to 3 ratio for the ministers and for the territory 29+% for the Turkish Cypriots and 71-% for the Greek Cypriots (Πολυβίου, Πολύβιος Γ., *Κυπριανού και Κυπριακό, Η Συνάντηση Κορυφής της Νέας Υόρκης το 1985*, Αθήνα 2010, σσ. 144-150· Άγγελος Μ. Συρίγος, *Σχέδιο Ανάν, Οι κληρονομίες του παρελθόντος και οι προοπτικές του μέλλοντος*, Αθήνα 2005, σσ. 97-100· Πέτρος Λιάκουρας, *Το Κυπριακό, Από τη Ζυρίχη στη Λουκέρνη, Σε Αναζήτηση Ομοσπονδιακής Επίλυσης*, Αθήνα 2007, σσ. 322-324; Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>). The Greek Cypriot side informed the Secretary General that before expressing its views on the proposals included in the “Draft Framework Agreement”, it was necessary to have an agreement on basic issues of the Cyprus problem such as the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Cyprus, the settlers and the

guarantees. From his side, Denktash, in a letter to the Secretary General and after stating his positions on certain issues, accepted (under certain conditions) the new proposal of the Secretary General. On 10 June 1986, Kyprianou informed the Secretary General of the rejection of his proposal because of his refusal to discuss and agree first on important and core issues for the Greek Cypriot side like those mentioned above (Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, «Προσπάθειες διευθέτησης του κυπριακού στην δεκαετία του '80», στο *Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, 1980-1989, Η δεκαετία της ανασυγκρότησης*, τομ. 3, Φιλελεύθερος, Λευκωσία, Μάιος 2011, σσ. 75-83).



President George Vasiliou

In 1988 **Spyros Kyprianou** lost the presidential elections, and **George Vasiliou** was elected President of the Republic of Cyprus. From the very beginning, the new Greek Cypriot leader expressed his willingness for the solution of the Cyprus Problem. Coming from the world of business and without any “connection or relation” with the political past of Cyprus, Vasiliou had the belief that there was no problem that could not be solved (*Προγραμματικές δηλώσεις του Προέδρου της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας Γεώργιου Βασιλείου στην Βουλή των Αντιπροσώπων, 28 Φεβρουαρίου 1988*). The UN Secretary General encouraged by the readiness of the new Greek Cypriot leader for a speedy solution which was proved not only by his attitude in the meetings with the Turkish Cypriot leader, but also by his comprehensive proposals to the UN under the title “**For the Establishment of a Federal Republic and for the Solution of the Cyprus Problem**” (proposed on 30 January 1989, [http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/1CF2A298CB8C65CEC2256D6D00344433/\\$file/Proposals%201989.pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/1CF2A298CB8C65CEC2256D6D00344433/$file/Proposals%201989.pdf)), proposed to Vasiliou and Denktash, in July 1989, a “Set of Ideas”. The plan of the Secretary General was for his Ideas to be used as a food for thought during direct negotiations between the two sides. Concerning the issues of the executive and legislature, the “Set of Ideas” were very close to previous UN proposals. On the sensitive issue of the three freedoms (the freedom of movement and of settlement and the right of property) in the “Set of Ideas” was stated that they would be recognised in the constitution. More specifically (a) the right of movement will be exercised without any restrictions as soon as the federal republic is established, and (b) the right of property and settlement will be implemented taking into account the ceilings to be agreed upon concerning the number of persons from one community who may reside in the area administered by the other and the amount of property which persons of one community may own in the federated state administered by other (Μιλτιάδης Χριστοδούλου, *Η Πορεία των Ελληνοτουρκικών Σχέσεων και η Κύπρος*, Τόμος Β', Λευκωσία 1995, σσ. 651-656). The Greek Cypriot leader George Vasiliou, even though he disagreed with certain provisions of the “Set of Ideas” accepted to discuss them, as a food for thought. On the other side, the Turkish Cypriot leader, following his usual negative approach rejected the Ideas and once more questioned the authority of the Secretary General to put forward specific proposals for the Cyprus Problem. At the same time, Denktash repeated his well known position for a two states solution.

The Secretary General continued his efforts to find a common ground for the resumption of meaningful talks and he invited in New York (during the period 26 February to 2 March 1990) the leaders of the two communities. His main purpose was for the two leaders to agree on a draft outline

of an overall agreement for Cyprus. Denktash refused to engage in serious negotiations, while at the same time he put forward new demands that if to be accepted would change the whole nature of the negotiations. In this regard the effort collapsed, and the Secretary General in his report to the Security Council regarding his good office mission in Cyprus, dated 8 March 1990 (S/21183), stated, among other, that “in the course of the discussion, Mr Denktash had stated that the term ‘communities’ be used in a manner that was synonymous with the term ‘peoples’, each having a separate right to ‘self determination’. I stated that, in the context of the intercommunal talks, the introduction of terminology that was different from that used by the Security Council had thus posed more than a semantic problem and that, unless acceptable to both sides, any change in terminology could alter the conceptual framework to which all had thus far adhered. In the circumstances, I came to the conclusion, regrettably, that we faced an impasse of a substantive kind, which raised questions regarding the essence of the mandate of good offices given to me by the Security Council and therefore, regarding the basis of the talks” (*Report of the Secretary General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus*, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S21183.pdf>). The insistence of Denktash on the inclusion of the term “peoples” was a clear indication of his attitude towards the solution of the Cyprus Problem which was nothing else than a two states solution.

The deadlock continued and on 4 July 1990 the Republic of Cyprus applied for full membership in the then **European Community** (Κρανιδιώτης, Γιάννος (επιμ.), *Οι σχέσεις Κύπρου-Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας*, Αθήνα, Ι. Σιδέρης, 1993; Κρανιδιώτης, Γιάννος, *Προτάσεις για μια Ευρωπαϊκή Πολιτική*, Αθήνα-Κομοτηνή 1993; Κρανιδιώτης, Γιάννος Ν., Συρίχας, Γιώργος Λ. και Χαραλαμπίδης, Θεόδουλος Γ., *Κύπρος-Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα, Εξέλιξη και Προοπτική των Σχέσεων της Κύπρου με την Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα*, Λευκωσία 1994; Tsardanides, Charalambos, *The Politics of the EC – Cyprus Association Agreement: 1972 – 1992*, Nicosia 1988; Kranidiotis, Yiannos, “Cyprus and the European Community”, *Επετηρίς του Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, XX, Λευκωσία 1994, σσ. 649-686). Its application caused the reaction, both of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey. Denktash and Ankara stated that the Turkish Cypriot side would not accept to return to the negotiating table for direct talks as long as the Greek Cypriots insists on their application for membership in the the European Community.

A number of separate meetings between Representatives of the UN Secretary General and the leaders of the two communities which took place during the period 1990 to 1992 did not lead to the resumption of meaningful negotiations. The new UN Secretary General **Butros Butros Ghali** took an initiative for the resumption of talks between the two sides. In this regard, he invited the leaders of the two communities in New York during June to August 1992 to negotiate a framework of an agreement on the basis of ideas, including specific suggestions on territorial adjustments and the displaced persons. The so called “**Ghali Ideas**” (with the title “**Set of Ideas for an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus**”) was a framework agreement on Cyprus. The purpose was for the “Set of Ideas”, after being completed by the two leaders at a high level meeting, to be submitted in separate referendums in the two communities.

The set of ideas – The “Ghali Ideas”

According to the Set of Ideas which comprised more than 100 paragraphs (the most detailed and important document until that day – a significant number of its provisions were included in 2004 in the Annan Plan) Cyprus was the common home of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and their relationship is not one of majority and minority but one of two communities in the federal republic of Cyprus. Furthermore, the Plan ensured that the Cyprus settlement was based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities. It is important to mention that according to the Ideas political equality did not mean equal numerical participation in all branches and administration of the federal government. The **political equality** would be reflected in the fact that

(a) the approval and amendment of the federal constitution would require the approval of both communities,

(b) in the effective participation of both communities in all organs and decisions of the federal government,

(c) in safeguards to ensure that the federal government would not be empowered to adopt any measures against the interests of one community, and

(d) in the equality and identical powers and functions of the two federated states.

([http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/\\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20\(1992\).pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf); Συρίγος, Άγγελος, *Σχέδιο Ανάν: Οι κληρονομίες του παρελθόντος και οι προοπτικές του μέλλοντος*, Αθήνα 2005, σσ. 103-107)

The major provisions of the Plan were that, Cyprus would be a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation that would be established by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. All powers not vested by them in the federal government would rest with the two federated states. The federal republic would be secular and religious functionaries would be prohibited from holding elected or appointed political office in the federal government or in the federated states. The federal republic would maintain special ties of friendship with Greece and Turkey and would accord most favoured nation treatment to Greece and Turkey in connection with all agreements whatever their nature. The official languages of the federal republic would be Greek and Turkish, while the English language might also be used.

The federal Government would have the following powers and functions: (a) Foreign affairs, (b) Central bank functions, including the issuance of currency, (c) Customs and the coordination of international trade, (d) Airports and ports as concerns international matters, (e) Federal budget and federal taxation, (f) Immigration and citizenship, (g) Defense (to be discussed also in connection with the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance), (h) Federal judiciary and federal police; (i) Federal postal and telecommunications services, (j) Patents and trademarks, (k) Appointment of federal officials and civil servants (on a 70:30 Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot ratio), (l) Standard setting for public health, environment, use and preservation of natural resources, and weights and measures, (m) Coordination of tourism and industrial activities ([http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/\\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20\(1992\).pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf)).

The legislature would be composed of a lower house and an upper house. The presidents of the lower house and of the upper house could not come from the same community, while the president and vice-president of each house would not come from the same community. The lower house would be bi-communal with a 70:30 Greek Cypriot / Turkish Cypriot ratio and the upper house would have a 50:50 ratio representing the two federated states. All laws should be adopted by majority in each house. A majority of the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot representatives in the lower house might decide, on matters related to foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship, that the adoption of a law in the lower house would require separate majorities of the representatives of both communities. Separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot majorities would be required to constitute a quorum in each house. If a quorum was not attained in either house on two consecutive meetings because of the absence of a majority of one or both communities, the president of the relevant house would call a meeting in no less than five days and no more than ten days. At that meeting, a majority of the upper house would constitute a quorum. In the lower house, 30% of the total membership would constitute a quorum

([http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/\\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20\(1992\).pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf)).

The federal executive would consist of a president, a vice-president, and a council of ministers. The president and the vice president would symbolize the unity of the country and the political equality of the two communities. In the Plan was mentioned that on the question of the election of the president and the vice-president, the two sides have expressed different positions: The Greek Cypriots in favour of a system under which the president would be elected by popular universal suffrage, and the Turkish Cypriots in favour of a system under which the president would be rotated between the two communities. According to the Ideas, the issue of the election of the president and vice president, together with other issues that the Ghali Ideas wouldn't specifically provide a solution, would be agreed by the leaders of the two communities at a high level meeting.

At the same time, according to the Ideas, in order to facilitate the effective launching of the federal government and for the initial eight years, the president and vice-president would also be the heads of their respective federated states. There would be a council of ministers composed of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ministers on a 7:3 ratio. The president and vice-president would designate the ministers from their respective communities. One of the following three ministries, that is foreign

affairs, finance, or defence, would be allocated to a Turkish Cypriot minister, while the president and the foreign minister would not come from the same community.

Decisions of the council of ministers would be taken by majority vote. However, decisions concerning foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship would require the concurrence of both the president and the vice-president. At the same time, the president and the vice-president would, separately or conjointly, had the right to veto any law or decision of the legislature concerning foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship and to return any law or decision of the legislature or any decision of the council of ministers for reconsideration.

Concerning the federal judiciary would consist of a supreme court composed of an equal number of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges appointed jointly by the president and vice president with the consent of the upper house. The presidency of the supreme court would rotate between the senior Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members of the supreme court. At the same time, each federated state would have its own judiciary to deal with matters not attributed to the federal judiciary by the federal constitution ([http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/\\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20\(1992\).pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf)).

Concerning the three basic freedoms (the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right to property) the Set of Ideas provided that they would be safeguarded in the federal constitution. The freedom of movement would be exercised without any restrictions as soon as the federal republic was established, subject only to non-discriminatory normal police functions. The freedom of settlement and the right to property would be implemented after the resettlement process arising from the territorial adjustments has been completed

([http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/\\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20\(1992\).pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf)).

The 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance would continue to be in force. The Treaty of Guarantee would (a) ensure the independence and territorial integrity of the federal republic and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession, (b) ensure the security of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot federated states, and (c) ensure against the unilateral change of the new constitutional order of the federal republic by either community.

The Treaty of Alliance would provide for the stationing in Cyprus of Greek and Turkish contingents of equal size and equipment not exceeding a number of persons that would be agreed by the two communities. The Greek contingent would be stationed in the federated state administered by the Greek Cypriot community and could not enter the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community, while the Turkish contingent would be stationed in the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community and could not enter the federated state administered by the Greek Cypriot community. Furthermore, the federal republic would maintain a federal force consisting of a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot unit of equal size and equipment not exceeding the size of the Greek and Turkish contingents, under the joint overall command of the president and the vice president (<http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF>

1/\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf).

Concerning the crucial issue of the territorial adjustments in the Ghali Ideas was attached a map setting out the territories of the two federated states. Persons affected by the territorial adjustments would have the option of remaining in the area concerned or relocating to the federated state administered by their own community. The property claims of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot displaced persons were recognized and would be dealt with fairly on the basis of a time-frame and practical regulations based on the 1977 High Level Agreement, on the need to ensure social peace and harmony. The first priority would be given to the satisfactory relocation of and support for Turkish Cypriots living in the area that would come under Greek Cypriot administration and to displaced persons returning to that area. Turkish Cypriots who in 1974 resided in the area that would come under Greek Cypriot administration would have the option to remain in their property or to request to receive a comparable residence in the area that would come under Turkish Cypriot administration. Turkish Cypriot displaced persons residing at that time in the area that would come under Greek Cypriot administration, would have the option to receive comparable residence in that area, to return to their former residence, or to receive a comparable residence in the area that would come under Turkish Cypriot administration ([http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/\\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20\(1992\).pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf)).

The ownership of the property of displaced persons, in respect of which those persons seek compensation, would be transferred to the ownership of the community in which the property was located. To this end, all titles of properties would be exchanged on a global communal basis between the two agencies at the 1974 value plus inflation. Displaced persons would be compensated by the agency of their community from funds obtained from the sale of the properties transferred to the agency, or through the exchange of property. The shortfall in funds necessary for compensation would be covered by the federal Government from a compensation fund obtained from various possible sources such as windfall taxes on the increased value of transferred properties following the overall agreement, and savings from defense spending.

In the Plan were also included a number of transitional arrangements that would be implemented in an 18-month period and it would be carried out in order to facilitate the implementation of the overall framework agreement. Furthermore in the Plan was attached an Appendix in which was included the programme of action to promote goodwill and close relations between the two communities.

Negotiations, based on the above mentioned proposals of the Secretary General took place during October and November 1992. According to the relevant report of the Secretary General to the Security Council, "In general terms, the Turkish Cypriot side affirmed that it was in 'basic agreement with 91 out of the 100 paragraphs' of the set of ideas, ... The Greek Cypriot side stated that it accepted the set of ideas and the map as a basis for reaching an overall framework agreement, subject to 'any improvements for the benefit of both communities'" (**Report of the Secretary General of 19 November 1992 on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, S/24830; Report of the Secretary-General provided pursuant to Commission on Human Rights decision 1992/106, 3 February 1993**, [http://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/\(Symbol\)/E.CN.4.1993.36.En?Opendocument](http://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.1993.36.En?Opendocument)). Because of the upcoming presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus, scheduled for February 2003, the leaders of the two communities and the Secretary General agreed to resume talks on March 2003.

The UN Secretary General proposal for confidence building measures

In the presidential elections, Vasiliou lost and **Glafkos Clerides** elected as new President of the Republic of Cyprus. Glerides met with Denktash in the presence of the Secretary General on 30 March 1993, and the two leaders agreed for the resumption of the talks in New York in May. In the meeting of the 24th May 1993, the Secretary General proposed to the two leaders a number of **Confidence Building Measures** (CBM) that would facilitate the effort towards finding a solution. The CBM were: (a) placing an important area of Varosha under the administration of the United Nations and its becoming a special area for bicomunal contact and commerce upon equally to both sides, (b) the re-opening, also under United Nations administration, of Nicosia International Airport for passenger and cargo traffic from and to both sides, and (c) number of measures to promote the bicomunal meetings in the island (such as meeting of political party leaders, expert cooperation in areas such as health and the environment, joint cultural and sports events) (<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S26026.pdf>).



President Glafkos Clerides

The Turkish Cypriots, in their first reactions, claimed that they did not fully accept the measures proposed by the Secretary General and they asked, among other, for the lifting of any restrictions on ports and airports in the occupied areas and the exclusion of certain area of Varosha from the area that would be returned under UN administration. At the same time the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash refused to give a concrete reply to the Secretary General on his proposal, stating that he wanted to return to Cyprus for consultations with his so called “government”. In this regard the Secretary General in his report to the Security Council on 1 July 1993 (S/26026) expressed his disappointment with the stance of the Turkish Cypriot leader ([http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S26026.pdf)

[S26026.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S26026.pdf)). The Greek Cypriot side accepted the confidence building measures proposed by the Secretary General, provided that no provisions were added that would have the effect, directly or indirectly, of recognizing the so called “turkish republic of northern cyprus”. While awaiting the final decision of the Turkish Cypriot leader, Clerides sent, on 21 December 1993, a letter to the Secretary

General proposing the disbandment of the National Guard and the return of all its arms and military equipment to the custody of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force. Clerides proposal was under the condition that together with the said measures, the Turkish forces would withdraw from Cyprus ([http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/D2DAA8FC0CC66A22C22571C7001E992F/\\$file/Report%20_7%20June%201994_.pdf?OpenElement](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/D2DAA8FC0CC66A22C22571C7001E992F/$file/Report%20_7%20June%201994_.pdf?OpenElement)).

In January 1994, Denktash accepted the CBM, in principle and under certain conditions and negotiations resumed in order to work out modalities for their implementation. However in the discussions that took place, the Turkish Cypriot side did not cooperate towards achieving this aim, and as a result the Secretary General on his report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus dated 30 May 1994 (S/1994/629) stated that “For the present, the Security Council finds itself faced with an already familiar scenario: the absence of an agreement due essentially to a lack of political will on the Turkish Cypriot side” (*Report of the Secretary General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, S/1994/629*). A new effort by the Secretary General, took place during October 1994, resulted in the same outcome for the same reasons as before: the Turkish Cypriot intransigence.

In the meantime, the prospect of Cyprus joining the European Community was now being approached as an opportunity for solving the Cyprus Problem. The US and the UK took the initiative for promoting the resumption of talks, under the auspices of the UN. At the same time the Anglo-American initiative was concentrated on Turkey, as a way to bypass the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. The Greek Cypriot side welcomed the initiative from Washington and London, stating at the same time that the UN and its relevant resolutions and decisions on Cyprus should not be bypassed. Their efforts did not bring serious progress towards the solution of the Problem.

On 1997, the new UN Secretary General **Kofi Annan** invited the leaders of the two communities in direct talks in **Troutbeck** (a New York suburb). During the talks (9-13 July 1997), the Secretary General presented to the two sides a document which was very close to the Ghali Ideas presented in the two sides in 1992. The talks resumed in **Montreux** (in Switzerland) on 11 August 1997, but collapsed few days later because of the positions put forward by the Turkish Cypriot leader. Denktash without commenting on the substance of the proposals put forward by the Secretary General demanded that the Republic of Cyprus withdrew its application for membership in the European Union. From its side, the Greek Cypriots accepted to start negotiations on the basis of the UN proposals.

On 31 August 1998 and contrary to all relevant UN resolutions concerning the solution of the Cyprus Problem, the Turkish Cypriot leader proposed the establishment of a Cyprus Confederation. As it was expected all parties involved in the effort to find a solution to the Cyprus Problem (except Turkey) rejected the Turkish Cypriot proposal. Once more the efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem reached a deadlock.

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3. International Peacemaking in Cyprus, 1980-1986 (<http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>)
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CHAPTER 12

**The Annan plan and
the April 2004 plebiscite.
Cyprus entry to the EU,
1999-2004**

N i k o s C h r i s t o d o u l i d e s

Aims

This chapter presents the developments from 1999 to 2004 which resulted, for the first time, in a Plan which was put in a referendum for the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to vote. Special reference will be made to the role of the international community during the 1999-2004 period and how the prospect of Cyprus joining the European Union was approached as a catalyst for finding a solution to the Cyprus Problem.

After studying this chapter, students will be familiar with

- The main provisions of the Annan Plan,
- The reasoning behind the positions presented by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides,
- The way the international community handled the efforts for finding a solution to the Cyprus Problem,
- The main reasons behind the decision of the Greek Cypriot community to vote against the Annan Plan V.

Keywords

- Alvaro De Soto
- Glafkos Clerides
- Kofi Annan
- core issues
- property issue
- settlers
- security
- guarantees
- Framework Agreement
- referendum
- Burgenstock
- Annan Plan V
- Conclusions of the European Council in Helsinki
- proximity talks
- direct negotiations
- territorial adjustments
- constitution
- Annan Plan I
- Annan Plan II
- Annan Plan III
- the European Council in Copenhagen
- Tassos Papadopoulos
- Annan Plan IV
- Cyprus in the European Union

Introduction

The prospect of Cyprus' entry in the European Union was approached by the international community as an opportunity for solving the Cyprus problem. In this regard, on 10 June 1999, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the G8 (the seven richest countries plus Russia) proposed to the UN Secretary General the launching of negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus Problem, without conditions, between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders (<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/foreign/fm9906010.htm>). By accepting the resumption of the negotiations, the leaders of the two communities would have to commit themselves to four principles: (a) no preconditions, (b) all issues on the table, (c) the leaders will attend the negotiations in a good faith until a solution will be reached and (d) the relevant UN resolutions and agreements will be taken under consideration.

The Conclusions of the European Union Council in Helsinki and the new effort for solving the Cyprus Problem

Following the call of the G8, the UN Secretary General asked the Greek Cypriot leader Glafkos Clerides and the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to agree for the resumption of the negotiations, under his auspices, for solving the Cyprus Problem. The two leaders replied positively to the call of the UN Secretary General, and on December 1999 the proximity talks started. In the meantime, the **Conclusions of the European Council** meeting in **Helsinki** (during the EU Finish Presidency) stated (among others) that the European Union welcomes the resumption of talks between the two communities in the island. In the Conclusions it was further mentioned that the solution of the Cyprus Problem would help the entrance of the Republic of Cyprus in the European Union, but if the solution of the Problem was not achieved before the conclusion of the negotiations of Cyprus with the European Union, the European Council would decide on the issue of Cyprus' joining the Union; thus the solution of the Cyprus Problem would not be a precondition for its entry (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm)

The negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus Problem under the auspices of the UN Secretary General continued with separate meetings of the UN Secretary General Special Advisor in Cyprus, the Peruvian diplomat Alvaro De Soto, with the leaders of the two communities. Together with Alvaro De Soto, the representative of the British Government for Cyprus, Lord David Hanney, the representative of the US President Alfred Mooses and the Special Coordinator for Cyprus of the US Department of State Tomas Weston played significant roles in the ongoing process (with meetings with the leaders of the two communities). Their major aim at the time was the replacement of the **proximity talks** with **direct negotiations** between the leaders of the two communities on the **core issues of the Cyprus Problem: territorial adjustments, property issue, settlers, constitution, security, guarantees**. Until that time the UN were proposing to the two sides different ideas on a number of issues and the two sides were replying to those proposals with their positions. Their aim through the replies of the two sides was to find common ground in order to be able to launch direct talks between the two sides.

After four rounds of proximity talks during the year 2000, the process reached a deadlock because of the positions presented by the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, and more specifically his

position for a confederal/two states solution to the Cyprus Problem. In September 2001, the UN Secretary General invited the leaders of the two communities to New York for separate meetings and with the aim of the resumption of the talks. The Greek Cypriot side replied positively to the invitation of the UN Secretary, while the Turkish Cypriot side, with the full support of the Turkish Government, replied negatively, stating that there was no common ground in order for the negotiations to be resumed. The international community, including the UN, the European Union and the major international actors in the Cyprus Problem (US and the UK), expressed their great disappointment with the position expressed by the Turkish Cypriot community and its unwillingness to commit itself in direct negotiations for finding a solution in the Cyprus problem.

The first visit of a President of the Republic of Cyprus to the occupied areas – The first visit of Denktash to the free areas of the Republic

The continual efforts for the resumption of the talks, lead to two private dinners in Cyprus, between the leaders of the two communities, in the presence of Alvaro De Soto. More specifically, on December 5, 2001, Glafkos Clerides, leader of the Greek Cypriot community and President of the Republic of Cyprus, visited the occupied area in order to participate in a private dinner with the Turkish Cypriot leader in the latter's residence. On December 29, a second private dinner took place at the residence of Glafkos Clerides and Denktash visited the free areas of the Republic of Cyprus for the first time since the Turkish invasion of 1974.

The continuous efforts led to the beginning of direct talks in Cyprus between the leaders of the two communities (on January 16, 2002) in the presence of the UN Secretary General Special Adviser (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/EC16EB05F3AF7856C22578380034CAB8?OpenDocument>). During the direct talks no real progress was achieved due to the position of the Turkish Cypriot side for a two-state solution which was contrary to all relevant UN resolutions on Cyprus as well as the two High Level Agreements. At the same time all the positions put forward by the Turkish Cypriot side attempted to promote the idea of two separate states, while on core issues for the Greek Cypriot side (like territorial adjustments and property issues) the Turkish Cypriot side would not accept to discuss or propose positions that would change the existing status quo. Among the main positions of the Turkish Cypriot side was also the need for recognition of the so called "turkish republic of northern cyprus".

While the direct talks were continuing without real progress due to the positions of the Turkish side, the international community, and especially the UN, tried to keep equal distances from the two communities, without blaming Mr. Denktash for the lack of progress. The attitude of the UN was due to its attempts to keep the process alive.

The Annan Plan I

In an effort to give new impetus to the process and to break the deadlock that had been reached, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Cyprus in May 2002 and had a meeting with the leaders of the two communities. The SG urged Clerides and Denktash, to continue the direct talks with the aim of reaching, as a first stage, a **Framework Agreement** regarding the core issues. The two sides exchanged documents on those core issues, like the property issue, and the one side commented on the other side's proposals. On September 6 and after more than fifty direct meetings between the leaders of the two communities, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan invited Clerides and Denktash for a meeting in Paris (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/EC16EB05F3AF7856C22578380034CAB8?OpenDocument>). New meetings of the two leaders with the Secretary General took place in New York on October 3 and 4, 2002. The Secretary General informed the two leaders that the UN was planning to put forward to the two sides a proposed plan for the solution of the Cyprus Problem. The international community was attempting, through the submission of a specific plan, to take advantage of the fact that in December 2002, **the forthcoming European Council in Copenhagen (EU Danish Presidency)**, would decide over the future of the Cyprus' application in the EU.

On Monday, November 11, the UN submitted to the two sides a plan for the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus Problem (the so called "**Annan Plan I**"). The Plan with the title "Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem" was presented to President Clerides in Nicosia and to the advisor of the Turkish Cypriot leader Ergun Olgun in New York (the Turkish Cypriot leader was in hospital in New York for medical examinations). The Annan Plan I was also presented in New York to the Permanent Representatives to the UN of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom (the three guarantor powers under the 1960 agreements that established the Republic of Cyprus). It was the first time since the emergence of the Cyprus Problem that the UN proposed such a comprehensive plan (145 pages); its purpose was to be used for further negotiations between the two sides and as final aim, to reach a solution to the Cyprus Problem (for the full version of the Annan Plan I visit http://www.kypros.org/Occupied_Cyprus/unplan.pdf. See also http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_Text.html).

In the first page of the Plan was mentioned:

"We, the democratically elected leaders of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, through negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in which each side represented itself, and no-one else, as the political equal of the other, have freely agreed to settle the Cyprus Problem in all its aspects in the following comprehensive manner:

Article 1 Foundation Agreement

1. The main articles of the appended Foundation Agreement (Appendix A) are hereby

agreed, as is the substance of the specially marked parts of the Annexes thereto and the map delineating the boundary between the component states. The Draft Annexes as a whole are hereby accepted as a basis for agreement to be finalized no later than 28 February 2003.

2. The finalization of all Draft Annexes shall be accompanied and facilitated by the appended measures. (Appendix B)

3. The Secretary-General is invited to certify the results of the finalization

process, and to include his suggestions, if any are indispensable, to finalize the Agreement.

4. That finalized Foundation Agreement shall be submitted by each side to referendum on 30 March 2003, together with other specified matters related to the coming into being of the new state of affairs, including accession to the European Union.

5. Should the Foundation Agreement not be approved at the separate simultaneous referenda, it shall be null and void, and the commitments undertaken in this Comprehensive Settlement shall have no further legal effect.

Article 2 Treaty on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus

Upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement, the Co-Presidents of Cyprus shall, on invitation and in the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (or his representative), sign the appended Treaty (Appendix C) with Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, which shall be registered as an international treaty in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 3 Matters to be submitted to the United Nations Security Council for decision

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to request the Security Council to take decisions as appended. (Appendix D)

Article 4 Conditions of accession to the European Union

Pursuant to the willingness of the European Union to accommodate the terms of a comprehensive settlement and to assist its implementation, as expressed in the conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 24 and 25 October, the requests to the European Union to attach the appended Protocol to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of Cyprus to the European Union, and to include the appended paragraph in the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, are hereby agreed.

(Appendix E)

Glafcos Clerides

Rauf Denktash

For the Greek Cypriot side

For the Turkish Cypriot side

The Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Turkey, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland hereby agree with this Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, and commit themselves to sign together with Cyprus the appended Treaty (Appendix C) on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus, which shall be registered as an international treaty in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Signature

Signature

Signature

Hellenic Republic

United Kingdom

Republic of Turkey

of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Witnessed by

Kofi A. Annan

Secretary-General of the United Nations”

The 5 Appendixes mentioned above were, Appendix A: Foundation Agreement, Appendix B: Measures to accompany and facilitate the finalization process, Appendix C: Treaty between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus, Appendix D: Matters to be submitted to the United Nations Security Council for decision, Appendix E: Requests to the European Union with respect to the accession of Cyprus to the European Union.

According to the timetable of the UN, the first round of negotiations between the leaders of the two communities had to be concluded by the beginning of December and to have as a result the endorsement by the leaders of the two communities, of the Basic Principles which would be the basis for the solution of the Cyprus Problem. In fact, the United Nations and the International Community wanted the two sides in the island to agree and sign, before the European Council in Copenhagen, the

main articles of the Foundation Agreement.

According to Annan Plan I “Each side shall organize a **referendum** on 30 March, asking the following question: “Do you: i) Approve the Foundation Agreement and all its Annexes, including the Constitution of Cyprus; ii) Approve the Constitution of the [Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot] component state and the provision as to the laws to be in force for the component state; iii) Approve the terms of the draft Treaty between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus, and require the signature by the Co-Presidents of the Treaty; iv) Approve the accession of Cyprus to the European Union in accordance with the conditions of accession laid down in the draft Treaty concerning accession of Cyprus to the European Union, and require the signature and ratification by the Co-Presidents of the Treaty?”

Yes []

No []”

(http://www.kypros.org/Occupied_Cyprus/unplan.pdf)

According to the Annan Plan I, after the signing of the said Agreement, there would follow, a second round of negotiations which would last until the day before the referendums. Should the Foundation Agreement not be approved at the separate simultaneous referenda, it would be null and void and the commitments undertaken in this Comprehensive Settlement would have no further legal effect.

During the period between the signature of the Comprehensive Settlement and the separate simultaneous referenda to approve the Foundation Agreement, certain provisions would be applied. Among these were that the two leaders would appoint Committees to finalize the Foundation Agreement, that a competition would be conducted to design a flag and compose an anthem for Cyprus, each side would have to prepare a draft of its constitution consistent with the draft Constitution of Cyprus, and the two leaders would, by consensus, select, from a list of candidates presented by the presumed members of the transitional Judiciary Board, three non-Cypriot judges and three judges from each side to sit on the transitional Supreme Court of Cyprus for a period of one year after entry into force of the Foundation Agreement.

According to the Plan, which it should be stated, was very complex and difficult for the people to understand, the status and relationship of the State of Cyprus, its common state government, and its component states, was modeled on the status and relationship of Switzerland, its federal government, and its Cantons. Accordingly:

a. Cyprus would be an independent state in the form of an indissoluble partnership, with a common state government and two equal component states, one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot. Cyprus would have a single international legal personality and sovereignty and be a member of the United Nations. It would be organized under its Constitution in accordance with the basic principles of rule of law, democracy, representative republican government, political equality, bi-zonality, and the equal status of the component states,

b. The common state government sovereignty would exercise the powers specified in the Constitution,

which should ensure that Cyprus could speak and act with one voice internationally and in the European Union, fulfill its obligations as a European Union member state, and protect its integrity, borders and ancient heritage.

c. The component states would be of equal status. Within the limits of the Constitution, they would sovereignty exercise all powers not vested by the Constitution in the common state government, organizing themselves freely under their own Constitutions. (http://www.kypros.org/Occupied_Cyprus/unplan.pdf)

The functions and powers of the Central Government would be on issues regarding external relations, including the conclusion of international treaties and defense policy, relations with the European Union, Central Bank functions, including issuance of currency, monetary policy and banking regulations, finances, including budget and all indirect taxation (including customs and excise), economic and trade policy, security arrangements, and the international obligations of Cyprus, meteorology, aviation, international navigation and the continental shelf and territorial waters of Cyprus, communications (including postal, electronic and telecommunications), Cypriot citizenship (including issuance of passports) and immigration (including asylum, deportation and extradition of aliens), combating terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and organized crime, pardons and amnesties, intellectual property, weights and measures and antiquities. (http://www.kypros.org/Occupied_Cyprus/unplan.pdf)

According to Annan Plan I, the common state Parliament would be composed of two Chambers: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Each Chamber would have 48 members, elected for five years on the basis of proportional representation. The component states would serve as electoral districts, unless special majority law provided otherwise, in which case each district might have no less than ten seats (http://www.kypros.org/Occupied_Cyprus/unplan.pdf). Furthermore, according to the Plan, the Senate would be composed of an equal number of senators from each component state. The people of each component state would elect, on a proportional basis, 24 members of the Senate. The Chamber of Deputies would be composed of deputies from both component states, with seats attributed on the basis of the number of registered residents in each component state provided that each component state would be attributed a minimum of one quarter of the seats (http://www.kypros.org/Occupied_Cyprus/unplan.pdf).

The Presidents of the two Chambers would not come from the same component state. The Vice President who under the Plan could not come from the same component state as the President of the relevant Chamber, would be the First Vice-President of that Chamber. Unless otherwise specified, decisions of Parliament would need the approval of both Chambers with simple majority of members present and voting, including one quarter of senators present and voting from each component state. A special majority comprising at least two fifths of sitting senators from each component state, in addition to a simple majority of deputies present and voting, would be required for: a. Ratification of international agreements on matters which fall within the legislative competence of the component states; b. Ratification of treaties and adoption of laws and regulations concerning the airspace, continental shelf and territorial waters of Cyprus; c. Adoption of laws and regulations concerning citizenship, immigration, and taxation; d. Approval of the common state budget; e. Election of the

Presidential Council; and f. Other matters which specifically require special majority approval pursuant to other provisions of this Constitution (http://www.kypros.org/Occupied_Cyprus/unplan.pdf).

According to Annan Plan I, the Office of the Head of State would be vested in a six-member Presidential Council, which would exercise the executive power. The members of the Presidential Council would be elected by Parliament for a fixed five-year term on a single list by special majority. The composition of the Presidential Council would be proportional to the population of the two component states though at least two members should hail from each component state. The Presidential Council would strive to reach all decisions by consensus. Where it would fail to reach consensus, it would make decisions by simple majority of members voting unless otherwise stated in the Constitution. However, such majority should in all cases comprise at least one member from each component state (http://www.kypros.org/Occupied_Cyprus/unplan.pdf).

According to the Plan, the President and Vice-President of the Council would not hail from the same component state. The offices of the President and Vice-President of the Council would rotate every ten calendar months among members of the Council on the basis of time spent on the Council since last serving in either office and with no more than two consecutive Presidents to come from the same component state. Among members of the Council who would have spent equal time on the Council without having served as President or Vice-President, a lot shall be drawn, unless the members concerned agree to an order of precedence. The Vice-President of the Council would assume the duties of the President in the absence or temporary incapacity of the President. Neither the President nor the Vice President of the Council would have a casting vote.

Each member of the Presidential Council would head a Department which would be attributed by decision of the Council. Where the Council would be unable to reach a decision, departments would be attributed on the basis of time spent on the Council; among members who have spent equal time, a lot shall be drawn. The heads of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and European Union Affairs would not hail from the same component state (http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_November2002.html).

The Presidential Council would appoint the judges from among the candidates listed by the Judiciary Board, three judges hailing from each of the component states and three non-Cypriot judges who would not be citizens of Greece, Turkey or the United Kingdom. According to the Plan, Cyprus would be an independent and sovereign state with a single international legal personality and a common state government and consists of a Greek Cypriot component state and a Turkish Cypriot component state. The independence, territorial integrity, security, and constitutional order of Cyprus would be safeguarded and respected by all. Union of Cyprus in whole or in part with any other country, any form of partition or secession, and any other unilateral change to the state of affairs established by the Foundation Agreement and this Constitution would be prohibited. The component states were of equal status and exercise its authority within the limits of this Constitution and its territorial boundaries as set out the attachment to this Constitution. The component states would have their own anthems and flags, while the component state flag would be flown on component state government buildings, along with and in the same manner as the flag of Cyprus. No other flags would be flown on

component state government buildings or public property. Each component state would determine and observe its own holidays in addition to those of the common state (http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_November2002.html).

Concerning the composition of diplomatic missions of Cyprus, the heads of mission of Cyprus to the United Nations in New York, the United Nations in Geneva, the European Union, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Russia and China would hail in equal numbers from each component state. The official languages of the common state would be Greek and Turkish, while the use of English for official purposes would be regulated by law. All persons would have the right to address the authorities of the common state in any of the official languages and to be addressed in that same language. The official languages of the common state would be taught mandatorily to all secondary school students. The National Holiday of Cyprus would be the day of the referenda on the Foundation Agreement. In addition to Sundays, the following official holidays would be observed throughout Cyprus: 1 January (New Year's Day), 1 May (Labour Day), 25 December (Christmas), Good Friday, Easter Monday, the first day of Ramadan/Sheker Bayram, the first day of Kurban Bayram and the birthday of the Prophet Mohammed. According to the Plan, public servants of the common state would be entitled to observe, in addition to the above, the official holidays of either one component state or the other (http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_November2002.html).

Concerning the very important issue of the settlers, in the Plan was stated that upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement, the following persons would be considered citizens of Cyprus:

- a. Any person who held Cypriot citizenship in 1960 and his or her descendants;
- b. Any 18 year old person who was born in Cyprus and has permanently resided for at least seven years in Cyprus;
- c. Any person who was married to a Cypriot citizen and has permanently resided for at least two years in Cyprus; and
- d. Minor children of the persons in the above categories who were permanently residing in Cyprus.

In addition to the above, persons whose names would figure on a list agreed by the two sides would be considered citizens of Cyprus upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement (http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_November2002.html).

According to the Plan, the Treaty of Alliance would permit the stationing in Cyprus of Greek and Turkish contingents, each not exceeding a four digit number that will be agreed by both sides. At the same time, there would be a United Nations peacekeeping operation to monitor the implementation of the Agreement and use its best efforts to promote compliance with it and contribute to the maintenance of a secure environment, to remain as long as the government of the common state, with the concurrence of both component states, does not decide otherwise. The supply of arms to Cyprus would be prohibited in a manner that was legally binding on both importers and exporters. Cyprus would not put its territory at the disposal of international military operations other than with the consent of Greece and Turkey, while the common state and the component states would be demilitarized (http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_November2002.html).

There were two maps attached to the Plan. According to the first map, the area of the Turkish Cypriot component state would be 28.5% **of the territory of the island Cyprus** and according to the second map 28.6%. Areas subject to territorial adjustment which would be part of the Greek Cypriot component state upon entry into force of the Agreement, would be administered during an interim period no longer than three years by the Turkish Cypriot component state. Administration would be transferred under the supervision of the United Nations to the Greek Cypriot component state in agreed phases, beginning 90 days after entry into force of the Agreement with the transfer of administration of largely uninhabited areas contiguous with the remainder of the Greek Cypriot component state. Special arrangements would safeguard the rights and interests of current inhabitants of areas subject to territorial adjustment, and provide for orderly relocation to adequate alternative accommodation in appropriate locations where adequate livelihoods may be earned (http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_November2002.html).

According to Anna Plan I, in areas subject to territorial adjustment, properties would be reinstated to dispossessed owners. In areas not subject to territorial adjustment, the arrangements for the exercise of property rights, by way of reinstatement or compensation, would have the following basic features: Dispossessed owners who opt for compensation or whose properties would not be reinstated under the property arrangements should receive full and effective compensation on the basis of value at the time of dispossession plus inflation; Current users, being persons who have possession of properties of dispossessed owners as a result of an administrative decision, may apply for and should receive title if they agree in exchange to renounce their title to a property, of similar value and in the other component state, of which they were dispossessed. Current users might also apply for and should receive title to properties which have been significantly improved provided they pay for value in original condition. There should be incentives for owners to sell, lease or exchange properties to current users or other persons from the component state in which a property was located (http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_November2002.html).

The Plan provided the right to a component state to restrict the right to reside of Cypriot citizens who did not hold its internal component state citizenship status, if the number of such residents had reached one-third of the total population of a municipality or village. Without prejudice to the provisions of the above Article, component states might, during a transitional period of 20 years after entry into force of the Agreement, further restrict the establishment of residence of Cypriot citizens who did not hold the relevant internal component state citizenship status, if the number of such residents had reached a certain percentage of the total population of a municipality or village. According to the Plan, the relevant percentage should be 1% for the first year after entry into force of the Agreement, and should rise by 3% for each three year period thereafter. There should be no limitations for establishment of residence by former inhabitants and their descendants in certain villages like those in the occupied areas where Greek Cypriot enclaves reside (http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_November2002.html).

According to the Plan, Cyprus should grant equal treatment to Greek and Turkish nationals with respect to entry and residency rights to the extent permissible under European Union law and the conditions of accession of Cyprus to the European Union. The Aliens Board would not authorize

further immigration of Greek nationals if the number of permanently resident Greek nationals had reached 10% of the number of resident Cypriot citizens who hold the internal component state citizenship status of the Greek Cypriot component state nor should it authorize further immigration of Turkish nationals if the number of permanently resident Turkish nationals had reached 10% of the number of resident Cypriot citizens who hold the internal component state citizenship status of the Turkish Cypriot component state. For the purpose of this Article, persons who were citizens of both Cyprus and Greece or Turkey should be counted as citizens of Cyprus only (http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_November2002.html)

The Plan provided that Cyprus should be a member of the European Union and the governments of the component states should participate in the formulation of the policy of Cyprus in the European Union. Cyprus would be represented in the European Union by the common state government in its areas of competence or where a matter predominantly concerns an area of its competence. Where a matter falls predominantly or exclusively into an area of competence of the component states, Cyprus could be represented either by a common state or a component state representative, provided the latter was able to commit Cyprus. Obligations of Cyprus arising out of European Union membership should be implemented by the common state or component state authority which enjoys legislative competence for the subject matter to which an obligation pertains. If a component state failed to fulfill obligations of Cyprus vis-à-vis the European Union within its area of competence and Cyprus might be held responsible by the Union, the common state should, after notification of no less than 90 days, take necessary measures in lieu of the defaulting component state, to be in force until such time as that component state discharges its responsibilities (http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_November2002.html).

The Annan Plan II

On December 5, 2002, the two sides presented to the UN their comments on the Annan Plan I. Following bilateral meetings of the UN team for the Cyprus Problem with the leaders of the two communities, the Secretary General with a letter to Clerides and Denktash, dated December 10, presented **Annan Plan II** which was a revised version of Annan Plan I (http://www.unannanplan.agrino.org/1revised_un_plan.pdf).

Annan Plan II was different from Annan Plan I in minor aspects. The most important changes were

(a) the transitional period concerning the return of Greek Cypriot refugees decreased to 15 from 20 years,

(b) on the same issue, the paragraph in Annan Plan I under which “if the number of such residents has reached a certain percentage of the total population of a municipality or village; the relevant percentage shall be 1% for the first year after entry into force of the Foundation Agreement, and shall rise by 3% for each three year period thereafter” changed as follows: “Permissible restrictions include a moratorium on such residence during the first four years after entry into force of the Foundation Agreement. Thereafter, there may be restrictions if the number of such residents has reached 8% of the population of a village or municipality between the 5th and 9th years and 18% between the 10th and 15th years”,

(c) The reference in the Annan Plan I that Greek and Turkish contingents, each not exceeding a four digit figure, to be agreed by the two sides, changed. In the new Plan, it was mentioned that the number of soldiers should be between 2,500 and 7,500,

(d) Upon entry into force of the Agreement, the leaders of the two sides would become Co-Presidents of Cyprus for thirty calendar months (instead of three years which was mentioned under Annan Plan I)

(e) on the issue of the persons whose names would be given to stay in Cyprus and considered citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, in Annan Plan II was added that “each side’s list may number no more than 33,000 persons”. In the relevant paragraph, it was also added that the persons should be included on the list based on the length of their residence in Cyprus,

(g) In the relevant paragraph for the settlers, it was added that “Persons who do not so receive permanent residence may apply for financial assistance to relocate to their country of origin if they have lived in Cyprus for no less than [five] years. Such assistance shall be in the form of cash grants payable on their arrival in their country of origin, within five years of entry into force of the Agreement. The amount of the grant shall be in accordance with a scale, based on a figure of no less than 10,000 Euros for a household of four”.

(http://www.unannanplan.agrino.org/1revised_un_plan.pdf. See also <http://www.philenews.com/afieromata/news/ekselikseisdec.htm>).

In his letter to the two leaders, the Secretary General, besides asking them to urgently study the new Plan and have their answer before the Copenhagen European Council meeting (which would decide about EU enlargement) on December 11, mentioned that there was a great opportunity for solving the Cyprus Problem and for a united Cyprus to join the European Union. The Secretary General closed his letter by stating that Cyprus had an appointment with History and should not lose it.

The Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides travelled to Copenhagen on 11 December. In the Danish capital, besides the leaders of all the EU member states, they were representatives of the UN and the Representatives of the US and the UK for the Cyprus Problem, the Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul and the leader of the Turkish ruling party Tayip Erdogan. On 12 December the Turkish Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash was hospitalised in Ankara and did not attend.

The EU Conclusions in Copenhagen

As it was mentioned before, the UN was trying to reach an agreement on the Cyprus Problem before the Conclusions of the European Council in which it was planned to have special reference to the issue of Cyprus joining the European Union. On December 13, the negotiations for solving the Cyprus Problem collapsed due to the Turkish intransigence despite the great efforts for all the parties involved. While the Greek Cypriot side expressed its willingness to further discuss the Annan Plan II and reach an agreement, the representative of Mr Denktash in Copenhagen, refused to further discuss the Plan. Thus, the Conclusions of the European Council included the following regarding Cyprus: “10...Cyprus will be admitted as a new Member State to the European Union. Nevertheless, the European Council confirms its strong preference for accession to the European Union by a united Cyprus. In this context it welcomes the commitment of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to continue to negotiate with the objective of concluding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem by 28 February 2003 on the basis of the UNSG’s proposals. The European Council believes that those proposals offer a unique opportunity to reach a settlement in the coming weeks and urges the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to seize this opportunity. 11. The Union recalls its willingness to accommodate the terms of a settlement in the Treaty of Accession in line with the principles on which the EU is founded. In case of a settlement, the Council, acting by unanimity on the basis of proposals by the Commission, shall decide upon adaptations of the terms concerning the accession of Cyprus to the EU with regard to the Turkish Cypriot community. 12. The European Council has decided that, in the absence of a settlement, the application of the *acquis* to the northern part of the island shall be suspended, until the Council decides unanimously otherwise, on the basis of a proposal by the Commission. Meanwhile, the Council invites the Commission, in consultation with the government of Cyprus, to consider ways of promoting economic development of the northern part of Cyprus and bringing it closer to the Union”. (consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/NewsWord/en/ec/73842.doc. See also <http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/7D04838DC508B311C2256DDD004A3B41?OpenDocument>)

The Annan Plan III

In the meantime, the UN did not stop their efforts of finding a solution. The window of opportunity which was the Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen was lost, but the last opportunity was the entrance of Cyprus in the EU on 1 May 2004. In mid January 2003, the negotiations resumed once more in Nicosia. The aim was to reach a solution by the end of February, the date set in the Annan Plan I.



President Tassos Papadopoulos

Two internal factors of the time decisively influenced the developments in the Cyprus Problem. The first was the growing reaction within the Turkish Cypriot community against its traditional and historical leader Denktash and his negative stand at the negotiating table. The Turkish Cypriots in the occupied areas organized demonstrations in favour of a solution and a united Cyprus joining the European Union (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/EC16EB05F3AF7856C22578380034CAB8?OpenDocument>). The other internal factor was the presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus, scheduled for February 16, 2003. The elections were won by **Tassos Papadopoulos** who became President, ousting the incumbent, Glafcos Clerides (<http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/PIO/PIO.nsf/0/B5E35A288C6D3544C22571880039E62B?opendocument>).

The negotiations between the new Greek Cypriot leader Papadopoulos and the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash continued in Nicosia. At the end of February (26 to 28) the UN Secretary General visited Cyprus and had meetings with the two leaders and the leaders of all Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot parties, asking them to work for the solution of the Cyprus Problem. At the same time, the Secretary General submitted to the two leaders a new version of his Plan, the **Annan Plan III** which was more detailed from the previous versions running to 450 pages (http://www.unannanplan.agrino.org/2revision2_un_plan.pdf).

With the submission of the Annan Plan III, the Secretary General invited the two leaders to the Hague (on March 10) in order for them to inform him if they were ready to sign a “declaration of commitment” to put the proposed plan to separate referendums, on 30 March 2003 (<http://www.philenews.com/afieromata/news/xagi.htm>).

Some of the new provisions in the third version of the Annan Plan were,

- (a) the new state would be called United Cyprus Republic
- (b) in the article concerning the Citizenship of the new State the following paragraph was added: “Until Turkey’s accession to the European Union, a constituent state may limit the establishment

of residence by persons hailing from the other constituent state. To this effect, it may establish a moratorium until the end of the sixth year, after which limitations are permissible if the number of residents hailing from the other constituent state has reached 7% of the population of a village or municipality between the 7th and 10th years and 14% between the 11th and 15th years and 21% of the population of the relevant constituent state thereafter. After the second year, no such limitations shall apply to former inhabitants over the age of 65 accompanied by a spouse or sibling, nor to former inhabitants of specified villages”,

(c) in the article concerning Demilitarization it was added that “upon accession of Turkey to the European Union, all Greek and Turkish troops shall be withdrawn from Cyprus unless otherwise agreed between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey”,

(d) in the reference in the Annan Plan II that Cyprus should not put its territory at the disposal of international military operations other than with the consent of both constituent states, it was added the sentence: “until the accession of Turkey to the European Union, the consent of Greece and Turkey shall also be required”,

(e) The number of the persons to be included in the list (to be citizens of the new State) changed to no more than 45,000 persons (http://www.unannanplan.agrino.org/2revision2_un_plan.pdf).

Certain provisions in the Plan were not filled and in the Plan was mentioned that: “insert agreed text no later than 25 March 2003. If agreement is not reached by that date, the constituent states shall, *ad interim*, exercise the functions governed by this law, upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement. A committee established by the Co-Presidents shall present a common draft of this law for approval by the transitional federal Parliament no later than 15 September 2003. The transitional Parliament shall resolve any outstanding issues regarding the law and adopt it no later than 15 October 2003. Should the law not be adopted by the transitional Parliament by the specified date, the Supreme Court shall decide on the unresolved issues giving due regard to the positions of both constituents and promulgate the law within six weeks of that date” (http://www.unannanplan.agrino.org/2revision2_un_plan.pdf).

In the **Hague**, the leaders of the two communities met separately at first and then together with the UN Secretary General. In the Dutch capital, they were also present Representatives of the Greek, Turkish, British and the US government. Following three days of intense meetings and exchange of ideas, the Secretary General announced that while the Greek Cypriot leader replied positively in his request and accepted, under certain conditions, to put the Plan to the people in a referendum, the Turkish Cypriot leader replied that he was not ready to do this, because he had serious disagreements with some of its major provisions (<http://www.philenews.com/afieromata/news/xagi.htm>).

The Annan Plan IV

The developments in the Hague were followed by two major events. The first took place in Athens, on April 16, when the leader of the Greek Cypriot community and President of the Republic of Cyprus signed the **Accession Treaty of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU** (http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_2310_en.htm). Few days later and following pressure from the international community and the Turkish Cypriots against his negative stance in the efforts for finding a solution to the Cyprus Problem, the Turkish Cypriot leader decided the **partial lifting on the movement restrictions between the occupied areas and the areas under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus**. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Greek Cypriots visited the occupied areas for the first time after 1974 to see their houses, their fields, their schools, graveyards and churches (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/E620A587100F0FF6C22578380036872D?OpenDocument>).



Ledras Street after the partial lifting of the movement restrictions

Following the developments in Copenhagen and the Hague, and the signing of the Accession Treaty of the Republic of Cyprus in the European Union, the international community set May 1, 2004, the day of Cyprus' entry in the European Union, as the new deadline for solving the Cyprus Problem. In this regard, on 4 February 2004, the UN Secretary General sent a letter to Papadopoulos and Denktash, inviting them to New York on February 10. In his letter, Kofi Annan also mentioned that if the two leaders accepted his invitation it meant that they accepted to negotiate, having as base the Annan Plan III and without renegotiating the basic principles of his Plan. He also stated in his letter that the two leaders by replying positively to his invitation agreed to put the Plan to simultaneous separate referendums, set for 21 April 2004.

The two leaders accepted the invitation of the Secretary General and visited New York. As a result of their meetings in the UN headquarters on **February 10**, it was agreed that "the parties have committed to negotiating in good faith on the basis of his [Secretary General's] plan to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem through separate and simultaneous referenda before 1 May 2004" (<http://www.philenews.com/aferomata/news/ekselikseisfeb2004.htm>). In the UN announcement was also stated: "To this end, the parties will seek to agree on changes and to complete the plan in all respects by 22 March 2004, within the framework of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices, so as to produce a finalized text. In the absence of such agreement, the Secretary-General would convene a meeting of the two sides - with the participation of Greece and Turkey in order to lend their collaboration - in a concentrated effort to agree on a finalized text by 29 March. As a final resort, in the event of a continuing and persistent deadlock, the parties have invited the Secretary-General to use his discretion to finalize the text to be submitted to referenda on the basis of his plan...The Secretary-General welcomes these commitments as well as the assurances of the European Union to accommodate a settlement and the offer of technical assistance by the European Commission. He looks forward to drawing on this assistance as well as that of others in the course of the negotiations" (<http://www.un.int/cyprus/intercommunal.htm>).

The Annan Plan V

The negotiations between the leaders of the two communities resumed in Cyprus (**February 19**), as planned with the timetable agreed in New York. Due to the stance of the Turkish Cypriot leader, the negotiations were not proceeding as scheduled and the next step, according to the agreement of the two communities with the UN Secretary General (February 13), was the participation of Greece and Turkey in the negotiations. On March 23, the leader of the Greek Cypriot community and President of the Republic of Cyprus Tassos Papadopoulos, accompanied by the leaders of all the Greek Cypriot parties arrived in **Burgenstock**, Switzerland for the second phase of the negotiations. The Turkish Cypriot leader informed the secretary General that he will not attend the second phase of the negotiations and that he authorized the so called “prime minister” Mehmet Ali Talat and the so called “minister of foreign affairs”, to participate in the negotiations. Greece was represented in the negotiations by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Petros Molyviates, while Turkey was represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul. The involvement of Greece and Turkey did not result in the conclusion of the Plan since no formal negotiations took place and the procedure moved to its third phase which was the conclusion of the Plan by the UN Secretary General. On March 27, 2004, Kofi Annan arrived in Switzerland and two days later submitted to the interested parties the **Annan Plan IV**. In Switzerland also arrived the newly elected Prime Minister of Greece Costas Karamanlis and the Turkish Prime Minister and Tayip Erdogan. With the submission of the fourth version (which was more than 9000 pages – the most detailed ever proposed plan) of his Plan, the Secretary General asked from the leaders of the two communities to give their comments until the next day in order for the UN to finalize the document, by March 31 (**Footnote**). The changes in the Plan were approaching the Turkish positions, and the Greek Cypriot side asked for changes on the issues of settlers and security. In the fourth version of the Plan, the constitutions of the two constituent states and the constitution of the United Cyprus Republic were also included. On April 1, 2004, the United Nations Secretary General submitted to all interested parties the fifth and last version of his Plan, asking the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to submit it before the Cyprus people in separate and simultaneous referendums, now set for 24 April 24, 2004 (http://www.unannanplan.agrino.org/Annan_Plan_MARCH_30_2004.pdf. See also http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Plan_Information.html).

The last version of the Plan was not a result of an agreement between the two sides and created different reactions in the two communities. In fact, Tassos Papadopoulos stated from Switzerland that “The Turkish Cypriot side not only continued its negative stance and insisted on its intransigent positions throughout the talks, but Turkey added 11 new additional demands aiming at serving mainly, through Cyprus, her aims and interests. These demands, through the procedure of the Secretary General using his discretion to finalize the text, were met either fully or to some extent” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/C670F739E1636C14C225783800390D72?OpenDocument>). After his return in Cyprus, Papadopoulos in a televised statement to Greek Cypriots asked

them to reject the Annan Plan V. The Greek Cypriot leader characterized the Plan as dangerous and further mentioned that “With the final Annan Plan Cypriots have not been satisfied, however Turkey’s pursuit to control and dominate Cyprus has been fully met...The particular plan would not lead to the reunification of the two communities but on the contrary it would promote the permanent division with restrictions on movement, settlement, the right to acquire property, the exercise of political rights and other divisive elements” (http://users.uoa.gr/~nektar//history/3contemporary/tassos_papadopoulos_diaggelma.htm). The newly elected Greek Government of Costas Karamanlis decided to keep a “neutral’ position regarding the Plan, while the Turkish Government stand was in favor of a Yes vote in the Plan. Denktash was against the proposed Plan, while his so called “prime minister”, Mehmet Ali Talat asked the Turkish Cypriots to vote in favour of the Plan.

On 24 April 2004, 75.83% of the Greek Cypriots (313.704 out of 428.587) voted against the proposed Plan of the United Nations, while 64.91% of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor. As a result, and according to the relevant provision in the Annan Plan, the Plan became null and void. In a statement to the Foreign Media, Papadopoulos repeated that “throughout the process, no real negotiation took place. Most of the time had been consumed by the other side putting forward suggestions that either were not genuinely within the parameters of the Plan, or were contrary to its fundamental principles, or important “trade-offs” agreed by my predecessor or contradicted its core provisions. Sadly, these demands appear to have been satisfied, almost in total, in the revised Plan of 31 March through the adoption of all 11 demands made by Permanent Undersecretary Ziyal, of Turkey, particularly those in an EU context. Let me point out, that, in contrast, basic concerns of the Greek Cypriot side, within the spirit of the Plan, have been disregarded. It seems that everybody involved in the talks were anxious to bring on board Turkey and ensure a “yes” vote by the Turkish Cypriot community ignoring the fact that the far bigger Cypriot community had also to be convinced to vote “yes” on the Plan. Thus, this process has failed in addressing the legitimate concerns, need and interests of both sides” (<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/07CBD376111D42FDC2256E82003ABA3D?OpenDocument>).

According to President Papadopoulos, the major reasons behind the No vote of the Greek Cypriots were the

- (a) “presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus in perpetuity as well as the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee for an indefinite period of time and the expansion of its scope in comparison to the 1960 agreements. It is this Treaty that Turkey used as a pretext to justify its 1974 invasion of Cyprus”,
- (b) the fact that “Greek Cypriots failed to understand why, under the Plan, 45,000 Turkish settlers were to be given citizenship of Cyprus plus a further 20-25,000 (in addition to those who are married to T/Cs or have been born in Cyprus) were to be given permanent residence with citizenship in 4 years’; and
- (c) “Greek Cypriots disapproved of a Plan according to which the right of return to their homes in safety of “refugees” should be denied to the great majority of displaced persons”, so that even in 2023, they may only total 18% of the population of the Turkish-speaking area, 50 years after Turkey’s occupation of Cyprus and expulsion in or denial of the right of return to such persons” (<http://www>.

moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/07CBD376111D42FDC2256E82003ABA3D?OpenDocument).

One week later, the Republic of Cyprus became a member of the European Union. According to the relevant EU decision, the whole island entered the EU, whereas the *acquis* was suspended in the areas not under effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus enjoy the same rights as all EU citizens.

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CHAPTER 13

A Guide To Major Cypriot Sites

CHAPTER 13a

Archeological museum, Kourio, Amathounta, Pafos – Mosaics

P a n o s C h r i s t o d o u l o u

Archeological museum, Kourio, Amathounta, Pafos – Mosaics

Periods	Date Range
Neolithic and Chalcolithic	8200-2500
Bronze Age	2500-1050
Early Cypriot	2400-2000
Middle Cypriot	2000-1700
Late Cypriot	1700-1050
Iron Age	
Cypro Geometric	1050-750
Cypro Archaic	750-480
Cypro Classical	480-310
Hellenistic	310-30
Roman	30-330

The Cyprus Museum

The first archaeological Museum of Nicosia was housed in a building on Victoria St. in old Lefkosia, in the occupied part of the town. It was founded in 1888 as a privately run institution to protect the finds that started to come to light during the first legal excavations undertaken during the British rule of the island. As the visitor to the Cyprus Museum moves from room to room, he can trace the development of Cypriot civilization from the Neolithic times to the Early Christian period. The fact that its exhibits all come exclusively from Cyprus makes the museum of special interest to the scholar but also to the visitor. The first law concerning archaeology was voted in 1905 and was the first essential step towards the establishment of archaeology in Cyprus. A committee, chaired by the British governor, undertook the direction of the museum. Since 1935 the museum has been under the jurisdiction of the Government Department of Antiquities, which was created that year by a new law. The construction of the original building, which served as the nucleus of the present one, started in 1908 and was completed in 1924. The Archaeological Museum of Nicosia consists of fourteen rooms surrounding a square central area and is comprised of offices, a library, storerooms and areas for preserving and studying items in the collection. The objects in the rooms follow a chronological and a thematical succession.

Room I – Neolithic and chalcolithic Period

The first room is dedicated to the Chalcolithic period when stone vessels coexist with handmade clay vessels as well as with figurines made out of picrolite. In the first exhibition case, in the middle of the room, clay objects are on display, which constitute the first evidence of worship.

Rooms II and III - Pottery from Early Bronze Age until Roman Period

This rooms are conveniently divided by two pairs of pilasters into three sections. The first is devoted to the Early Bronze Age, the second to the Middle and Late Bronze Ages and the third to the Iron Age. The objects, mainly pottery, illustrating these periods are exhibited in the metal and glass cases fixed against the whole length of the left-hand wall and along part of the right –hand wall. Large vases or objects of exceptional interest are exhibited on pedestals placed respective sections. The exhibited objects demonstrate the rich local ceramic tradition of Cyprus but at the same time special reference is made to the imported Mycenaean, Phoenician and Attic pottery as well as to faience objects, which played a vital role in the establishment of the local pottery style. The imported Mycenaean craters and the locally produced Archaic vessels of the “free-field” style are given a prominent position.

Room IV – Archaic sanctuary at Agia Irini

This Room, unlike the previous gallery, where the exhibits derive mainly from tombs, is devoted to

selected finds from ancient sanctuaries. It takes its name from the village near which was found the series of terracotta votives forming its chief exhibit.

The room it hundreds of clay figurines and statues are displayed that were found around a circular altar in the Archaic sanctuary at Agia Irini.

Room V – Statuary of Classical Period

The evolution of the strong Egyptian and Assyrian influences of the statuary from the Classical period is on display in this room. As rule male votaries are offered in temples of male gods while female ones in temples of female deities. In the early part of the Iron Age to Hellenic times no figure representing the god appears in the temple, but from that time onwards statues of worshipped deities do occur: in the fifth century Athena temple at Vouni Palace; the archaic Curium temple of Herakles – Melqart; the Hellenistic Aphrodite-Isis temple at Soli.

Room VI – Later phase of statuary

In this Room we find mainly marble and bronze statues. In the centre the bronze statue of Septimius Severus constitutes the main exhibited work of art. Also in this room are the principal small finds found with the Ayia Irini terracottas in Room IV, a selection of bronze objects and relics of the mining industry of ancient Cyprus.

Room VII – Bronze objects collection /Collection of seals and coins

This long gallery is divided into two sections, separated by the entrance to the annexe, containing the tomb reconstructions. The first one is dedicated to the rich collection of bronze objects which reflect the wide use of this material, for which Cyprus was famous in antiquity, so much so in everyday activities (agricultural tools) as in warfare activities (weapons), commercial exchange goods (tripods) and ritual practices (Horned God from Egkomi). In the central section of the room specimens from the museum's rich collection of seals and coins are on display, which represent all the mints of the Cypriot kingdoms as well as the mint during the Ptolemaic rule on the island. On the wall behind the coins two boards are hung containing parts of floor mosaics from two roman buildings. The last section of the room contains gold jewellery, silver vessels, glass objects and lamps dating from the Early Bronze Age to early Christian times.

Room VIII – Ancient Tombs

This Room is reached through the doorway on the left of the Tamassus tomb and then down the steps. It contains six reconstructed tombs belonging to six successive periods from Late Stone Age to Hellenic times.

Room IX – Grave monuments

This room contains grave monuments such as carved grave stele, painted clay sarcophagi and limestone sarcophagi decorated with carvings.

Room X – Evolution of Writing in Cyprus

In this room we find a retrospection of the evolution of writing in Cyprus. Starting from the earliest evidence of writing is the Cypro-minoan script followed by specimens of the Cypro-syllabic script, and finally the predomination of the alphabetic script. The Museum possesses a number of inscriptions in the Cypriot syllabary, which as already explained was used by the Cypriots from the sixth century (and perhaps earlier) to the third century B.C. for writing Greek. The syllabic inscriptions in the Museum comes from the site Rhantidi (Paphos District) where during Dr. Zahn's excavations in 1910 a great number of dedicatory inscriptions was found. These refer to Apollo and Aphrodite.

Room XI – Royal Tombs of Salamis

Is on the first floor and hosts magnificent finds from the royal tombs of Salamis, such as the bed decorated with pieces of ivory and coloured glass, the two thrones and a bronze cauldron supported on an iron tripod and decorated around the edges with four busts of sirens and eight griffins.

Room XII – Ancient Metallurgy

This room is dedicated to ancient metallurgy. Through the disposition of the finds, which bear an educational character, we can follow the process of the mining and smelting of copper as well as metalworking.

Room XIII – Roman Gymnasium of Salamis

Sculptures that decorated the gymnasium in Salamis during the Roman period are on display in this room. The sculptures are accompanied by photographs of the excavations of the gymnasium, which took place before 1974. The statues are all Roman copies of Hellenistic and Classical prototypes and belong to the second century A.D. during which the Gymnasium flourished under the Emperors Trajan and Hadrian.

Room XIV – Clay figurines

The important production of clay figurines dating from the Early Bronze Age until the Roman period is represented in chronological order in this room.

Guide to Amathus

The ancient town of Amathous is situated on the south coast of Cyprus, about 7 km east of the town of Lemesos. The city enjoys remarkable situation, protected by valleys extending from the Troodos mountain range, and adjacent to an adequately watered countryside inland, rich in agricultural and mineral resources.

Minor changes in sea level combined with erosion have affected the ground to a certain extent since antiquity. The landscape, worked by generations of farmers, was similar to the landscape of antiquity. Today the capital of ancient kingdom of Amathus is only a decorative feature preserved in the residential and tourist suburbs of a big city.

1. The North wall
2. The Palace
3. The harbor
4. The Agora
5. The aqueduct
6. The sanctuary of Aphrodite
7. The church of Ayios Tykhonas
8. The basilica at the foot of the Acropolis
9. The Christian basilica on the acropolis
10. The West terrace of the acropolis

Prehistory and History of Amathus

Prehistory

Traces of the earliest human presence, dating to the Neolithic period, have been detected during archaeological excavations on the hills neighbouring Amathous. However, we do not know with certainty the exact moment of the foundation of the town of Amathous, which is not included in the list of towns founded by the Greek settlers in the 11th century B.C. It seems that the acropolis of Amathous, which possesses a natural defense, was inhabited since 1050 B.C. by the autochthonous population of Cyprus, the Eteocyprians. The term Eteocypriot is used to describe the native language, and by extension the native population living on the island before the arrival of Greeks or Phoenicians.

Historical Period

During the Archaic period the town acquired special wealth as one of the Kingdoms of Cyprus, and had remarkable commercial relations with neighbouring countries. Already in the 8th century B.C. a strong group of Phoenicians settled in Amathous, probably sharing power with the Eteocyprians and the Greeks. A necropolis, structural lions in tombs, and incense burners in the form of sphinxes attest to their presence as does pottery, especially a type of a cup fixed to a saucer and also a large stemmed cup perhaps designed to hold an ostrich egg.

Royal power during the Archaic period shifted among Phoenician, local Cypriot, and Greek rulers, but despite these moves there existed a central power with strong religious component exhibiting both Semitic and Egyptianizing elements.

It appears that in 709/7 the Cypriot kings willfully submitted to the rule of Sargon II. The only archaeological evidence in Cyprus related to the Assyrian rule, the plate of Sargon II, has no mention of Cypriot kingdoms or their accession in the empire's administrative regions. Amathus does not appear in the Assyrian records (prism of Esarhaddon 683 BC).

Surprisingly considering the important role Amathus must have played in the 5th century, until very recently we did not know the name of any Amathusian king of that century. But the discovery of eleven coins of a well-known type in a tomb east of Amathus not only provided us with the name of a mid – 5th century king, but it confirmed the attribution to Amathus of a particular series of coins stretching from the middle of the 5th century till about the middle of the 4th.

In 500 B.C. the Greek cities of Ionia were dissatisfied with Persian intervention in their affairs, interventions resulting in the support of tyrannical regimes that served the interests of the Great King. They thus decided to revolt. The revolt soon spread to the greater part of Asia Minor, and in 499 Sardes was set on fire, urging other cities and areas to join the uprising, amongst them some cities-kingdoms in Cyprus. It seems however that the King of Amathus remained loyal to the Persians and as a result of his loyalty to the Persian king he was besieged by the Cypriots revolutionaries led by Onesilos. A general destruction of the acropolis at the beginning of the early fifth century can be

attributed to this episode (Herodotus 5, 104-105).

The final destruction of the palace is difficult to explain. It seems to have occurred during the time of the sole rule of Demetrius Poliorketes (301-294 BC).

The only buildings of note known from the Ptolemaic period (294-58BC) were a second-century BC stoa toward which one Onesicrates contributed funds, and a bathing establishment located at the edge of the inner harbor of the port. The city recovered some of its vitality under the Antonine emperors to judge from the plentifulness of glass and jewelry in tombs. After the second half of the third century, documents ceased to be inscribed on stone, and crafts, except pottery, disappear. Tomb furnishings are meagre.

Remains of the City of Amathus

Agora and baths

The agora is located in the lower town at the east of the hill of the acropolis. The area south of the agora is occupied by a public bath (balaneion), which is comprised of a closed circular area and annexes. The bath along with part of the west portico of the agora date to the Hellenistic period and constitute the earliest indications of human activity in the area.

According to the excavator, the paving in the west half of the agora square is well preserved, and architectural elements recovered permit the reconstruction of an elevated central basin and fountain covered by a baldachino, the roof of which, perhaps pyramidal, was supported by four spirally fluted columns of dark, stone, originally standing on white marble bases (one is preserved) and topped by Corinthian capitals also of white marble (all four preserved).

The Palace

The acropolis always served as a means of defense. We now know that the escarpment was fortified with walls. The acropolis also helped protect the lower city, which extended directly north into the Verka meadow, where an aqueduct ended, and to the east onto a lower hill in a silted-up bayhead. It was there that elements of a natural mooring were found, perhaps transformed into a port due to the regional importance of Amathous, prior to the construction of the major port of the Hellenistic period. The docks are still visible ahead of the current coastline. Behind the Byzantine wall part of the palace of Amathous is preserved. It was built in the 8th century B.C. and was destroyed after the reign of the last king of the town, Androkles, around 300 B.C. The preserved ruins, where many remarkable objects such as pithoi and athoric stele have been unearthed during excavations, are part of the palace's storerooms. We can approach the area by climbing up the hill along a test trench from the central gate i of the central wall or by coming down from the modern dirt road which passes above. Coming down from the dirt road on the north side, one first encounters a group of seventh-century AD buildings.

The Northern Wall

Since the Archaic period the city was walled on all sides. The Classical wall, which already included robust towers, was reinforced in the Hellenistic period by an impressive tower on a corner. The walls were reinforced when the port was constructed and today we can see the southwest part of the walls with the west tower near the sea, and a large part of the north wall with three towers, which linked the steps of the acropolis with the higher point of the lower city. A gate exists in the north wall, permitting the entrance to those who entered the town from the hinterland. After the destruction of the wall in the 4th century A.D., a second wall was built in the 6th century (probably by Justinian in order to face a potential military threat from Persia) in the middle of the hill of the acropolis, in front of the abandoned palace.

The harbor

The external port of the city was situated in front of the agora and its ruins are preserved today under the sea. The port was built at the end of the 4th century B.C. by Demetrios Poliorcetes, as part of the defense of the town during the period of the quarrel with the Ptolemies for the domination of Cyprus. The port's lifespan was short since it was covered by sand. In front of the agora an internal basin of the port existed where the sailors had the opportunity to pull the ships out of the water in order to better protect them from the wind. Seismic elevation in land levels, combined with the accumulation of sand deposited by wind and water, moved the effective line of the beach into the middle of the harbor by the first century AD.

The Christian Basilica on the acropolis summit

The basilica commands panoramic views from the summit and dates from the 6th/7th century. It was built on the site of an ancient Temple and sanctuary of Aphrodite. The basilica and its dependant buildings occupied one quarter of the courtyard to the north and east. Porticoes bordered the courtyard on the rest of the northwest side and on the southwest portico.

Guide to Kourion

Topography

The archaeological site of Kourion, one of the richest area of the entire island in archaeological terms is situated on the south shores of Cyprus, in the bay of Episkopi, about 19 Km west of Limassol and 16 Km east of Amathus.

Systematic excavations were undertaken in 1933 by the Pennsylvania University Museum, and continued, with a break during the war years, until 1954. During the excavations the building of the Achilles Mosaic, the Theatre, the Baths and the Complex of Eustolios, the Stadium and the Sanctuary of Apollon Hylates came to light (during 1980-1983 the excavation of this site was undertaken by the American Mission of the Walters Art Gallery and the Universities of Missouri and Maryland). In 1974-1979 the American Mission of the Dumbarton Oaks Centre for Byzantine Studies carried out excavations in the Early Christian Basilica of Kourion. At the same time (from 1964 until today) the Department of Antiquities of Cyprus excavated the Agora, the House of Gladiators, the Small Basilica next to the Stadium and the newly discovered Coastal Basilica. The Department is also responsible for the creation of the archaeological park of Kourion.

Source: Department of Antiquities (<http://www.mcw.gov.cy/mcw/da/da.nsf/All/CB2E60AEDED0A248C225719B0038B505?OpenDocument>)

Prehistory and History of Kourion

Prehistorical Times (4500-8 B.C.)

The area of Kourion has been inhabited since Neolithic Times (4500-3900 B.C.), while in the grand area important settlements dating to the Late Neolithic Age have been found (Sotira, Kantou) and also to the Chalcolithic Age (Erimi, Bamboula, Sotira). [χάρτης]. At the location called Phaneromeni, under the cliffs of Kourion, close to the river Kouris, a big part of the cemetery dating to the Middle Bronze Age (2000-1600) has been excavated.

The settlement of Kourion dates to the 16th century B.C. and according to the archaeological evidence the 14th century BC may be considered the prosperity period of the prehistoric urban center. There while the characteristic architectural style of the houses

at Bamboula, with the quadrate trilateral ground plan as well as the ceramic art and the minor objects imitate the Cretan and the Mycenaean model. According to the foundation myth current in Antiquity by Herodotus () and Strabo () Kourion was associated with Argos of Peloponnese, and its inhabitants believed that their city was founded by Argean immigrants and claimed to be their descendants. Indeed, this very first settlement dating to the Late Bronze Age (1200 BC) is attested by the archeological evidences, and there are indications that Greek colonists from Peloponnesus settled Kourion (on the sloaps of Bamboula hill). According to different tradition, the name of the city is attributed to its founder, Kourea, son of the legendary Cypriote king Kinyras.

Historical Period

It appears that in 709/7 the Cypriot kings willfully submitted to the rule of Sargon II. The only archaeological evidence in Cyprus related to the Assyrian rule, the plate of Sargon II, has no mention of Cypriot kingdoms or their accession in the empire's administrative regions. Kourion is listed as Kuri in the Assyrian records and its King is Damasu (prism of Esarhaddon 683 BC).

In 500 B.C. the Greek cities of Ionia were dissatisfied with Persian intervention in their affairs, interventions resulting in the support of tyrannical regimes that served the interests of the Great King. They thus decided to revolt. The revolt soon spread to the greater part of Asia Minor, and in 499 Sardes was set on fire, urging other cities and areas to join the uprising, amongst them some cities-kingdoms in Cyprus. During the Revolt Kourion it seems that fought at first next to the other Cypriots kings. But at the crucial battle (498 B.C.) outside Salamis, the king Stasanor (Herodotus, 5.113), halfway through the battle decided to fight with the Persians, taking with him part of Onesilos' army.

After this episode we know very little about the classical history of Kourion. The Cypriot kingdoms found themselves subdued to the new ruler of Asia, Alexander III Macedon (331BC) and according to Arrian (Anab. 2.22.2) Pasicrates' ship (the king of Kourion in that time), was sunk during the siege of Tyr. Cypriot kingdoms dissolve between 333 and 310 B.C. and is almost certain that when Demetrios Poliorketes conquered the island in 306 B.C. Kourion was not any more an independent kingdom.

Although there are no written sources concerning Kourion under Ptolemaic () and Roman administration, is certain that it was still a place of importance to judge from its visible remains and movable finds. The roman inscriptions found in the site, record the cosmopolitan nature of the population, with officials and traders drawn from other parts of the empire. These included Jewish elements, in the form of the cult of Hypsistos ('Almighty'), which combined Graeco-Roman and Judaic elements.

Christianity was well established at Kourion by the begging of the 3rd century A.D. but persecutions against the first Christians cost the inhabitants of the city many painful tortures. In the early 4th century there was testimony about the existence of the Episcopal See with Filonides (303-305 A.D.) being the first known bishop. Filonides, suffered martyrdom during the time of the Emperor Diocletian (A.D. 284-305), and Zeno, Filonides' successor represented the Church of Cyprus at the Council of Ephesus (431 A.D.) and he was instrumental in securing a favorable decision on the claim of the Church of Cyprus to independence. Zenon is also among the Cypriot Bishops declared Saints of the late Christian era with Saint Tychon, Saint Epifanios, and Saint Spyridon. Kourion, was ruined by earthquakes in the 4th century AD., and dramatic evidence for this episode has been revealed in the ruins of houses on the acropolis. The city was rebuilt, at the beginning of the 5th century, perhaps after a period of abandonment.

Kourion like the most coastal cities in the island seems to have suffered from the threat of Arab raiders, fact which made the coastal areas less attractive for settlement.

So, its inhabitants moved and established themselves at a new site 2.5Km, to the east, at Episkopi.

The name of this modern village derived from the name of the bishopric of Kourion, transferred there from the abandoned part of the town.

During the Middle Age the village of Episkopi was known as La Piscopie. In the 13th century it belonged to Jean D' Ibelin, Count of Jaffa and from the 14th and 15th centuries until the Turkish conquest, it formed part of the domains of the Coronaro family. The fortified manor of Episkopi, successfully resisted the Mamelukes in 1426.

Remains of the City of Kourion

The archaeological remains found at the site of Kourion belong to the Roman period, apart from the Basilica and the House of Eustolios which are dated to the Early Christian period. The extra-mural Basilica, the Roman Stadium and the Sanctuary of Apollo date from the Archaic period to the end of Roman times.

The Roman Forum (Agora)

The remains of the Forum (which is situated in southwest sector of the site) excavated, suggest that it was monumental colonnaded public building in the middle of the town serving as a market – place and meeting place. The excavators have made out three architectural phases, which date from 325-200 A.D., 200-100 A.D. to 100-50 A.D. Despite the lack of archaeological evidence, it is plausible to conclude that the Forum was entirely destroyed by the same severe earthquake which caused the desertion of the entire city of Kourion (Christou 45).

The Theater

The Roman Theater is situated at the southern end of the Kourion bluff and according to the excavators it seems that the original theater (constructed probably around the late 2nd century A.D.) was a small Hellenistic theater with the circular orchestra and elevated scenae frons (the forehead of the stage). In the curved auditorium the spectators' seats rose, row upon row, and provided accommodation for about 3500 people.

In the 2nd century the theatre was enlarged to its present dimensions, and it was an imposing building resembling the developed theatrical types of Roman Imperial times. Towards the end of the 2nd century, or early in the 3rd century A.D. (under Caracallas' reign 214-217 A.D.), the theater was rearranged for staging the popular spectacle of hunters pursuing animals.

In the 4th century the theatre was abandoned and latter destroyed by stone-robbers.

The Roman Nymphaeum

Devoted to the nymphs, the daughters of Poseidon, the Nymphaeum measuring 45m. in length and 15m in width, is one of the largest and most significant monuments of its kind, not only in Cyprus but in other Roman provinces as well. The monument consisted of a rectangular room with a central apse facing an entrance with two columns leading into a second rectangular room or open courtyard. It was destroyed and abandoned during the Arab raids of the mid-7th century A.D.

The House of Gladiators

This Roman house, which dates to the second half of the 3rd century A.D., has a central courtyard with corridors on all four sides and rooms opening onto them. The house was entered from its northeast corner by a built staircase leading to the small eastern open courtyard without porticoes, the floor of which seems to have been decorated with coloured mosaics of geometric patterns. Among the mosaics, which decorate the east and south wings of the courtyard, the most important are those in the east wing depicting a Gladiator combat scene which is rare in Cyprus. Originally there must have been three but the south one has been lost with the collapsed part of the house, while almost all the central panel has been destroyed by a later wall.

The House of Achilles

The House of Achilles, it is situated at the northwestern edge of the hill adjacent to the street leading to the Sanctuary of Apollo Hylates. Only part of the building, is preserved today. The precise date and function of the building have not been ascertained by the excavators, but it seems that this was a civic reception centre for distinguished visitors and it date from 4th century A.D. Several rooms are decorated with mosaic floors. The most interesting floor depicts the popular story of the revealing of Achilles' true identity by Odysseus in the court of the king Lycomedes at Skyros. Unlike the majority of known examples, this one shows Achilles still fully dressed in feminine attire, although he has discarded one of his lady's shoes, which is known, lace undone, next to his foot. He is holding a long spear in his right hand and a large shield in his left.

The Stadium

Between the City and the Sanctuary of Apollo Hylates there is the Stadium that we see today, which was constructed in the period of Antonine Emperor (138-180 A.D.). The outlines of its U-shaped plan are preserved as are the three entrance gates, one on either side and one in the middle of the rounded end. Its internal measurements are 217m. in length and 17m. in width. Of the original seats only a few were preserved on the north and south sides. A section of the seating has been reconstructed to show the arrangement of the seats, which were raised above the track and of which there were

seven rows. The Hellenic Pentathlon (running, high jump, long jump, wrestling, javelin,) should have been the basic sports practised in this Stadium. Chariot and horse races related to the cult of Apollo should also have been practised there since the Archaic period according to the testimonies obtained in ceramic and plastic that is to say the clusters of pottery offerings to the Sanctuary but not to the precise Stadium the turn of which was too small for horse races. The athletic games in the Stadium were financed by the city of Kourion and were organized either in memory of specific events, such as the great victories of the Roman Army and the birthday of the Emperors.

The Early Christian Basilica

South of the Agora are the remains of the large complex of buildings belonging to the three-aisled basilica, the cathedral of Kourion. Originally built in the beginning of the 5th century A.D., and replacing earlier constructions this imposing building was the Cathedral Church of the first Bishops of Kourion. In the west, the basilica communicated with a narthex and a succession of buildings including the diakonikon, where the faithful deposited their offerings, and the house of the bishop of Kourion. To the north, the basilica extended to the atrium and the baptistery, which had the form of a small three-aisled basilica with a narthex. The basilica was decorated with mural mosaics and marble sculpture in the champlévé technique.

Guide to Palaipaphos (Kouklia)

Topography

The ancient town of Palaipafos is located within the limits of the modern village of Kouklia, 16 kilometres east of the modern town of Pafos. The site is situated at an average altitude of 85m. in the coastal plain of Pafos, north of the central highway of Limassol-Pafos, close to the mouth of the Diarrhizos, the only river on the southwest coast of Cyprus.

The site was partially investigated from the beginning of the 19th century but systematic archaeological research took place between 1950-55 by the Kouklia Expedition of the University of St Andrews and the Liverpool Museum, directed by J.H. Iliffe and T.B. Mitford. From 1966 archaeological research at Palaipafos was resumed under the auspices of the German Archaeological Institute joined by the University of Konstanz (until 1972) and Zürich (since 1973) directed by Franz Georg Maier and M.-L. von Wartburg. The Department of Antiquities of Cyprus has excavated a certain number of tombs in the area surrounding Kouklia.

Source: Department of Antiquities (<http://www.mcw.gov.cy/mcw/da/da.nsf/All/CB2E60AEDED0A248C225719B0038B505?OpenDocument>)

Prehistory and History

Prehistory

The earliest vestiges of human activity at Palaipaphos date back to the later Chalcolithic period (c. 2800BC). No levels of undisputed structures of this period have been recovered so far, although the two rock-cut pits below the hall of the Late Bronze Age sanctuary resemble Chalcolithic house pits excavated at Kalavassos. The archaeological evidence yields precious information about various aspects of life in the Late Bronze Age (1650-1050 BC) city at Palaipaphos.

The dominant position of Late Bronze Age Palaipaphos in southwestern Cyprus was no doubt enhanced by its Sanctuary – a cult center rivaling the great temples of Enkomi and Kition. According to the foundation myth of the city, Agapenor, the king of Tegea in Arcadia, Greece, was the founder of the city and the sanctuary. Another legend, however, mentions Kinyras, the local legendary king, as the founder and first High Priest of the sanctuary. What is certain is that the site of Palaipafos and its surrounding area are linked to an ancient cult associated with the “Great Goddess”, the goddess of fertility, who was worshiped in Cyprus since the Neolithic period.

Historical Period

It appears that in 709/7 the Cypriot kings willfully submitted to the rule of Sargon II. The only archaeological evidence in Cyprus related to the Assyrian rule, the plate of Sargon II, has no mention of Cypriot kingdoms or their accession in the empire's administrative regions. We can thus assume that they remained autonomous as cities and paid a yearly tribute to Assyrian kings, and that Paphos was among the kings submitted to the Assyrian King. Paphos is included in the Assyrian records as Pappa, and its king as Ituandar, that is, Eteandros (prism of Esarhaddon 683 BC).

The political history of Paphos in classical times is not very well known, except for the names of its kings. In 500 B.C. the Greek cities of Ionia were dissatisfied with Persian intervention in their affairs, interventions resulting in the support of tyrannical regimes that served the interests of the Great King. They thus decided to revolt. The revolt soon spread to the greater part of Asia Minor, and in 499 Sardes was set on fire, urging other cities and areas to join the uprising, amongst them some cities-kingdoms in Cyprus. During the Revolt Paphos it seems that fought at first next to the other Cypriots kings but unfortunately Herodotus tell us nothing about its participation.

In 480 BC the King of Paphos, Penthilos, contributed twelve ships to the fleet of Xerxes. When the last King of Palaipafos, Nikokles, moved his capital at the end of the 4th century B.C. to the newly-founded Nea Pafos, some 16 km to the west, the town retained some of its importance thanks to the continuation of the cult at the temple of Aphrodite.

Remains of the City of Paphos

The continuity of occupation on the site from the Chalcolithic period to the early Byzantine era is well established; a considerable medieval settlement is attested at least since the 12 c. AD. Seen as a whole, the history of the settlement spans a time of nearly 5000 years, from c. 2800 BC to the present day. Three of the sites excavated yielded results of special historical significance. In the Sanctuary of Aphrodite the continuity of cult has been definitely established for more than 1500 years, from the Late Bronze Age (c. 1200 BC) to the Late Roman period (end of the 4th c. AD).

The Sanctuary of Aphrodite

According to the excavators the surviving remains on the sanctuary site from two groups of buildings: the Late Bronze Age Sanctuary I to the south, erected as the first monumental shrine of Aphrodite, and the Roman Sanctuary II north of it, built in the late first or early second century.

It consists of an open court (temenos), surrounded by a monumental wall comprised of enormous limestone blocks. Its western side and part of its south side are preserved along with a hall, which housed a conical baetyl in its centre symbolising the power of the Great Goddess.

That the Paphian goddess was called the "Wanasa" until the end of the classical period may be another

survival of Achaean religious traditions. In Late Classical period, Aphrodite is depicted by types common in the representation of Aphrodite in Greece.

According to the excavator, important information about the life of the sanctuary is derived from the votive monuments deposited there over centuries. Relics of large marble and bronze statues are scarce, although many of their inscribed bases survive. But several thousand fragments of Archaic, Classical, Hellenistic and Roman terracottas not only demonstrate a strong Greek influence on the original fertility cult, but also Phoenician traces reflecting the impact of Astarte on the worship of Aphrodite.

The City wall and the Palace of Hadji Abdulla

Amongst private houses and workshops rose a number of important public buildings, such as a large Late Classical peristyle house and a remarkable palatial building with Achaemenid features at Hadji Abdullah which most likely represents a Royal residence. It dates to the 6th or early 5th century BC.

This remarkable monument of Archaic Cypriot architecture, dominating the eastern living quarters of Palaipaphos, seems to have been inhabited throughout the Classical period until finally collapsed towards the end of the fourth century BC.

The excavation of the Northeast Gate, a stronghold of the defences of Palaipaphos, revealed the development of the city's fortifications from the early Archaic to the early Hellenistic period. At the same site, extensive remains of elaborate siege and countersiege operations were discovered, conducted by a Persian army in 498 BC.

The House of Leda

The mosaic pavement of the triclinium (summer dining room) was found completely preserved. The myth well known and well illustrated in Antiquity, tells Zeus' metamorphosis into a swan in order to approach Leda during one of her baths in the river Eurotas. After their union Leda laid two eggs out of which came the Dioscuroi and Helen Troy. The fine work of late second century testifies to both the private wealth of the inhabitants and the high standards of the Paphian mosaic ateliers. The mosaic has been attributed to the late 2nd/early 3rd century A.D. The floor has been left in situ but the central panel has been lifted and replaced by a modern replica. The original central panel is now exhibited in the Archeological Museum in Nicosia.

The Northeast Gate of the defensive wall

The Northeast Gate of Palaipafos occupied a commanding position above the living quarters of the ancient city on the Marchellos hill and consisted one of the strongholds of the ancient fortifications. The first wall and gate buildings were erected in the early Archaic period (second half of the 8th

century B.C.). The gate is connected with the dramatic siege of the city by the Persians during the Ionian revolt in 498 B.C. According to an inscription the last King of Palaipafos, Nikokles, rebuilt the defensive walls in the middle of the 4th century B.C. but soon after 300 B.C. they fell into disuse.

The reconstruction of the development of the Paphian defences over a period of more than 400 years is of considerable interest, as excavated Greek fortifications spanning a comparable time are still fairly rare. For a long time they were left in disrepair, to be reconstructed for a last time on a large scale in the second half of the fourth century.

Nea Paphos - Mosaics

Topography

Nea Paphos is situated on a small promontory on the southwest coast of the island, and occupies a site on which there was an earlier settlement that had grown around a small, sheltered bay – the future harbour of Nea Paphos. According to written sources, the town was founded at the end of the 4th century by Nicocles, the last king of Palaipafos. In the beginning of the 3rd century B.C. when Cyprus became part of the Ptolemaic kingdom, which had its capital in Alexandria, Nea Pafos became the center of Ptolemaic administration on the island. Until the end of the 2nd century B.C., Nea Pafos acquired such an important role as a political and economical centre of the region that the Ptolemies made it the capital of the whole island. When in 58 B.C. Cyprus was annexed by Rome, Nea Pafos continued to be the capital of Cyprus. Only after the disastrous earthquakes of the 4th century A.D. was the capital transferred to Salamis, which was then renamed Constantia.

Mosaics



A chance discovery has brought to light what still remains the most spectacular group of mosaics in Cyprus. The excavations brought to light large wealthy residences of the Roman period. In Roman times mosaic was the most prestigious type of decoration, especially when it involved figures. In Early Christian times, with marble becoming more readily available the technique became widely used for decorating floors. Figured wall incrustations, however, remained always one of the most luxurious ways of decorating a building.

The House of Dionysos

This rich building belongs to the Greco-Roman type where the rooms are arranged around a central court, which functioned as the core of the house. No other house in Cyprus preserves its mosaic decoration as complete as the House of Dionysos. The building was discovered by chance in 1962 when the area was being leveled, and it was excavated by the Department of Antiquities. It seems that the house was built at the end of the 2nd century A.D. and was destroyed and abandoned after the earthquakes of the 4th century A.D. The plan of the house is of a characteristic Greco-Roman type consisting of an atrium (an open central court), acting as the focal point around which the rooms

were arranged. House of Dionysus occupies 2000sq. metres of which 556 are covered with mosaic floors decorated with mythological, vintage and hunting scenes. At the House's entrance there is a pebble mosaic representing the mythical sea-monster Scylla that belonged to a Hellenistic building found below the later Roman one.

The Four Seasons

The mosaic must belong to the entrance of the house, or a room very near it, because it incorporates in its geometric frame a good-omen inscription: XAIPEI/KAI CY ("Rejoice/you too"). The inscription is divided into two small parts, each enclosed in a tabula ansata, placed on opposite sides of the room. Those in the corners depict the Four Seasons which (at least as the mosaic stands now), starting from the top left moving clock-wise, are: Summer, crowned with ears of corn and holding a sickle; Spring, crowned with flowers and holding a shepherd's crook; Autumn holding a pruning – knife and crowned with leaves; and finally Winter, represented as a grey, bearded man, with next to him an upturned vessel out of which issues water.

The House of Orpheus

It belongs to the type of the wealthy Greco-Roman Houses with a central court similar to the House of Dionysus. The building has been dated to the late 2nd /early 3rd century A.D. The style of mosaics is very similar to that of the House of Dionysus, but appears to be fractionally earlier. The buildings' main room, the reception hall, is decorated with a mosaic floor depicting Orpheus among the beasts. The next rooms' mosaic floor bears two panels, one representing Hercules and the Lion of Nemea, and the other an Amazon with her horse.

Only three rooms with mosaic floors have been discovered so far. The figured mosaics are quite similar in style and technique to those of the House of Dionysos.

Hercules and the lion of Nemea

This mosaic is a straightforward depiction of Hercules' first labour in which he killed the invulnerable Lion of Nemea, in order to take its skin to king Eurystheus. The Lion according to some writers, was born to Echidna and Orthros, and according to others, fell, from the moon. Hercules first tried his arrows but to no effect. He then ceased it with his club but the Lion hid in a cave. After blocking one of the two exits of the cave, Hercules entered, threw his club away and throttled the beast with his bare hands.

Orpheus and the Beasts

The mosaic decorates a room measuring 4.25x5.10m. Apart from a rather simple geometric frame, the whole floor is occupied by one large panel. Orpheus is seated on a rock and with his left hand holds a lyre, the sounds of which attract a multitude of creatures that gather enchanted around him. The most important feature of this mosaic is the inscription that runs above the poet's head. It reads [ΓΑΙ]OC [ΤΙΤ]OC IINNIOC/PECTITOYTOCEΠOIEI, which translated means Gaius (or Titus) Pinnius

Restitutus made it. At first sight this may be taken for the signature of the mosaicist. Whichever the exact meaning, such inscriptions are not all that common and this is the first one we know from Roman Cyprus.

The Villa of Theseus

The Polish excavations directed by W.A. Daszewski, at the locality Maloutena in Nea Paphos, have been in progress since 1965 and have brought to light a vast Roman building known as the villa of Theseus. The villa was built in the second half of the 2nd century A.D. over the ruins of earlier houses of the Hellenistic and early Roman periods and was in use until the 7th century AD. The villa's large size, it consisted of more than 100 rooms, suggests that the building was the residence of the governor of Cyprus. Many of the rooms and three of the four porticos around the central court are covered with mosaic floors with geometric motifs. Three rooms in the south wing of the building are embellished with mosaic floors with human representations, all belonging to different phases. The oldest one is the mosaic representing Theseus and the Minotaur, dating to the very end of the 3rd or beginning of the 4th century A.D. with obvious later restorations, probably made after the earthquakes of the middle of the 4th century. At the end of the 4th century A.D. a new mosaic depicting Poseidon and Amphitrite was added to a room, which probably served as a bedroom. Finally, at the beginning of the 5th century, a mosaic floor was laid in the reception room, of which only a part is preserved today and depicts Achilles' first bath.

Theseus and the Minotaur

Archeological evidence indicates that the pavement was created at the very end of the 3rd or in the early 4th century A.D. The scene on the mosaic shows a decisive moment in the fight. Unlike most of the other mosaics with this subject known from various part of the Roman Empire, the Paphos representation does not limit itself to the main protagonists, Theseus and the Minotaur alone.

Balancing the figure of the Minotaur on the other side, there is a personification of the Labyrinth, who is shown as an elderly man. Outside the Labyrinth, on the right, there is a personification of Crete, wearing the turreted crown typical of personifications of cities, and on the left there is Ariadne, anxiously waiting for the outcome of the combat.

The House of Aion

Only part of the house has been excavated so far. On the floor of an apsidal room, lies the most spectacular mosaic of Pafos dated from the middle of the 4th century A.D. The mosaic, which is of excellent quality, consists of five figural panels depicting the newborn Dionysos, Leda and the Swan, the beauty contest between Cassiopeia and the Nereids, Apollon and Marsyas, and finally the Triumph of Dionysos.

The mosaic decoration of the reception hall is composed of five figural panels within a Π-shaped geometric frame opening in the direction of the entrance. The frame itself was made up of several borders, the outermost having the form of a band of white reticulatum ornament upon grayish background.

CHAPTER 13b

**Orthodox Churches and
Monasteries of Cyprus
The Byzantine Museum of the
Archbishop Makarios III
Foundation**

C h r i s t o d o u l o s

H a d j i c h r i s t o d o u l o u

The Monastery of St Neophytos

The Monastery of St Neophytos lies near the village of Tala in the Paphos district. Its foundation is dated back to the 12th century and is attributed to the Cypriot Saint Neophytos the Recluse. Neophytos had himself carved his ascetic cavern, the so-called *Engleistra* or hermitage, which includes a church, a cell, and a refectory. Inside the Saint's cell lies his stone desk and grave.

The Engleistra was decorated for the first time in 1183 with remarkable wall-paintings by painter Theodoros Apsevdís, who had probably come to the island from Constantinople. The wall-paintings include scenes from the Passion of Christ and isolated saints. Of special note is the illustration with St Neophytos flanked by two angels, and the Small Deesis, in which the saint is depicted kneeling in supplication to God. The icons of Christ and Our Lady Orans from the Engleistra have also been dated to the 12th century.

The Monastery's *katholikon*, just as the more recent monastic complex which surrounds it, lies to the east of the Engleistra. The church belongs to the Franco-Byzantine style and dates from the 16th century. It is very similar to the Cathedral of St Mamas in Morphou and was possibly built by the same workmen. The scarce wall-paintings preserved in the *katholikon*, which is dedicated to the Dormition of Theotokos, date from the first half of the 16th century.

The Monastery of Our Lady Eleousa (Merciful) of Kykkos

The Holy, Royal, and Stavropegic Monastery of Our Lady Eleousa of Kykkos was founded around the end of the 11th century, and according to local tradition its founder was the Byzantine Emperor Alexios Comnenos. The Emperor bestowed the miraculous icon of Our Lady Eleousa on the Monastery's founder, Monk Isaiah. The icon, attributed to the Evangelist Luke, was kept in the imperial palace.

Through the centuries, the Monastery became the most important in Cyprus, owing to a wealth of miracles performed by the Holy Icon. Our Lady of Kykkos is believed to be a rainmaker and a healer of female sterility. The old icon has a 1759 silver gilt revetment and is at all times covered with a precious veil so that her face may remain unseen by the faithful. In times of draught the icon is carried in procession to the *throni*, which lies on the top of the mountain to the west of the Monastery. There, with the uncovered icon facing the sky, far from the eyes of the faithful, a supplication for rain is performed. Our Lady is also considered a guardian of seamen, and this is why model ships used to be dedicated to her.

Despite repeated fires having ravaged the Monastery in the past, the icon of Our Lady was always salvaged.

The monastic complex comprises many constructions dating from different epochs, namely: the *katholikon*, the *hegoumeneio* (Abbot's quarters), the Library, the refectory, the guest house, and the Museum. The present-day church is a three-aisled domed basilica dating from the 19th century. It

was decorated during the 20th century with wall-paintings in the Byzantine style by painter Georgios Georgiou. During recent renovations, a large area of both the exterior and the interior wall surfaces of the monastic complex was decorated with mosaics and wall-paintings.

On the post-Byzantine wood-carved gilt iconostasis of the church there are icons of different styles and periods. Of special note among them are the icons of the apostles or isolated saints in the Italo-Byzantine style, such as the icon of St John Chrysostom, and the icons in the style of Ioannis Kornaros the Cretan, such as that of St George and of Our Lady Paramythia.

During the years of Ottoman rule, the monastery became a Pan-Orthodox pilgrimage site with several dependencies in Asia Minor and Russia. Pilgrims to the Holy Land considered that for their pilgrimage to be complete, they had to visit the Monastery.

During the days of Hegoumen Nikiphoros (second half of the 20th century) one of the most significant ecclesiastical museums in Cyprus was founded inside the monastery. From the exhibits, which span a period from the Early Christian years to the 19th century, of note are an Early Christian marble offering table, fragments of wall-paintings from the 13th century with the figures of Our Lady and St Demetrius, as well as icons from the same period, such as the icon of Christ, Our Lady Brephokratousa, and St John the Baptist from Moutoullas.

The Monastery has several dependencies, including St Prokopius in Nicosia and the Archangel Michael in Lakatamia.

The Church of Our Lady “Angeloktisti”

The church is one of the most important Christian monuments in Cyprus. The Byzantine church of Our Lady Angeloktisti is located in the village of Kiti in the Larnaca district. Tradition relates that it was built by angels, hence the designation of Our Lady as “Angeloktisti”. The foundation date of the initial church, a basilica, is set in the 5th century. Later, after the church had been ruined, its salvaged apse was incorporated into the present-day church which was built in c. 11th century.

It is a cross-in-square church that preserves fragments of wall-paintings from the 13th century. Of the same period is also an icon depicting Our Lady enthroned, flanked by the Evangelist Luke and St Lazarus of the Four Days, the first bishop of Kition.

During the years of French Dominion, in particular the 13th century, a Latin chapel was added to the south side of the church by feudal lords of the Gibelet family. Today, this chapel has been converted into a small museum, mostly exhibiting post Byzantine icons from the church. On display is also a medieval tombstone of Simone Guers, who died in 1302.

The wood-carved iconostasis dates from the 19th century, its icons from the 18th and 19th centuries. Of note among them is the icon of the Archangel Michael, possibly an 18th-century work from Mount Athos.

On the apse of the bema one of the most important mosaics in the Christian world has been preserved,

dated to the last quarter of the 6th century. The mosaic depicts Theotokos standing, *Aristerokratousa*, namely holding baby Jesus in her left arm, with the accompanying inscription ΑΓΙΑ ΜΑΡΙΑ [SAINT MARY]. This inscription evokes teachings of the Monophysite heresy and not the doctrine of Theotokos affirmed in the third Ecumenical Council of 431. Theotokos is flanked by the Archangels Michael and Gabriel doing reverence. The composition is surrounded by a band with plants, animals, and birds. The original models of such bands may be found in the art of the East but also the West.

The Byzantine Museum of the Archbishop Makarios III Foundation

This is the largest and most significant museum of its kind in the whole of Cyprus. Its exhibits originate from churches and monasteries of the island. They include wall-paintings, portable icons, sacred vessels, sacerdotal vestments, golden embroideries, and manuscripts. These items span a period from the Early Christian years to the 20th century.

Of special interest are mosaics and wall-paintings from the island's occupied monuments, illegally exported abroad after the 1974 Turkish invasion and eventually repatriated. Special reference should be made to fragments of mosaics from the church of Our Lady Kanakaria in Lythrangomi dated to the first half of the 6th century, and the wall-paintings from the 13th-century church of St Euphemianus in Lysi and from the 15th-century church of Christ Antiphonetes in Kalograia.

On display in the Museum's exhibition area are also the wall-paintings that have been removed from the cavern of St Sozomenos near Potamia, possibly of the 10th century, as well as those from the church of St Nikolas "of the Roof" of the 14th century.

Further, two *despotikai* icons of Christ and Our Lady Arakiotissa from the church of Our Lady of Arakas in Lagoudera are on display in the Museum. The icons have been dated to the 12th century and are considered masterpieces of Comnenian art.

Churches of Troodos

The ecclesiastical monuments of Troodos include Byzantine and post-Byzantine monasteries, churches, chapels, and rural churches which either adorn various picturesque villages or lie in remote, wooded areas.

These monuments are very important in that the wall-paintings which decorate them cover a wide span from the post-Byzantine years to nowadays. Ten of these monuments are included in the UNESCO World Heritage list. These churches are the following:

- **Church of the Holy Cross “Ayiasmati” in Platanistasa**

It is the katholikon of an old monastery, the monastic buildings of which have been ruined. The church is a timber-roofed basilica with an ambulatory along its south and west sides. It was built by friar Petros Perates and his wife Pepane. The founders are depicted on a wall-painting on the south external wall of the church. The interior of the church is decorated with wall-paintings attributed to two significant painters. The first is Minas from Myriantoussa, who decorated the bema apse with Our Lady of Blachernae and the Communion of the Apostles. On the front and the left gable he painted prophets, the Annunciation, and Christ, King of Glory.

The remaining surfaces of the walls are decorated with scenes from the life of Christ, Saints, and the cycle of the Discovery and Exaltation of the Holy Cross. These paintings are the work of Philippos Goul from 1494 or 1505.

- **The Church of Our Lady of Arakas in Lagoudera**

The church was the katholikon of a monastery. A two-storey building with cells is preserved on its northern side. The church was founded by Leon Afthentis in the late 12th century. It belongs to the single-aisled domed style with a cross-shaped upper structure.

The church is decorated with wall-paintings of the Comnenian period which, according to an inscription, date from 1192. The wall-paintings are believed to be among the most significant in the Christian world in terms of their quality.

The dome is dominated by the mellow figure of the Pantokrator and on a lower level the Preparation of the Throne and busts of angels in medallions. Also depicted are prophets, the Annunciation, and the four Evangelists in pairs of two.

Of special interest is Our Lady Arakiotissa in the type of Our Lady of Passion, the scenes from the lives of Christ and Theotokos, and the depictions of Cypriot Saints.

- **The Church of the Holy Cross in Pelendri**

The church belongs to the single-aisled domed type with its oldest wall-paintings on the apse dating from 1178. They depict the Great Deesis and co-officiating hierarchs.

In the 14th century, it was decorated by at least four different painters. Scenes from the Divine Passion are depicted, as well as the events after the Resurrection, scenes from the Marian cycle, and death portraits of dedicators.

- **The Church of St Nikolas ‘of the Roof’ in Kakopetria**

This cross-in-square church has a second inclined roof with flat tiles. It was built in the 11th century to serve as the katholikon of a monastery and preserves wall-paintings dating from the 11th to the 17th century.

The large icon of St Nikolas, meant for public veneration, dates from the 13th century. Aside from the scenes with the life of the Saint, also depicted is the family of the donor – a Western knight, along with his horse. The Saint is invoked as “of the Roof”.

- **The Church of Our Lady Podythou in Galata**

The Church of Our Lady Eleousa Podythou used to be the katholikon of a small monastery. It was built by the De Coronne family in 1502, according to a relevant inscription. The church was never entirely decorated with wall-paintings.

Wall-paintings in the Italo-Byzantine style of the 16th century adorn the Holy Bema and depict Our Lady with the Archangels, Prophets, and scenes from the Marian cycle. In the interior of the church, the Crucifixion is represented, with “The prophets from above” composition on the exterior.

- **The Church of Our Lady Forviotissa in Asinou**

The church was built as the katholikon of a monastery by the magistrate Nikiphoros Ischyrios between 1099 and 1105. Nikiforos is depicted in a subsequent dedicatory wall-painting of the 14th century.

It is a small barrel-vaulted church with a second inclined roof covered with tiles. At the end of the 12th century, a narthex with a calotte was added to the west side of the church.

Densely decorated, the church preserves very significant wall-paintings dated to 1105/6, among which an inscription commemorating the emperor Alexios Comnenos. It includes wall-paintings from the 13th, 14th, and 17th centuries.

The narthex is decorated with scenes from the Second Coming, saints, and numerous portraits of donors.

- **The Monastery of St John Lampadistes in Kalopanaghiotis**

The Monastery includes three churches covered by a second timber roof with tiles. The katholikon of the monastery is dedicated to St Heracleidius, bishop of Tamassos, and was built in the 11th century.

In the 12th century, the church of St John Lampadistes was built, inside which his tomb was placed. The chapel of the Akathistos Hymn was built in the 15th century.

The church of St Heracleidius preserves few wall-painting of the 12th century. The 13th century wall-paintings reverberate Eastern influences, whilst those of the 15th century in the narthex are the works of a painter from Constantinople according to a semi-ruined inscription. The church's iconostasis, dated to the 14th century, has written decoration with animals and birds.

The Italo-Byzantine wall-paintings in the chapel of the Akathistos Hymn date from the 16th century.

- **The Church of Our Lady in Moutoullas**

It is a small timber roofed church, which was built by Ioannis Moutoullas and his wife Irene in 1280. The church was decorated with wall-paintings in the so-called Crusaders style of the 13th century. They depict scenes from the life of Christ and isolated saints, among whom St Christopher on horseback as well as the dedicators offering a model of the church. Some wall-paintings date from the 16th century.

- **The Church of the Archangel Michael in Pedoulas**

This is a single-aisled timber roofed church with an ambulatory along its south and west sides. It was built in 1474 by friar Basil Chamados and his family. At the time, it was decorated entirely with wall-paintings by the painter Minas from Myrianthousa, who signs his work. Minas follows the last phase of Paleologian art. The decoration includes scenes from the Christological and Marian cycles on the upper layer and isolated saints on the lower layer. Particularly impressive is the large depiction of the sword-bearing Archangel on the north wall. The iconostasis, which is contemporary with the church, has painted decoration.

- **The Church of the Transfiguration of the Saviour or Saint Sotera in Palaichori**

This is a small timber roofed church from the beginning of the 16th century. The narthex on the west side of the church was built in the early 17th century.

The interior of the church was probably decorated by painter Philippos Goul in the second decade of the 16th century. Scenes from the Christological cycle are depicted, as well as isolated saints, monks, and soldiers at full length. Even though the painter follows the so-called Cypriot School of the 16th century, the influence of Western art may be discerned in his work. The external west wall of the church is decorated with wall-paintings of 1612 with influences from 16th century-art.

The wood-carved iconostasis includes an interesting icon of the Transfiguration of the Saviour (18th century) originating from Mount Athos.

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CHAPTER 13c

**Ayia Sophia, Omerye Mosque,
Ayia Napa**

C h r i s S c h a b e l

Ayia Sophia, Omerye Mosque, Ayia Napa

The Frankish conquest of 1191 brought Cyprus into the sphere of western art and architecture at a time when the gothic style was dominant. During the period of Cyprus' greatest prosperity, gothic was employed in the Latin cathedrals that were constructed in all four cities, in the major Latin monastic establishments in the countryside at Bellapais (Episcopia) and probably Stravrovouni (the Cross), and in the numerous foundations of the western monastic and mendicant orders in the cities, around twenty in the capital, ten in Famagusta, and three or four each in Paphos and Limassol. After over a century of coexistence with the Latin clergy, the Greeks, Syrians, and Armenians adopted the gothic style when they built or reconstructed their own churches from the fourteenth century onwards, the spectacular ruins of the cathedral of St George of the Greeks in Famagusta being the greatest example, but the Greek cathedral of the Virgin Hodegetria in Nicosia, the so-called Bedesten, is also notable. One can still see the remains of some Latin gothic churches in Paphos and Limassol, and the Carmelite church near Polemidhia outside Limassol is still intact. Bellapais Abbey, in its enchanting setting between the mountains and sea close to Kyrenia, still constitutes one of the most beautiful gothic structures in the world. Nicosia boasts several examples in varying states of preservation, from the intact church of St Catherine and the modified structure of the Benedictine nunnery of Our Lady of Tortosa to the ruins of the New Mosque and the foundations of the Cistercian convent of St Theodore. Famagusta is undoubtedly the most impressive locale, with over a dozen gothic churches either intact or with substantial remains, from the great St Nicholas Cathedral and the mysterious Sts Peter and Paul to the ruins of the large churches of the Carmelites and Franciscans. Following the century of decline after the Genoese invasion, Venetian rule brought the Italian Renaissance to Cyprus, especially in the fortifications of Kyrenia, Famagusta, and Nicosia, but also in domestic architecture. This chapter will go into some detail about three buildings: the Cathedral of Holy Wisdom of Nicosia, or Ayia Sophia; the church of the Augustinian Hermits in Nicosia, or the Omerye Mosque; and the monastery of Ayia Napa in the southeast of the island.

Ayia Sophia

The cathedral of Ayia Sophia either gradually replaced its domed Greek predecessor or was built alongside it, taking its typical Greek name, "Holy Wisdom." The first building campaign probably began in 1209 when Archbishop Albert laid the foundation stone. Construction may have accelerated in the early part of Archbishop Eustorge's reign (late 1210s and 1220s). Perhaps Eustorge managed to finish the east end with the normal pointed arches, ribbed vaulting, and flying buttresses of the early gothic style, which came to Cyprus before the Syrian mainland. Contrary to a common hypothesis, King Louis IX of France's visit in 1248-49 probably had nothing to do with the development of Cypriot gothic. The nave was begun and partly carried out by the middle of the century, as was the two-storied sacristy/treasury connected to the north transept. The entire interior maintains the traditional scheme of nave with single lower side aisles, reflected in the three west portals, but Ayia

Sophia is two-storied, lacking a triforium. Still, the plain round columns of the arcade resemble those of Notre-Dame of Paris, while the (eastern) clerestory windows of two lancets are similar to those of Sens Cathedral before thirteenth-century alterations. The aisle plan, with elevated galleries below the windows, shares a certain similarity with that of churches in Burgundy and Champagne.

Another great spurt of activity took place in the later thirteenth and the first half of the fourteenth century. The structure of the west end of the nave was probably complete by the late 1310s. Further evidence of building works is furnished for the reign of the Dominican Archbishop John of Conti (1312-32), who arrived on Cyprus in 1319 and consecrated the cathedral in 1326. He completed the gallery up to the vaults and the chapel dedicated to St Thomas Aquinas, the Dominican theologian who was canonised only in 1323. In the Middle Ages most churches were more richly adorned than they appear to us today. This decoration, where it survives (for example in the heavily restored Sainte-Chapelle in Paris), often strikes the modern visitor as gaudy, but was of great significance to the medieval viewer. John thus “provided a large baptismal font and a rich marble rood-screen, two large bells and two silver angels, probably for the high altar; he had the vaults of the nave and the six columns of the choir painted and enriched the sacristy with a large number of expensive draperies, silk tapestries, altar frontals and sacerdotal vestments.” Travellers later noted that the choir vaults were painted blue with golden stars (much like the Sainte-Chapelle), and that John’s Aquinas chapel was painted with scenes from the saint’s life, contained a plaque on the altar describing Aquinas’ “acts,” and held a marvelous jasper sarcophagus.

The central western portal accidentally preserves the sculpture of its archivolt, dating to the end of the thirteenth century. The many statues reflect, in style and symbolism, the influence of Reims Cathedral, the coronation church of the kings of France, which served as a model for the coronation church of the kings of Cyprus. Thus the sculptural programme of Nicosia contains elements of coronation symbolism and statues of kings and queens, in addition to church prelates and biblical prophets. A possible influence from Orthodox art may be seen in the apparent placement of niches for icons on the sides of the portals.

After John of Conti’s reign a series of disasters befell the cathedral, city, and kingdom. Further construction became difficult, and the money available probably went to maintenance and repairs, except for the small, square, fifteenth-century “chapel” with a sole exterior entrance, attached to the third bay of the south aisle. There is some question as to whether the “second” façade was ever completed. What remains is the north tower, the beginnings of the south one, and the start of an arch that would connect the two. A traveller, in 1518, remarked that the west façade had three porches under “the finest possible beginning of a bell tower of well cut sandstone,” and he repeats that there was only one tower.

With the possible exception of the royal palace, Ayia Sophia was the main landmark of the capital. Still, western visitors remarked more on its decor than its size, which was even termed “little.” In fact, although it may have been the largest church built in the Eastern Mediterranean in the millennium between the rise of Islam and the late Ottoman period, Ayia Sophia pales in comparison to the greatest French cathedrals in terms of magnitude. The exterior measures roughly 43 metres wide at the transepts by about 80 metres long, the nave being 22-23 metres high. Amiens Cathedral, by

contrast, gives the figures 70, 145, and 42. Due to the climate, the exterior was perhaps never fitted with its pitched wooden roofs over the aisles and nave, although they might have been planned over the choir, and this makes the cathedral appear even more squat than its continental counterparts.

The cathedral was a focus of activity throughout the Latin era, hosting, for example, the trial of the Templars in 1310. It was a part of a complex of structures, including the archbishop's palace opposite the north transept entrance, built by Archbishop Eustorge and probably much modified later. There does not appear to have been a separate chapter house for the committee running the cathedral; instead, the cathedral chapter met in the palace or the sacristy/treasury. The complex also contained the cathedral school, which George the Cypriot, later Patriarch Gregory of Constantinople, surely attended in the 1250s. Ayia Sophia served as the coronation church for the Lusignan kings of Cyprus and, after the Genoese invasion, Jerusalem and eventually Armenia. Until 1314, Nicosia Cathedral was also a preferred place of interment, with a dozen significant burials, including Kings Aimery and Hugh III. The archbishop was supposed to hold, in the cathedral church, church councils for the diocese of Nicosia twice a year and councils for the whole province of Cyprus on a regular basis. The *Synodicum Nicosiense* provides the proceedings of some synods, which could be the occasion for Greek rioting, as in 1313, 1360, and 1567. The last known public gathering in the cathedral took place in 1570, when Francesco Contarini, the bishop of Paphos, attempted to inspire the Nicosia populace to defend the capital against the Turks. When Nicosia fell, Ayia Sophia was converted into the capital's main mosque, with added minarets, although it retained the name "Aysofya" until 1954 when, amid rising tensions, it became the "Selimiye Mosque," after the sultan of the time of the conquest.

Omerye Mosque

Unlike the reclusive monastic orders, the mendicant orders, or "beggars," were created to preach to the urban poor, combat heresy, act as missionaries, and promote learning. Thus, unlike monks, mendicants were comfortable in the cities. Franciscans and Dominicans probably settled in Nicosia in the 1220s, Carmelites a few decades later. The presence in Nicosia of the Augustinian Hermits (or Austrin Friars), not to be confused with the Augustinian Canons, is first attested in 1299. By 1394, the convent contained two cloisters. The Nicosia Augustinians like John of Cyprus, master of theology, and Andrew Audeth, doctor of canon law, took an active role in higher education. The discovery of several tombs of Augustinian Hermits in the Omerye Mosque in Old Nicosia is enough to identify that structure with the Augustinians' church, often wrongly called St Mary. Over 110 tombs were found in total, including those of seven Greeks. The oldest clearly legible tomb is dated to 1341, and Camille Enlart's claim that the church is from the first half of the 14th century fits the other written evidence perfectly. After Ayia Sophia, it is the largest surviving medieval church in Nicosia.

Externally, the church is over 50 metres long and about 14 metres wide, consisting of a western porch, two rectangular bays of the nave, and an eastern bay ending in a three-sided apse. Like many mendicant churches, which were built for preaching to the masses, the Augustinian church has no side aisles, and so the interior of the nave is actually slightly wider than that of Ayia Sophia. Originally it was roofed with ribbed vaults about 15 metres from the floor, but the church was damaged by

the Ottomans during the siege of 1570 (or possibly an earthquake?), and a simple wooden roof on transverse arches was installed in its transformation into a mosque. The tall lancet windows and much of the porch also perished, but the central door and the porch's south arch remain. The side chapel, however, measuring 10 by 6 metres, not only retains its ribbed vaulting, but also a beautiful rose window on the west side. The chapel has a rectangular western bay and an eastern bay ending in a three-sided apse, whose ribs converge in the conventional way. Attached to the east of the chapel are ruins that presumably belonged to a sacristy and the conventual buildings (?). Interestingly, besides a well-crafted Gothic doorway, there are two pedimented Renaissance windows. It is uncertain whether this monumental front was part of the "Hostel of St Augustine" that Queen Charlotte of Bourbon constructed around 1420 or, more likely, "the guest houses" Archbishop William Goneme built before his death in 1473, a refurbishing thereof or some other structure. It should probably be ascribed a sixteenth-century date.

Ayia Napa

Ayia Napa monastery is situated in the centre of the busy tourist town of the same name. It is a curious combination of Byzantine, gothic, and Renaissance elements, probably reflecting its complicated past. The church, on the west, is partly an underground cave. In the 1370s it seems to have been a convent of Greek nuns, but in the so-called Latin chapel in the church there was a Latin inscription commemorating its construction in 1530, during the Venetian period. When a Czech traveler visited sixteen years later, he noted that "a monk who belonged to the order of St Augustine treated us to bread and wine and put us up for the night." He went on to say that "in the chapel in which the icon of the Virgin was located Greek Orthodox monks celebrated, while in the area more in front Catholics of the order of St Augustine celebrated." After 1571 the references are again to Greek nuns, although the Latin chapel was still in occasional use 1625, probably by visiting Franciscans, and the monastery functioned down to the end of the eighteenth century.

Thus it appears that in the Venetian period, when the claustral buildings were constructed, the monastery was shared by Greeks and Latins, the latter probably monastic Augustinian Canons, rather than the mendicant Hermits of Nicosia. The claustral buildings are interesting, within the same walled enclosure as the church. The north entrance to the enclosure is a two-floored structure with interesting gothic and Renaissance details both on the inside and outside. Below this building on the interior of the cloister water brought from outside via an aqueduct, originally Roman, exits from a beautiful marble boar's head. In the cloister yard, or garth, there is a sculpted octagonal fountain within a square, domed pavilion. The east and south ranges of the cloister are rather simple, except for the heavy barrel-vaulted south entrance.

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CHAPTER 13d

Sites of Nicosia

E u p h r o s y n e

R i z o p o u l o u - E g o u m e n i d o u

The Old Archbishopric, Nicosia

The Old Archbishopric stood to the north of the Cathedral, and both occupied the site of the Benedictine Abbey of St. John the Evangelist of Bibi. After the Mameluke raid of 1426 the Benedictine Order left Cyprus, and the building passed into Orthodox hands and remained a Greek monastery until 1720, when the seat of the archbishop was transferred to this area, in the southern part of the town where most Christians resided. The building was then renovated to become the residence of the Orthodox Archbishop Silvestros (1718-1733). The renovation is commemorated by an inscription over the door of the room which later became the residence of Archbishop Kyprianos (1810-1821). In 1814, John Macdonald Kinneir was conducted to the “episcopal palace” and was received in the vestibule by the Archbishop, who ordered an apartment to be prepared for the visitor in the Palace, “a large and straggling building containing upwards of a hundred chambers ... all required for the accommodation of the bishops, priests and their attendants”. Kyprianos himself took Kinneir by hand and led him through a gallery into the refectory, “a long and dirty hall”, for supper. In 1816, the young traveller Otto Friedrich von Richter was also received by Kyprianos. He described the archbishopric as a monastery built around the courtyard of the cathedral. In 1835, the American missionary Lorenzo Warriner Pease paid a short visit to the “Archiepiscopal residence”. He was invited into a reception room and was served with the usual refreshments. In this room, most probably the *synodikon*, he found a copy of Demosthenes, a manuscript produced by one of the inmates of the convent. In 1862/3, Archbishop Makarios I (1854-1865) built the Great *Synodikon* (Synod Hall) and the adjoining rooms in the garden, to the north of Apostolos Varnavas Street. He also built the two viaducts over the street, in order to connect the new building with the Old Archbishopric. Ten years later, in 1873, the Archduke of Austria Louis Salvator recorded his visit to the “archiepiscopal palace ... flanked by clay houses and colonnades ... an irregular building with lofty halls, surrounded by wooden and stone balustrades. The interior is plain, but spacious, the Archbishop having a suite of fifty persons, of whom twenty are priests”. Archbishop Sophronios III had ordered a pope to show the palace to the visitor. They started with the inspection of the outer corridors, and came up the stairs: “After passing through the bare looking ante-room we came into a hall, where we found the Archbishop: he was sitting on a divan covered with Turkish carpets, on which he also offered me a seat after a friendly greeting...”. Afterwards, several popes conducted the guest through the other apartments. “First we went across to a new wing of the building, in which there is a modern Turkish reception-room, with a fine view over the garden. We entered now the very modest bedroom of the Archbishop, with a few pointed arches supporting the ceiling, and a very small alcove. From the balcony, you look over both the gardens belonging to the palace and the azure mountains at the back. A small apartment over the arcades and the stable of the mules contains a small library and the insignia of the bishop”. The rooms mentioned by Louis Salvator can be identified with rooms in the surviving north wing of the Old Archbishopric. The divan room could be the small Synod Hall, while the reception room in the “new” wing is undoubtedly the great Synod Hall of 1862, which is flanked by two rooms on either side. The “modest bedroom of the Archbishop” must be a small room with arches opening to the balcony, while the “small library” over the arcades was Kyprianos’ room.

The 18th/19th-century archbishopric incorporated the north wing of the monastery of St. John of Bibi. These earlier remnants – walls and arcades – are still visible, mainly on the ground floor, and contribute to the wonderful effect of the architecture of the building. This, in its present form, is L-shaped, with two storeys and covered verandas facing the courtyard of the cathedral. A series of rooms opens to the south onto the covered veranda, which is accessible through a stone-built staircase. Before its 20th-century restoration, the staircase had, at the lower end, an iron arch with a cross at the top and the date 1886. This arch can be seen in the “The Old Archbishopric”, painted by Ioannis Kissonergis. The tiled roof with its wide eaves, the rows of windows with shutters or jalousies on the upper floor, the wood-carved balustrades of the balconies and the decorated cornices around the roof connect the architecture of the Old Archbishopric with that of the monasteries and grand mansions of the 18th/19th centuries. Until the late 1950s, the Old Archbishopric also extended along the west and partly along the south side of the cathedral in a Π-shaped arrangement. The entrance to the courtyard was an arched doorway with a wooden door and built benches, one on each side for mounting and dismounting. Next to the doorway, to the south, there were rooms for the porter. The south and west wings were also two-storied and were partly built of mud brick. On the upper floor of the south wing, there was a covered veranda with wooden posts. Most of the rooms were used for the accommodation of priests or laymen who worked for or had some connection with the Archbishopric. The surviving north wing extended further to the west, where there were the kitchen, storerooms and servants’ rooms opening onto a courtyard. The refectory formed an extension of the west wing to the west. The south wing, part of the west wing and the buildings extending further to the west were demolished and replaced by the New Archbishopric, built between 1956 and 1960, and the Makarios III Foundation Cultural Centre, inaugurated in 1982. The courtyard and auxiliary rooms extended to the west, up to Isaakios Komnenos Street, where the camel stables and a high doorway (*kameloporta*, camels’ door) were. Later, the archbishopric’s printing office and shops were built on this side but they were demolished in the 1950s. The ground floor of the north wing was used for storing wine, oil, etc. – not as stables, as it was at Louis Salvator’s time – and as servants’ rooms. In the early 1960s, the surviving part of the building was adapted so as to house the Cyprus Folk Art Museum. The northern rooms were later occupied by the Museum of National Struggle 1955-1959.

As the seat of the Orthodox Archbishopric during the troubled 18th and 19th centuries, this building is of high historical importance. It was here that Archbishop Kyprianos was captured and taken to his martyrdom. His bust now stands in front of the courtyard of the Cathedral. The Old Archbishopric remained the centre of all spiritual, national and political movements of the Greek Cypriots down to the struggle for independence of the 1950s.

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Cyprus Folk Art Museum

The Cyprus Folk Art Museum belongs to the Society of Cypriot Studies. It was founded in 1937 by a few pioneer members of the Society, and is the earliest ethnographic museum in Cyprus. It is housed in the premises of the Old Archbishopric, a Gothic building which was used as a monastery by the Order of the Benedictines before it passed into Orthodox hands to be used as a Greek monastery and from the early 18th century onwards as the seat of the Orthodox Archbishop. Its long and varied history is reflected in the architecture of the building, which dates back to the 15th century and later on has undergone several renovations and repairs. When the seat of the Archbishop of Cyprus was moved to the new palace, in 1961, His Beatitude Makarios III, handed over the whole of the premises of the Old Archbishopric to the Society of Cypriot Studies, and sponsored its restoration. Extensive reconstruction of the building was carried out from 1962 to 1964, and also later, in the early 1990s. In April 1996, the new exhibitions of the Museum in the ground floor opened for the public. Today the Museum Collection comprises over 5000 items. Many of them were donated, while others were bought from private collections or directly from villagers all over Cyprus. Most of the items come from areas that are occupied by Turkish troops since 1974.

The Cypriot folk art is the artistic expression of a preindustrial rural society, which mostly created functional objects of everyday use, produced with local raw materials and traditional techniques. Folk art items from the period of Ottoman rule have hardly been preserved; thus, most of the handicrafts exhibited in the museum, date to the 19th and the first half of the 20th century. However, there are also items dated to the 18th, or even to the 17th century. The Collection consists of artifacts which represent all branches of folk art, mainly weaving, embroidery and lace, pottery, woodcarving and stonecarving, metalwork, basketry, painting, leatherwork.

The exhibition has been adapted to the restricted space and the architecture of the building, which preserves its composite style. It is a museum housed in a historical monument. Upon entering the spacious reception room, the visitor can see a variety of exhibits, such as traditional costumes and embroideries, an iron four-poster bed with loom-woven clothing, an 18th century grandfather clock in a wooden painted case, carved stone plaques with protective symbols, used as door lintels, etc. An important item here is the wooden door from the Church of St. Mamas in the village of Dali; the wood-carved bird on this door inspired the poet George Seferis, who refers to “the little owl” in his poem “Little things of Cyprus”, dedicated to his friend and first Director of the Museum, Adamantios Diamantis.

Before proceeding to the main exhibition room, the visitor walks through the entrance to the old building, a long vaulted corridor with arches; on the wall above a richly decorated Gothic arch, is preserved a 16th century fresco of the Annunciation bearing a Greek inscription (only the end of it is preserved). Here are exhibited some icons and wood-carved and gilded pieces of ecclesiastic art, such as the 18th century central door of iconostasis, depicting the three hierarchs and St. Heraklidios, with the Annunciation above; there are also votive offerings made of wax in the shape of human figures, mostly children, body parts and animals. They were dedicated to churches in order to be

cured from illnesses.

In a small room to the right are exhibited representative examples of wood-carved pieces of furniture, such as chests and cupboards, a table and chairs. Along the walls are fixed *souvantzes*, wooden shelves with relief and painted decoration. On these are exhibited plates with painted ornaments, mostly imported, as well as *tsestoi*, shallow circular panniers made from the stalks of ears of corn and decorated with multi-coloured stripes of cloth. The centre of the room is occupied by a large bed with four wood-carved posts. This is one of the very few specimens found in Cyprus; they recall the Venetian four-poster beds, which are recorded in the late 18th /early 19th century lists of belongings of deceased Christians.

The spacious main exhibition hall is a long room which includes a variety of folk art items: a loom of the horizontal type with all its accessories and tools used for the preparation of yarn; different kinds and sizes of baskets; cylindrical pots used as beehives and a tall cylindrical jar used for dyeing in black the traditional *vrakes* (baggy trousers); a potter's kick-wheel from Lapithos; wood-carved and painted shelves, wall-cupboards and chests.

The Museum has a rich collection of chests which are exhibited in all rooms; on their front panels are carved the most beautiful motifs of folk art, such as flowers in pots, cypress trees, eagles and other birds, buildings with arches, rosettes and geometric patterns; the variations in the composition of the designs, the method of execution and the forms of the motifs, all give each piece a singular identity of a handcrafted work of art. The most important exhibits in this room are two panels with frescoes; these paintings were detached from the walls of a coffee-house in the village of Geri, before its demolition. One depicts the arrest of Athanasios Diakos, a hero of the Greek Revolution in 1821, and the other the famous wrestler Panais Koutalianos. The respective names of the persons represented, and the date 1892, are painted on the panels. These subjects were popular by that time, and similar paintings have been found in two other coffee-houses, public buildings frequented by villagers. More often, national and folk heroes, as well as religious scenes, animals, flowers and other themes were painted in oil paint on glass. The Museum possesses a wide variety of such works of art. One of the best exhibits is an oil painting by the naïve artist Michael Kashialos, from Ashia in Mesaoria; it depicts various scenes of a traditional wedding. Among other items of everyday use in the same room, is a rare piece of painted leatherwork: it is a *tampoutsia*, a kind of sieve with leather base, used also as a drum; on the base is depicted a "modern" lady between two disproportionally large flowers; she is holding an umbrella, and the date 1899 is painted on her dress.

On one side of the large exhibition hall there is a series of five small rooms, all of which communicate with the central space. The first three are used for the exhibition of textiles and embroideries, silver objects and jewellery, and traditional costumes; the last two house the rich collection of pottery; wood-carved pieces of furniture are found in all exhibition rooms.

The variety of textiles made of cotton, wool, linen, silk or mixtures of these raw materials, usually in bright colours, reflects the specialization in different parts of the island and the development of local weaving traditions. Weaving was the women's principal occupation not only in the villages but also in the towns. The designs of embroideries were either made on the cloth as it was woven on

the loom -the most characteristic examples being the *fythkiotika* woven polychrome embroideries, named after Fyti village in Pafos- or sewn by hand; of the latter type is the cross-stitch embroidery, which is very common in many parts of the island. The designs comprise mostly geometric motifs or stylized flowers and human figures. White embroidery is best represented with fine examples from the village of Lefkara, decorated in various distinctive stitches and elaborate cut-work patterns. The Museum also presents fine specimens of lace work, such as needle-point laces and crochet work. Local variations of traditional costumes, both rural and urban, include, among others, the Karpass festive costume with the *sayia* (gown open in front), the Paphos costume with *foustani* (dress), the Amalia costume, named after the Greek Queen Amalia, as well as men's costumes with the *vraka* (pleated baggy trousers). Fine pieces of jewellery accompany the festive costumes, such as silver buckles in filigree technique, brooches, necklaces, crosses, amulets etc. Household utensils, forks and spoons, filigree baskets, incense burners and rose-water sprinklers, *zarfs* (cup-holders) and bowls with delicate decoration reflect a flourishing craft practiced by local silversmiths.

Pottery is another craft with a long tradition going back to prehistoric times. A variety of clay vessels represent the main pottery producing centres -Kornos, Foini, Lapithos, Varosia. Worth mentioning are also pumpkin gourds, which are decorated with incised patterns and scenes of everyday life; they were mainly used as wine vessels. Gourds are exhibited together with musical instruments in a small room on the other side of the main hall.

Objects of big dimensions, such as pithos jars, a cart and parts of wooden water-raising wheels, are found outside the Museum. Numerous other folk art items are kept in rooms of the upper floor; one room is devoted to the shadow theatre. Furthermore, there are rooms for temporary exhibitions, lectures and other cultural activities. The equipment used for making silk, a wine-press and other items are exhibited in the veranda. Most important on the upper floor is the room of Archbishop Kyprianos, from where he was taken to the place of his martyrdom, in July 1821.

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The House of Hadjigeorgakis Kornessios

The most important example of urban architecture of the last century of Ottoman rule that survives in Nicosia is the House of Hadjigeorgakis Kornessios, the Dragoman or Interpreter of the Serai. In its time, this Konak must have stood out as one of the few grand residences in the city. The austere façades, built of hewn sandstone, and the iron-barred and latticed windows placed high up on the walls, give the building a fortress-like character. Above the pointed arch of the entrance, there is an immured marble slab. On it is carved the winged lion of Venice facing to the front, its right paw holding an open gospel with the Latin inscription: “Pax tibi Marce Evangelista meus”. To the right of the lion there is a ruined tower with a flag and in the centre a double-headed eagle in a shield charged with the Passion cross on a sextuple mount on its breast, a simplified form of the coat of arms of the Podocataro family, to whom the house originally belonged. Three hills are depicted on either side of the eagle above branches bearing leaves and five pomegranates in a horizontal position; a series of anthemia decorate the lowest concave part of the plaque. Above the plaque, there is a protruding wooden kiosk. On the interior of the main entrance above the door, there is a second marble plaque of protective character, set into the wall; it bears the monogram of Hadjigeorgakis and the year 1793 under three crosses in relief.

The entire building, U-shaped in plan, is organized around the courtyard, with a colonnaded portico supporting pointed arches developing on three of its sides. The Hadjigeorgakis mansion has been defined as an example of the “original courtyard house”, in which all parts of the house are connected to the unifying courtyard, the entrance being just a communication passage between the street and the courtyard. This passage, which cuts through the building creating a covered space (*iliakos*) flanked by rooms behind the entrance, is a feature typical of houses that are built onto the street, and a commonplace in traditional Cypriot architecture. In the Dragoman’s house, all ground floor rooms are accessible through the portico. On the upper floor, the dominant feature is a spacious hall that communicates with all rooms. This hall, the ceiling of which is supported by a broad wooden arch, was originally a covered veranda that extended up to the raised floor of the kiosk to the north and to the official reception room to the south. In the eastern part of the house, there was another covered veranda with wooden posts supporting the roof, but this too was walled in at a later stage, in order to increase the living space. This transformation of verandas into rooms during the late 19th century has been observed in many houses. The reception room occupies the southern end of the building’s east wing, the much lighter construction of which -in deliberate contrast to the stone blocks used for other parts of the house- is stressed by the profusion of wooden elements (e.g., the wide eaves of the tiled roof, and the window frames and lattices), a multitude of openings and the white-washed walls. The airy, pavilion-like character of this room is accentuated by its being supported by pillars and projecting from the main body of the building. Its exterior walls were originally decorated with a frieze with chevron patterns painted below the eaves. Much more interesting, however, is the painted decoration of the interior, which is confined to this room.

In layout and internal arrangement, the Dragoman's reception room follows Anatolian tradition. Characteristic of this style are: the tiny vestibule leading to an entrance opening onto the corner of the room; the wooden wall cupboards which occupy the whole entrance side of the room in a symmetrical arrangement; the alcove with superimposed shelves under a niche with a mural painting of a city; the wooden panelling; and the decorated ceiling. The painting in the apse-like niche shows domed houses painted in perspective, walls, cypress trees, springs and, in the foreground, the sea with sailing ships and a bridge. This painting has been interpreted either as a distorted view of Venice or, most probably, as a conventional representation of Constantinople. On either side of the painting flies an angel with a trumpet.

The reception room is actually divided in two parts, a rectangular space in front of the wall cupboards and the main part, which is square and raised by a step. The decoration of the corresponding ceilings is also differentiated. The framed rectangular ceiling of the smaller, lower part consists of two moulded beams crossing diagonally, with rich painted decoration of flowers, fruit and birds. The ceiling of the main, raised part of the room has the most elaborate carved, painted and gilded decoration. Its central panel has the form of a sun wheel with rays in gilded carved wood on a painted dark blue background - the sky - with stars. The cornices framing it carry floral decoration and are profiled so as to create the effect of a dome. A wooden cornice extends all around the walls above the nine windows of the room, dividing it horizontally into an upper and a lower section. By contrast, the wooden panels between the windows underline the vertical axis, and extending from the cornice downwards, stop 36cm above the floor, suggesting a low seating arrangement along the walls. The general pattern of the painted decoration is more or less similar on all wall panels, and includes beribboned bunches of flowers, roses, tulips, lilies, in different colours and combinations, that reflect the richness and variety of nature and create the atmosphere of a garden. In their artistic expression, the decorative features in the konak (mansion) of Hadjigeorgakis show a close relationship with those in grand houses found in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, from the Balkans to the East, from the grand houses in northern Greece (e.g. in Siatista and Ampelakia), to the konak of Çakır Ağa in Birgi, or Murat's house in Bursa, where the decorative art of the east blends with western, baroque and rococo influences.

According to the description given by the Dragoman himself in the inventory of his property, written in 1794: "the upstairs sitting room [was] furnished with divans, felt covers, velvet cushions, and three santouria [musical] clocks, and two paintings, and eight lummières [chandeliers]". It is with this interior arrangement in mind that the reception room is now presented as a museum. According to the inventory, there were several other divan-rooms in the Dragoman's house. The reception room, which at the time of Hadjigeorgakis (1779-1809) must have been very spectacular, had, as was customary, the official seat of the Dragoman in the corner diagonally opposite the door. The visitor would enter the vestibule, leave his shoes on the lower part of the floor and would then step onto the carpeted area, where he could sit cross-legged on a divan.

Gilded ceilings, covered with thin leaves of gold, like in the Dragoman's house, are exceptional and a sign of prosperity. The monumental character of the konak and its embellishment reflect the Dragoman's wealth as well as his political and social status. In fact, Hadjigeorgakis was very rich.

Being a Dragoman of the Serai for thirty years (1779-1809), appointed by the Supreme Court, the liaison between the Ottoman administrative authorities and the Christian subjects, responsible for the collection of the taxes paid by the Christians of the island, he had amassed a large fortune.

The history of the house is closely linked with the turbulent life of Hadjigeorgakis himself, his family and heirs who lived in the konak, adapting it according to their needs for about two hundred years. During a rioting by the local Moslem inhabitants but also Christians against the officials in 1804, because of the heavy taxation and shortage of foodstuffs, the rebels set fire to the main door and looted the mansion. Hadjigeorgakis and his family abandoned the house and fled to Constantinople. After the Dragoman's decapitation there in 1809, for the folk poets in Cyprus Hadjigeorgakis' house became a symbol of wealth and grandeur at a time of great poverty and misery.

His family, the wife and six children, continued to live abroad until 1830. Then, the youngest son Ioannis returned to Cyprus and bought back his paternal home, which in the meantime was sold to a Turkish lady; Tzelepi Yiangos, as he was called, lived in the mansion with his wife Iouliani until his death in 1874. Unable to have any more children after the loss of their only son at the age of six months, Iouliani adopted her niece Ourania. When Iouliani died in 1894, Ourania continued to live in the house together with her four daughters. By the end of the 19th century, the building had been split up between the various members of the family. The last resident of the main part of the house was Ourania's granddaughter, Ioulia Pikis, who died in 1979. Ioulia and her sister Anna bequeathed the house to the Archbishopric with the expressed wish that the building become a Byzantine or Ethnological Museum.

Due to its distinctive architecture and historical importance, the House of Hadjigeorgakis was declared an Ancient Monument, under the Antiquities Law, as early as 1935. It was the first example of urban architecture to be declared an Ancient Monument. The first repairs to the building were carried out at the end of the 1940s and then continued practically every year by the department of Antiquities. Systematic restoration work began in 1981 and by May 1987 the largest and most important part of the house was opened to the public as a Museum. The basic rule followed during the work of preservation was that the form and structure of the building and the existing elements would be reinforced, and only replaced when absolutely necessary. Traditional materials were used as much as possible and only in some cases (e.g. the roof) were modern materials used for their strength and durability. The work was aimed at restoring the house to the form it had taken at the end of the 19th century, before it had been divided up by the heirs. Thus, later additions which had changed the character of the mansion were removed, such as a second entrance with a balcony above it, a second staircase in the west wing and a dividing wall which had cut across the large arch in the upstairs hall. By restoring the building and furnishing it in the style of the period, the Department created a living museum which captures the atmosphere of the period during which Hadjigeorgakis had been alive, as well as the later periods during which the building had housed his son and later heirs. The small bath-house in the courtyard was also restored and furnished with items traditionally used in hammams. The garden has been replanted with trees which embellished Nicosia in the past. The spacious courtyard is a perfect setting for various cultural activities.

In 1988, the House of Hadjigeorgakis received the Europa Nostra award.

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CHAPTER 13e

**Museum Of The National
Struggle, Imprisoned Tombs,
Machairas' Hideout**

A n d r e a s K a r y o s

The Museum of the National Struggle

The Monument

One of the most significant periods of the Cyprus Question is that from April 1955 to February 1959 when EOKA (*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* - The National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters), a Greek Cypriot underground organisation carried out an armed struggle against the British garrison in Cyprus. The anti-colonial struggle did not result in the union of Cyprus with Greece (*enosis*), as the Greek majority of the island aimed at, but the creation of an independent island republic on 16 August 1960. During the early post-independence period, the Greek Communal Chamber -which acted as a lower Parliament with jurisdiction over religious, educational and cultural affairs- decided to proceed with the establishment of an institution that would reconstruct the experience of the anti-colonial movement against the British rulers. It is precisely this mission that the Museum of the National Struggle (MNS) has been serving since its foundation on 26 January 1961.

Nowadays, the MNS occupies a part of the Old Archbishopric Palace, an eighteenth century two-storey building in the heart of Nicosia that is closely associated with the modern religious and political history of Cyprus. Nevertheless, during the first period of its existence, the Museum was housed at 25 Hera Street in Nicosia, at a building donated by Zenonas Sozos. The inauguration ceremony took place in these premises on 1 April 1962, coinciding with the annual celebrations for the opening of EOKA's campaign in 1955. In 1966, however, the institution was transferred to a renovated part of the Old Archbishopric Palace after a grant offered by Anastassios Leventis, a prominent wealthy Greek Cypriot benefactor. During the period 1996-2001, the collection of the Museum was temporarily exhibited in a building situated at 7 Kinyra Street in Nicosia because of further renovations at the old premises. The result of these works was the present building of the MNS, which basically constitutes a complex of the renovated part of the Old Archbishopric Palace and a newer establishment.

Apart from conserving the memory of the struggle that preceded the independence of Cyprus, the MNS also intends to honor those individuals who were killed during the course of the conflict in the service of EOKA. The collection of primary material (oral testimonies, documents, items etc) to assist the reconstruction, exploration or analysis of the various aspects of the four-year rebellion also falls within the scope of the institution. Finally, according to its own publications, the institution intends to serve as an inspiration to future generations with regards to the duty to participate in liberation struggles.

In seeking to accomplish its multi-level tasks, the MNS uses a variety of mediums or activities. A comprehensive collection of photos and items are employed to reconstruct incidents from EOKA's operational program as well as the resistance performed by the Greek Cypriot masses against the British counter-insurgent measures. Furthermore, a series of documentaries about the Cyprus Revolt

in the museum's projection room offers a vivid representation of Cyprus during the 1950's, paying emphasis upon the political and military field. The institution's library with its books collection (that covers not only the period of the Cyprus emergency but also the post-independence years) provide valuable material, thereby rendering the MNS as a dynamic collector of information for the scientific research of the Modern History of Cyprus. Finally, lectures to visitors and students and tours of the Museum is another set of activities developed by the museum personnel to fulfill its purpose to picture the temperament of the Cypriot people in the decade of the 1950's.

Touring each room clockwise, the Museum's exhibition adopts a thematic structure. The first corridor contains an introduction to the History of Cyprus and photos or newspaper articles covering the opening of EOKA's campaign on 1 April 1955. A room follows, which contains replicas of items that testify the close interrelations between Cyprus and the rest of the Greek world through time. In the same room, a visitor meets various exhibits that demonstrate the ways in which the Greek Cypriots manifested their will for *enosis*: a Greek flag from the spontaneous uprising in October 1931 (*Octovriana*) that was severely suppressed by the British and led to the abolishing of many Cypriot constitutional and democratic rights; the three referendums organised on 25 March 1921 (coinciding with the celebrations for the centenary of the Greek War for Independence), on 25 March 1930 (coinciding with the celebrations for the centenary of the Greek Independence) and on 15 January 1950. The Museum holds and exhibits the thirty volumes in which nearly 96% of the Greek population of Cyprus signed for union with Greece.

The next corridor exhibits photographic material about EOKA's organizational period as well as Archbishop Makarios III, the political leader of the majority of the Greek inhabitants of Cyprus during the Cyprus Emergency and Colonel George Grivas, the military leader of the EOKA movement. The oath that the twelve personalities of the Struggle Committee (who belonged to the broader Greek and Greek Cypriot political and intellectual elite) signed in Athens in 1953 to support *enosis* or die trying is another valuable item of the museum's collection. The key concept of EOKA was evolved and gradually implemented by this committee.

The collection of Room D includes photos from various incidents that occurred while the Struggle was on: the participation of the masses of the people supporting EOKA and the British repressive reaction involving curfews, collective fines, extensive searches or arrests, detention camps and mistreatment of the population. Additionally, the collections on show preserve items that assisted and supported the EOKA struggle against the British colonial administration: leaflets of EOKA's underground publications, typewriters, orders for forthcoming action, guerilla uniforms, binoculars, a note with the oath which EOKA used during the recruitment process, the text of the first proclamation circulated by the rebellious organization, personal possessions of EOKA fighters as well as arms, explosive devices (Pipe Bombs, Junction Pipe Bombs) and ammunition either smuggled from the organization's supplying mechanism in Athens or locally manufactured by EOKA members, in order to achieve self-efficiency.

The main topic of the corridor next to Room D is the incident in a Cypriot village, Kontemenos, where a Turkish Cypriot mob killed eight Greek Cypriot civilians in June 1958. Physical attacks against Greek Cypriot civilians or property was one of the efforts of the second largest ethnic group of Cyprus

to promote its opposition to *enosis* and advance its own aim, the demand for partition of the island between Greece and Turkey. A series of photos includes British members of the Police who mistreated Greek Cypriots during interrogation. Another collection informs visitors about an initiative of EOKA in 1958, the 'Arbitration Committees', which settled disputes between individuals from the Greek Cypriot community. The functioning of these Committees, naturally sought to displace the colonial judiciary. In this manner, not only was the government deprived of certain revenue, but disobedience to civil administration was encouraged.

In large Room E the main topic of the exhibition is physical insurgent activities or EOKA members killed by the British garrison. EOKA dead fighters are described in the post-independence Greek Cypriot collective memory as 'heroes' or 'martyrs'. Moreover, material from three famous incidents appears in a collection of photos: Gregoris Afxentiou's death in his hideout at the region of Machairas (on mount Troodos) where he was surrounded and fought off British troops for more than 8-10 hours in March 1957; the 'Farm Yard Siege in Liopetri' when in September 1958 the British soldiers faced in the village of Liopetri unusual resistance put up by four hard-core EOKA fighters (Andreas Karyos, Christos Samaras, Elias Papakyriakou and Photis Pittas), all of whom were eventually killed; and the killing of Kyriakos Matsis, an EOKA leading member, by the British on 19 November 1958 in Dikomo (near Kyrenia). In all three circumstances, the British Army used fire, bombs and inflammable materials in order to neutralize the EOKA combatants. Apart from the above events, the material refers to other forms of EOKA's operations or to incidents that shaped the collective Greek Cypriot remembrance: the results of EOKA sabotages, pupil demonstrations that often ended in bloody street fights with the British anti-mob squads, EOKA personnel killed by the British, guerrilla groups and the large numbers of Greek Cypriots who attended not only the funerals of EOKA cadres, but also their memorial services (for instance, the funeral of Charalambos Mouskos was attended by about a thousand people whilst the memorial service for Stylianos Lenas was attended by more than four thousand people). The bitter experience from British or Turkish Cypriot forceful activities is also presented via the photograph collection; additionally, the Imprisoned Tombs (where the British buried the dead bodies of thirteen EOKA fighters), the everyday life of prisoners in the detention camps, the wanted persons for EOKA-related activities, the celebrations after the official cessation of the Cyprus Revolt with the warm reception of the EOKA combatants by the masses of the Greek Cypriot people and the official declaration of the Cypriot independence on 16 August 1960.

In the same room, personal belongings of the protagonists in the events at Machairas, Liopetri and Dikomo are exhibited in the glass showcases: diaries, poems, books, letters or manuscripts. Possessions of other EOKA members who were killed by the British forces (Markos Drakos, Petrakis Giallouros, Savvas Rotsidis, Stylianos Lenas and others) are also exhibited as well as those of the nine individuals who were sentenced to death by hanging for EOKA-related activities (Evagoras Pallikarides, Andreas Demetriou, Michael Karaolis and others).

The last corridor is dedicated to the nine EOKA members upon whom the British colonial regime imposed the death penalty by hanging. The exhibition includes newspaper articles, the last pictures of the nine EOKA members taken by the British or correspondence with their relatives. One of the most outstanding exhibits of the collection is the two-page letter published by the French author and

philosopher Albert Camus asking for clemency for Michael Karaolis; another important exhibit is the one of the three gullets which were used by the British Administration for the imposition of the death penalty. The second gullet is preserved in the Imprisoned Tombs and the last one is reported to have been taken by the British when they left Cyprus.

Finally, the tour of the museum ends with the photos of the one hundred and eight Greek Cypriots who were killed in the service of EOKA.

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The Imprisoned Tombs

The Monument

The Imprisoned Tombs is one of the most well-known and respected places of historical memory in Cyprus. They comprise a small cemetery dug in the Central Prison (Nicosia) by the British authorities during the period of the Cyprus Revolt. The main reason behind the colonial regime's initiative was to prevent the funerals of EOKA prominent cadres from becoming mass meetings and anti-British demonstrations.

The premise is very confined and is surrounded by high walls topped with broken glass to deter illegal entrance. It lays right next to the cells of the prisoners sentenced to death (Block 8) and the room with the gullet (where executions took place). The works for its construction started in February 1956, during the governorship of Field-Marshal Sir John Harding (when the first executions of EOKA members took place). The construction team were used a mixed twelve-member team, constituted of both prisoners convicted for criminal actions and political prisoners (convicted for EOKA-related activities). The authorities had planned the cemetery to be completed in two phases; because of the termination of the rebellion, however, the second part of it was never put to use.

In the graves were buried the corpses of the nine individuals executed by hanging by the British: Michael Karaolis and Andreas Demetriou on 10 May 1956; Charilaos Michael, Andreas Zakos and Iakovos Patatsos on 9 August 1956; Michael Koutsoftas, Stelios Mavrommatis and Andreas Panayidis on 21 September 1956; and the young poet Evagoras Pallikaridis on 14 March 1957. Furthermore, in the same place were buried four distinguished EOKA members killed during exchanges of fire: Markos Drakos on 18 January 1957; Gregoris Afxentiou on 3 March 1957; Stylianos Lenas on 28 March 1957; and Kyriakos Matsis on 19 November 1958. In order to save space, four graves were used twice. Therefore, Stylianos Lenas was buried in the same grave as Andreas Demetriou, Kyriakos Matsis with Andreas Zakos, Michael Koutsoftas with Andreas Panayidis and Evagoras Pallikarides with Gregoris Afxentiou. The dead bodies were placed into the graves by British soldiers and Turkish Cypriot prison wardens. Contrary to christian religious practice, entrance to the burial ground was forbidden to any Greek Cypriot, including relatives, prison wardens and even priests. A priest was allowed to perform the funeral service in accordance with the Christian Orthodox ritual outside the closed entrance of the cemetery. Consequently, a complete lack of evidence remained about the exact manner or location of the burials, a fact which in turn made things extremely difficult for the families of the executed persons who wanted to pay their respects. Things became even more shadowy by some testimonies that chemicals were used by the British to effect the fast decomposition of the dead bodies (allowing them quicker reuse of the available space).

Information on the burials was achieved only during the post-independence years when Onisiforos Antoniou, the director of the Central Prison, accidentally discovered a plan of the cemetery and its burials. With the assistance of some prisoners, the small location was renovated. Later on, the Prison's

directorate in cooperation with the families of the executed EOKA members planted crosses on each tomb. Nevertheless, no removal of the corpses was ever attempted to verify the remnants, principally for emotional reasons. Further renovation works resulted in the opening of special access for visitors, as the monument remains until today one of the most popular historic places to visit in Cyprus.

The Imprisoned Tombs is a part of a larger museum exhibition that was established by Archbishop Makarios III, the first President of the Cyprus Republic and was further extended in 1997. The other parts of the establishment are a small garden, the room with the gullet and Blocks 8, 7 and 3 (all parts of the Central Prison). The premise where executions by hanging took place comprises the ground floor with a wooden floor and the trap-door mechanism and an underground chamber. In the ground floor, only one of the three original gullets remains (the second gullet is preserved in the Museum of the National Struggle, whereas the last one passed in British hands). The gullet is made up of a rope (tied from a beam) with a leather loop and a metal ring. On the one side of the room there is the lever that the executioner pulled to open the trap-door. The underground floor is the space where the corpses of the hanged EOKA cadres fell: as soon as the doctor verified their death, they were transported from the underground floor to the small cemetery, a short distance away.

Block 8 was the last residence of those convicted to the death penalty. It is a small establishment of two cells and a toilet. Each cell is so tiny that hardly fits a bed. Both cells include a small window and a door, all with iron bars for maximum security. Each heavy door was purposely equipped with a metallic netting of so many tiny holes so that vertigo was created to the prisoner looking at it.

Blocks 7 and 3 are larger complexes of cells similar to those of Block 8, although they housed many more prisoners. On the concrete floor one can still see the marks from the hobnailed boots of the British guards. The latter used to walk making noise with their boots, using this technique to break the morale of the imprisoned EOKA members, as the rebellious organization maintained high organizational levels, even in prisons or detention camps: uprisings, singing of the Greek national anthem, strikes, correspondence with EOKA's leadership or even organized escapes were only some of the activities of the EOKA branch in prisons and detention centres.

At the entrance of the entire museum complex, a visitor meets an inscription referring to the latest renovations which took place in 1997. On the left of the entrance of the Imprisoned Tombs, a memorial was established with the names of the thirteen EOKA fighters who are buried in the cemetery. On the memorial, an inscription states: 'And the imprisoned dead bodies praise glory to Freedom'. Above the cemetery's entrance, a dedicational inscription says: 'TO THOSE WHO DIED. And in your memory the nation kneels and salutes you'. Finally, within the cemetery and at the eastern side, an inscription refers to a folk song verse which is very common in Greek memorials or places memory: 'A brave person's death, is not considered death'.

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The Machairas' Hideout

The Monument

The Machairas' Hideout is a monument reconstructed after the independence of Cyprus in 1960 and one of the most well-known monuments of the Modern History of the island. More specifically, however, the legacy of Machairas' Hideout is tied up with Gregoris Afxentiou, who became one of the most prominent guerrilla leaders of EOKA not only because of his substantial record of activities, but also because of the manner he died.

Gregoris Afxentiou was born in Lyssi, a Cypriot village between Nicosia and Famagusta, in February 1928. He was educated at the local primary school and then at the Hellenic Gymnasium of Famagusta (the principal institution of secondary education in the Famagusta district at that time). Reports by his family and friends describe him as a keen sportsman and passionate about football. On reaching adulthood he went to Athens and sat for the examinations for the Greek Military Academy without success. In December 1949 he joined the Greek Army as a volunteer. From March to October 1950, he attended a reserve officer's academy on the island of Syros. Afxentiou served in the ranks of the Hellenic Army on the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, before being discharged and returning to Cyprus, where he worked as a taxi driver. As a trained reserve officer, on joining the ranks of EOKA, he became a skillful instructor to the organization's recruits, especially as it concerned the guerrilla tactics and the use of arms and explosives. Outlawed by the British authorities, he had a price of £250 (soon rising to £5,000, a very significant sum for the time) set on his head. He adopted various noms-de-guerre: *Zidros*, *Aias* (Ajax) and *Aris*. Afxentiou was appointed by EOKA's supreme commander, George Grivas, as *tomearchis* (district sector leader), with duties extending to all aspects of political and military nature within his regional sector. Because of his effectiveness, Grivas entrusted to him command of the Famagusta district. After Famagusta, he was transferred to the Kyrenia administration where he became very active in the Pentadaktylos range. Finally, he was appointed as *tomearchis* of the Pitsilia district sector, in mount Troodos, tasked to reorganize the guerrilla mountain groups.

With regards to the guerrilla mountain groups, it must be clarified that in the effort to show that the British did not effectively control the island, EOKA's subversive activities were a combination of irregular mountain warfare, urban guerrilla and mass popular agitation. The armed groups capable of hitting targets all over Cyprus were the armed wing of the organization. In view of the regions of the island in which they operated, they were distinguished into three sub-categories: the city groups, the units in the countryside and the mountain guerillas. The mountain groups were all full-time guerrilla units, operating up in the hills or in the plains mainly by harassing security installations, personnel and routes of communication. In most cases the members were fugitives having escaped from detention, or persons wanted for EOKA-related activities undertaken while operating with town or village groups. Apart from purely military tactical reasons, they were also a haven for personnel whose EOKA identity was compromised or discovered by the authorities; who could no longer stay in their homes. Therefore, EOKA guerrilla units included some of the more experienced members of the organisation.

They were generally organised in groups of between three and eight. Mountain groups usually relied for food, mail and clothing on the nearest EOKA village unit. All provisions were paid for unless the providers did not wish for reimbursement; expenditure was kept as low as possible. According to British reports, some groups kept a good standard of personal discipline and when captured were clean and well shaven; others, were in less good shape. To achieve maximum results, each group operated within specific boundaries. The basic form of mountain group operations concentrated on ambushes of military vehicles or raids against Police and Army installations. The guerrilla groups were not intended to fight pitched battles, although in some cases the EOKA combatants resisted capture by fighting British units to the end. Such instances raised the guerrillas' value, added to the prestige of EOKA and lifted the morale of its members. Apart from their main hideouts (caves, dugouts etc), substitutes were constructed for use in case the mountain groups were surrounded or forced in some way to move from their area.

Generally, EOKA's hideouts constitute an interesting case study because of their high importance: general security measures apart, the organization's ability to survive was closely connected to various forms of concealment, by means of which the members escaped the British search operations. It is interesting to note that according to the Emergency Regulations introduced by the British authorities during the Revolt, hideouts had to be destroyed/blown up after they were discovered (even if they were constructed within houses of Greek Cypriot civilians).

Since EOKA's operational terrain occupied the whole of Cyprus (urban areas, mountains, countryside) each type of EOKA hideout corresponded to the nature of the region where it was. Hideouts in occupied houses were usually small, constructed below floorboards, above ceilings, in walls, in large cupboards or in unused water cisterns. In other cases the entrance of the hideout was behind a large piece of furniture (or under it) or under a fireplace. Another method was the construction of a trap-door under tiles. Hideouts in outhouses or farmhouses were usually built in false walls, between adjoining barns or between different levels. Most of the times, hideouts of the first two types were



The hideout of Gregoris Afxentiou in Machairas

used as a temporary bolt hole during Army searches. On the other hand, mountain or rural dugouts were constructed to house guerrilla groups for longer periods. It was an axiom of EOKA's mountain bands that apart from their main hideouts they had to have substitutes for use in case they were surrounded or forced in some way to move on. The mountain hideouts were dug on slopes where bushes provided with concealment to approaches and not far away from little used tracks and a water supply. Sophisticated hideouts had good fields of observation as well as a good field of fire. Timber and sheets of corrugated iron for the roof constituted the main construction materials. The entrance was blocked with stones whereas camouflage was carried out with care and ingenuity. Consequently, as the British troops admitted in several occasions, mountain hideouts were difficult to find even when they had information about their

approximate location.

The Machairas' Hideout was of a mountain dugout type. It is constructed in the region of Machairas up on the mount of Troodos. It lies near to the Machairas' Monastery, dedicated to the Virgin Mary. The site is both historic and prestigious, built in the 12th century with a grant from the Byzantine Emperor Manuel Komnenos. According to Avgoustis Efstathiou, a member of Gregoris Afxentiou's guerrilla group charged with the hideout's construction, works commenced on 24 February 1957. The main dugout was ready within three days and was camouflaged the following day. It was planned to be a substitute residence for the group; up to that point the guerrillas used to find shelter in the Machairas' Monastery itself or under shrubs in the area. Materials, beams and sheets of zinc, were supplied by EOKA, with the monastery serving as intermediate station. It must be considered that the Machairas' Monastery and Abbot Irineos had a major contribution to the EOKA movement (in both the material and the spiritual spheres). This is not surprising given the long tradition of participation of the Greek Orthodox clergy in wars of resistance or liberation movements.

On 3 March 1957, British troops launched another 'big sweep' (search operation involving significant amounts of troops) to keep pressure on EOKA guerilla groups in the region. Gregoris Afxentiou and his group sought refuge in the hideout that they had recently constructed. Following intelligence they had, the British came upon the hideout and called the rebels in Greek to come out. Afxentiou ordered his four men, Antonis Papadopoulos, Andreas Stylianou, Feidias Symeonidis and Avgoustis Efstathiou to surrender. As for himself, he preferred to resist capture. Following a burst of gunfire, a British officer threw a grenade into the dugout and after that Efstathiou was forced to enter the hideout to fetch Afxentiou. Finding his leader alive, Efstathiou remained in the hideout to assist him. The British troops took up shooting positions. The EOKA men's resistance was so strenuous, that the soldiers retreated many times. Afxentiou and Efstathiou planned to escape under cover of a smoke grenade. However, as soon as the smoke screen formed outside the entrance of the hideout, the British fire became heavier, to prevent the two rebels from escaping. This fact, in combination with the delay by Efstathiou to fire, forced the two guerrillas to miss the chance provided. The exchange of fire lasted for more than ten hours. Since the resistance by Afxentiou and Efstathiou proved to be difficult to subdue, the British troops decided to use inflammable materials. They poured petrol down the slope in a steady trickle towards the hideout's entrance. The first beehive charge resulted in a burst of fire coming from the hide. More petrol was poured into the exact position of the hideout and a long length of fuse was ignited. A deafening explosion was achieved this time. Avgoustis Efstathiou rushed out of the flames and arrested by the British servicemen soon after. A second deafening explosion followed. The British forced Efstathiou to enter the hideout again; entering, he saw Afxentiou dead, his body charred. Nevertheless, the soldiers were only persuaded of the truth of Efstathiou's statement about Afxentiou's death after they destroyed part of the hideout to see for themselves. The dead body of Afxentiou was not handed over to his family for a funeral. On the contrary, it was buried in the small cemetery in the Central Prison which passed in the Greek Cypriot collective remembrance as 'The Imprisoned Tombs'.



The monumental statue of Gregoris Afxentiou outside the EOKA Museum in Machairas

Thereafter, Gregoris Afxentiou's prolonged fight to death against much superior forces became a prime inspiration in EOKA ranks. It also impressed the Greek and Greek Cypriot people and intellectuals, but also British authors, with the latter describing this action as 'epic'.

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