

CHAPTER 11

**In search of a settlement:
Cyprus solution plans and
international diplomacy,
1974-1999**

N i k o s C h r i s t o d o u l i d e s

Aims

This chapter aims to present the initiatives of the international community for solving the Cyprus Problem, from the end of the Turkish invasion until 1999. Special reference will be made to the agreements reached between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides and the developments that influenced the efforts for finding a comprehensive settlement.

After studying this chapter, students will be familiar with

- The main positions of the two sides in the island concerning the solution of the Cyprus Problem
- The initiatives taken by the international community for solving the Cyprus Problem
- The main reasons behind the failure to find a solution
- The role of the great powers in the efforts to find a solution
- The main changes between the proposals presented by the international community over the years

Keywords

- Makarios
- Denktash
- freedom of movement
- freedom of settlement
- Henry Kissinger
- ABC Plan
- core issues
- Executive
- European Community
- Territory
- proximity talks
- Ghali Ideas
- Spyros Kyprianou
- Butros Butros Ghali
- First High Level Agreement
- right of property
- arms embargo on Turkey
- Second High Level Agreement
- The “Cuellar Indicators”
- “turkish republic of northern cyprus”
- Resolution 541
- Resolution 550
- Legislative
- 5 points scenario
- Draft Agreement on Cyprus
- Draft Framework Agreement
- The Soviet Union Proposals
- international conference for Cyprus

- political equality
- Glafkos Clerides
- Kofi Annan
- Montreux
- Set of Ideas for an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus
- Confidence Building Measures
- Troutbeck
- George Vasiliou

Introduction

Following the Turkish invasion, the Greek Cypriot side in its effort to start negotiations and solve the Cyprus problem put forward to the Turkish Cypriot side, on 10 February 1975, certain proposals, based on the UN relevant resolutions regarding Cyprus. Negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary General took place between April 1975 and May 1976 in Nicosia, Vienna and New York, but due to the Turkish attitude in the negotiations, no progress was achieved. It was obvious, from the proposals put forward by the Turkish side and its general attitude in the negotiating table that its main purpose was to use the period of the negotiations to gain time in order to consolidate the results of the invasion and occupation in the island.

The First High Level Agreement

On 9 January 1977 (after almost a year of stalemate in the talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots) and following an interview of President Makarios in London Times in which among others he stated that he was ready to accept a **federal solution** that would safeguard the unity of the state, the Turkish Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash sent a letter to Makarios stating that he was ready to meet him to discuss the Cyprus Problem. Makarios accepted the invitation of the Turkish Cypriot leader and on a meeting between the two on 12 February 1977, in the presence of the United Nations Secretary-General Dr. Kurt Waldheim, the leaders of the two communities, concluded the **First High Level Agreement**. The four points of the Agreement which would be used as guidelines for the solution of the Cyprus Problem were as follows:

1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.
3. Questions of principles **like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property** and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot Community.
4. The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.

(<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/263FD94AA15B6F2DC2256D6D00311D48?OpenDocument>)

The acceptance of federation by Makarios was a major concession for the Greek Cypriot side. By accepting the aforementioned agreement the Greek Cypriots believed that the solution would come closer and the Turkish Cypriots would accept to alter the positions they had put forward until that time and were in favour of a confederal or two states solution. The First High Level Agreement led to the resumption of talks in Vienna during the period 31 March to 7 April 1977. By agreeing to go in Vienna, the Greek Cypriot side undertook the responsibility to submit first its proposals on the territorial aspect, accompanied by map, while the Turkish Cypriot side would submit first its proposals on the constitutional aspect (Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, *Τα Σχέδια Λύσης του Κυπριακού, 1948-1978*, Αθήνα 2009, σσ. 207-208). At the same time, both sides undertook to discuss in a meaningful and substantive way each other's proposals; and that all proposals submitted should be within the framework of the First High Level Agreement. By accepting those specific commitments the Greek Cypriot side was expecting, having in mind that in previous occasions efforts had failed, that the negotiations in Vienna would be meaningful and substantive. It is important to mention, that the

acceptance of the specific commitments by the two sides was due to the involvement of Clark Clifford who was appointed by the US President Jimmy Carter as a US Representative for Cyprus. Clifford's main objective was the resumption of talks in order for the US Government (using as a pretext the negotiations) to ask Congress to lift the arms embargo on Turkey which was imposed following the use of US military equipment in the 1974 invasion (Ioannides, Chris P, *Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean, From Kissinger and the Cyprus Crisis to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish Arms Embargo*, New York 2001, pp. 190-203).

The talks resumed in the presence of the United Nations Secretary General while the two sides were represented by interlocutors. During the talks and while the Greek Cypriot side honoured its commitments (on the territorial issue it proposed that the area under Turkish Cypriot administration would be 20% of the territory of Cyprus), the Turkish Cypriot side refused to do so, since its proposals on the constitutional aspect did not comply with the guidelines agreed on the First High Level Agreement. Instead, and following its previous attitude, the Turkish Cypriot side proposed two separate states loosely connected. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot side refused to comment on the Greek Cypriot proposals on the territorial aspect, claiming that it was not willing to give territory back. As a result the talks resulted in a new deadlock (Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, *Τα Σχέδια λύσης του Κυπριακού, 1948-1978*, Αθήνα 2009, σσ. 208-209; Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, «Διπλωματική ιστορία του Κυπριακού, 1970-1979», στο *Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, 1970-1979, Η δεκαετία της κυπριακής τραγωδίας*, τομ. 2, Φιλελεύθερος, Λευκωσία, Ιανουάριος 2011, σσ. 182-189).



President Spyros Kyprianou

On 3 August 1977, President Makarios died and Spyros Kyprianou, the then President of the House of Representatives, became President of the Republic of Cyprus. On January 1978, the UN Secretary General asked the Turkish Cypriot side to put forward concrete proposals regarding constitutional and territorial issues. Based on the content of the Turkish Cypriot proposals the Secretary General would decide if there was common ground for the resumption of the talks. The Turkish Cypriot proposals (April 1978) were of the same context as it was before: partition of Cyprus in two states, while in the territorial issue was proposing the return of approximately 1% of the territory under occupation (Συνάντηση Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή – Helmut Schmidt, 3 Μαΐου 1978, *Αρχείο Καραμανλή*, τόμ. 10, σ. 202· Γιάννης Κ. Λάμπρου, *Ιστορία του Κυπριακού, Τα Χρόνια μετά την Ανεξαρτησία, 1960-2004*, Λευκωσία 2004, σ. 677). As a result of the Turkish proposals, no common ground was achieved and the negotiations did not resume.

The first plan for the solution of the Cyprus Problem. The ABC Plan

In the meantime, following the Turkish invasion of 1974, on February 1975 the US Congress imposed an **arms embargo** on Turkey on the grounds that US military equipment was used during the Turkish military invasion in Cyprus. According to the relevant decision of the Congress the use of US military equipment in the Turkish invasion in Cyprus violated the provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which prohibits the use of US weapons for purposes other than national self-defence. From the very beginning of the decision, the US Government, and more specifically the US Secretary of State **Henry Kissinger** initiated a campaign for the lifting of the embargo (Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, *Τα Σχέδια λύσης του Κυπριακού, 1948-1978*, Αθήνα 2009, σσ. 203-208). His main arguments were that the embargo was causing serious problem to the NATO capabilities in the Southeastern Europe, and there was a possibility for Turkey to develop its relations with the Soviet Union. During the same period and following the decision of the Congress, Turkey, in order to get the attention of the US and the Western World and push them for the lifting of the embargo, started to enhance its relations with Moscow and the communist block countries of Europe. The efforts of those in favour of lifting the embargo did not succeed due to the existence of the Cyprus Problem and the lack of progress in the efforts to find a solution to the problem due to the Turkish intransigence (Ioannides, Chris P., *Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean, From Kissinger and the Cyprus Crisis to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish Arms Embargo*, New York 2001, pp. 190-203).

In this context, during the first days of 1977 the US Department of State initiated a campaign for the the resumption of talks between the leaders of the two communities in order to make it easier for the US Government to ask from Congress the lifting of the embargo. The initiative of the State Department officials and the Pentagon (and following several failed attempts for the resumption of talks), led to the lifting of the embargo in September 1978 and the development of a joint initiative from the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada for solving the Cyprus problem. Their initiative resulted, on 10 November 1978, in a specific proposal to the two sides in Cyprus. The plan proposed would be used, if both sides agreed, for the resumption of the negotiations for finding a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus Problem.

The main points of the so called American – British – Canadian **(ABC) Plan** with the title “Framework for a Settlement”, according to which the parties to the intercommunal talks would negotiate in good faith and in a sustained manner, under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General, towards a comprehensive Cyprus settlement, were:

(1) The Republic of Cyprus shall be a bicomunal federal state with two constituent regions, one of which will be inhabited predominantly by Greek Cypriots, the other predominantly by Turkish

Cypriots. The independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus shall be assured, as shall its right to conduct a policy of nonalignment should it so choose. The incorporation of all, or part, of the Republic into any other state shall be expressly prohibited.

(2) A new constitutional structure for the Republic of Cyprus, incorporating an operative federal system of government, shall be negotiated on the basis of the provisions set forth herein. The negotiations shall be guided by the Makarios-Denktaş instructions of February 1977, shall draw upon pertinent elements of the Constitution of 1960, and shall bear in mind United Nations resolutions. Substantial powers and responsibilities will be reserved to the two constituent regions in such a manner as to protect the rights and to meet the concerns of members of both communities.

(3) Fundamental rights and liberties, to include freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and the right to property ownership, shall be embodied in the federal Constitution subject only to such modifications as are required to preserve the character of each region.

(4) The following powers and functions shall reside in the federal Government of Cyprus: Foreign Affairs, External Defense, Currency and Central Banking, Interregional and Foreign Commerce, Communications, Federal Finance, Customs, Immigration, and Civil Aviation. Powers and functions not explicitly granted to the federal government shall be reserved to the two constituent regions. Powers and functions initially exercised by the regions may be assumed by the federal government upon joint agreement of the two regions.

(5) The federal government shall be structured along the following lines:

(a) Legislative authority shall be vested in a bicameral legislature, the upper chamber to represent the two communities on a basis of equality and the lower chamber to be elected in proportion to population.

(b) In the event that a majority in the upper chamber fails to concur in a bill passed by the lower chamber, a subsequent affirmative two-thirds vote in the lower chamber shall be sufficient to enact, provided that at least three-eighths of the representatives from each community concur therein.

(c) There shall be a President and a Vice President, elected through democratic processes, one of whom shall be from one community and the other from the other community. In the event of the incapacity or temporary absence of the President, the Vice President shall act in his stead. The President and Vice President shall jointly appoint a Council of Ministers. Neither community shall have less than 30 percent of the ministerial portfolios. The President and the Vice President may jointly veto federal legislative acts, although their veto may be over-ridden by a two-thirds vote in each chamber.

(d) A Federal Supreme Court shall be established, to consist of one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot, and one non-Cypriot appointed jointly by the President and the Vice President. The Court shall have the function of interpreting the Constitution and shall act as the highest court of appeal where federal legislation is concerned.

(e) Provision shall be made for the fair participation of members of both communities in the federal civil services. Senior appointments shall be subject to approval, by the upper chamber of the legislature.

(6) The two regions shall establish regional governmental institutions for the purpose of carrying out the powers and functions reserved or assigned to them under the Constitution. The executive and legislature of each region shall be democratically elected. The parties to the intercommunal talks shall discuss ways of ensuring the necessary degree of congruity between the governmental institutions of the two regions.

(7) An Agency for Regional Cooperation and Coordination shall be established, jointly headed by a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot and staffed by an equal number of representatives of each constituent region. The Agency will foster practical cooperation between the two regions, especially in the economic and commercial field; will seek the maximum possible compatibility between the two regions; and will promote the unity of the nation.

(8) The specific territory under the administration of each region shall be negotiated on the basis of criteria such as economic viability and productivity, land ownership, security, population patterns, and historical factors. In this regard, it is understood that the Turkish Cypriot side will agree to significant geographical adjustments in favor of the Greek Cypriot side.

(9) The parties shall make provision, to the extent feasible and consistent with the bicomunal character of the Republic, for the return of displaced persons to their properties and for the settlement of claims that may be made by those who are unable or do not choose so to return.

(10) An integral part of a final settlement shall be the withdrawal of non-Cypriot armed forces (except for those specifically agreed to) from the territory of the Republic. Consideration may be given to a possible phased demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus in a manner that will best assure the security of the Republic and its citizens under a final settlement. It would be understood that demilitarization would not preclude lightly-armed regional police forces with the function of maintaining law and order within each region.

(11) There shall be established a Cyprus Reconciliation Fund, financed primarily by the federal government and administered jointly by the two regions, that will provide funds for development projects designed to assist in the process of readjustment subsequent to a settlement and to assist those sectors of the Republic that have the greatest economic and social need. Other governments and international organizations would be invited to contribute to the Fund.

(12) In order to promote an atmosphere of goodwill and to resolve pressing humanitarian problems, the Varosha area shall be resettled under UN auspices in accordance to provisions specified in a document attached to ABC Plan. Such resettlement shall be initiated in phase with the resumption of full intercommunal negotiations on a comprehensive agreement.

The attached to the Plan document with the title "The Varosha Area" under which the parties to the intercommunal talks should cooperate with the Secretary General of the United Nations and his representatives in arranging the modalities for an early resettlement of the Varosha area. The

guidelines that would obtain were:

(a) The area for resettlement shall encompass territory lying to the east of the village of Ayios Nikolaos and to the south of the old Nicosia-Famagusta road. In defining the precise area for resettlement, the concerns of the Turkish Cypriot party for the security of Old Famagusta and Famagusta Harbor shall be taken into account.

(b) The area for resettlement shall be administered under the supervision of the United Nations, and shall be considered as an extension of the present United Nations buffer zone. There shall be a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot liaison officer to the United Nations authorities for this purpose. Cypriot laws and regulations shall be in force in the area of resettlement.

(c) It is understood that as many former residents of the area of resettlement may return as choose. There shall be no fixed numerical limitation.

(d) Those who return to the area for resettlement shall not be subject to further involuntary displacement.

(Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, *Τα Σχέδια λύσης του Κυπριακού, 1948-1978*, Αθήνα 2009, σσ. 216-219; Συρίγος, Άγγελος, *Σχέδιο Ανάν: Οι κληρονομίες του παρελθόντος και οι προοπτικές του μέλλοντος*, Αθήνα 2005, σσ. 94-96; Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, «Το Αμερικανοβρετανοκαναδικό Σχέδιο για επίλυση του Κυπριακού, 1978», *Χρονικό*, τεύχος 104, Εφημερίδα Πολίτης, 21 Φεβρουαρίου 2010).

The Greek Cypriot side did not accept the Plan on the grounds that serious concessions on its side would have to take place from the first stages of the implementation phase while that was not the case with the Turkish actions. At the same time, the Greek Cypriot side claimed that the Plan had a lot of confederal provisions and at the same time stated that it wanted a Plan proposed by the UN Secretary General and not three Western countries. The Turkish Cypriot leader did not comment on the Plan. The ABC Plan even though did not achieve to solve the Cyprus Problem, it is of crucial importance since as the first detailed proposed Plan after the Turkish invasion of 1974 is used, until today, as the basis for any proposed solution for solving the Cyprus Problem (Συρίγος, Άγγελος, *Σχέδιο Ανάν: Οι κληρονομίες του παρελθόντος και οι προοπτικές του μέλλοντος*, Αθήνα 2005, σσ. 94-95).

The Second High Level Agreement

Few months after the failure of the American initiative, on 19 May 1979, in a meeting, under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General, between the leaders of the two communities, Spyros Kyprianou and Rauf Denktash, a **Second High Level Agreement** was reached. The text of the agreement which would be used as guideline for the solution of the Cyprus Problem was as follows:

1. The two sides agreed to resume the intercommunal talks on 15 June 1979.
2. The basis for the talks will be the Makarios - Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the UN relevant to the Cyprus question resolutions.
3. There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic.
4. The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.
5. Priority will be given to reaching agreement for the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem.
6. Both sides agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.
7. The demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating thereto will be discussed.
8. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.
9. The intercommunal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained matter, avoiding any delay.
10. The intercommunal talks will take place in Nicosia.

(<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/1ED21A110C7E672FC2256D6D0032A808?OpenDocument>)

The negotiations that resumed following the Second High Level Agreement, on 15 June 1979, collapsed immediately due to the Turkish stance (Ομιλία υπουργού Εξωτερικών Γεώργιου Ράλλη στη Γενική

Συνέλευση των Ηνωμένων Εθνών, 26 Σεπτεμβρίου 1979, *Αρχείο Καραμανλή*, τόμ. 10, σ. 223). As a result, the UN publicly recognized that the new deadlock was due to the positions presented by the Turkish Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash. With UN initiative, a new round of negotiations resumed in August 1980. According to the opening statement of the UN Representative, the Secretary-Generals' understanding of the common ground that was worked out in the course of consultations which took place over past several months, was that:

(a) Both parties have reaffirmed the validity of the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979,

(b) Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a bizonal solution of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem,

(c) Both parties have indicated that the matter of security can be raised and discussed in the intercommunal talks. It is understood that this matter will be discussed, having regard to certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as to the security of Cyprus as a whole

(d) Both parties have appealed to the Secretary-General for the continuation of the intercommunal talks.

(Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>)

At his opening statement, the UN Representative also stated that concerning the matters to be discussed in the negotiations, the Secretary-General understood, on the basis of the 19 May High level Agreement, that these would include: (a) Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices, in accordance with the provisions of Point 5 of the 19 May Agreement, (b) Initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the provisions of Point 6 of the Agreement, which states that special importance will be given to this matter, (c) Constitutional aspects, (d) Territorial aspects (Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>).

The first round of the talks started in Nicosia on September 1980. After the two sides expressed their ideas on the issues mentioned above, it was obvious once more, that there was no common ground for meaningful negotiations. The proposals put forward by the Turkish Cypriot side (on 5 August 1981) were outside the parameters of the High Level Agreements of both 1977 and 1979. More specifically the proposals of the Turkish Cypriot side were once again close to a confederal solution of two separate states, while on the territorial issue they proposed the return of 2.6% of the occupied territories under which it would be possible for 31,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their homes (Γιάννης Κ. Λάμπρου, *Ιστορία του Κυπριακού, Τα Χρόνια μετά την Ανεξαρτησία, 1960-2004*, Λευκωσία 2004, σσ. 685-686; Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, «Προσπάθειες διευθέτησης του κυπριακού στην δεκαετία του '80», στο *Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, 1980-1989, Η δεκαετία της ανασυγκρότησης*, τομ. 3, Φιλελεύθερος, Λευκωσία, Μάιος 2011, σσ. 75-83).

The “Cuellar Indicators”

With UN initiative, the negotiations continued, but it was obvious that there was no real progress since each side was insisting on its positions. In this regard, the UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar decided that, instead of letting the two sides put forward proposals and express their views in an unending discussion without positive outcome, he would take the initiative. On 8 August 1983, he put forward specific proposals on the **core issues** of the Cyprus problem: **Executive, Legislative** and **Territory**. The proposals were remain known as “**Cuellar Indicators**” and the purpose was for the discussions between the two sides to take place within the framework/limits of these Indicators. In this regard for each issue the Secretary General proposed two options, and asked the interested parties to inform him if they agreed to start negotiations within the limits defined by the Indicators.

On the Executive the Secretary General proposed EITHER the leader of the Greek Cypriots to be the President of the Federal Cyprus, the leader of the Turkish Cypriots to be the Vice President, together with a proportion of 60% for Greek Cypriots and 40% for Turkish Cypriots in the federal executive, OR the leaders of the two communities to be appointed head of State and Government respectively on a rotation basis together with a proportion of 70% for Greek Cypriots and 30% for Turkish Cypriots in the federal executive.

On the Legislative the Secretary General proposed EITHER a lower chamber with proportional representation and an upper chamber with equal representation, OR a lower chamber with 30% Turkish Cypriots and 70% Greek Cypriot representation and an upper chamber with equal representation.

On the issue of Territory the Secretary General proposed EITHER the territory under Greek Cypriot control to be 77% and 23% under Turkish Cypriot control, OR the territory under Greek Cypriot control to be 70% and 30% under Turkish Cypriot control.

(Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>; Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, «Προσπάθειες διευθέτησης του κυπριακού στην δεκαετία του '80», στο *Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, 1980-1989, Η δεκαετία της ανασυγκρότησης*, τομ. 3, Φιλελεύθερος, Λευκωσία, Μάιος 2011, σσ. 75-83).

The leader of the Greek Cypriot community Spyros Kyprianou without officially rejecting the UN Secretary General Indicators he put forward to the Secretary General certain preconditions in a way it was obvious that he did not agree with their content. The Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash rejected the proposal of the Secretary General.

Few days later, on 15 November 1983, Denktash announced the establishment of the so called “**turkish republic of northern cyprus**” in the area of the Republic of Cyprus under Turkish military control (Βενιζέλος, Κώστας, «Η ανακήρυξη του ψευδοκράτους, 15 Νοεμβρίου 1983», στο *Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, 1980-1989*, τομ. 3, Φιλελεύθερος, Λευκωσία, Μάιος 2011, σσ. 84-91). The same day, the so called “trnc” was recognised by Turkey which, until today, is the only country that

recognizes such a “state”. Three days after the illegal declaration of the so called “trnc” the United Nations Security Council adopted, on 18 November 1983, its **Resolution 541**, by 13 votes in favour, 1 against (from Pakistan) and 1 abstention (from Jordan). The Resolution, which has great importance until today, deplored the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus, considered such an act as legally invalid and called for its withdrawal. At the same time, with the said Resolution, the Security Council called upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus, 1960 – 2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia 2006, pp. 87-88).

On 11 May 1984, the United Nations Security Council, with 13 votes in favour, 1 against (from Pakistan) and 1 abstention (from the United States), adopted **Resolution 550** which until today is the most important UNSC Resolution on Cyprus. With this Resolution, the Security Council gravely concerned with the further secessionist acts in the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus (namely the purported “exchange of Ambassadors” between Turkey and the legally invalid “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” and the contemplated holding of a “constitutional referendum” and “elections”, as well as by other actions aimed at further consolidating the purported independent state and the division of Cyprus) and the Turkish threats for settlement of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants, reaffirmed the call upon all States not to recognise the purported state of the “turkish republic of northern cyprus” set up by secessionist acts and called upon them not to facilitate or in any way assist this the aforesaid secessionist entity. At the same time with the Resolution, the Security Council calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and considered attempts to settle any part of Varosha (the fenced area of Famagusta) by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible. Furthermore, it called for the transfer of this area to the administration of the United Nations. Moreover, the Security Council requested the Secretary General to undertake new efforts to attain an overall solution to the Cyprus problem in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions for such a settlement laid down in the pertinent United Nations resolutions (*United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus, 1960 – 2006*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia 2006, pp. 90-91).

Following the secessionist act by Turkey in the occupied areas of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot side proposed on 11 January 1984, the “**Framework for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem**”. The main points of the proposal were: on the territorial issue the region under Turkish Cypriot administration to be between 23% - 25%, on the executive the continuation of the 1960 Constitution (Greek Cypriot President and Turkish Cypriot Vice President, 7 Greek Cypriot ministers and 3 Turkish Cypriots) and on the legislature while the Greek Cypriot side was expressing its preference for one House it was ready to accept, as an alternative, the creation of two bodies, the Lower Chamber (representation based on population) and the Upper Chamber (representation would depend on the powers and functions of this body) (Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>).

The Turkish Cypriot side rejected the Framework proposed by Kyprianou and the UN Secretary General in an effort to achieve the resumption of the talks and avoid further deterioration of the situation, proposed in April 1984, a **5 points scenario**. The main points of the scenario were that (a) No further step to internationalize the Cyprus problem would be undertaken by the Greek Cypriot side, (b) there would be no follow-up to the illegal declaration of the so called “trnc” by the Turkish side, (c) the two sides would not proceed with measures that would lead to an increase to their military forces, (d) the Varosha area would be handed over to the UN within a period of 6-9 months, (e) The legal inhabitants of the said area, which would be part of the buffer zone, would return (Μιλτιάδης Χριστοδούλου, *Η Πορεία των Ελληνοτουρκικών Σχέσεων και η Κύπρος*, τομ. Β, Λευκωσία 1995, σσ. 570-571; Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>).

While the Greek Cypriot side accepted the proposals of the Secretary General, the Turkish Cypriot side, with the backing of Ankara, once more rejected it on the grounds that the UN Secretary General did not have the authority, under the relevant UN Resolutions, to put forward specific proposals regarding the solution of the Cyprus Problem. In his letter to the Secretary General, the Turkish Cypriot leader stated that “the exercise in which we are at present engaged is being conducted within the context of the mission of good offices entrusted to you by the Security Council on 12 March 1975...Such a mission of good offices clearly involves a process or consultations or soundings with both sides with a view to finding a mutually acceptable formula for the resumption of negotiations between the two sides on its existing, mutually agreed basis” (Report by Secretary General, S/16519, 1 May 1984).

Developments from the end of 1984 to August 1985

The UN Secretary General in a new effort for the resumption of the negotiations invited, on 10 September 1984, the leaders of the two communities in New York for “**proximity talks**”. Three rounds of talks took place in New York between September and December 1984. Despite that in the two first rounds no real progress was achieved, in the third round Denktash changed his attitude and expressed willingness to accept certain provisions that he rejected, even to discuss, in the past. In this regard, the Secretary General, encouraged by the developments, invited the two leaders in New York on a High Level Meeting between 17 and 20 January 1985. The meeting did not have concrete results since Kyprianou, who had the impression that the meeting in New York would be another round of talks and that he would have the opportunity to ask for clarifications in certain issues (like the guarantees and the withdrawal of foreign troops), refused to sign a document presented by the UN Secretary General. After the refusal of the Greek Cypriot leader, Denktash did not comment on the request of the Secretary General, and another initiative came to an end, with the Greek Cypriot side to be considered responsible for the deadlock (Κουφουδάκης, Βαγγέλης, «Σχέδιο Ντε Κουεγιαρ και Πολιτική της Τουρκίας», στο *Διαστάσεις των Ελληνοτουρκικών Σχέσεων: Αιγαίο – Κύπρος*, Αθήνα 1988; Evriviades, Marios, *The US and Cyprus: The Politics of Manipulation in the 1985 UN Cyprus High Meeting*, Athens 1992; Πολυβίου, Πολύβιος Γ., *Κυπριανού και Κυπριακό, Η Συνάντηση Κορυφής της Νέας Υόρκης το 1985*, Αθήνα 2010, σσ. 86-88; Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>; de Cuellar, Javier Perez, *Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary General's Memoir*, New York 1997).

In a new effort, the Secretary General proposed to the two sides on 12 April 1985 two documents with the titles “**Draft Agreement on Cyprus**” and “**Draft Statement by the Secretary General on the Agreement on Cyprus**”. The Draft Agreement was very close to what the Secretary General had proposed the two to leaders sign during the High Level Meeting on January 1985. More specifically, on the core issues, the Draft Agreement proposed: for the legislative two chambers (lower chamber 70 to 30 representation, and upper chamber 50 / 50), for the executive a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot President, 7 to 3 ratio for the ministers and for the territory 29% for the Turkish Cypriots and 71% for the Greek Cypriots. The Secretary General asked the two leaders to accept and sign the Agreement so it would be used as the basis for further negotiations ((Πολυβίου, Πολύβιος Γ., *Κυπριανού και Κυπριακό, Η Συνάντηση Κορυφής της Νέας Υόρκης το 1985*, Αθήνα 2010, σσ. 136-143; Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, «Προσπάθειες διευθέτησης του κυπριακού στην δεκαετία του '80», στο *Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, 1980-1989, Η δεκαετία της ανασυγκρότησης*, τομ. 3, Φιλελεύθερος, Λευκωσία, Μάιος 2011, σσ. 75-83; Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>). The Greek Cypriot leader, even though he had refused to sign similar


documents few months earlier, informed the Secretary General that he accepted the documents and he was ready to sign. The Turkish Cypriot leader, on August 1985, informed the Secretary General that he refused to sign the documents.

The Soviet Union proposals

On 21 January 1986, the Soviet Union announced for the first time certain proposals concerning the international aspects of the Cyprus Problem and more specifically the launching of an **international conference for Cyprus**. According to the relevant announcement from Moscow: “1. The proceedings of such a conference could result in signing a treaty or another document stipulating the following integrally interconnected components of the settlement: demilitarization of the island, including the withdrawal of all foreign troops, dismantling of all foreign military bases and installations; a system of effective international guarantees ensuring independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus; respect by all parties of its status of a non-aligned state, 2. The international guarantees of Cyprus independence should exclude the possibility of any future outside interference whatsoever into the affairs of the Republic. As guarantors might be named the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council or the Security Council as a whole, Greece and Turkey as well as some non-aligned countries. Measures towards implementing the guarantees shall be taken upon universal consent of all the guarantor-states. Cyprus should not be subject to use or threat of use of force, 3. The participants to the conference could include the Republic of Cyprus (with representation of both communities), Greece and Turkey, all member-states of the Security Council. It is also possible to engage other countries, particularly non-aligned, to participate in the conference” («Σοβιετικές Προτάσεις για λύση του Κυπριακού», *Ελευθεροτυπία* (εφημερίδα), Λευκωσία, 22 Ιανουαρίου 1986, σ. 1· «Προτάσεις της ΕΣΣΔ για το Κυπριακό», *Τα Νέα* (εφημερίδα), Αθήνα, 22 Ιανουαρίου 1986, σ. 2; *Cyprus: The 1986 Soviet Proposal*, Congressional Research Services, 1986). While the Greek Cypriot side approached favorably the Soviet proposal, especially due to its reference on the launching of an international conference which was a constant Greek Cypriot request, the Turkish side rejected it.

On 29 March 1986, the UN Secretary General in a new effort proposed to the leaders of the two communities a new “Draft Framework Agreement”. According to the new proposal of the Secretary General, the legislative would be composed by two chambers (lower chamber 70 to 30 representation, and upper chamber 50 to 50), for the executive a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot President, 7 to 3 ratio for the ministers and for the territory 29+% for the Turkish Cypriots and 71-% for the Greek Cypriots (Πολυβίου, Πολύβιος Γ., *Κυπριανού και Κυπριακό, Η Συνάντηση Κορυφής της Νέας Υόρκης το 1985*, Αθήνα 2010, σσ. 144-150· Άγγελος Μ. Συρίγος, *Σχέδιο Ανάν, Οι κληρονομίες του παρελθόντος και οι προοπτικές του μέλλοντος*, Αθήνα 2005, σσ. 97-100· Πέτρος Λιάκουρας, *Το Κυπριακό, Από τη Ζυρίχη στη Λουκέρνη, Σε Αναζήτηση Ομοσπονδιακής Επίλυσης*, Αθήνα 2007, σσ. 322-324; Mirbagheri Farid, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/int'l%20dip,%20'80-86.html>). The Greek Cypriot side informed the Secretary General that before expressing its views on the proposals included in the “Draft Framework Agreement”, it was necessary to have an agreement on basic issues of the Cyprus problem such as the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Cyprus, the settlers and the

guarantees. From his side, Denktash, in a letter to the Secretary General and after stating his positions on certain issues, accepted (under certain conditions) the new proposal of the Secretary General. On 10 June 1986, Kyprianou informed the Secretary General of the rejection of his proposal because of his refusal to discuss and agree first on important and core issues for the Greek Cypriot side like those mentioned above (Χριστοδουλίδης, Νίκος, «Προσπάθειες διευθέτησης του κυπριακού στην δεκαετία του '80», στο *Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, 1980-1989, Η δεκαετία της ανασυγκρότησης*, τομ. 3, Φιλελεύθερος, Λευκωσία, Μάιος 2011, σσ. 75-83).



President George Vasiliou

In 1988 **Spyros Kyprianou** lost the presidential elections, and **George Vasiliou** was elected President of the Republic of Cyprus. From the very beginning, the new Greek Cypriot leader expressed his willingness for the solution of the Cyprus Problem. Coming from the world of business and without any “connection or relation” with the political past of Cyprus, Vasiliou had the belief that there was no problem that could not be solved (*Προγραμματικές δηλώσεις του Προέδρου της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας Γεώργιου Βασιλείου στην Βουλή των Αντιπροσώπων, 28 Φεβρουαρίου 1988*). The UN Secretary General encouraged by the readiness of the new Greek Cypriot leader for a speedy solution which was proved not only by his attitude in the meetings with the Turkish Cypriot leader, but also by his comprehensive proposals to the UN under the title **“For the Establishment of a Federal Republic and for the Solution of the Cyprus Problem”** (proposed on 30 January 1989, [http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/1CF2A298CB8C65CEC2256D6D00344433/\\$file/Proposals%201989.pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/1CF2A298CB8C65CEC2256D6D00344433/$file/Proposals%201989.pdf)), proposed to Vasiliou and Denktash, in July 1989, a “Set of Ideas”. The plan of the Secretary General was for his Ideas to be used as a food for thought during direct negotiations between the two sides. Concerning the issues of the executive and legislature, the “Set of Ideas” were very close to previous UN proposals. On the sensitive issue of the three freedoms (the freedom of movement and of settlement and the right of property) in the “Set of Ideas” was stated that they would be recognised in the constitution. More specifically (a) the right of movement will be exercised without any restrictions as soon as the federal republic is established, and (b) the right of property and settlement will be implemented taking into account the ceilings to be agreed upon concerning the number of persons from one community who may reside in the area administered by the other and the amount of property which persons of one community may own in the federated state administered by other (Μιλτιάδης Χριστοδούλου, *Η Πορεία των Ελληνοτουρκικών Σχέσεων και η Κύπρος*, Τόμος Β', Λευκωσία 1995, σσ. 651-656). The Greek Cypriot leader George Vasiliou, even though he disagreed with certain provisions of the “Set of Ideas” accepted to discuss them, as a food for thought. On the other side, the Turkish Cypriot leader, following his usual negative approach rejected the Ideas and once more questioned the authority of the Secretary General to put forward specific proposals for the Cyprus Problem. At the same time, Denktash repeated his well known position for a two states solution.

The Secretary General continued his efforts to find a common ground for the resumption of meaningful talks and he invited in New York (during the period 26 February to 2 March 1990) the leaders of the two communities. His main purpose was for the two leaders to agree on a draft outline

of an overall agreement for Cyprus. Denktash refused to engage in serious negotiations, while at the same time he put forward new demands that if to be accepted would change the whole nature of the negotiations. In this regard the effort collapsed, and the Secretary General in his report to the Security Council regarding his good office mission in Cyprus, dated 8 March 1990 (S/21183), stated, among other, that “in the course of the discussion, Mr Denktash had stated that the term ‘communities’ be used in a manner that was synonymous with the term ‘peoples’, each having a separate right to ‘self determination’. I stated that, in the context of the intercommunal talks, the introduction of terminology that was different from that used by the Security Council had thus posed more than a semantic problem and that, unless acceptable to both sides, any change in terminology could alter the conceptual framework to which all had thus far adhered. In the circumstances, I came to the conclusion, regrettably, that we faced an impasse of a substantive kind, which raised questions regarding the essence of the mandate of good offices given to me by the Security Council and therefore, regarding the basis of the talks” (*Report of the Secretary General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus*, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S21183.pdf>). The insistence of Denktash on the inclusion of the term “peoples” was a clear indication of his attitude towards the solution of the Cyprus Problem which was nothing else than a two states solution.

The deadlock continued and on 4 July 1990 the Republic of Cyprus applied for full membership in the then **European Community** (Κρανιδιώτης, Γιάννος (επιμ.), *Οι σχέσεις Κύπρου-Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας*, Αθήνα, Ι. Σιδέρης, 1993; Κρανιδιώτης, Γιάννος, *Προτάσεις για μια Ευρωπαϊκή Πολιτική*, Αθήνα-Κομοτηνή 1993; Κρανιδιώτης, Γιάννος Ν., Συρίχας, Γιώργος Λ. και Χαραλαμπίδης, Θεόδουλος Γ., *Κύπρος-Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα, Εξέλιξη και Προοπτική των Σχέσεων της Κύπρου με την Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα*, Λευκωσία 1994; Tsardanides, Charalambos, *The Politics of the EC – Cyprus Association Agreement: 1972 – 1992*, Nicosia 1988; Kranidiotis, Yiannos, “Cyprus and the European Community”, *Επετηρίς του Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, XX, Λευκωσία 1994, σσ. 649-686). Its application caused the reaction, both of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey. Denktash and Ankara stated that the Turkish Cypriot side would not accept to return to the negotiating table for direct talks as long as the Greek Cypriots insists on their application for membership in the the European Community.

A number of separate meetings between Representatives of the UN Secretary General and the leaders of the two communities which took place during the period 1990 to 1992 did not lead to the resumption of meaningful negotiations. The new UN Secretary General **Butros Butros Ghali** took an initiative for the resumption of talks between the two sides. In this regard, he invited the leaders of the two communities in New York during June to August 1992 to negotiate a framework of an agreement on the basis of ideas, including specific suggestions on territorial adjustments and the displaced persons. The so called “**Ghali Ideas**” (with the title “**Set of Ideas for an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus**”) was a framework agreement on Cyprus. The purpose was for the “Set of Ideas”, after being completed by the two leaders at a high level meeting, to be submitted in separate referendums in the two communities.

The set of ideas – The “Ghali Ideas”

According to the Set of Ideas which comprised more than 100 paragraphs (the most detailed and important document until that day – a significant number of its provisions were included in 2004 in the Annan Plan) Cyprus was the common home of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and their relationship is not one of majority and minority but one of two communities in the federal republic of Cyprus. Furthermore, the Plan ensured that the Cyprus settlement was based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities. It is important to mention that according to the Ideas political equality did not mean equal numerical participation in all branches and administration of the federal government. The **political equality** would be reflected in the fact that

(a) the approval and amendment of the federal constitution would require the approval of both communities,

(b) in the effective participation of both communities in all organs and decisions of the federal government,

(c) in safeguards to ensure that the federal government would not be empowered to adopt any measures against the interests of one community, and

(d) in the equality and identical powers and functions of the two federated states.

([http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/\\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20\(1992\).pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf); Συρίγος, Άγγελος, *Σχέδιο Ανάν: Οι κληρονομίες του παρελθόντος και οι προοπτικές του μέλλοντος*, Αθήνα 2005, σσ. 103-107)

The major provisions of the Plan were that, Cyprus would be a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation that would be established by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. All powers not vested by them in the federal government would rest with the two federated states. The federal republic would be secular and religious functionaries would be prohibited from holding elected or appointed political office in the federal government or in the federated states. The federal republic would maintain special ties of friendship with Greece and Turkey and would accord most favoured nation treatment to Greece and Turkey in connection with all agreements whatever their nature. The official languages of the federal republic would be Greek and Turkish, while the English language might also be used.

The federal Government would have the following powers and functions: (a) Foreign affairs, (b) Central bank functions, including the issuance of currency, (c) Customs and the coordination of international trade, (d) Airports and ports as concerns international matters, (e) Federal budget and federal taxation, (f) Immigration and citizenship, (g) Defense (to be discussed also in connection with the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance), (h) Federal judiciary and federal police; (i) Federal postal and telecommunications services, (j) Patents and trademarks, (k) Appointment of federal officials and civil servants (on a 70:30 Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot ratio), (l) Standard setting for public health, environment, use and preservation of natural resources, and weights and measures, (m) Coordination of tourism and industrial activities ([http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/\\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20\(1992\).pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf)).

The legislature would be composed of a lower house and an upper house. The presidents of the lower house and of the upper house could not come from the same community, while the president and vice-president of each house would not come from the same community. The lower house would be bi-communal with a 70:30 Greek Cypriot / Turkish Cypriot ratio and the upper house would have a 50:50 ratio representing the two federated states. All laws should be adopted by majority in each house. A majority of the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot representatives in the lower house might decide, on matters related to foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship, that the adoption of a law in the lower house would require separate majorities of the representatives of both communities. Separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot majorities would be required to constitute a quorum in each house. If a quorum was not attained in either house on two consecutive meetings because of the absence of a majority of one or both communities, the president of the relevant house would call a meeting in no less than five days and no more than ten days. At that meeting, a majority of the upper house would constitute a quorum. In the lower house, 30% of the total membership would constitute a quorum

([http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/\\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20\(1992\).pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf)).

The federal executive would consist of a president, a vice-president, and a council of ministers. The president and the vice president would symbolize the unity of the country and the political equality of the two communities. In the Plan was mentioned that on the question of the election of the president and the vice-president, the two sides have expressed different positions: The Greek Cypriots in favour of a system under which the president would be elected by popular universal suffrage, and the Turkish Cypriots in favour of a system under which the president would be rotated between the two communities. According to the Ideas, the issue of the election of the president and vice president, together with other issues that the Ghali Ideas wouldn't specifically provide a solution, would be agreed by the leaders of the two communities at a high level meeting.

At the same time, according to the Ideas, in order to facilitate the effective launching of the federal government and for the initial eight years, the president and vice-president would also be the heads of their respective federated states. There would be a council of ministers composed of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ministers on a 7:3 ratio. The president and vice-president would designate the ministers from their respective communities. One of the following three ministries, that is foreign

affairs, finance, or defence, would be allocated to a Turkish Cypriot minister, while the president and the foreign minister would not come from the same community.

Decisions of the council of ministers would be taken by majority vote. However, decisions concerning foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship would require the concurrence of both the president and the vice-president. At the same time, the president and the vice-president would, separately or conjointly, had the right to veto any law or decision of the legislature concerning foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship and to return any law or decision of the legislature or any decision of the council of ministers for reconsideration.

Concerning the federal judiciary would consist of a supreme court composed of an equal number of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges appointed jointly by the president and vice president with the consent of the upper house. The presidency of the supreme court would rotate between the senior Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members of the supreme court. At the same time, each federated state would have its own judiciary to deal with matters not attributed to the federal judiciary by the federal constitution ([http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/\\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20\(1992\).pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf)).

Concerning the three basic freedoms (the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right to property) the Set of Ideas provided that they would be safeguarded in the federal constitution. The freedom of movement would be exercised without any restrictions as soon as the federal republic was established, subject only to non-discriminatory normal police functions. The freedom of settlement and the right to property would be implemented after the resettlement process arising from the territorial adjustments has been completed

([http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/\\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20\(1992\).pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf)).

The 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance would continue to be in force. The Treaty of Guarantee would (a) ensure the independence and territorial integrity of the federal republic and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession, (b) ensure the security of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot federated states, and (c) ensure against the unilateral change of the new constitutional order of the federal republic by either community.

The Treaty of Alliance would provide for the stationing in Cyprus of Greek and Turkish contingents of equal size and equipment not exceeding a number of persons that would be agreed by the two communities. The Greek contingent would be stationed in the federated state administered by the Greek Cypriot community and could not enter the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community, while the Turkish contingent would be stationed in the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community and could not enter the federated state administered by the Greek Cypriot community. Furthermore, the federal republic would maintain a federal force consisting of a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot unit of equal size and equipment not exceeding the size of the Greek and Turkish contingents, under the joint overall command of the president and the vice president (<http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF>

1/\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf).

Concerning the crucial issue of the territorial adjustments in the Ghali Ideas was attached a map setting out the territories of the two federated states. Persons affected by the territorial adjustments would have the option of remaining in the area concerned or relocating to the federated state administered by their own community. The property claims of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot displaced persons were recognized and would be dealt with fairly on the basis of a time-frame and practical regulations based on the 1977 High Level Agreement, on the need to ensure social peace and harmony. The first priority would be given to the satisfactory relocation of and support for Turkish Cypriots living in the area that would come under Greek Cypriot administration and to displaced persons returning to that area. Turkish Cypriots who in 1974 resided in the area that would come under Greek Cypriot administration would have the option to remain in their property or to request to receive a comparable residence in the area that would come under Turkish Cypriot administration. Turkish Cypriot displaced persons residing at that time in the area that would come under Greek Cypriot administration, would have the option to receive comparable residence in that area, to return to their former residence, or to receive a comparable residence in the area that would come under Turkish Cypriot administration ([http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/\\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20\(1992\).pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf)).

The ownership of the property of displaced persons, in respect of which those persons seek compensation, would be transferred to the ownership of the community in which the property was located. To this end, all titles of properties would be exchanged on a global communal basis between the two agencies at the 1974 value plus inflation. Displaced persons would be compensated by the agency of their community from funds obtained from the sale of the properties transferred to the agency, or through the exchange of property. The shortfall in funds necessary for compensation would be covered by the federal Government from a compensation fund obtained from various possible sources such as windfall taxes on the increased value of transferred properties following the overall agreement, and savings from defense spending.

In the Plan were also included a number of transitional arrangements that would be implemented in an 18-month period and it would be carried out in order to facilitate the implementation of the overall framework agreement. Furthermore in the Plan was attached an Appendix in which was included the programme of action to promote goodwill and close relations between the two communities.

Negotiations, based on the above mentioned proposals of the Secretary General took place during October and November 1992. According to the relevant report of the Secretary General to the Security Council, "In general terms, the Turkish Cypriot side affirmed that it was in 'basic agreement with 91 out of the 100 paragraphs' of the set of ideas, ... The Greek Cypriot side stated that it accepted the set of ideas and the map as a basis for reaching an overall framework agreement, subject to 'any improvements for the benefit of both communities'" (**Report of the Secretary General of 19 November 1992 on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, S/24830; Report of the Secretary-General provided pursuant to Commission on Human Rights decision 1992/106, 3 February 1993**, [http://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/\(Symbol\)/E.CN.4.1993.36.En?Opendocument](http://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.1993.36.En?Opendocument)). Because of the upcoming presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus, scheduled for February 2003, the leaders of the two communities and the Secretary General agreed to resume talks on March 2003.

The UN Secretary General proposal for confidence building measures

In the presidential elections, Vasiliou lost and **Glafkos Clerides** elected as new President of the Republic of Cyprus. Glerides met with Denktash in the presence of the Secretary General on 30 March 1993, and the two leaders agreed for the resumption of the talks in New York in May. In the meeting of the 24th May 1993, the Secretary General proposed to the two leaders a number of **Confidence Building Measures** (CBM) that would facilitate the effort towards finding a solution. The CBM were: (a) placing an important area of Varosha under the administration of the United Nations and its becoming a special area for bicomunal contact and commerce upon equally to both sides, (b) the re-opening, also under United Nations administration, of Nicosia International Airport for passenger and cargo traffic from and to both sides, and (c) number of measures to promote the bicomunal meetings in the island (such as meeting of political party leaders, expert cooperation in areas such as health and the environment, joint cultural and sports events) (<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S26026.pdf>).



President Glafkos Clerides

The Turkish Cypriots, in their first reactions, claimed that they did not fully accept the measures proposed by the Secretary General and they asked, among other, for the lifting of any restrictions on ports and airports in the occupied areas and the exclusion of certain area of Varosha from the area that would be returned under UN administration. At the same time the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash refused to give a concrete reply to the Secretary General on his proposal, stating that he wanted to return to Cyprus for consultations with his so called “government”. In this regard the Secretary General in his report to the Security Council on 1 July 1993 (S/26026) expressed his disappointment with the stance of the Turkish Cypriot leader ([http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S26026.pdf)

[S26026.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S26026.pdf)). The Greek Cypriot side accepted the confidence building measures proposed by the Secretary General, provided that no provisions were added that would have the effect, directly or indirectly, of recognizing the so called “turkish republic of northern cyprus”. While awaiting the final decision of the Turkish Cypriot leader, Clerides sent, on 21 December 1993, a letter to the Secretary

General proposing the disbandment of the National Guard and the return of all its arms and military equipment to the custody of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force. Clerides proposal was under the condition that together with the said measures, the Turkish forces would withdraw from Cyprus ([http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/D2DAA8FC0CC66A22C22571C7001E992F/\\$file/Report%20_7%20June%201994_.pdf?OpenElement](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/D2DAA8FC0CC66A22C22571C7001E992F/$file/Report%20_7%20June%201994_.pdf?OpenElement)).

In January 1994, Denktash accepted the CBM, in principle and under certain conditions and negotiations resumed in order to work out modalities for their implementation. However in the discussions that took place, the Turkish Cypriot side did not cooperate towards achieving this aim, and as a result the Secretary General on his report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus dated 30 May 1994 (S/1994/629) stated that “For the present, the Security Council finds itself faced with an already familiar scenario: the absence of an agreement due essentially to a lack of political will on the Turkish Cypriot side” (*Report of the Secretary General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, S/1994/629*). A new effort by the Secretary General, took place during October 1994, resulted in the same outcome for the same reasons as before: the Turkish Cypriot intransigence.

In the meantime, the prospect of Cyprus joining the European Community was now being approached as an opportunity for solving the Cyprus Problem. The US and the UK took the initiative for promoting the resumption of talks, under the auspices of the UN. At the same time the Anglo-American initiative was concentrated on Turkey, as a way to bypass the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. The Greek Cypriot side welcomed the initiative from Washington and London, stating at the same time that the UN and its relevant resolutions and decisions on Cyprus should not be bypassed. Their efforts did not bring serious progress towards the solution of the Problem.

On 1997, the new UN Secretary General **Kofi Annan** invited the leaders of the two communities in direct talks in **Troutbeck** (a New York suburb). During the talks (9-13 July 1997), the Secretary General presented to the two sides a document which was very close to the Ghali Ideas presented in the two sides in 1992. The talks resumed in **Montreux** (in Switzerland) on 11 August 1997, but collapsed few days later because of the positions put forward by the Turkish Cypriot leader. Denktash without commenting on the substance of the proposals put forward by the Secretary General demanded that the Republic of Cyprus withdrew its application for membership in the European Union. From its side, the Greek Cypriots accepted to start negotiations on the basis of the UN proposals.

On 31 August 1998 and contrary to all relevant UN resolutions concerning the solution of the Cyprus Problem, the Turkish Cypriot leader proposed the establishment of a Cyprus Confederation. As it was expected all parties involved in the effort to find a solution to the Cyprus Problem (except Turkey) rejected the Turkish Cypriot proposal. Once more the efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem reached a deadlock.

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